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The decline of youth political participation in established democracies has long been 
researched by scholars and it is often viewed as signalling a crisis of democracy. However, 
research from the UK and other democracies suggests young people still engage in other non-
mainstream political activities closer to their everyday lives. While scholarship from semi-
democratic regions has traditionally neglected this line of enquiry, limiting itself to electoral 
participation, by applying these theoretical insights this thesis explores the diverging patterns 
of youth political participation in Malaysia and argues that young people are not apathetic 
towards politics but rather that they tend to practice low-risk, more diffused forms of 
everyday engagement like online activism, political discussion, etc. The research thus also 
sheds light on whether patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia are linked to the 
type of political system and semi-democratic setting or whether they are similar to those for 
political participation in established democracies. To carry out this investigation, the thesis 
applies a mixed-methods approach encompassing the quantitative analysis of existing survey 
data from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and Asian Barometer as well as the qualitative 
analysis of interviews with academics, political leaders, youth activists and youth non-
participants. Evidence from the survey data analysis shows that young Malaysians participate 
in both conventional and unconventional forms of participation less than their older 
counterparts. The findings from the qualitative interviews complement these insights by 
indicating how young people in Malaysia explain and make sense of their own participation 
in politics, mainly in the form of low-risk channels such as online activism, popular cultural 
representations, and political discussion more generally. The study thus concludes that while 
the engagement of young people in politics could contribute to reinforcing the process of 














1.1 The puzzle of youth political participation 
 
Active citizen participation in decision-making is vital for a strong and vibrant democracy. 
The primary mechanism that facilitates the effective functioning of democracy is electoral 
participation. However, there is great concern among scholars in established democracies 
that young people are turning away from participating in the political process, particularly 
‘conventional’ political participation such as voting and party membership (Putnam, 2000; 
Dalton, 2007; Norris, 2002; Sloam, 2007; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005). We have 
witnessed the breakdown of the democratic representative mechanism since increasing 
numbers of citizens, particularly the younger generation, reject mainstream politics for 
example, by not voting or by disengaging from political and civic activities. This tends to 
be seen as signalling a democratic malaise. And it is particularly concerning as a 
worldwide trend, since the younger generation constitutes one of the world’s largest 
population groups.1  
 
The apparent disconnect between young people and the institutional process, 
particularly elections, has led observers to argue that Western democracy is undergoing a 
‘crisis of legitimacy’ (Habermas, 1973), a ‘crisis of liberal democracy’ (Dalton, 2008) or 
experiencing a dramatic ‘democratic deficit’ (Norris, 2001). Some scholars are particularly 
concerned about what will happen in the future when the current group of young people 
grows up and replaces the more active older generations in the population (Franklin, 2004; 
Grasso, 2016). Fears of youth disengagement are clearly linked to the theory of generation 
effect—that the political attitudes or habits of a generation are formed as a result of the 
shared social and historical experiences at the time of their coming of age. In this respect, 
                                                          
1Statistically, the total number of youngsters (under the age of 24) is estimated around 1.8 billion (25 per 
cent) out of the 7 billion world’s total population in the year 2013. Many of them are concentrated in the less 
developed countries, those in Asia, Middle East and Africa, where they make up a majority of the population 





if today’s younger generations or cohorts have been socialised in a depoliticised period 
(Hay 2007), they will exhibit lower levels of political participation throughout their lives, 
bringing down aggregate participation levels in the population as they come of age and 
replace older, more participatory generations as they die out. However, others argue that 
the low level of youth engagement in politics, mainly in the form of lower voter turnout, 
does not mean that this cohort is dissatisfied with democracy and the political system, but 
rather shows that young people feel complacent about the existing status quo (Miroff et al., 
2009). Young people only participate in politics if they want to change the government, 
especially when they feel unhappy about economic inequality and political instability—
but, their absence of participation in fact implies consent for the current system. However, 
other scholars have countered that either way, low or very low levels of political 
participation in fact undermine the government’s claim to legitimacy since a democratic 
mandate rests on popular support from elections. 
 
  Moreover, another argument that has emerged in response to growing fears of 
youth disengagement turns on the contention that this group’s lower levels of institutional 
engagement has been overblown, since young people are simply participating in different 
forms of political activity compared to the past (Zukin et al., 2006). The advancement of 
technology, for example, has dramatically changed how young people engage in politics, 
leading many scholars to believe that the waning of conventional forms of political 
participation is complemented by an expansion of political repertoires—the rise of protest 
activism, social movement, and single-issue pressure groups (Norris, 2007; Putnam, 2000; 
Zukin et al., 2006; Dalton, 2007; Henn et al., 2002; Sloam, 2007). Recent political 
phenomena such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements have 
demonstrated the power of young people in bringing about democratisation and social 
change. The revolutionary uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have been depicted as a 
tremendous victory for young people in overthrowing autocratic regimes and bringing a 
new wave of democratisation to the Arab world.2 Inspired by the Arab Spring, Occupy 
                                                          
2The political crisis in Tunisia or so called ‘Jasmine Revolution’ occured on 17 December 2010, when a 
young unemployed man, name Bouazizi, immolated himself as a sign of protest for the government’s failure 
to provide jobs, eradicate poverty and improve living standards. This incident angered Tunisians as they also 
suffered from economic recession, rampant corruption, and nepotism under Ben Ali’s regime. As a result, a 
series of massive protests took place around Tunisia. In response to this, the Tunisian government closed all 
educational institutions and schools to restrict young people from joining the street protests. Although the 
government promised to increase employment and allow the freedom of press and media, Tunisians refused 
to disperse and the popular rally continued, forcing the government to declare a state of emergency in 





Wall Street was a manifestation of collective awakening, largely amongst youth, and 
marked a major protest event in U.S history that deserved worldwide attention. Many 
scholars have noted how young people today are more attracted to these kinds of social 
movements because they focus on specific issues which they find relevant. However, 
Grasso (2016:1) argues that a rise in unconventional engagement such as protests and new 
social movements does not in and of itself solve the problem of a ‘hollowed out 
democracy’ (Mair, 2006) and cannot replace a functioning representative democratic 
system. Moreover, Grasso’s analysis shows that unconventional participation in Western 
European democracies will also begin to decline in the future as more politically passive 
generations coming of age in the 1980s and 1990s will come to increasingly replace the 
politically active 1960s-1970s baby-boomers in the population as they age and die out 
(Grasso, 2011, 2014).  
 
The preceding paragraphs have briefly summarised the key themes of research on 
youth political participation and disengagement in Western democracies. However, how 
does youth participation in semi-democratic states in the Southeast Asian region compare 
to the discussion above? What are the key findings on current patterns of youth political 
participation in the Southeast Asia region? Are young people there also disengaged from 
politics or have they simply moved to different forms of political participation? Falling 
political participation is not just a Western phenomenon. Some argue that young people in 
the Southeast Asian region also appear to be apathetic towards politics, less likely to vote 
and to join a political party (Chang, 2012). This could also be evidenced when comparing 
voting levels between young and older voters at the national level in the four main 
countries in Southeast Asia, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, 
based on Wave 6 (2010-2013) of the World Values Survey (See Figure 1.1).  
                                                                                                                                                                                
people’s revolution in Tunisia inspired Egyptians to organise anti-government protests which resulted in the 
end of 30 years’ dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. Egyptians protests began peacefully on January 25, 2011 in 
Tahrir Square, Cairo, and were also attended by the opposition parties, civil society and anti-Mubarak 
groups. However, they were blocked from entering the city by the police, causing large-scale battles which 
then spread to several other cities. Among the factors that contributed to the uprising are political issues (such 
as limited freedom of speech and corruption) and economic-driven factors (increased unemployment rate, 
inflation, and low minimum wages). The regime also cut-off the networks and telecommunication systems in 
Egypt so the people could no longer communicate and disseminate protest ideas to one another. Mubarak 
also refused to step down even when the popular upsrising had mounted in Egypt. Due to the international 
pressure, Hosni Mubarak finally resigned on February 11, 2011, after 18 days of battle between the people 
and his regime, causing a total of 365 deaths and thousands of injuries. See the articles by Elfatih (2015) and 








Source: World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Figure 1.1 Percentage of voting in the national election: comparison of age groups in four 




Source: World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Figure 1.2 Percentage of active membership in political parties: comparison of age groups 
in four countries in Southeast Asia4 
                                                          
3The total sample size for this graph is N=5,024.  To be specific, the sample for Malaysia is N=1170 (Age 
21-40=523/Age 41-70=647), the Philippines N=1075 (Age 21-40=521/Age 41-70=554), Singapore N=1653 
(Age 21-40=806/Age 41-70=847), and Thailand N=1126 (Age 21-40=379/Age 41-70=747).  
 
4The total sample size for this graph is N=5,058.  To be specific, the sample for Malaysia is N=1170 (Age 
21-40 N=523/Age 41-70 N=647), the Philippines N=1080 (Age 21-40 N=522/Age 41-70 N=558), Singapore 



















































































The findings reflect claims in the literature that young people in these Southeast Asia 
countries are less likely to vote and generally also less likely than their respective elders to 
be members of a political party (though here proportions are smaller so sometimes the 
differences are negligible).5 As we can see from Figure 1.1, Malaysia has the lowest 
absolute levels of participation in the region, with the differences between youth and older 
people’s participation even more marked than Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. 
Similarly, the membership of political parties amongst young Malaysians is at the lowest 
level compared to the older counterparts and other youth in ASEAN countries, with 
exception of Singapore and Thailand (see Figure 1.2). Why is youth participation so low in 
Malaysia? What makes many young Malaysians disengaged from formal politics?   
 
1.2 Youth political participation in Malaysia   
 
In Malaysia, as defined by the National Youth Policy 1997, ‘youth’ refers to those aged 
between 15 and 40 years old, constituting approximately 43 percent of the 28.3 million 
total of Malaysia’s population (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2010). Ethnicity is very 
important for Malaysian politics—many political parties are ethnically-based and turnout 
results sharply delineate Malaysian politics along racial lines. This is because the country’s 
population consists of three different main ethnic groups, namely the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians. However, the 1969 ethnic riot marked a turning point that changed the political 
landscape of Malaysia from democratic to ‘semi democratic’ (Crouch, 1996), 
‘authoritarian democracy’ (Case, 2002), ‘soft authoritarianism’ (Means, 1996) and ‘quasi-
democracy’ (Zakaria Ahmad, 1989). Although elections are held regularly every five years 
with highly competitive political parties, but citizens have very limited political rights and 
freedoms, particularly after the ethnic riots of 1969. The government has used draconian 
laws such as the Sedition Act 1948, the Internal Security Act 1960 (replaced by Security 
Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012) and the Universities Colleges Act 1971 to stifle 
free speech and dissents. Through these laws, students are no longer allowed to be 
members of, or show a support for, any political party or become involved in many off-
campus activities. It is not a surprise, then, that Malaysian youth are apathetic with respect 
to mainstream politics.  
                                                          
5The definition of ‘youth’ is varied across countries and is treated differently by political scientists. Although 
youth in Malaysia is defined as those between 15 to 40 years old based on the definition stated in the 1997 
National Youth Policy in Malaysia, for the purpose of this thesis, I tend to focus on the age group between 21 





The nature of youth political engagement in Malaysia has changed dramatically 
over the last decade. This change was apparent during the ‘reformation’ era, starting in 
1999, that witnessed the remarkable emergence of young people in Malaysian politics. The 
participation of young voters exploded in this period and began with the dismissal of a 
former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim from the government in 1998. He 
organized the Reformasi movement which was strongly supported by young people and 
particularly university students.6 Although some argue that the Reformasi movement failed 
to create structural changes in politics (Nair, 2007), the emergence of this movement 
developed support for democracy among large numbers of young people in Malaysia. 
Young Malaysians’ political awareness increased as well as their calls for political change, 
particularly with regards to respecting the civil rights of citizens and the eradication of 
money politics and corruption among politicians. In support for political reform and 
disappointment over the country’s financial crisis, many young people went to the polls in 
the 1999 General Election as the percentage of registered young voters increased from 80.9 
percent in 1980, to 89.4 percent in 1998 (Election Commission Malaysia, 2002). In 
addition, with the help of technological advancement such as social media and mobile 
phones, the youth now has another channel to access political news and express their 
concerns on public issues faster and more conveniently than before (De Vreese, 2007). 
Significantly, 60 percent (15 million) out of 28 million of the total population in Malaysia 
accessed the internet to read political information in 2008 (Ramanathan, 2008), and there 
are over 500,000 active bloggers with 10,000 websites making Malaysia one of the largest 
online communities in the world after Indonesia and the European Union (Kaufman, 2008). 
 
                                                          
6The wide-ranging support that Anwar received from the ordinary masses led him to launch a Reformasi 
agenda in the Permatang Pauh declaration on 12 September 1998 to surge anti-Mahathir sentiments. This 
movement echoed Indonesia’s anti-Suharto movement and called for the elimination of the practice of 
“kolusi, korupsi and nepotisme” (collusion, corruption, and nepotism). The Reformasi movement was staged 
in two different phases: The Reformasi through random street demonstrations; and the Reformasi through 
social media. This made it easier for Anwar to mobilise support and formulate an effective strategy against 
the government. During the first phase, Anwar began to garner mass supports for the Reformasi movement 
from the opposition parties, NGOs, and the public, including young people and university students. Those 
who were sympathetic with Anwar held a series of mass rally protests over his dismissal and called for the 
prime minister’s resignation. Secondly, pro-Anwar and Reformasi websites such as Anwar Online, Reformasi 
Diary and FreeMalaysia grew tremendously. These websites depicted the savage cruelty of the government, 
updated news on Reformasi events and Anwar, political commentaries, satires, and even made-up rumours. 
These websites gained popularity among the public who lost trust in the government media. Whilst this 
movement failed to remove Mahathir from power, the Reformasi seriously tarnished Mahathir’s image and 







This new political landscape also gave rise to protest activism and social 
movements when a series of large-scale protests were launched, known as BERSIH or the 
‘Yellow’ movement, successfully mobilizing young people to play a role as a catalyst for 
the democratisation of Malaysia. The idea of organising the BERSIH movement was 
developed by the opposition parties after they were defeated in the 2004 General Election, 
and was supported by a coalition of civil society groups. They formed a committee called 
the Joint Action Committee for Electoral Reform (JACER), with the objective to reform 
the electoral system to ensure clean, free, and fair elections. At the early stage of 
BERSIH’s formation, it was affiliated with political parties. Later there was an initiative to 
re-launch BERSIH as a non-partisan social movement (Khoo, 2014). BERSIH held its first 
rally in 2007, and this was followed by another four street protests on 2011 (BERSIH 2.0), 
2012 (BERSIH 3.0), 2015 (BERSIH 4.0), and 2016 (BERSIH 5.0). Support for the 
BERSIH movement grew rapidly with thousands of young people from different ethnic 
groups joining the demonstrations. Furthermore, the BERSIH movement is often credited 
with the political changes made during the 2008 and 2013 general elections which resulted 
in the ruling coalition, the National Front (BN), losing its two-thirds majority in 
Parliament.  
 
As voter turnout rate rose remarkably, from 76 percent to 85 percent in the 2013 
general election to be the highest ever recorded in the general elections, many scholars in 
Malaysia agreed that at least some young Malaysians were now becoming actively 
engaged in the political arena, including in voting, and in fact some of them were elected 
as political representatives (Noorsulastryyurni, 2014; Norshuhada et al., 2016; Samsudin et 
al., 2012). However, the real issue is the alarming proportion of unregistered voters. 
According to the statistics of the Election Commission, approximately 70 percent of 4.2 
million unregistered voters are between the ages of 21 to 40, and of that number, three 
million are Malay youth who were eligible to vote in the next election but were not 
interested in voting (Pandian, 2014b). Another issue is the shrinking membership of 
political parties and other major political organisations among Malaysian youngsters. The 
rigid structures and culture of established political parties in Malaysia discourage younger 
people from participating since it typically takes a long time for aspiring younger people to 
become politicians and often the leadership positions are given to older members (Zhen Yi, 
2015). Indeed, out of 13.8 million youth in Malaysia, only eight percent or 984,850 of 





Therefore, this thesis argues that the decline of youth political engagement in Malaysia, 
however, gets less attention from scholars since they focus more on the shift of youth votes 
from the ruling party to the opposition.  
 
A large body of research testifies that individual resources such as age, education, 
and income affect political participation (Verba et al., 1995; Norris, 2002; Quintelier, 
2007). Scholars generally agree that educated citizens are more likely to vote in elections 
and participate in political parties because they have time, money, knowledge and ability to 
access political information (Schlozman, 2002; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Blais et 
al., 2004). Looking at Malaysia’s demographic profile, we can see that the literacy rate in 
Malaysia has increased from 92 percent in 2004 to nearly 95 percent in 2013 (ASEAN 
Statistical Yearbook, 2015), with 48 percent enrolment in higher education (1.2 million 
students) in 2012 (Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2015). In terms of economic growth, 
Malaysia is the ASEAN’s third largest economy with monthly household income steadily 
increasing, largely in urban areas, to RM 4,585 from RM 3,626 in 2012 (Department of 
Statistics Malaysia, 2015). As Malaysia has achieved greater economic prosperity and 
education has been an increasingly higher priority, therefore we expect more young people 
to have higher levels of education and household incomes which should in turn enable 
them to participate in politics. However, many choose not to vote and in fact there are 
about 4.2 million young Malaysians not registering as voters. Moreover, some claim that 
political participation depends on opportunity structures within a given political setting 
(Kriesi, 2007; McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 1998). Since Malaysia is regarded as a country 
with a hybrid political setting, a system that combines both inherent traits of democracy 
and authoritarianism (Razali 2017; Levitsky and Way, 2010), we can expect that there are 
wide restrictions on political freedom, including freedom of speech and assembly, which 
may inhibit young people from participating politically. However, not all hybrid countries 
have very low levels of youth political engagement. Singapore, for example, has a 
relatively high rate of party membership and voter turnout amongst young people 
compared to Malaysia whilst civil liberties there are also curtailed.  
 
Over the last few decades, a series of controversial events has occurred in Malaysia 
when compared to the other Southeast Asian countries. These controversial events, 
including a wave of mass protests organised by Bersih (Since 2007), the imprisonment of 





involving a government-run fund, 1MDB (2015) and government economic policies such 
as the enforcement of Goods and Services Tax (GST) (2015) may have negatively affected 
young people’s impression of politics and politicians. The literature has shown how 
specific national contexts can impact the socialisation experiences of young generations 
(Tilley, 2002; Grasso, 2011, 2014). As such, there is a good argument to be made that the 
Malaysian national context may have played a role in exerting a negative influence on 
perceptions of politics and political engagement, leading young people to become 
disengaged from politics. These are the guiding hypotheses underpinning this investigation 
and in the remainder of this thesis we will discuss the relative literature as well as evidence 
to analyse them. This diverse array of evidence on youth political disengagement in 
Malaysia has produced a puzzle which necessitates a clear empirical investigation.  
 
To summarise, the main aim of this study is to contribute to an evidence-based 
analysis to the current debate on young people’s political participation in the Southeast 
Asian context, and more specifically to analyse whether the patterns of youth political 
participation in Malaysia exhibit distinctive patterns relative to established democracies 
and what explains these divergences. To gain deeper insight on this issue and to be able to 
provide a thorough analysis, including the background and history of one specific case, we 
choose to focus on Malaysia as exhibiting ideal-type Southeast Asian political 
characteristics such as a semi-democratic regime, a divided society, and a powerful ruling 
elite. We will examine how Malaysian youngsters (dis)engage politically and present some 
explanations for these trends. In turn, this will contribute to the emerging literature on 
youth political participation and non-participation in non-Western contexts and speak to 
the future of political engagement worldwide as young cohorts age and replace older 
generations. Therefore, one of the more significant contributions of this thesis to the 
political participation literature is to provide a well-rounded picture of the changing pattern 
of youth political participation in Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia, by developing a 
value-added explanatory model specifically for youth engagement in the region.  
 
1.3 The thesis and the wider literature  
 
As hinted at above, the motivations for this research are grounded in the analytical 
problems caused by several important limitations in previous work. By overcoming these 





ways, and thus advances scholarship. First, it is undeniable that an enormous literature has 
been developed by prominent scholars on youth political participation. However, most 
literature is Western-oriented, so it is focused more specifically on the Western socio-
political context. Second, studies of youth political participation in Southeast Asia (Chang, 
2012; Rashila, 2012; Zhang and Lallana, 2013; Yun Han Chu, Welsh and Weatherall, 
2012), and particularly Malaysia (Weiss, 2006; Mohd Azizuddin, 2009; Francis Loh and 
Saravanamuttu, 2003; Muhammad Febriansyah and Muhammad Takiyuddin, 2013) have 
begun to develop but there is limited to research on the engagement or disengagement of 
the youth from electoral activities, without comprehensively analysing whether young 
people opt to engage outside of mainstream politics. It is worth noting that there are two 
contrasting narratives in the literature on youth political participation. The first camp, the 
so-called ‘youth disengaged paradigm’ (Bennett, 2008) depicts young people as apolitical, 
indifferent, and politically apathetic pointing to evidence for a decline of conventional 
forms of political participation, such as voting (Dalton, 2002), partisanship (Kimberlee, 
2002), and civic life (Putnam, 2000). On the other hand, the second camp, the so-called 
‘youth engaged paradigm’ sees this decline as a transformation—a steady shift from 
traditional forms of politics in favour of new and unconventional forms of political 
participation like protest, political consumerism, and social movement engagement 
(Putnam, 2000; Henn et al., 2002; Dalton, 2007). The emergence of these new repertoires 
of participation has cut across the traditional left-right spectrum and weakened the older 
styles of politics.   
 
In this study, we find evidence to support the ‘youth engaged paradigm’ for 
Malaysia (Norris, 2002; Henn et al., 2002; Sloam, 2007; Dalton, 2007) and challenge the 
conventional wisdom that young people in Malaysia are politically apathetic citizens. It is 
misleading to claim that young Malaysians in general are apolitical or apathetic without 
analysing a broad conception of politics, which includes both conventional and 
unconventional political participation, and their explanatory factors. Following such a 
methodology allows us to see clearly the relationship between the new types of 
participation that young people are involved in and how these may be replacing traditional 
forms of participation. We find that young Malaysians are less likely to engage in 
conventional forms of participation, but that they replace this to some extent with 
participation in alternative forms such as protests, social movement activism and other 





actions, rather than simply being confined to voting and elections. Focusing on electoral 
and conventional political activity as the only forms of meaningful political participation 
undermines the importance of other forms of political participation, and leads to the view 
that young people in general are politically apathetic citizens (Phelps, 2005, Marsh et al., 
2007; Henn et al., 2002).  
 
 Moreover, explanations of youth disengagement and the shift to a new politics in 
Western democracies link to a number of recognisable themes (Quintelier, 2007) such as 
life-cycle theories (e.g., Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980), 
mobilising agencies (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Norris, 2002), and generational 
effects (e.g., Giugni, 2007; Grasso, 2011, 2014; Jennings, 1987). However, most literature 
in Southeast Asia generally, and Malaysia specifically, provides vague and limited 
explanations of youth political participation because it commonly relies on classical 
approaches limited to socioeconomic status as indicators of participation (Pandian, 2014a; 
Marshelayanti et al., 2016), with some studies also looking at political values (Mohd 
Azizuddin, 2009; Francis Loh and Saravanamuttu, 2003) and life-cycle effects 
(Muhammad Febriansyah and Muhammad Takiyuddin, 2013). Undeniably, different 
socioeconomic indicators such as educational status, income and so forth, have large 
impacts on political participation. However, the failure to go beyond classical explanations 
and neglect of alternative models of participation in the conceptual framework means that 
certain important variables and concepts such as institutional context, mobilising agents 
and the cost-benefit analysis underpinning political engagement are under-emphasised by 
these scholars. Although this thesis acknowledges the complex interaction of individual 
factors in explaining political participation, we argue that relying on these factors alone is 
not enough to account for the puzzle of youth political participation in Malaysia. As this 
thesis sets out to examine the diverging patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia 
and to investigate the characteristics and motivations of those who choose to actively 
participate in politics and those who decide to disengage from politics, we argue that it is 
essential to also consider alternative models of political participation. Most specifically, 
this thesis combines different approaches including the civic voluntarism model, the social 
psychological model, the rational choice model, the insights of approaches emphasising the 
importance of mobilising agencies and political opportunity structures as factors allowing 





motivations.7 By combining these models, this thesis expands and develops on 
Hirschman’s ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ (EVL) framework (see Chapter 2).  
 
The current Malaysian political context means that young generations coming of 
age today have very different social and political experiences from those that older 
generations have experienced, especially those who grew up after the political and 
economic reforms of the 1970s. We know from previous work that the current political 
participation habits of generations can influence future trends (Plutzer, 2002, Franklin, 
2004), and this is why this thesis compares the differences in political activism between 
Malaysian younger and older people respectively. This investigation fills a very important 
gap in the literature on Malaysian youth political participation and allows us to generate 
valuable insights on the future patterns of youth political participation, given socialisation 
and population replacement (Park, 2000; Grasso, 2011, 2014; Norris, 2002). In addition, 
much literature in this field from Southeast Asia has rarely employed a qualitative or 
mixed-methods approach. Heavy reliance on a single method may only provide a partial 
impression of the youth as an apathetic generation. A combined mixed-methods 
(quantitative and qualitative) approach is needed to provide more in-depth and richer 
contextual explanations of how young people conceptualise politics and perceive their 
engagement with politics (Marsh et al., 2007; Henn et al., 2002). As such, by applying a 
mixed-methods approach to the study of youth participation in Malaysia, this research 
further provides novel insights into the issue.  
 
Even though this thesis focuses only on one country, it makes an important 
contribution to the literature as it examines the patterns of youth political participation in a 
semi-democratic and divided society where ethnicity has long coloured its politics, and 
where the rural-urban divide has impacted on how young Malaysians engage with and 
view politics. This thesis thus seeks to provide cross-sectional comparative evidence which 
takes into account the different socio-cultural settings in Malaysia based on social 
                                                          
7To be specific, this study combines theories from  politics, economics and social movement studies such as 
the socioeconomic status (SES) (Verba and Nie, 1972), the civic volunterism (Verba et al., 1995), the social 
psychological model (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) including the relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970; 
Klandermans, 2007; Dalton, 1988; Farah et al., 1979), the rational choice theory, the general incentives 
model (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992), mobilising agencies (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Stolle, 2007) and 
institutional context (Tarrow, 1998; Kriesi, 2007; Klandermans, 2007) to explain why  young people 
participate or fail to do so, and examine whether they exhibit distinctive patterns of activism  relative to 





differences in age, education, gender, ethnicity, as well as the semi-democratic setting and 
the rural-urban dichotomy, synthesizing qualitative and quantitative evidence. Moreover, 
the research draws comparisons with youth political participation in established 
democracies highlighting differential features and theoretical gaps.  
 
1.4 Aims and research questions  
 
As mentioned above, most literature in the field of political science in Malaysia has largely 
ignored the dynamic patterns of youth political participation when aiming to understand 
youth participation and non-participation. Recently, there has been growing interest in 
electoral participation and conventional forms of participation rather than an exploration of 
why young Malaysians have a very low level of participation in political activities. The 
absence of meaningful research on youth political engagement in Malaysia has led young 
people to be labelled as an ‘apathetic’ generation. Therefore, the aims of this thesis are: 
 
1. To analyse the changing patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia  
 
This aim relates to the governing assumptions of both elitist and popular conceptions of 
democracy when understanding the role of political participation. For popular theorists of 
democracy, the participation of citizens is vital for democracy since decisions made 
through deliberation strengthen the relationship between state and citizens, thus enhancing 
civic consciousness (Barber, 1984). On the other hand, elite competition theorists believe 
that only electoral participation is necessary for legitimising decision-making made by the 
elites (Schumpeter, 1952; Almond and Verba, 1963). Therefore, to avoid confusion with 
the concept of ‘civic participation’, we use the term ‘elite-directed’ and ‘elite-challenging’ 
forms of political participation introduced by Inglehart (1977; 1997). Accordingly, 
Inglehart (1997) clearly distinguishes between elite-directed activities—relating to 
traditional politics, mainly elections and participation through established organisations 
such as political parties and labour unions—and elite-challenging repertoires, synonymous 
with new politics, that “take place when one knows how to cope with elites and want 
something contrary from what elites want” (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1979:209). ‘Elite’ 
here refers to people in the leadership position who are directly involved in decision-
making (Hoffmann-Lange, 2007:910). Therefore, to study the diverging patterns of youth 





unconventional politics. Rather, it is important to look at the different forms of political 
activism side by side (Grasso, 2013). We must study both elite-directed and elite-
challenging activities to examine more thoroughly whether young people’s disengagement 
is found across political activities, and whether they are becoming less involved in 
conventional politics and more likely to participate in elite-challenging repertoires. To 
meet this aim, we compare political activism between young and older people in Malaysia 
by using existing survey data from Wave 6 (2010-2014) of the World Values Surveys 
(WVS) and the Asian Barometer Wave 2 (2005-2008) and Wave 3 (2010-2012). These 
quantitative analyses are presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis. To contextualise the 
survey data, we also investigated specific questions concerning current patterns of youth 
engagement with different groups in Malaysian society, namely academics, political elites, 
youth activists and youth non-participants via semi-structured interviews. In relation to the 
first aim, the empirical research sets out to answer the following questions:  
• Are young Malaysians politically apathetic or have they shifted from ‘elite-
directed’ politics to ‘elite-challenging’ forms of political participation? 
• Are the patterns of youth political engagement in this country influenced by the 
characteristics of the authoritarian regime or are they instead similar to those 
present amongst young people in Western democracies?  
 
2. To investigate the conception of politics amongst young people 
 
To meet this aim, we have adopted semi-structured interviews as an approach that enables 
me to understand how young people conceptualise ‘politics’ on their own terms from a 
‘bottom-up’ approach (O’Toole, 2003). According to Bessant (2016), the overly restrictive 
way people are encouraged to think about politics often discounts young people’s political 
activity and may indicate reasons for young people’s disinterest from conventional politics. 
In this thesis, we argue that when young people have very limited conceptions of politics it 
shows that they have a poor understanding of politics and perceive politics as a complex 
and ‘boring’ subject, which in turn is linked to their disenchantment with the political 
process. The questions in line with this aim are:  
• How do young Malaysians conceptualise ‘politics’? 
• Do young activists and young non-participants differ in their interpretations of 





3. To examine the attitudes of young Malaysians towards ‘elite-directed’ and 
‘elite-challenging’ forms of participation  
 
This thesis sets out to investigate why young people participate or do not participate in 
politics, and in particular the characteristics and motivations of those who choose to 
participate in the different kinds of repertoires. To achieve this aim, the study applies a 
threefold strategy. First, we test different variables which may play a role in explaining 
participation such as socioeconomic factors (age, education, income, etc.), attitudinal 
determinants (interest to politics, political efficacy, etc.), and mobilising networks (group 
membership). Second, we select samples of youth activists and youth non-participants in 
qualitative interviews to identify the subjectively explained reasons behind participation 
and non-participation. Importantly, analysing the factors that motivate young people to 
engage or disengage in different forms of political activities allow us to clearly understand 
the underlying political attitudes of young people. Third, we examine the youth wings of 
political parties in Malaysia by interviewing prominent members to investigate to what 
extent they make efforts to recruit young members, as well as understanding their own 
motivations for becoming party members, the different party structures and how this 
impacts on the previous questions, and finally the development of strategies to attract more 
young members in the future. To achieve this aim, the following empirical research 
questions guided the analysis:  
• Why are some young people politically active whereas others are largely 
politically inactive? 
• What drives different types of young people to embrace such divergent attitudes?  
 
1.5 The structure of the thesis   
 
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. In Chapter 1, we offer a critical analysis of the 
various understandings of youth political participation in the context of Southeast Asia as 
well as a detailed picture of youth engagement in Malaysian politics. The chapter also 
provides a discussion of the general background for the thesis investigation, including an 
explanation of the research problem and key questions. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on youth political participation in established democracies and in 
developing nations, particularly in Southeast Asia. Additionally, this chapter identifies a 





will be employed in the analytical framework of this dissertation in order to develop an 
explanation of youth political (dis-) engagement in Malaysia. Chapter 3 presents the 
methodological approach applied in the thesis, in particular the rationale for using a case 
study and a mixed methods approach in the investigation.  
 
The subsequent six chapters illustrate the empirical analysis of the thesis. Chapters 
4 and 5 are the quantitative chapters. They provide the statistical analyses of age group 
differences, particularly between the younger and older cohorts, in both conventional and 
unconventional political activism. This chapter examines analytically whether young 
Malaysians are less likely to be politically engaged than their older counterparts by 
analysing their political activism through survey data from Wave 6 (2010-2014) of the 
World Values Surveys (WVS), and testing whether explanatory variables such as 
education, gender and ethnic composition play a role in explaining these differences. 
Chapter 5 expands the analysis of political activism repertoires to scrutinize whether young 
people are really disengaged from the political process relative to their elders by using 
another well-known survey data source, the Asian Barometer Wave 2 (2005-2008) and 
Wave 3 (2010-2012). Chapter 5 focuses on analysing the relative impact of important 
intervening variables, including education levels and the rural-urban divide and tests their 
differential effects for youth political activism in Malaysia.    
 
On the other hand, Chapters 6 to 9 present the results from the qualitative analyses 
of the semi-structured interviews with academics, political leaders, youth activists and 
youth non-participants. Chapter 6 reports the results of interview with expert academics on 
the current patterns of youth participation in Malaysia and youth attitudes towards elite-
directed and elite-challenging forms of political participation. More specifically, we focus 
on whether young Malaysians are politically apathetic or if instead they have simply 
shifted their participation to other informal modes of engagement. The analysis then moves 
on to Chapter 7, which comprises an analysis of political elites’ views on youth political 
participation, the structure of the major political parties in Malaysia, the motivations of 
their members and what role parties play in fostering the political engagement of young 
people. The analyses reported in Chapter 8 and 9 allow us to compare the political 
participation patterns of youth activists with those of youth non-participants by considering 
‘the cost-benefit’ analysis underpinning rational choice approaches for understanding why 





particular, these chapters analyse young people’s interpretation of politics, including their 
motivations and what drives them to embrace politically favourable or apathetic attitudes. 
In the final chapter, we conclude the thesis by returning to the research questions and the 
key debate between elitist and popular conceptions of democracy, highlighting the 















This chapter reviews relevant empirical evidence on young people’s political engagement 
to gauge the extent to which existing studies explain youth participation and non-
participation in general. The sources included in this literature are selected to give a picture 
of the gaps in previous studies, to provide analytical criticism and a well-rounded picture 
of academic discourse on youth political participation in established democracies and 
developing nations. This literature review is structured into three parts. First, we motivate 
this research by explaining in detail the relationship between political participation and 
democracy in some of the normative literature on participation to consider why political 
participation can be seen as something good for democracy. This part also examines the 
concept of political participation by highlighting changes in the conceptualisation of 
political participation and a broader repertoire of political actions. The second part of this 
chapter discusses the empirical literature on youth political participation in established 
democracies, Southeast Asia, and Malaysia more specifically, the focus of the present 
study, to identify the gaps in scholarly understanding of patterns of youth political 
participation. Having reviewed the empirical evidence that already exists in relation to 
young people’s political (dis) engagement, this chapter then moves on to analyse the main 
theoretical explanations for participation in the literature thus allowing for the construction 
of a more comprehensive model of participation devised specifically to explain why young 








2.2 The concept of political participation and democracy  
 
Citizen participation is the heart of democracy (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). It is 
necessary to participate in the political system since it determines the way democracy 
works, and acts as an indicator to measure the democratic quality (Russell et al., 2002). By 
participating in democracy, citizens’ preferences are transmitted to political decision 
makers (Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992; Lipset, 1963). Thus, the democratic values of 
society can be strengthened when many people influence political decision-making, or at 
least influence those who make the decisions (Hague and Harrop, 2001). From Ancient 
Greece up to the present day, the role and power of citizen participation in political 
decision-making have long been subject to critical debate (Held, 2006). Disagreements are 
particularly focused on the question of who is best suited to make political decisions, the 
elites or the masses? And to what extent is participation by the people desirable? Given 
that the central premise of this thesis lies in a belief that more active engagement in politics 
is generally desirable, we first start by looking at the normative literature on political 
participation, particularly the debate between two conceptions of democracy: elitist 
democracy versus popular conceptions of democracy. 
 
2.2.1 The elitist conception of democracy  
 
The main claim of the elitist theory of democracy is that citizens alone are ineffective in 
decision-making and thus should only play a limited role and rely on representatives. 
Democracy, according to the minimalist or realist conception, is “an institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1943:24). 
By this definition, Schumpeter argues that citizens are ‘incapable of action other than 
stampede’ (Schumpeter, 1943:283); thus, their participation will be limited to voting, not 
the day-to-day affairs of governing.  
 
Popper (1962:124) notes how democracy is “the only system in which citizens can 
get rid of the government without bloodshed”. In a democracy, leaders compete for mass 
support in periodic elections. This means citizens act as ‘controllers’ rather than 
‘participants’ (Parry and Moyser, 1984). Elitist theorists see citizen participation in 





making (Berelson et al., 1954; Schumpeter, 1952). However, for them, the key concern is 
that the government gain legitimacy through popular democratic validation (Schumpeter, 
1952). 
 
Most advocates of elite democracy emphasise the dangers of mass political 
participation and claim that power must be handed to experts, since they alone have the 
requisite knowledge, skills, and experience to deal with it. The emergence of representative 
democracy due to the growth of industrialised mass society changed the responsibility of 
decision-making from the hands of the citizens to the representatives who are elected in 
periodic elections. For Schumpeter (1943), ordinary people are incapable of making 
rational judgements in the law-making process because the relevant political issues are too 
distant from their daily lives. It is thus better to limit the impact of citizen participation on 
the political system to reduce any discrepancies and facilitate adjustments (Berelson et al., 
1954). On this conception, the political system will be overloaded by too much input. In 
the words of Pateman (1970:14), “The level of participation by the majority should not rise 
much above the minimum necessary to keep the democratic method (electoral machinery) 
working.”   
 
Elitist conceptions hold that democracy is better if fewer people participate, which 
assumes that many people not participating is a sign of satisfaction (Miroff et al., 2009). 
The ‘problem’ of low participation only occurs from this perspective insofar as it makes 
the system look illegitimate when too few people participate in elections. For Beetham 
(1993, 2002), political participation may not lead towards democracy and in fact, will 
damage democracy, especially in the authoritarian and communist nations because there is 
a high level of participation, but could not provide meaningful participation because 
citizens have less control over political decisions. However, some argue that elite 
democracy has normative shortcomings in its pessimistic outlook about citizens and sole 
focus on the stability and effectiveness of the system, rather than trying to stimulate greater 
individual participation and the moral development of citizens (Schafer, 1974; Walker, 
1966). Thus, the elitist discussion on democracy is important in uncovering to what extent 
political elites in Malaysia encourage or discourage young people from becoming 







2.2.2 The popular conception of democracy 
 
The central thrust of the theory of popular democracy is that the political system should 
encourage as many citizens as possible to participate in the decision-making process 
(Miroff et al., 2009). On this conception, it is important to give democratic control to the 
people as a means of holding the government to account and to reinforce a stronger 
democracy (Barber, 1984).8 For popular democratic thinking, the fact that many people 
disengage from politics is a problem, and the blame for people’s disengagement should be 
laid on the system and its actors, rather than people themselves (Bale et al., 2006). 
However, other scholars like Hibbings and Theiss-Morse (2002) take a more sceptical 
view by arguing that not all citizens desire to participate actively in politics, but instead opt 
to leave political decisions in the hands of representatives or have a ‘stealth’ democracy. 
 
Popular democracy emerges as a means to improve the flaws and broken promises 
of the representative system (Hayward, 1996; Taggart, 2002), and to include new social 
groups within the democratic process (Laclau, 2005).9 Popular democracy involves more 
than free elections—it means citizens are capable of managing and governing themselves 
effectively. They must be allowed to involve themselves in political affairs and the 
institutions of civic society as stakeholders, and ensure that representatives are accountable 
to preserve individual rights and equality, as opposed to the interests of the elites. Thus, the 
proponents of popular democracy such as Blinder (1997) and Majone (1996) suggest that 
the power of decision-making should not be handed to non-partisan experts or non-
majoritarian institutions (NMIs). These institutions, according to Majone (1996), are not 
directly accountable to the people or the elites. Delegating power to experts – such as self-
regulatory bodies, national regulatory agencies or supranational organisations – in order to 
promote ‘policy credibility’ (Gilardi, 2002) and ‘procedural legitimacy’ (Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet, 2002) degrades the government, devalues politics, and at the same time, 
alienates citizens from politics.  
 
                                                          
8It is important to note that popular democracy is distinct conceptually from notions of direct democracy or 
simply majority rule since it is still consistent with representative systems (see Mair 2006 for example), but it 
is rooted in the ideas of direct democracy practiced in Ancient Greek city-states. 
 
9Citizens’ participation in democracy, for Parry (1972), can be understood through two broad theories: the 
instrumental and developmental. The instrumental theories see participation as an effective way to safeguard 
the citizens’ interests from the growth of government tyranny. On the other hand, the developmental theories 





 Yet, institutional reform has been advocated by advocates of participatory 
democracy as a reaction to the imperfections of modern liberal democracy (Held, 2006; 
Behrouzi, 2006). This approach emphasizes the importance of citizens participating in 
political discussions, which simultaneously ‘increase[s] the quality of democratic 
judgements’ (Warren, 1996:4), and leads to maximizing the creation of more informed and 
critical citizens (Fishkin, 1991). Deliberative democracy also promotes the ideal of mutual 
respect, where each citizen justifies public policy by giving realistic reasons that can be 
mutually accepted by others (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). The acceptance of collective 
decisions helps to limit the danger of conflicts and polarization among citizens. However, 
some argue that the modes of communication used in deliberation can exclude many 
potential participants, since they have different socioeconomic backgrounds, social 
privileges, and political knowledge (Young, 2000; Stoker, 2006).  
 
Mair (2013) claims that many institutional reforms, particularly those trying to 
make democracy more meaningful for ordinary citizens, actually discourage mass 
engagement. For Mair (2013), scholars who attempt to redefine democracy (such as 
Zakaria, 1997; Everson, 2000) tend to emphasise the constitutional element, rather than 
bringing back popular sovereignty. The downgrading of popular democracy, according to 
Mair (2013), is due to the failure of political parties. Parties fail in two ways: they fail to 
mobilize the masses to participate in the political process (Watternberg, 2000); and they 
are seen as a way for political leaders to pursue self-interest by holding office, rather than 
serving the public (Mair, 2013). Without political parties, there will be a breakdown of 
democracy (Schattschneider, 1942; Mair, 2013; Dalton and Watternberg, 2000). In 
contrast, Norris (2002) argues that many traditional agencies, including mass political 
parties no longer hold the monopoly on democratic engagement since many new 
contemporary channels of participation have emerged such as social movements and 
single-issue campaigns which allow greater participatory choice. Rather than declining, 
participation has thus merely shifted from the politics of loyalties towards the politics of 
choice. Whilst there is an expansion in participatory repertoires, Mair (2006), however, 
stresses that these forms of participation cannot replace the important role of political 
parties in representative democracy. Therefore, the popular conception of democracy is 
particularly useful to contextualise the analyses in this study because it provides a 
compelling argument for why participation is desirable for all citizens – and particularly, 





2.3 Political participation: towards a definition  
 
Most literature on political participation derives from an assessment of the practice of 
democracy (Van Deth, 2014). Although the term political participation has been defined 
by many scholars in various ways, differing remarkably in its interpretations and the 
potential activities of citizens, the main ideas behind each definition are similar (Brady, 
1999). To understand political participation, we identify the conceptualizations of some 
prominent scholars into different categories such as definition, typology, and actions (see 
Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 A conceptual map of political participation  





 “...those activities by 
private citizens that are 
more or less directly 
aimed at influencing the 
selection of 
governmental personnel 











 “...those actions of 
private citizens by which 
they seek to influence or 





 -Holding public and 
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-Attending a political 
rally 
-Donating money to a 
party 
-Contacting an official 
 
Spectator activities– 
-Wearing a button 
-Trying to talk to 












“all voluntary activities 
intended to influence 
either directly or 
indirectly political 
choices at various levels 
of the political system”  










 “.. actions by citizens 
which is aimed at 
influencing decision 
which are in most cases 
ultimately taken by 
public representatives 
and officials. This may 
be an action which seeks 
to shape the attitudes of 
decision-makers in 
matters yet to be decided, 
or it may be actionable in 
protest at the outcome of 























Political participation can 
not only be aimed at 
governments, but also at 
markets, NGOs, the 

















Teorell et al. 
(2007:336) 
“...any decision over the 
authoritative allocation 
















“...all actions directed 
towards influencing 
governmental decisions 


















-Voting in elections and 
referenda 
-Deliberate acts of non-
voting or blank voting 
-Contacting political 
representatives or civil 
servants 
-Holding public office 
-Donating money to 
political organizations 
-Being a member a 
political party, 
organization or trade 
union. 





-Boycotting and political 
consumption 
-Signing petition 
-Handing out political 
leaflets 
-Joining new social 
movements 
-Demonstrating and 
participating in strikes 
-Civil disobedience 
-Politically motivated 




with political opponents 
or police. 
 
Based on the table above, several important points can illuminate the concept of political 
participation. First, four main elements occur in most definitions of political participation 
as proposed by Brady (1999): activity, citizens, influence, and political decisions. The 
activity here refers to how citizens participate in politics, for example by voting, 
demonstrating, or attending meetings (Quintelier, 2007). As this thesis aims to examine the 
patterns and attitudes of young Malaysians toward politics, it follows Almond and Verba 
(1963), Barnes and Kaase (1979) and Milbrath and Goel (1977), to include ‘everyday’ 
informal engagement such as political discussion, and reading or watching political news 





as exemplifying relatively low levels of participation, they can elucidate the extent to 
which young people in Malaysia are engaged or disengaged from politics. 
 
In addition, political participation needs to be engaged in by citizens or the mass 
public, rather than politicians or professional lobbyists (Burns, Scholzman and Verba, 
2001). The third component is influence, which means citizens voluntarily attempt to 
influence the government’s decisions, without any threats or law enforcement (Brady, 
1999). The fourth common aspect in political participation is political decisions. In 
particular, citizens participate to influence the authoritative allocation of values, and public 
goods by the government. Thus, the participant aims to target the political system as a 
whole, rather than being restricted to public policy makers.  
 
Historically, there has been a development in the typologies of political 
participation studied in the literature from one-dimensional phenomena to two dimensional 
and then multidimensional phenomena. One-dimensional understandings of participation 
consist primarily of electoral activities and non-violent participation, such as voting and 
party membership. For example, McClosky (1968), and Milbrath and Goel (1977) view 
political participation as a one-dimensional political activity. Notably, citizens are 
distinguished based on their ‘activeness’ in politics, ranging from political activists who 
play a full role in politics, through citizens who observe, but refuse to take part in politics, 
to apathetic citizens who neither participate nor concern themselves with political matters 
(Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). However, a general increase in the level of education of 
citizens has augmented their tendency to participate more directly in methods, such as 
protest-oriented activities, to influence political decision makers (Inglehart, 1990). Thus, it 
is helpful to broaden the conception of political participation to include non-conventional 
methods. This is called a two-dimensional concept of political participation. Barnes and 
Kaase (1979) show that unconventional participation, such as protesting, does not fit in the 
one-dimensional mode of participation, since people who participate in one form of 
participation do not necessarily participate in other forms. So, the authors provide a 
distinction in the form of political involvement into conventional and unconventional 
forms. Most of the recent literature, however, argues that political participation is a 
multidimensional phenomenon, where citizens tend to engage in a combination of different 
forms of political participation with different potential targets and spread over more 





multidimensional understanding of political participation is more likely to reflect the 
patterns of engagement embraced by young people, since it is more meaningful and 
practical to them (Vinken, 2005).  
 
In this regard, political action is not only targeted at the government but can also be 
directed towards other agencies, such as private organisations and NGOs, in an attempt to 
influence political outcomes (Teorell et al., 2007). For example, political consumerism—
boycotting, consumption or purchasing products for political or ethical motives—aims to 
influence international or supranational actors more than national government (Stolle, 
Hooghe and Micheletti, 2005; Ward and De Vreese, 2011). Stuart (2015) identifies three 
factors that are responsible for broadening the repertoire of political participation in 
Western democracies. First, the rise of new media makes citizens become more politically 
informed since they can easily access political information via online platforms (Norris, 
2001). These developments enable citizens to engage in new ways in political activities 
such as online participation, consumer boycotts and signing petitions, while at the same 
time depending on traditional agencies like political parties (Theocharis, 2012). In 
addition, the expansion of education has created more politically sophisticated citizens who 
are more capable of gathering and interpreting information, and who use this information 
to achieve their political goals (Watternberg, 2012; Dalton, 2013). Education, as argued by 
Watternberg (2012) and Dalton (2013), is closely linked to political sophistication, where 
the more educated an individual, the more politically sophisticated they will likely be. As 
politically sophisticated citizens possess greater political knowledge and skills, they are 
less attached to political agents for guidance and resources (Norris, 2001). Even without 
mobilisation from political parties, they still can be politically active citizens, particularly 
in political activities outside the formal arena (Dalton, 2013). Finally, the evolution of 
political participation is also related to the decline of deeply-rooted political cleavages such 
as class and ethnicity, and alongside this decline we have seen rising levels of individual 
autonomy and self-expression—with individuals being understood to have a greater 
capacity to express attitudes without constraints from external factors such as economic 
concerns, gender and so forth (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). In this regard, changes in 
society and in the economy, including rising living standards and the expansion of 
education, have reduced individuals’ concerns for materialist issues (economic prosperity 
and physical security) making them instead more concerned about ‘postmaterialist’ values 





is in turn understood to have brought new political issues such as environmentalism to the 
fore and provided a new impetus for social movements.  
 
Since the repertoire of political engagement is broad and sometimes overlapping, 
we focus on the distinction between conventional and unconventional forms of political 
participation, or elite-directed and elite-challenging repertoires (Inglehart, 1990). This 
classification is relevant for this research since it provides a clear differentiation between 
the two repertoires and allows for an investigation into different modes of political action 
to assess whether young people in Malaysia are apathetic or whether they simply prefer to 
participate through non-conventional means. 
 
 2.3.1 Conventional political participation: elite-directed forms of political 
participation 
 
Conventional political participation, also known as ‘formal politics’, ‘traditional politics’, 
and ‘elite-directed participation’, can be defined as all means recognised by the prevailing 
political culture as acceptable and that are related to institutionalized actions (Conway, 
1991) or sanctioned and inspired by political elites (Marsh, 1990). According to Inglehart 
(1997:3), “Elite-directed political participation is largely the matter of elites mobilising 
mass support through established organizations such as political parties, labour unions, 
religious institutions and so on”. It is often associated with moderate actions or activities 
that are embedded in the legal institutionalized framework such as voting and electoral 
politics, including ‘everyday engagement’ like political discussion, work for a party and 
contacting officials. Thus, we will use these types of political activity as parameters to 
examine the current patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia. However, many 
scholars show how, during the 1970s, there was a waning of civic and political activism, 
mainly voting and party membership, in post-industrial societies (Habermas, 1973; Crozier 
et al., 1975), and that activities that challenge elite decisions have become increasingly 
widespread (Inglehart, 1990), thus in turn developing another strand of forms of political 








2.3.2 Unconventional political participation: elite-challenging forms of political 
participation 
 
Since the 1960-70s, a ‘protest wave’ (Barker, 2008) or ‘cycle of protest’ (Tarrow, 1983) 
was on the rise, including phenomena such as demonstrations, strikes, riots and student 
movements in Western democracies. The rise of the civil rights movement in America and 
the May Revolts in France were some examples of the vigorous protests that occurred in 
the 1960s. Many scholars believe that voting and institutionalized activities are not the 
only way to identify citizen engagement in politics. For example, Barnes and Kaase (1979) 
emphasise that engagement in politics should include other modes of participation or so-
called ‘unconventional’ participation, like protests, riots, and civil disobedience, to 
influence political decisions.10 Unconventional political participation refers to those modes 
related to non-institutionalized actions (Marsh and Kaase, 1979). This type of participation 
is also referred to as ‘new’, non-institutionalized (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier, 2010), 
alternative (Della Porta, 2005), elite-challenging (Inglehart, 1990), and extra-parliamentary 
(Ekman and Amna, 2012). Amongst its characteristics are that it is not structurally 
embedded in the political system, frequently directed against the system; and at least aimed 
at changing the status quo. Therefore, activities like boycotting, signing petitions, joining 
demonstrations, and new social movement engagement will be examined to measure 
Malaysian youth’s participation in unconventional politics. 
 
These activities are pervasive and popular, mostly attracting young people in recent 
decades. They are attracted to these forms of participation because of their characteristics: 
they are loosely structured (Wuthnow, 1998); community-based initiatives (Fahmy, 2006); 
ad hoc and focused on a clear issue (Inglehart, 1990). According to Norris (2003:17), 
young people in post-industrialized societies are more likely to involve themselves in 
cause-oriented political action or unconventional forms of participation, so there is a 
broader cultural shift amongst young people “from the politics of loyalties towards the 
politics of choice”. Unconventional participation differs from traditional modes in several 
ways. First, it is targeted at powerful state actors, and to some extent other country’s 
governments and international organizations. Second, unconventional acts happen 
                                                          
10Barnes and Kaase (1979) were the first to identify a typology of political participation based on 
conventional; and unconventional politics. This typology is widely accepted and has been developed upon by 






sporadically, for a specific reason, rather than following a fixed schedule (Quaranta, 2012). 
Finally, though sometimes they fail to achieve their objectives, these acts tend to create 
pressure on the actors being challenged. 
 
2.4 The changing patterns of youth political participation in established 
democracies 
 
Young people’s political engagement has been the subject of academic debates in 
established democracies over past decades. There is a vast literature on youth political 
participation in Western democracies, which largely takes a quantitative-based approach. 
Much of this literature confirms that young people or the ‘millennial generation’ are less 
likely than their older counterparts to vote in elections (Henn et al., 2005; Henn and Foard, 
2012; Furlong and Cartmel, 2012, Marsh et al, 2007). The reluctance of young people to 
vote is also reflected in other formal political activities. Young people are shown to have a 
weaker party identification (Norris, 2002; Russell et al., 2002; Mycock and Tonge, 2012) 
and to be less likely to join political parties than older people. They were also less likely to 
engage in traditional institutions, such as labour unions and churches (Putnam, 2000; 
Skocpol, 2003; Phelps, 2010) and apparently are shown to have less interaction with 
politicians (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Henn and Foard, 2012). Some studies also 
argue that young people have a very low level of political knowledge relative to older 
people (Park, 2000; Watternberg, 2012). The decline of youth engagement in conventional 
politics for some (Pirie and Worcester, 1998; Kimberlee, 2002) is related to the hypothesis 
of youth apathy—young people are apathetic with regards to politics.11  
 
2.4.1 Young people and political apathy  
 
The youth are perceived as politically apathetic when many of them are disengaged from 
political activities, show low levels of political interest and literacy, and are seriously 
under-represented at all levels of government. Why do young people appear to be 
politically inactive? The basis for an explanation of youth disengagement could lie in the 
theory of life-cycle effects: the changes in maturity, physical and social experiences that 
                                                          
11According to Rosenberg (1955), political apathy refers to an individual’s lack of motivation for personal 
involvement with politics. This could mean that an apathetic youth sees political activities as undesirable and 





take place as individuals age influence their political attitude (Verba and Nie, 1972; Norris, 
2003; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Van Deth, 1990; Dalton 1988). Research has 
shown that young people tend to be uninterested in politics since they are facing more 
important life tasks, such as starting a career and a family (Converse and Niemi, 1971), but 
when these issues resolve themselves, they will participate in politics. Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980) support the idea that the interest to participate in politics may arise 
when young people begin to take on the role of adults in society and settle down. For 
example, when young people get married and start a family, they may start thinking about 
their responsibility to provide a brighter future for their children, and therefore they will 
vote in order to influence government policies. Additionally, family is an important agent 
of socialization that tends to develop the political interest of children to become politically 
engaged adults. However, Dinas (2014) finds out that young adults from highly politicised 
families are more likely to diverge from their parents’ partisan preferences due to the new 
social context and political issues. Therefore, young people tend to be marginalised as they 
have more idealistic views about the world than older generations. Although this approach 
has been widely accepted, theories of the life-cycle alone do not provide sufficient 
explanations of the universal decline in formal politics in established democracies 
(Franklin, 2004; Hooghe et al., 2004).  
 
Some suggest another possible explanation of youth political apathy, that of 
‘generational’ or cohort effects (Kimberlee, 2002; Park, 2000; Grasso, 2014, 2016). The 
concept of generation was first discussed by Mannheim, who acknowledged a strong 
connection between generations and social change. For Mannheim ([1928] 1952), 
members of the same generations who face similar experiences and encounter similarly 
impressionable events developed a shared set of attitudes, which differ from their older 
counterparts. Therefore, it could be expected that the apathetic young people of today will 
be the apathetic older generations of tomorrow (Park, 1995). Grasso (2014), for example, 
shows how across Western Europe, the 1960s-70s generations who came of age in a more 
radical political context are more likely than both the younger generation coming of age in 
the 1980s and also those generations coming of age in the 1990s to demonstrate and 
petition and more likely than the 1990s generation to participate in social movement 
organizations (SMOs). In her recent study, Grasso (2016) shows how extra-
institutionalised participation like protest activism cannot be the solution for raising 





unconventional participation will continue to decline in future, based on the evidence that 
the politically active 1960s-1970s generation of baby-boomers will be replaced by 
politically passive 1980s-1990s generation in the population.  
 
Although young people may be seen as less active than some older generations in 
political activities such as voting or protest, this should not be taken as a sign of apathy 
towards politics per se (Wilkinson and Mulgan, 1995). Instead, scholars such as O’Toole et 
al., (2003), Marsh et al. (2007), Phelps (2005) and Henn et al., (2002) underline a number 
of problems with ‘conventional political science’ (Henn et al., 2002:170) or ‘mainstream 
survey-based’ research (O’Toole et al., 2003:46). Firstly, they criticised the 
methodological grounds of the mainstream literature for over-reliance on close-ended 
questions in measuring youth political participation and assuming that older people shared 
similar view about politics with young people (Henn et al., 2002; O’Toole et al., 2003). 
They also argue that heavy reliance on quantitative approaches in studying participation 
caused ‘mainstream’ research to embrace a very narrow concept of political participation. 
They argue that the failure of most ‘mainstream’ research to go beyond conventional 
politics to consider other forms of political activity has led young people to be counted as 
apathetic and to undermine the importance of other ‘alternative’ forms of political action. 
For example, O’Toole et al., (2003:46) criticised the use of ‘top-down’ approaches in the 
mainstream literature by arguing that it is difficult to determine youth disengagement 
without exploring how young people themselves define politics. This is because young 
people conceptualise ‘politics’ in a different way from older generations (White et al., 
2000). Only when a qualitative approach is applied by researchers on youth participation 
would they be capable of identifying the youth’s conception of political participation and 
find evidence for higher levels of youth political activism (Henn et al. 2002; Marsh et al., 
2007). In this thesis, we thus follow the advice of O’Toole et al. (2003) and Henn et al. 
(2002) that it is necessary to employ qualitative methods alongside quantitative techniques 
and to employ a broad concept of political participation and explore youth-based definition 
of politics, to include new political repertoires that lie outside mainstream politics if we are 
to better understand why young people are not interested in politics. 
 
Many qualitative-based studies (Henn et al., 2005; Norris 2007; Sloam, 2014), 
particularly those who oppose the youth apathy thesis, make contrasting findings: young 





are politically engaged. However, they are ‘doing politics’ differently to older people by 
participating in informal forms of participation such as online actions, political 
consumerism, and single-issue groups that are not counted as ‘politics’ in some 
conceptions. Sloam (2013), for example, finds evidence that young Britons are more 
actively engaged in protest activism than their elders by pointing to their participation in 
protests against the Iraq war and in the Occupy movement. These new forms of political 
participation may be considered as “less political” (Quintelier 2007:167) but more 
attractive to young people.  
 
2.4.2 Young people and political alienation  
 
Far from being apathetic some scholars have pointed out how young people are distinctly 
alienated from the political process, including its actors and institutions (Henn et al., 2005, 
Fahmy, 2006; Marsh et al., 2007). Consequently, they are typically characterised as 
‘engaged sceptics’ (Henn et al., 2002; O’Toole et al., 2003). According to the perspective 
of youth alienation, there are several reasons why young people are alienated from politics. 
First, young people’s alienation is related to lack of trust in political actors due to their 
unresponsiveness in fulfilling promises and prioritising the interests of young people 
(Henn et al. 2002; Fahmy, 2006; Wilkinson and Mulgan, 1995). For example, research by 
Henn and Foard (2012) reveals that only half of young people felt that politicians cared 
enough about what they thought and less than half of the youth claimed that they were 
treated fairly by the government. Young people tend to view politicians in a very cynical 
light as unresponsive, remote, and only pursuing their own self-interest. Second, some 
point to young people’s lack of political knowledge and understanding as one of the 
reasons underpinning youth political alienation (Henn and Foard, 2012; White et al., 2000; 
Delli Carpini, 2000). In this regard, young people are understood to be largely ignorant 
about how the system and government function. According to White et al., (2000), a lack 
of knowledge about politics makes young people perceive politics as a ‘dull’, ‘irrelevant’ 
and a ‘complex’ subject, which leaves them uninterested in participating. To some extent, 
the use of political jargon and ‘vague’ language by politicians promotes a deficit in the 
understanding of politics amongst young people. In particular, young people could not 
develop an interest and knowledge to facilitate political participation because of their lack 
of engagement with the sources of information such as the media (Bennett, 1997) and 





In addition, the nature of the political system and parties, which are seen as too 
complicated, has undermined young people’s ability to influence political decisions 
(Sloam, 2014; Watternberg, 2002). For example, studies show that members of political 
parties, including young members, feel increasingly marginalised by highly centralised 
policymaking in both the Conservative and Labour Party (Seyd and Whiteley, 2002). 
Similarly, Marsh (1975) finds that young people are blaming the system, i.e democracy, 
for their dissatisfaction over living conditions in developed countries like Britain. When 
the system does not grant young people the opportunity to speak about their views, it 
discourages young people from participating because they feel that their demands are not 
represented by their country’s institutions. Sometimes, policies regulated by the 
government are problematised, do not reflect young people’s interests, and there are times 
when the youth are increasingly criminalised by the state due to their participation in 
politics, particularly those actions that aim to challenge the status quo (Bessant, 2016). In 
2010, for example, the demonstration ‘Fund Our Future’ (FoF) in the UK saw the use of 
riot police, kettling and mass arrests against students protesting for austerity measures by 
the government. Furthermore, growing individualisation has undermined the role of 
traditional parties and organisations in society (Giddens, 2000; Piven and Cloward, 2000). 
In other words, political parties, which are supposed to serve as an important recruitment 
channel for party members to mobilize citizens’ supports and facilitate governance, have 
weakened as the candidate-centred or issues-centred approaches have become more 
priorities to citizens, particularly young people. Nowadays campaigns are channelled 
through the media, rather than candidates directly greeting, and speaking to the voters. 
Political parties are understood to be withering and politicians are seen as detached from 
the people and particularly young people.  
 
2.4.3 Young people and political exclusion   
 
The impact of rapid industrialisation, modernisation and globalisation have transformed 
society from being hierarchically-structured to being network-based (Castells and Cardoso, 
2006). In a network-based society, the citizen’s orientation is no longer attached to 
constructed interests such as class, ethnicity, and party affiliation (Akram et al., 2014). 
Also, most of the functions of the state are delegated from political elites to non-partisan 





new form of political participation known as ‘expert citizens’ and the ‘everyday makers’.12 
Bang (2005) argues that these types of participation further alienate citizens from the 
political process, meaning citizens’ trust of political representatives wanes, thus creating 
the crucial problem of political exclusion. Political exclusion is when groups of people are 
excluded from governance networks and the decision-making process (Bang, 2005). The 
exclusion of substantial parts of the population from political decision-making is bad for a 
democracy as their ‘interests will not be given the same attention as the interests of those 
who do have a voice’ (Dahl, 1989:76). In this respect, participation in democracy aims at 
the distribution of collective goods, in which the benefits have to be shared across the 
whole society, including those who do not contribute to the production. As a consequence, 
‘free-rider’ citizens may emerge, those who do not engage in any political activities, but 
enjoy the benefits of citizenship and collective actions (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones, 2007; 
Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004).  
 
Returning to the major concern of this section, several factors contribute to political 
exclusion. One of the potential factors to measure exclusion is inequality in political 
participation. Inequality occurs when political power or influence is biased in favour of 
some groups in society against others. In particular, the practices of participation tend to 
privilege those with better structural advantages like higher levels of education and 
socioeconomic status (Kirby and Bryson, 2002). Those with better economic and social 
resources generally have greater influence in political decision-making. For instance, Dahl 
(2006: 85) argues that economic inequality should be expected to reduce political 
participation, particularly among the poorer citizens. Brady (2004), however, believes that 
greater inequality should increase political engagement, generally of the affluent. There is 
also a group of people who possess better structural positions but exit from politics because 
they feel that political activity is futile (Rosenberg, 1955; O’Toole et al. 2003). In addition, 
political inequality can be expressed in several forms such as socioeconomic status, 
education, gender gap, age, disabilities, minority status and so on. There are gender gaps in 
voting and other conventional activities, including affiliation with political organisations, 
                                                          
12‘The expert citizens’ concept refers to strategic individuals or new professionals who are involved in 
voluntary organizations, use their expert knowledge and skills to influence elites in political outcomes. On 
the other hand, ‘the everyday maker’ is defined as those individuals who shun state-based participation, but 
get involved in local issues or cause-driven projects. Among the characteristics of everyday makers are: 
lower interest in political parties or organizations; they participate in politics just for fun, part time, ad hoc 
and for non-ideological reasons; they are seen to have emerged as a response to the expert citizens. See Bang 





campaign contributions, contacting officials and working informally to manage community 
problems (Verba et al., 1995). Women are more likely to participate less in politics than 
men and are under-represented in parliaments as they have traditionally fewer resources 
and are constrained by family commitments (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001; Karp and 
Banducci, 2008). However, Stolle and Hooghe (2009) show how women are being more 
active in non-institutionalised activities like signing petitions and boycotts, since there are 
now more women who have entered the labour force, permitting them to gain resources 
and learning skills through activities carried out on the job.   
 
2.4.4 Young people and changing values  
 
One idea that is fundamental to understand the disengagement of young people from 
conventional politics is the decline of the structure of political cleavages (such as class and 
ethnic cleavages), that traditionally framed party competition and tied voters to parties 
(Dalton, 1999). The thawing of political cleavages is due to the emergence of new ‘value 
cleavages’ or post-materialist values which make young people more fragmented and 
individualised, excluded socially and politically. As Inglehart (1990) argues, people’s 
values can no longer be understood with reference to the traditional left-right cleavage, but 
depend increasingly on a single-issue politics. This has occurred due to a modernization 
process, where material well-being and physical security have been achieved so that there 
is a move to post-material concerns such as self-expression and emancipative values, as 
well as priorities like quality of life and individual freedom. Inglehart (1990) for example, 
argues that the cohort which experienced two World Wars and the Great Depression is less 
postmaterialist than the youngest cohort (post-war cohort) who lived under more secure 
formative conditions. He claims that developments in education, an expanded youth cohort 
and an era of prosperity have led to the rise of new social movements and ‘elite-
challenging’ activities. These activities, such as online petitions, online protest, and 
mobilising users to boycott certain products, are seen as more congruent with the 
characteristics and values of post-materialism (Loader, 2007; Wring and Ward, 2010). 
Moreover, Giugni (2007) and McAdam (1999) conclude that activism in turn impacts on 
the social and cultural patterns of contemporary Western society, particularly on the 
population at large and the aggregate patterns of life-course events such as non-traditional 






These new values motivate people to have a free choice, which later encourages 
them to become involved in collective actions (McAdam, 1999), which in turn lead to the 
formation of a ‘participatory culture’ and a greater push towards democratisation 
(Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2002; Norris, 2002) as well as deviations from the normal life-
course sequence (Rindfuss et al., 1987). Thus, to move from authoritarian rule to 
democracy, people must possess these values and put pressure on regimes for 
democratisation. According to Almond and Verba (1963), the stability of political regimes 
depends on the people’s beliefs about its legitimacy and authority and therefore political 
regimes must supply democracy in accordance to the demand of the people in order to self-
sustain.  
 
The review of the existing literatures above has drawn from evidence on the decline 
of young people’s engagement in formal politics in established democracies and 
summarised the key findings. Most of this research provides comprehensive analyses using 
a combination of variables and models in examining the patterns of young people’s 
political (dis) engagement. In the next sections, we develop a theoretical framework which 
is underpinned by previous studies to examine the dynamic patterns of youth political 
participation in Malaysia more specifically. 
 
2.5 The patterns of youth political participation in developing nations: the case of 
Southeast Asian countries 
 
The dramatic fall of young people’s political engagement in established democracies has 
long been debated by scholars. Although this issue has traditionally been neglected in 
Southeast Asian countries, recently the academic literature on the subject has begun to 
grow due to the dramatic change in youth turnout in national elections (See Figure 2.1). 
Asian Barometer Survey (Wave II and III) has shown a decline of youth turnout in 
Southeast Asia countries except for Vietnam (in Yun Han Chu, Welsh and Weatherall 
2012). Vietnam has a higher turnout because of its newly revised electoral system (Chang, 
2012). What explains this change? What are the most important and common factors 






Figure 2.1 Change in youth turnout in Southeast Asia countries  
(Source: Asian Barometer Survey, in Chang, 2012) 
 
2.5.1 Key studies on participation in Southeast Asia  
 
Although socioeconomic factors such as age, gender and income have been widely used as 
the most prominent type of explanation for youth political engagement in established 
democracies, Chang (2012) argues that the variation in socioeconomic background is not a 
strong predictor for the decline of youth voter turnout in Southeast Asia. However, some 
argue that socioeconomic indicators are important to measure political participation in this 
region. For example, Yun Han Chu, Welsh and Weatherall (2012:210) show how less 
developed economies have entered a period of rapid growth and industrialization, which 
should lead young people to engage in politics as they have greater access to education and 
the new media or ‘post-industrial knowledge’. However, not every East Asian country has 
undergone rapid industrialization and economic development. Some of the young people in 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos are unemployed, have been forced to drop out of school and 
find jobs to support their families. Thus, poor living conditions remain the obstacle for 
young people from participating in politics in developing counties (Mansfield, 2008). This 
argument is endorsed by the findings of Welsh and Chang (2012) on a comparative study 
of youth and democratic citizenship comparing Malaysia with Cambodia. They find that 
low income youth in both countries tend to have less interest in politics and those with low 
education strongly support political traditionalism—government as a powerful entity 



































  As scholars in established democracies and particularly the United States have 
traditionally argued that religiosity plays an important role in explaining citizens’ 
engagement in politics (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995), those studying Southeast 
Asia perceive religion as an explanatory driver that shapes young people’s attitude towards 
democracy (Welsh and Chang, 2012; Rashila, 2012). Welsh and Chang (2012) find that 
religion places a greater emphasis on issues of corruption and moral governance, which 
attracts religious youngsters in Malaysia and Cambodia to agitate for political change. 
However, the hierarchical structure (with regards to an age hierarchy) that has long been 
embedded in Asian societies makes political change less salient, since young people play a 
marginal role in making political decisions (Chandler, 2000). Based on the Muslim Youth 
Survey 2011, Rashila (2012), for instance, finds that Malaysian and Indonesian young 
Muslims not only believe in a strong democratic system, but also accept the 
implementation of Shariah law as the basic standard of human conduct. Thus, based on the 
literature discussed in this section, there is strong evidence that the variation in 
demographic factors such as age, education and urban-rural factors can be used in this 
thesis as predictors to explain youth political (dis)engagement since they have significant 
impacts on political activism in the population, including amongst youth.  
 
Other scholars, such as Zhang and Lallana (2013), Yun Han Chu, Welsh and 
Weatherall (2012) and Henke (2011) point out that disappointment with the practice of 
democracy and an oppressive regime is another determining factor in the decline of youth 
political engagement in Southeast Asia. The restrictions of the political system, particularly 
to freedom of assembly, expression, media, and open public discourse, increase non-
participation amongst the youth. In addition, young people also lose their trust in the 
political representatives as they are associated with corruption, cronyism, and money 
politics (Zhang and Lallana 2013). They feel their vote would not change anything and that 
they are powerless to influence political decisions made by the government. Political 
parties also fail to encourage young people to participate in politics. Thus, they are 
marginalized, albeit they are concerned for the political development of the respective 
countries (Rashila, 2012). This argument is in line with the theorising of studies in the UK 
(Henn et al, 2005; Sloam, 2007) on the weakening of links between political agents and 






Some argue that there is a positive correlation between social capital and youth 
political participation in Southeast Asia (Chang, 2012). In this sense, young people who 
actively participate in political activities, both in electoral or informal approaches, are 
influenced by their strong reciprocal networks, membership of associations and community 
members who are concerned with local affairs (Chang, 2012:14). Many argue that a strong 
agent in mobilising youth for political action is the new media (Zhang and Lallana, 2013; 
Vadrevu and Sun Lim, 2012; Xiaoming Hao et al., 2014). For example, based on a limited 
sample of 397 students from Singaporean universities, Xiaoming Hao et al. (2014), argue 
that online news consumption either through the Internet or social network sites is 
significantly correlated with both online and offline political and civic participation 
amongst Singaporean youth, compared to the consumption of news through the traditional 
media. However, the findings could not be generalised to the whole youth population in 
Singapore due to the limitation in the sample. Zhang and Lallana (2013), in contrast, claim 
that new media function as alternative sources of information and platforms to address 
community issues. However, in heavily censored regimes like Malaysia and Singapore, 
young activists do not have the opportunity to use new media as useful tools to reach the 
public and the government. Thus, such barriers create dissatisfaction among youngsters, 
which later lead them to avoid participating in politics.  
 
 As mentioned above, young people in Southeast Asia seem to be disengaged from 
formal politics, mainly voting and party membership. Amongst the key factors widely used 
for explaining youth participation in this region are socioeconomic status such as religion 
and income, dissatisfaction with political actors and systems and social capital. However, 
there is a relative dearth of research in Southeast Asia investigating the shift of young 
people’s political participation from mainstream politics to new forms of political activity. 
We cannot simply characterise young people as apathetic if they are involved in 
unconventional politics. Instead, they are only apathetic about conventional politics. Thus, 
we argue that many studies on youth political participation in Southeast Asia provide only 
a vague analysis in examining the involvement of young people in institutionalized modes 
but not extra-institutionalized activities like protest, strikes, and petitions. In addition, 
some researchers do not operationalize their studies within the multilevel and multi-
disciplinary framework of political participation, which make them overlook certain 
factors like institutional context, rational choice (cost-benefit analysis) and relative 





2.6 The patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia  
 
The academic literature on Malaysian youth political engagement has started to grow. 
However, most existing literature is concerned with either conventional political 
participation and online activism, including youth voting patterns and behaviours, the issue 
of unregistered voters in several recent elections,13 or the influence of new media on youth 
political engagement. Neither literature provides detailed explanations of youth party 
activism, nor empirical research comprehensively examining youth engagement in elite-
challenging activities. Thus, by using the existing typology of political participation in 
established democracies, we will examine the patterns and when appropriate the provided 
explanations for youth political (dis) engagement in Malaysia.  
 
Explanations for pervasive engagement of young people in elections often relate to 
the advent of digital technology (Norshuhada et al., 2016; Teng and Joo, 2016; Salman and 
Saad, 2015; Samsudin, 2008; Rashila, 2012; Mohd Fuad and Junaidi, 2012a, 2012b; Tan 
Lee Ooi, 2010). For instance, Samsudin (2008) studies how social media and issues raised 
in the electoral campaigns affect the result of the 2008 general election by surveying 8,823 
Malaysian young people aged between 21 to 40 years old. The study finds that social 
media is the main source of information relied on by young people to make an electoral 
decision, particularly among those who are not satisfied with their socioeconomic 
conditions. The methodology used in this study was robust because it had a large and 
representative sample of youth. However, this study did not look at the context of urban 
and rural characteristics, potentially leading to bias in the analysis. Similarly, research by 
Norshuhada et al., (2016) which interviewed a group of 1029 member of Generation Y14  
aged between 15 to 25 years old illustrates findings common to many studies of youth 
online participation. The findings show that social media is the significant tool used by 
Generation Y to voice their views and as a platform to engage in the decision-making 
                                                          
13The numbers of unregistered voters who are eligible to vote in the 2013 General Election were 4.3 million, 
and 70 percent of them were young people. Although there is an increase of 20 percent first time voters in the 
2013 General Election, the numbers of unregistered voters among youth remain high. This shows that many 
Malaysian young people do not exercise their rights as citizens, to determine the future leadership of the 
country. See Mohamed Nawab (2013) for further elaboration. 
 
14 Generation Y or the ‘Millennials’ are those who were born in 1980s and early 1990s. This generation is 
perceived as the most tech savvy group and familiar with communications media and digital technology.  See 
‘Millennials, A Portrait of Generation Next’, Pew Research Centre Report (2010), 





process. By referring to the 2013 general election, they argued that social media has played 
a significant role in facilitating young people’s engagement in the election since it was 
extensively utilised by this generation to gather information, debate, and communicate 
with political leaders. However, another recent study by Teng and Joo (2016) challenges 
the conventional wisdom that social media was a major trigger for youth political activism 
in the 2013 election. Through a limited and unrepresentative online survey of 250 young 
people, the findings revealed that social media, mainly Facebook, has remarkably 
increased political awareness amongst youth, but it does not encourage young people to 
vote since they would still vote even without the media. They also found that young people 
in general use social media for gathering information, rather than participating in online 
political debates or political groups. In this regard, most of the empirical literature on youth 
online participation, irrespective of their optimistic or sceptical stance, based their central 
argumentation of the findings from surveys, except for a few studies that using a 
qualitative approach. However, most of these surveys are not actually representative which 
means we cannot be sure of their findings. As such, this study employs data from 
representative established surveys such as the Asian Barometer and World Values Study.  
 
Other studies have also shown that the role of political leadership is one of the most 
important factors for explaining Malaysian young people’s voting patterns and behaviours 
(Mohd Fuad and Junaidi Awang Besar, 2012a, 2012b; Pandian, 2014a, 2014b). Mohd Fuad 
and Junaidi Awang Besar (2012a), for example, discuss the opinions and needs of the 
young generation in the Muar Parliamentary constituency, by using the questionnaires 
distributed to 1,500 youths. They conclude that youth in Muar want the government to 
satisfy their needs, particularly their economic needs and give them more political 
freedom, as well as freedom of speech. Although this study provides statistical evidence, it 
cannot be generalized across wider young people as it is limited to a specific constituency 
only. Junaidi Awang Besar et al. (2012), however, analyse youth perceptions and criteria 
for the selection of candidates and political parties by looking at the youth population at 
large. Based on the large and representative sample of 13,078 young people, aged between 
21 to 40 years old in different regions in Malaysia, they conclude that young people prefer 
honest and trustworthy candidates in the elections and support a political party who will 
fight for human rights. Similarly, Nazni Noordin et al. (2010) argue that young people vote 
for candidates based on their track records. Those who are ‘clean’ from any scandals, 





young voters to be ‘fence-sitters’, rather than giving loyalty to a particular candidate or 
political party. This argument is supported by the findings of Pandian (2014a) who 
surveyed a limited and unrepresentative sample of 615 students from various universities 
in Malaysia. He concludes that students have indecisive vote proclivities and easily change 
their preferences. To win more votes from them, political leaders need to possess an ideal 
leader’s characteristics such as honesty, ethical principles, knowledge, and authority. This 
raises important questions in this study: do the failures of politicians and parties in 
appreciating young people’s views make them move away from formal politics?  
 
  The most influential explanations for the changing pattern in youth voting 
behaviour is the emergence of civil society movements in Malaysia (Weiss, 2006; Mohd 
Azizuddin, 2009; Francis Loh and Saravanamuttu, 2003; Muhammad Febriansyah and 
Muhammad Takiyuddin, 2013). Particularly, these scholars emphasise the importance of 
civil society as a platform for developing and encouraging youth activism in Malaysia. 
Civil society is increasingly active and powerful since the reformation era in 1998, due to 
the support of youth. According to Francis Loh (in Pandian, 2008), “We have a new set of 
voters—middle class, educated, and those who are exposed to global developments, and 
the use of new technology”. This new set of voters refers to the younger generation who 
are concerned more with democratic ideals, good governance, and human rights. These 
young people are more likely to participate in the civil rights movement due to its loose-
structured, voluntary, ad hoc, and non-ideological organization, which give them more 
freedom to articulate ideas and political issues (Muhammad Febiansyah and Muhammad 
Takiyuddin, 2013). This argument confirms the findings of Samsudin et al. (2012) that 
Malaysian youngsters have shifted from political-oriented participation to civic-oriented 
participation—they are more inclined to become involved and to work with voluntary and 
non-governmental organizations, rather than political parties. This reveals a weakening 
role of political parties in Malaysia and their linkage with society, mainly as seen in young 
people. Yet, there are few empirical works on why young people are disillusioned with the 
political parties, an issue which will be covered in this study. 
 
Instead of focusing on youth voting behaviour, some studies go beyond electoral 
participation by expanding the repertoires analysed to include various conventional 
political activities, including party membership, attending a campaign meeting, and 





showed that young people in Malaysia have a moderate level of political participation by 
examining youth engagement in conventional politics. This study corresponds to the 
argument by Abdul Hadi et al., (2013) that young people’s political engagement in this 
country is at the moderate level as many of them exhibit nonpartisan attitudes. According 
to the findings, based on a limited and representative sample of 417 young people aged 18 
to 40 years old which were randomly selected in three different states in Malaysia (Johor, 
Selangor, and Perak), 65 percent of those young people who were surveyed voted in 
elections, and less than 50 percent of the sample were engaged in a political party, attended 
political meetings and activities. They pointed out that interest in politics is the most 
important cause for youth engagement in politics. At the same time, two agents of political 
socialisation, mainly family and educational institutions, also play significant roles in 
encouraging young people to participate in politics. Since many previous studies in the 
literature are focused only on youth engagement in conventional politics, they cannot 
adequately capture the nuance of the patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia. 
Another recent study by Muhammad Febiansyah and Muhammad Takiyuddin (2016) 
focuses on informal participation of young people in politics prior to the 2013 Malaysian 
general election. Generally, this study has suggested that the repertoires of political action 
for young people broadened during the 2013 general election by highlighting the 
emergence of new social movements and loose-structured youth groups such as Universiti 
Bangsar Utama (UBU) and Occupy Dataran. Whilst this has helped to contribute towards 
our understanding on the activist community, it has done little to account for the lack of 
empirical evidence with respect to the motivations of youth activists and the study of 
young people’s non-participation in general. In fact, their arguments are essentially 
descriptive, based on content analysis, rather than providing statistical evidence. Therefore, 
this thesis provides a detailed analysis of youth political participation in formal and 
informal forms of participation and intentionally focuses on both participation and non-
participation. 
 
 Based on the discussion above, young people in Malaysia are shown to be 
politically inactive in conventional forms of participation, including voting and party 
activism, and to some extent refuse to register as voters. Although the issue of the 
abstention of young people in politics deserves serious attention from researchers, they 
focus mainly on the swing of the Malaysian youth’s votes from the ruling coalition to the 





Malaysians conceptualise ‘politics’ and political participation. There is a relative dearth of 
good empirical data and specific youth-oriented studies to pinpoint the participation of 
young Malaysians in both elite-directed and elite-challenging forms of participation. In 
terms of the methodological approach, most existing literature used either qualitative or 
quantitative data, rather than employing a mixed-methods approach in understanding 
young people’s politics. Thus, this study aims to fill these gaps and weaknesses of earlier 
studies by providing a systematic analysis of the patterns of youth political participation in 
Malaysia and construct a more comprehensive model of participation and non-
participation. 
 
2.7 A theoretical framework in explaining youth participation and non- 
participation in Malaysia  
 
Having reviewed empirical evidence on youth political (dis) engagement in different 
contexts such as established democracies, Southeast Asia, and Malaysia specifically, it is 
now possible to assess different models of participation by offering some initial comments 
on their strengths and weaknesses so that we can develop an alternative theoretical 
framework which would help to explain and understand youth (dis) engagement in 
Malaysia. In examining several models, this study goes back to Hirschman’s framework of 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (EVL) which mapped out the ways that people respond to 
organisational change.  
 
Albert Hirschman in his seminal work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to 
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970), came out with a useful interpretative 
framework for understanding different individual behaviour in response to a decline in the 
quality of an organisation or a product. Although this model originally was proposed for 
market-based solutions, it has been applied in a wide range of subject areas, including 
comparative politics (Dowding et al., 2000), the collapse of East Germany (Gehlbach, 
2006), local governments (Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog, 1992), as well as protest and 
revolutions (Pfaff, 2006; Hirschman, 1993).  
 
To be specific, this theoretical framework is constituted by three elements: Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty. Exit is defined as a decision to leave the organisation or not to buy a 





or organisational strategy (Hirschman, 1970). When facing a decline in a quality of a 
product or an organisation, individuals have three options: they can either ‘exit’ the 
organisation and not buy the product, use ‘voice’ to express their discontentment and 
express ‘loyalty’ by staying silent instead of complaining. The individual decision to exit 
or to use voice is closely related to the cost-benefit calculation (benefits outweigh the 
costs) of the rational choice approach. In addition, Hirschman (1970:77) defines the 
Loyalty as ‘a special attachment to an organisation’ which denotes the willingness to trade-
off between the certainties of exit against the uncertainty that their voice might lead to 
improvements (Dowding and John, 2012:13). According to Pfaff (2006), Hirschman’s 
framework of Exit, Voice and Loyalty is a combination of economic action (exit), political 
action (voice) and a sociological factor (loyalty) in understanding how individuals respond 
to the decline of quality in an organisation. In this respect, Gehlbach (2006) has extended 
the element of Loyalty by linking it with the concept of Silence, which can be manifested 
in two ways—apathy and enforced silence. Apathy occurs when apathetic individuals see 
no reasons to exit or to voice their concerns as they are satisfied and accepts the status quo. 
On the other hand, enforced silence comes about when the organisation suppresses the 
voice of its members, which leaves no option for them but to accept the status quo 
(Gehlbach, 2006). In other words, individuals are forced into silence and to accept the 
status quo because they have been denied the rights to exit or voice.  
 
In addition, Hirschman (1993) himself applied this framework in the case of East 
Germany (GDR) by showing that the emigration of people and the rise of democratisation 
protests were present at the same time, and this led to the collapse of communism in the 
GDR. This finding challenged his original thesis that the relationship between exit and 
voice are mutually exclusive and work against each other. Therefore, he reiterated the 
relationship between exit and voice by arguing that exit and voice can work in ‘hand in 
hand’, and reinforce one another (Hirschman, 1993). Similarly, Pfaff (2006) explores 
further this framework by combining it with collective action literature. He argues that 
‘exit’ often is the more attractive option than ‘voice’, since the use of voice involves such a 
high cost compared to exit. However, protests in East Germany were initiated and 
sustained due to the role played by resilient social movements in mobilising the people. In 
this regard, these strong social movements managed to survive whilst many people who 






Hirschman’s framework is particularly useful in this study because of its capability 
to combine different subject areas, including economic, political, and sociological 
approaches for understanding individual behaviour. Many subsequent works that applied 
this framework tended to focus mainly on political participation in the context of 
emigration and non-emigration. However, this study employs the same logic in the 
different setting by linking the framework of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in the case of youth 
political participation in an authoritarian regime, particularly Malaysia. More precisely, 
this study uses this framework to reach a greater understanding of young Malaysians’ 
decisions to engage or disengage from politics, mainly whether they are disengaged from 
‘elite-directed’ politics and shifting to ‘elite-challenging’ forms of participation, or if they 
are politically apathetic citizens. Drawing on this framework, therefore, we build on our 
own interpretation of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, as follows: Exit refers to the decision made 
by young people to disengage from both elite-directed (voting and party membership) and 
elite-challenging forms of political activism (contentious politics) in response to their 
dissatisfaction with the regime. Young people use Voice to express their dissatisfaction 
about the existing status quo through their involvement in high-cost political activities, 
such as protests, party membership, NGOs and perhaps, electoral participation. In terms of 
Loyalty, we employ Gehlbach’s concept of Silence (2006) by relating apathetic silence 
with those young people who are not complaining but rather support the status quo, abides 
the rule by participating in elite-directed activity and they see no reasons to engage in voice 
or exit. This can also be understood from the perspective of the general incentives model. 
On the other hand, enforced silence refers to those young people who are discontented with 
the regime, but have no choice but to accept the status quo because their opportunity to 
exit or voice have been ‘blocked’ by the regime. This suggests that political disengagement 
(exit) rather than voice, becomes a more attractive option for many young people in semi-
democratic regime like Malaysia because they perceive the costs or the risks of 
participation as very high and outweighing the benefits. However, these unsatisfied young 
people may simultaneously be in a group of enforced silence, since their rights to exit or to 
use voice are denied by the regime. It also suggested that exit and voice can work in 
tandem or reinforce one another, as argued by Hirschman (1993) and Pfaff (2006). 
Therefore, this thesis used these models (see Table 2.2) below as expected factors to 







Table 2.2 Models to explain youth political participation in Malaysia  
Model Key Studies Variables 






Rational Choice Downs (1957), Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968), 
Whiteley and Seyd (2002) 
Cost and benefits  
Selective incentives 
The Social Psychological 
Model 
Niemi, Craig and Mattei 
(1991), Klandermans 
(2007), Gurr (1970) 
Political Attitudes 
Relative Deprivation 
The Mobilization Agencies Rosenstone and Hansen 




Institutional Context  
 
  
Kriesi et al. (1995), Giugni 
(2007), Hibbs (1973), 
Klandermans et al. (2014), 




Normalisation of protest 
State Repression 
 
2.7.1 The civic voluntarism model  
 
The most widespread model for an explanation of political participation is the civic 
voluntarism model. The civic voluntarism model proposed by Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady (1995) was developed by moving beyond the standard socioeconomic model (SES) 
to explain political participation. The scholars establish the later version of the model by 
combining resources, engagement, and recruitment to provide more answers for non-
participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Resources refer to the time, cost, and 
civic skills of individuals to participate. Engagement, on the other hand, is an individual’s 
sense of political efficacy, political information, political interest, and partisanship that 
facilitate them to participate. Recruitment is considered in terms of social networks in 
mobilizing citizen’s participation. Thus, having the necessary resources, motivation to 
participate, and being approached by individuals who are actively connected with political 
process tend to have a higher level of political participation. Many researchers have 
suggested that well-educated young people are more likely to engage in politics than their 
less educated counterparts because they have ample time, money, and access to political 





civic orientations are also one of the factors motivating participation. Individuals’ civic 
orientations can be developed through political socialization—the process by which 
individuals acquire political attitude, values, and ideas through transmission from agencies 
such as family, peer groups, educational system and political institutions in a given society 
(Almond and Verba, 1963). Therefore, political socialisation involves such a life-long 
process through interactions in family, workplace, and broader social environments etc. 
Abrams and Little (1965), for example, find that family socialization is clearly apparent 
among young party members where many came from highly politicized families.  
 
2.7.2 Rational choice theory  
 
Rational choice, which is derived from the work of economists, is another important theory 
in explaining political behaviour, mainly in the field of voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 
1968; Uhlaner, 1989; Whiteley, 1995). Based on the seminal work of Downs, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957)15, the central premise of this theory is that 
individuals are rational decision-makers as they are able to make political decisions based 
on their own judgments by weighing up the alternatives available to them, with the aim of 
increasing either pleasure or profit. In other words, individuals will only vote in elections if 
the perceived benefits of voting outweigh the costs associated with voting or the so-called 
‘calculus of voting’. For example, individuals will vote for a political party which in their 
opinion will deliver policies that bring most benefit to them. Therefore, actors in politics, 
either parties or voters, will try to maximise their advantage in any situation at the 
minimum cost. According to Clarke et al., (2004), there are three main elements in the 
calculus of voting. First, pivotality is the calculated probability of casting a deciding vote 
that allows a most preferred (utility providing) party to win and prevents a less preferred 
party (less-utility providing) from doing so. This simply refers to the calculation of 
whether casting an individual vote will make a difference. Thus, voters must be informed 
about the background of the elections, including the electoral system, the size of the 
electorate and the degree of party competition (Blais, 2000). Second, the ultimate aim of 
voters is to gain as much benefits or ‘utility income’ by seeking to determine which of the 
                                                          
15According to Downs (1957:6), a rational individual is one who follows such behaviours: (1) s/he can 
always make a decision when confronted with a range of alternatives. (2) s/he ranks all the alternatives facing 
her/him in order of her/his preferences in such a way that each is either preferred to, or indifferent to, or 
inferior to each other. (3) her/his preference ranking is transitive (4) s/he always chooses from among the 
possible alternatives that which ranks highest in his preference ordering. (5) s/he always makes the same 





competing party has implemented or proposed policies that will be of most benefit to them. 
To determine this, the voters may look at parties’ past records as a guide to what the future 
might bring if that party holds the power. Third, voters need to assess the costs of voting, 
mainly the time to gather such information to make an informed choice and the time 
needed to cast the ballots.  
 
However, this theory faces a problem, called ‘the paradox of participation’ (Olson, 
1965). This lies in the fact that rational actors will not participate in collective actions in 
order to achieve common goods (Whiteley, 1995). Amongst the criticisms are: first, the 
benefits that might be received by individuals from the electoral outcome (policies) would 
be enjoyed whether the individual participate or not since all public goods are accessible to 
everyone, even to those who are not participating in politics, or the ‘free-rider’ problem. 
Thus, as argued by Franklin (2004), the only rational reason for an individual to participate 
is to gain the non-material benefits, or civic virtues. Second, individuals prefer to abstain 
from participation when they think that the probability of making a difference is small, 
even if the benefits are large. Political activities, such as protest and party activism entail 
such high costs, but the rewards of participation are less than the costs associated with 
these acts. Therefore, many people choose not to participate in collective actions. Finally, 
it is difficult to argue that individuals act rationally in all circumstances since they may 
have limited intellectual capacity to process large amounts of information and less interest 
in politics. To be specific, an individual may choose to participate in a political action, not 
because of the benefits, but because they are reluctant to wait for a better opportunity 
which may or may not come. These criticisms do not mean that this theory cannot be used 
as a tool to explain political participation. Instead, this theory has been developed by Seyd 
and Whiteley (1992) in the general incentives model to include individual, groups and 
social norms benefits that people obtain when they participate. The key argument of this 
theory is that individuals are motivated to participate in politics because of incentives. This 
theory goes beyond Olson’s model of rational choice by focusing on a wide range of 
incentives, rather than confined to individual incentives as proposed in rational choice 
theory. Although Olson’s model is criticised for being inadequate to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of why people join a political party, the central premise of 
Olson’s argument that individuals need incentives to engage in political activities is 
accepted. In this regard, the general incentives model places greater emphasis on perceived 





There are several categorizations of incentives that might stimulate individual’s 
interest to join a political party, as divided by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). The first category 
of incentives is known as ‘selective incentives’—benefits that individuals would get from 
participating. Selective incentives can be divided into two types: outcome, and process. 
Outcome incentives refer to an individual’s desire to participate in achieving certain 
individual goals, such as developing a political career or to achieve political office. 
Process incentives describe the motives for political engagement coming from the process 
of participation itself. For example, the opportunity to meet like-minded people and be 
involved in group activities can be considered as a benefit gained from activism. As 
selective incentives put greater emphasis on material rewards, such incentives are more 
applicable to party activists who have private interest such as to get well-paid jobs and 
political office (Whiteley, 1995) compared to social movement activists who are less likely 
to have interest in personal rewards (Melucci, 1995). Another incentive also included in 
process incentives is ideological incentives (intangible rewards) where individuals are 
drawn to political activism because they are driven by ideological reasons. All these 
incentives lie outside of Olson’s theory of rational choice that individuals will weigh out 
the costs and benefits before participating. However, Seyd and Whiteley (1992) believe 
that individuals might be politically active citizens, not necessarily because of individual 
benefits, but of collective incentives—referring to the collective or policy goals of a party. 
To be specific, a political party is seen as a means to implement the policies they favour or 
to oppose the policy goals of other parties. In addition, Seyd and Whiteley (1992) also put 
forward the idea of altruism—referring to emotional attachment such as a sense of loyalty 
for a party as another inducement for individuals to engage in political actions. Finally, this 
model also fills the vacuum of rational choice theory by adding another set of factors that 
explain political participation, which are the social norms motives relating to an 
individual’s desire to conform to certain norms in society, such as family pressure and peer 
approval. The incentives model postulates all-encompassing factors in predicting high-cost 
types of political activism, including social movements. However, this model has been 
criticised for its methodology, particularly the heavy reliance on survey data in explaining 









2.7.3 The social psychological model  
 
This theoretical approach is pertinent not only for explaining individual political 
behaviour, but also plays a crucial role in influencing collective action such as protest 
activism and social movement participation (Klandermans, 2007; Schussman and Soule, 
2005). The underlying theory focuses on the relationship between attitudes and behaviours. 
Behaviour, as argued by Fishbein (1967), can be determined by two broad classes of 
factors: expected benefits and social norms. In particular, individuals take into 
consideration the benefits of different actions, while society provides a set of standards and 
expectations which motivates individuals to behave in certain ways (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1969). Individuals will participate if they believe their participation will bring them 
benefits. However, without some degree of perceived efficacy: individuals’ beliefs about 
their competence to make a difference (Niemi, Craig and Mattei, 1991), individuals will 
not participate. Social norms, on the other hand, could be divided into private norms and 
public norms. Private norms refer to the values that individuals bring to their actions (eg. 
individuals participate in protest when they feel that the system is unjust), while public 
norms are related to the attitudes of other people whose views are important for their 
participation (eg. approval and disapproval of other people towards certain actions or 
behaviour).  
 
The core ideas of this theory have been widely applied by scholars of social 
movements. For instance, Gurr (1970) emphasises that the socio-psychological grievances 
of individuals, particularly the relative deprivation—feelings of frustration relative to their 
expectations of what they should have are important to make sense of why individuals 
participate in a protest. When people cannot bear the burden of intensifying deprivation 
and higher grievances, they will engage in collective behaviour (Buechler, 2007), and 
become active participants in protest to fight the political regime (Farah et al., 1979; 
Dalton, 1988). As emotions are particularly important in motivating protest, Klandermans 
et al. (2008) classified emotions into ‘approach’ (anger and frustration) and ‘avoidance’ 
(worry and fear). In this regard, those who feel that their group is weak are more likely to 
experience ‘avoidance’ emotions which in turn demotivate them from protest and vice 
versa. The socio-psychological approach also takes into account motivations of 
participation so called as ‘motivational dynamics’ (Klandermans, 2004:361). By 





(2007), emphasises three fundamental motives for why people participate in a movement: 
Instrumental, identity and ideology. Instrumental motives are based on rational choice 
approaches of selective and collective incentives, denoting an effort to influence the 
political decision-making or social environment. In contrast, identity refers to sense of 
belonging or identification to a valued group, and ideology simply means an expression of 
one’s views or in the pursuit for meaning (Klandermans, 2007:361).  
 
2.7.4 The importance of mobilizing agencies  
 
Many studies emphasise the importance of mobilizing agencies (social networks and 
organizations) for political participation (Putnam, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; 
Stolle, 2007). For example, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Russell (2005), and Norris 
(2002) highlight the role of mobilizing agents, such as political parties, interest groups, 
civic groups, media, and churches in inducing people to participate. Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) differentiate political mobilization between direct and indirect mobilization. 
The former involves interaction between political elites and citizens via TV campaigning, 
direct mails, and street canvassing; the latter is mobilization through social networks. 
Putnam (2000), on the other hand, believes that greater interactions may help to create 
civic networks, building social trust, and reinforcing collective relationships—social 
capital. So, the weakening of social networks within society and linkage between the state 
and individual, are understood to lead to the decreasing of political participation levels.  
 
Instead of looking at political mobilization as a source of social capital, social 
movement scholars view social networks as strong predictors of participation both at the 
individual and the collective levels (Diani, 2007; Kriesi, 1993; Snow et al., 1980). For 
instance, based on the comparative study of the Hare Krishna and Nichiren Shoshu 
organizations, Snow et al. (1980) conclude that the success of movement recruitment 
depends on the structure of that movement (public or closed), links to other groups and 
social ties (family and kin). Diani (2007), in contrast, provides a much broader discussion 
of social networks, by analysing the overall level of collective action in a whole 
population. He argues that an individual who has strong personal networks and participates 
in multiple organizations is more likely to be involved in collective actions, political 
protest, and counter cultural activities. This model clearly connects agencies or outside 





However, as argued by Klandermans (1984), it gives little credence to the role of emotions 
such as the feelings of grievances and consciousness in the mobilization process.  
 
2.7.5 The institutional context   
 
This perspective has been widely applied not only to the case of voting (Powell, 1982; 
Lijphart, 1999; Karp and Banducci, 2008) and political organisations (Morales, 2009), but 
also to the role of institutional frameworks on non-institutionalised political activities like 
demonstrating, boycotting, and signing a petition. For instance, some studies find out that a 
higher level of democratic development contributes to the increase in non-electoral 
participation (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier, 2010). Other studies that have developed 
Lijphart’s model of consociationalism have discovered that the constitutional system (the 
culture of inclusion, consensus, and efficacy) has attenuated non-electoral activities 
(Weldon and Dalton, 2010). In contrast, Grasso and Giugni (2016), combining grievance 
theories alongside political opportunity approaches to explain differential protest, find that 
individuals who feel more deprived due to the economic crisis in more generous welfare 
states have a greater tendency to protest than those who feel less deprived. Thus, it is 
worthwhile to conduct further research into the contextual or macro-level explanation of 
political participation, mainly the theory of political opportunity structure (POS) from the 
social movement literature (McAdam, 1999; Tilly, 1995; Tarrow, 1998).  
 
The POS, according to Tarrow (1998:76), is the formal and informal characteristics 
of the state and politics that provide incentives for citizens to undertake non-electoral 
activism. The more the government provides opportunities for people to participate in 
public affairs, the more there will be greater citizen activism. For Koopmans (2004:65), 
opportunities are “options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, 
which depend on factors outside the mobilizing group”. McAdam (1996) has emphasized 
four dimensions of POS, as follows: (1) the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of the elite; (3) the presence 
or absence of elite allies; (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. However, 
this thesis only focuses on two dimensions of POS, the openness and closure of 
institutional structure and state repression. Building on Tarrow’s ‘state-centred 
perspective’, Kriesi et al. (1995) propose two conceptual sets of institutional structures: the 





opportunity structure. One of the remedies offered to encourage citizens to participate is 
institutional engineering or changing the degree of institutional accessibility of the political 
system. According to Kriesi et al. (1995:28), the openness of the political system “implies 
a multiplication of state actors and, therefore, of points of access and decision making”. 
Thus, scholars make a distinction between strong and weak states.16 Strong states refer to 
the powerful central authority that has a limited degree of access, but a high capacity to act. 
Thus, it will limit the opportunity for individuals to participate in all non-electoral politics. 
Weak states, on the other hand, have a decentralised institutional design that has a greater 
degree of access, but has a limited capacity to act (Kriesi, 2007). As a result, individuals 
are prone to participate more in extra-institutional activities when states open greater 
opportunities for them.  
 
Kriesi et al. (1995) introduce the cultural models of POS under a notion of 
prevailing strategies and discursive opportunity structures (DOS). Prevailing strategies 
refer to the approaches use by political actors to deal with the challenges or political 
dissents (Koopmans and Kriesi, 1995). The two prevailing strategies are exclusive 
(repressive, confrontational, and polarizing) and integrative (facilitative, cooperative, and 
assimilative). In this regard, as Malaysia is considered as a semi-democratic country, thus 
we can expect that the regime in Malaysia often uses ‘exclusive’ prevailing strategies to 
deal with dissent. The use of ‘exclusive’ prevailing strategies by the Malaysian regime on 
dissenters may indirectly affect youth political participation. Some studies show that state 
repression has cumulative effects on political participation (e.g. Hibbs, 1973; Khawaja, 
1993; Gurr, 1970). For example, Hibbs (1973) finds that state repression has a negative 
effect on dissent because individuals are expected to participate in politics when the 
benefits are greater than the costs (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Clarke et al., 2004). 
Therefore, any increase in costs may lead to dissent disintegration and constrain citizens 
from participating in collective actions. Deprivation theory, however, makes the opposite 
claim by mentioning that state repression could generate ‘collective frustration’, which in 
turn escalates dissidents’ interest in putting more pressure on the regime so dissenters can 
survive (Gurr, 1970). From this perspective, repression can be seen to encourage dissent. 
                                                          
16These categorizations are in line with Lijphart’s (1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensus 
democracies. Majoritarian democracies mean political powers are concentrated within and between 
institutions, have a greater capacity to act even with limited institutional accessibility. Consensus 
democracies, on the other hand, refers to the democratic systems which divide political power between 






In this thesis, however, our own argument aligns with Hibbs’s view that state repression 
discourages citizens’ participation. We argued that state repression through implementation 
of existing criminal laws and violent repression inhibit young people in Malaysia from 
actively engaging in politics. 
 
 On the other hand, DOS is the combination of POS and social movement framing 
(Snow, 2007), specifically to understand which collective action frames are more likely to 
mobilize citizens’ involvement in collective actions (McCammon, 2013). According to 
Benford and Snow (2000:614), collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs 
and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement 
organization. These frames may function as comprehensive structures, determining the 
orientations and activities of different movements (Vicari, 2010). These are known as 
“master frames”. Framing is also an ongoing process which concerns itself with the 
construction of meanings and interpretations.  
 
One of the intrinsic features of the framing process is the construction of collective 
identity. Taylor and Whittier (1992:105) define collective identity as “the shared definition 
of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences and solidarity”, or a 
shared sense of ‘we-ness’ (Snow, 2001). Based on these definitions, it can be argued that 
collective identity is located within the aggregate level, rather than in individuals per se. 
According to Melucci (1995:44-45), collective identity is an interactive and shared 
definition produce by several individuals through shared repeated interactions. To simplify, 
he claims that collective identity is a process that involves: cognitive definitions regarding 
the objectives, ideology, means, and field of actions; network of active relationships 
among actors: and a certain degree of emotions. Collective identity is constructed by 
boundaries, negotiation, and consciousness (Taylor and Whittier, 1992; Hunt and Benford, 
2007). By providing an analytical argument of collective identity in the context of 
micromobilization of participation, Hunt and Benford (2007) show how collective 
identities resulted in commitment and solidarity building, biographical transformation, and 
the creation of a counterattack as well as social control.  
 
Additionally, the openness and opportunities provided by the political system also 
give rise to normalisation and non-normalisation of collective actions. For instance, due to 





Western democracies have progressively accepted and normalised street protest as a basic 
democratic right of the people. Rather than using repressive actions against the 
demonstrators, political elites prefer to negotiate and cooperate with them. The growth of 
action groups and the legitimacy of street protests have lead many citizens from all 
sections of the society to become mobilised (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Van Aelst and 
Walgrave (2001), however, find that the group underrepresented in protest is those who 
have low levels of education. This finding supports the argument that less educated people 
tend to have fewer resources for mobilisation (Verba et al., 1995). Klandermans et al. 
(2014) in their study of affiliated and unaffiliated participants in street demonstrations in 
seven European countries, point out that most of the demonstrators are not affiliated with 
any organizations, but they are primarily mobilised via an open channel (mass media and 
personal network) and motivated to participate because of anger.  
 
Having discussed these competitive models of political participation allows us to 
have preliminary arguments on which of these models appear to be empirically most useful 
for explaining youth (dis) engagement in Malaysia. It is clear that these models do add 
value to explaining political participation. However, relying on a single model would only 
allow a limited outlook. Since there is a notable lack of empirical evidence that supports 
the relevance of these models for the case of youth political participation in Malaysia, the 
investigation in this thesis assumes that a combination of these models will constitute the 
most promising framework for developing explanations of youth participation and non-
participation in this country. In Chapters 4 to 9, we will discuss the empirical results of the 
analyses in relation to the theoretical insights from these theories and discuss which 





This chapter sought to critically review the key literature on youth political participation in 
established democracies, Southeast Asia, and Malaysia. There are two important 
conclusions that can be drawn from the review. Firstly, the subject of youth political 
participation has been broadly researched in established democracies. Second, scholarship 
on this subject has recently also grown in Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia. However, 





approach in addressing the patterns of young Malaysians’ political participation in both 
elite-directed and elite-challenging forms of political activism. Moreover, given the lack of 
research on youth participation and non-participation in Malaysia, therefore this thesis sets 
out to fill these important gaps in the literature by using a mixed-methods approach to 
answer research questions. In addition, this chapter also discusses theoretical arguments 
building on the critical analyses of theoretical approaches to the explanation of 
participation: the civic voluntarism, the social psychological, rational choice approaches, 
mobilising agencies, and the institutional context. In this way, we can build a 
comprehensive model that allows us to investigate why young Malaysians (dis) engage 
from politics, and to examine whether they exhibit distinctive factors relative to young 



















This chapter provides an explicit overview of the research methodology and design 
adopted in this thesis. The first section discusses the research design used in this research, 
including the case study approach and its rationale. The chapter then explains the ‘mixed-
methods’ strategy—the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches—by 
focusing on the rationale for using this approach, including ethical and practical issues. To 
be specific, this chapter also elucidates in detail the quantitative and qualitative techniques 
used in the research. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the limitations of the 
research design, including the issues of reliability and validity of this study. 
 
3.2 Research paradigm  
 
We should first mention the philosophical assumptions including the epistemology and 
ontological positions that underpin this research as they will later determine the research 
strategy employed. The basis of the research paradigm of this study emerged from the 
pragmatic approach (Peirce, 1878 [1997]; James, 1981 [1907]; Dewey, 1948 [1920]), 
which is oriented towards solving practical problems in the real world (Feilzer, 2010:8). 
This implies both objective and subjective points of view as the epistemology, and the 
ontological belief that external reality can be accepted (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). The 
pragmatist approach is more concerned with research questions rather than the worldview 
or the method that is supposed to underlie research. As the purpose of research is to find 
the solutions to real-world problem, it is important to choose ‘what works’ (Howe, 1988) 
to address research questions, so that it may produce desired outcomes. This research 
adopted pragmatism as its research paradigm because it required an in depth and implicit 
understanding of youths’ attitudes towards politics. However, this research embraced a 





because they are subjected to statistical assumptions and analyses of the relationships 
between variables. This led to the implementation of a mixed-methods approach 
integrating qualitative and quantitative analyses.  
 
3.3 Research strategy: a mixed-methods approach  
 
The research strategy is a strategy of inquiry (Creswell, 2003) which translates ontological 
and epistemological assumptions into research procedures and designs (Sarantakos, 2005). 
It seeks to answer the question of how to investigate the research questions or how 
knowledge may be gained. There are two distinctive and common research strategies: 
qualitative and quantitative. 
 
Quantitative research methodology is strongly associated with the positivist 
research paradigm, and principally uses the scientific approach to study social phenomena. 
This type of research emphasises numerical data gathering and analysing this data using 
statistical methods; it has an objectivist view on social reality and it measures the variables 
and tests hypotheses or theories that are linked to general causal explanations (Bryman, 
2012; Sarantakos, 2005; and Creswell, 2003). Additionally, quantitative methods are 
synonymous with deductive, confirmatory or ‘top-down’ approaches where the researcher 
moves from a theory to hypotheses to data to support or contradict the theory (Creswell 
and Plano Clark, 2007). The data collection techniques employed are primarily surveys, 
experimental studies, and quasi-experimental research. 
 
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, are naturalistic. They attempt to interpret 
phenomena based on the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
Similarly, Merriam (2009:13) defines qualitative research as uncovering “how people 
make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world”. Thus, qualitative 
researchers have engaged themselves directly in society to observe people and their social 
interactions. There are several features of qualitative research: it belongs to the interpretive 
school of thought, it has a subjective view of social reality, is flexible and uses an inductive 
approach.  
 
Over the last few decades, another alternative mode of inquiry known as the mixed-





and qualitative approaches. A mixed-methods approach has been recognised as a ‘third 
paradigm’ (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Denscombe, 2008; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998) since it has evolved into an increasingly accepted approach that is widely used by 
researchers, particularly those who believe that quantitative and qualitative standpoints are 
both relevant to analyse their research questions  
 
Mixed-methods (Cresswell, 2003) has also been referred to as a multi-strategy 
(Bryman, 2012), mixed methodology (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), qualitative and 
quantitative methods (Fielding and Fielding, 1986), integrative research (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004), and a third major research paradigm (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and 
Turner, 2007) in political research. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007:5) define mixed-
methods as, “... the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination, provide 
a better understanding of research problems that either approach alone”. Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2010:5), on the other hand, indicate mixed-methods as “The broad inquiry 
logic that guides the selection of specific methods and that is informed by conceptual 
positions common to mixed-methods practitioners”. Based on these definitions, mixed 
method is an integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches in collecting and 
analysing data. There are several characteristics of a mixed-methods approach, as 
highlighted by its advocates (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998). First, it uses both quantitative and qualitative within the same research project. 
Second, mixed-method is a research method that clearly stipulates the sequencing and 
greater emphasis is given to the qualitative and quantitative elements of the data collection. 
Finally, this method adopts pragmatism as a research philosophical stance.  
 
3.3.1 The rationale for applying mixed-methods  
 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in the thesis is based on several 
reasons. Firstly, mixed-methods research was adopted in data collection and analysis as a 
tool for triangulation. Triangulation entails the study of one phenomenon using the 
integration of different methodologies (Denzin, 1989). In particular, triangulation is used to 
verify and corroborate the findings of qualitative (semi-structured interviews) with 
quantitative data (existing survey data). Triangulating improves “the validity and reliability 
of research or evaluation of findings (Golafshani, 2003:603). Jick (1979) identifies some 





overcomes the flaws in one single approach by counterbalancing with the strength of 
another; it enriches data and helps to expose contradictions. Secondly, a mixed-methods 
approach in this thesis was used to gain in breadth, depth and enrich understanding of 
youth political participation in Malaysia. According to Bryman (2007), a reason for 
combining quantitative and qualitative approaches is to obtain a holistic interpretation that 
integrates the findings of different methods. For example, in this thesis, the quantitative 
data provide statistical analyses on the patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia. 
On the other hand, qualitative data provide more refined explanations in respondents’ own 
words, including in their subjective conceptualisations, of why young people tend to 
engage and disengage from politics. Finally, using mixed-methods in this study helped to 
offset the weakness of using each approach on its own in order to minimise bias. For 
instance, quantitative methods have the ability to generalise the result to many cases, but 
are weaker for making sense of the understandings of an individual. Thus, using mixed-
methods is another way to compensate for the relative strengths and weakness associated 
with particular qualitative and quantitative methodologies. 
 
Applying a mixed-methods approach in youth political participation research is not 
wholly new. Many researchers in established democracies have adopted this form of 
methodology to avoid discrepancies between how researchers and young people perceive 
politics (Henn et al., 2005; Sloam, 2007). For example, Sloam (2007) and Henn et al. 
(2002) use mixed-methods, specifically focus groups and surveys, to understand young 
people’s political participation in Britain. However, none of the researchers implement a 
mixed-methods approach in their studies of youth political engagement in Malaysia. They 
choose to use one method, either qualitative or quantitative, mainly because the mixed-
methods design can be complex, taking up time and resources.  
 
3.3.2 Types of mixed-method  
 
In mixed-methods research, there are three ways for how qualitative and quantitative 
elements should be used in a single study, particularly on whether they can be integrated, 
combined, or used in parallel. Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner, (2007) develop three 
broad classifications of mixed-methods research, also known as ‘three research paradigms’ 
(see Figure 3.1), which is useful to understand the relationship between qualitative and 





qualitative and quantitative approaches have an equal status, which means the researchers 
use the philosophical logic of mixed-methods and equally emphasise the qualitative and 
quantitative data, methodologies, or research questions. Secondly, the qualitative dominant 
approach is a type of mixed-methods research which relies heavily on a qualitative study, 
but concurrently acknowledges the addition of quantitative data or approaches which 
complement and improve the research project. Another typology of mixed-methods 
research is quantitative dominant, where research relies heavily on a quantitative study, but 
concurrently acknowledges the addition of qualitative data or approaches which 
complement and improve the research project. Based on this classification, this study can 
be considered as ‘quantitative dominant’, where the quantitative approach is the core of 
this thesis, but qualitative data is added to check for consistent findings and to provide 





Figure 3.1 Three major research paradigms of mixed-methods research  
 (Source: Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner, 2007:124) 
 
3.4 Research design: country selection   
 
Research design is essential and helps to achieve the objectives of the work. It is a 
systematic plan or structure for the entire research process, from conceptualizing a problem 





(Creswell, 2007). Purposely, research design ensures that the evidence acquired enables us 
to answer the primary question as explicitly as possible (De Vaus, 2001). As Yin (1989:26) 
argues, 
 
Research design is a logical plan for getting from here to there, where here may be 
defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there are some set of 
conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between “here” and “there” may be 
found a number of major steps, including the collection and analysis of relevant 
data.  
 
In other words, research design provides a logical framework for choosing suitable 
research methods, and for deciding how data will be gathered and analysed to answer the 
initial questions. Thus, the first step in designing research is to understand the fundamental 
purpose of this research, whether it is exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory research 
(Burns and Bush, 2002; McNabb, 2004; Yin, 2003).17 The main aim of this research is to 
examine the patterns of participation and attitudes of young Malaysians towards politics. 
Thus, an explanatory research approach is implemented in this research because we want 
to identify the characteristics and factors spurring youth engagement or disengagement 
with politics. An explanatory research sets out to account for descriptive information by 
emphasising ‘why’ questions, and trying to understand the reasons for attitudes, motives, 
values, or causal relationships in particular social phenomena (De Vaus, 2001). In other 
words, it attempts to provide a comprehensive account of why and how a certain event 
happens. To provide logical explanations of this research, a case study approach is 
employed as a research design. 
  
Yin (2003:13) defines a case study as, “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life-context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. This definition can be 
challenged in that a case study not only deals with the contemporary phenomenon, but past 
phenomena are also taken into consideration. Robson (2002:178) claims that the case study 
“... involves empirical investigations of a particular phenomenon within a real-life context 
using multiple source of evidence.” On the other hand, some argue that a case study is a 
                                                          
17Descriptive research helps to describe a phenomenon by providing answers to the questions of who, what, 
when, where and how. On the other hand, Exploratory research is well-suited for a researcher who has little 
understanding of why the instance happened as as it did or has less information on how research issues have 





holistic approach, the idea that social phenomenon should be studied as a whole instead of 
a sum of their parts (Stoecker, 1991). A case study approach is preferred in this research 
based on several justifications. First, this approach enables us to focus on explaining 
phenomena within one country (Denscombe, 1998). In this context, it is important to 
examine why young people in Malaysia engage in or disengage from political activities. 
Thus, the case study approach allows us to provide a detailed understanding of the 
complex relationships within the unit of analysis. In addition, a case study is an intensive 
approach, which produces systematic detail on a certain phenomenon. By using a case 
study method, this study explores the real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual 
analysis of a limited number of events and relationships (Yin, 1984) and uses the 
researcher’s ability to ‘verstehen’ (Gummesson, 1988). However, the case study approach 
can be criticized as it provides less scientific generalisation since it deals with a single 
country primarily (Yin, 1984). However, in this case we felt that the choice to focus on 
Malaysia and analyse it in detail provided greater benefits to the research given constraints 
of time and resources for this project. These are detailed below.  
 
3.4.1 The selection of Malaysia   
 
As stated above, the aim of this research was to provide an empirical analysis of the 
diverging patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia. In particular, we aim to 
understand whether patterns of engagement parallel those in established democracies or 
rather exhibit unique characteristics that need to be explained with reference to the more 
specific features of a semi-democratic political system. This study investigates those 
factors influencing the attitudes of Malaysian youth’s political participation toward ‘elite-
directed’ and ‘elite-challenging’ forms of political participation and the impacts of their 
political (dis) engagement about Malaysia’s democracy. Thus, the study of youth political 
participation in Malaysia represents a unique case where young Malaysians were the focus 
of this case study.  
 
Why Malaysia? There are four major reasons for concentrating on Malaysia: first, 
Malaysia has a unique feature where ethnicity is the basis of Malaysian politics: many 
political parties are ethnically-based, and the vote sharply delineates Malaysian politics 
along racial lines as the country’s population consists of three different main ethnic groups, 





attitudes and political participation trends of youth. For example, the Bersih 4.0 rally was 
dominated by ethnic-Chinese who protested against Najib’s administration. Secondly, 
Malaysia is considered as ‘semi democratic’ (Crouch, 1996), an ‘authoritarian democracy’ 
(Case, 2002) and a ‘quasi-democracy’ (Zakaria Ahmad, 1989) with limited political 
freedoms. Young people who are socialized in an authoritarian regime tend to have 
different political values and attitudes than their counterparts in established democracies 
(Neundorf, 2010). Third, despite many excellent studies on youth electoral participation in 
Malaysia, there remains a dearth of empirical and systematic analysis of Malaysian youth 
engagement (dis) in ‘elite-directed’ and ‘elite-challenging’ forms of participation, which is 
pivotal in this study. Fourth, youth in Malaysia can be considered as a ‘most-different’ case 
as the term ‘youth’ itself is associated with those aged 15-40 years old, and constitutes 
approximately 43% of the 28.3 million total Malaysia’s population and one of the largest 
population groups (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2010).18  
 
 Though some argue that a single case study has pitfalls, specifically in terms of 
generalization and selection bias, it nonetheless allows an intensive in-depth analysis and 
generates new insight into the research topic. This is particularly important in under-
researched areas such as this one. Landman (2008) claims that single-country studies 
provide a relative description, develop new categorizations, create hypotheses, confirm, 
and inform theories, and explain the existence of deviant countries identified through 
cross-national comparison. By using the case study, this thesis provided a detailed analysis 
of the participation patterns and related attitudes and demographic characteristics of young 
Malaysians and as such allows us to bring together different sources of evidence and 
historical knowledge to form a holistic and detailed picture of patterns and trends.   
 
3.5 Operationalising key concepts  
 
The operationalisation of key concepts of this study is discussed as follows:  
 
 
                                                          
18It is worth mentioning that the Malaysian government will redefine the age of Malaysian youth from 15 to 
40 years old, to 15 to 30 years old in 2018 under the new Malaysian Youth Policy. This to ensure that the 
definition of Malaysian youth is in accordance with international standards. As this new age limit will only 
be implemented in 2018, this study used the extant definition of youth as the range between the ages of 15 to 







The concept of the youth, used interchangeably with young people, relates to a biological 
state, a certain age span, mainly the growth from childhood to adulthood, and is also 
associated with social construction: youth grow within particular social contexts (Spence, 
2005). Indeed, there is a contemporary debate among sociologists on whether to focus on 
changes in young people’s transition to adult positions, mainly the transition from 
education to employment (Woodman, 2015) or young people’s self-understanding and 
cultural practices (Furlong, Woodman and Wyn, 2011). This debate clearly shows that the 
conception of youth is complex as there is no agreement of what constitutes young people. 
Youth, based on the universal definition of the United Nations, are those between 15 to 24 
years old. However, in the context of Malaysia, the National Youth Policy 1997 indicates 
‘youth’ as a person between the ages of 15 to 40. Some prominent studies on youth politics 
in Malaysia such as a survey of Malaysian youth opinion by the Asia Foundation (2012) 
defined youth as those from 17 to 35 years old, and recently Marshelayanti et al. (2016) 
studied a 18 to 40 years cohort, Norshuhada et al. (2016) researched youth from age 15 till 
25 years old. Although youth programmes and activities in this country are aimed at youth 
aged 18 and above, but given that the voting age in Malaysia is 21 years old, thus this 
study employed the definition of youth as those between 21 to 40 years old in both survey 
and semi-structured interviews. The purpose behind using such a broad youth category is 
to include a large segment of the population with different political interests, attitudes, 
knowledges, and experiences. Although a variety of youth groups who may have quite 
different political values and political experiences is included in this research, this aligns 
with the national and local realities by considering socio-cultural and contextual issues in 
Malaysia. To be specific, this age group is regarded as the ‘Mahathir’ and ‘post-Mahathir’ 
generations who were born between the 1970s to the 1990s and came of age in the 
Mahathir era. Thus, we can expect that this age group shares similar social and historical 
experiences at the time of their coming of age as this cohort has been socialised in a 
‘depoliticised period’ where the country experienced autocratic and dictatorial rule. In 
addition, it has been argued that is possible to compare this broad youth category with 
youth groups in advanced liberal democracies (e.g, UK, US, and European countries etc.) 
since the emerging adulthood experiences of young people in western and non-western 
societies are different, depending on its culture (Nelson, Badger, and Wu, 2004). This 





and come to be seen to deserve the full respect as adults later than young people in western 
culture. Moreover, studies that do use a more limited youth category such as 18 to 24 years 
old, still find evidence (e.g., Marshelayanti, 2016; Chang 2012) of a decline in political 
engagement amongst Malaysian youth under the age of 21 years old, similar to the patterns 
of youth political participation in established democracies.  
 
Moreover, in this study, we have decided to exclude respondents aged over 70 due 
to mobility issues which affect the opportunities for political participation. Political 
activism such as protesting and attending campaign meetings require much personal and 
physical effort, and this older population has difficulties in physical mobility. Moreover, 
the percentage of older persons aged above 70 in Malaysia is relatively small, representing 
only seven percent of the total population (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2012). 
  
3.5.2 Activism  
 
The term activism is widely used today and treated differently by diverse researchers. 
There is no universal definition of activism but generally most researchers describe 
activism as a manifold dimension including the participants; the agents or organisations 
through which the participants commonly mobilise; and actions that they use. Martin 
(2007) defines activism as actions in support of a cause. Actions can take many forms 
including rallies, protests, marches, etc., whereas causes might be human rights, world 
peace, the environment movement and so on. To simplify, activism refers to personal 
efforts to affect social or political change. What is an activist? How can we consider an 
individual had reached ‘activist’ status? As activism depends on conventional and beyond 
conventional politics, thus the term ’activist’ has been defined based on political parties 
and social movements. Many scholars measure the degree of ‘activeness’ of a party 
member by considering the time and effort invested in party activities. For example, Seyd 
and Whiteley (2002:120) define activist as “a party member who works more than five 
hours for the party in the average month.” On the other hand, Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 
(2012:86) found that the members of the Scottish National Party (SNP) perceive an active 
member as someone who often attended local party meeting along with spending hours 






 A great deal of research in the social movements literature explores what 
constitutes activism (Klandermans, 2004; Bobel, 2007; Martin, 2007). Bobel (2007:147) 
argues that “an activist must live the issue, demonstrate relentless dedication, and 
contribute a sustained effort to duly merit the label of activist”. In this regard, the more 
involved an individual is in a movement, the more likely that individual would see him- or 
herself as an activist (Cortese, 2015) and perhaps become a regular participant or even live 
as a full-time political activist (Martin, 2007). Instead of considering ‘activists’ based on 
how much effort and how many hours individuals devote to activism, we sought to recruit 
young people who considered themselves as activists, and saw political activism as an 
important part of their lives or someone who felt very strongly about an issue and then 
acted upon it. Our interpretation of ‘activists’ aligns with Weinstein (2005), where we were 
interested to interview young people who actively participated in any political activities on 
a regular basis either in a political party, social movement, or through protest activism, etc.     
 
3.6 Data collection  
 
As the research design of this study is based on an explanatory research model, therefore, it 
involves two distinct interactive phases or a sequential mixed-method design. In an effort 
to shed light on youth political participation in Malaysia, an explanatory sequential mixed-
methods approach, proposed by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), is implemented as a 
means to collect the data. An explanatory sequential design starts with collecting and 
analysing the quantitative data, and is followed by the subsequent analysis of qualitative 
data (Creswell and Clark, 2011:71). The purpose of building up the qualitative follow-up 
phase is to provide a better understanding and help to clarify the mechanisms underlying 
the findings from the quantitative phase (Cresswell, 2009:122). In particular, the 
quantitative data provide a more general picture of the research problem and the qualitative 
data are needed to refine, expand and explain the particular context. It is also particularly 
useful when unexpected results arise from the quantitative findings (Morse, 1991). Thus, 
there are two significant phases of the data collection process in this research: the analysis 
of existing survey data in a first phase; and the conducting, transcribing and analysis of 
materials from semi-structured in-depth interviews in the second phase. As for this study, 
the initial quantitative phase is used to provide statistical evidence on the political activism 
amongst young people. In the second phase, the qualitative interviews are conducted to 





tend to be politically active citizens. Although these two forms of data are separated, their 
analyses are interrelated and integrated to complement each other to provide a detailed 
understanding of youth political participation in Malaysia.  
 
3.6.1 Phase 1: Re-analysis of existing survey data  
 
For the purpose of triangulation and enrichment of the findings from the qualitative 
method, the quantitative data is central. One of the methods used for quantitative analysis 
in this research is the re-analysis of existing survey data from Wave 6 (2010-2014) of the 
World Values Survey (WVS), to show the diverging patterns of how young Malaysians 
engage in politics relative to their older counterparts and what the key variables for 
explaining these divergences might be. In particular, the survey data also allows for 
statistical analyses, such as to test for correlations between young people’s political 
participation in elite-directed and elite-challenging activities, as the main dependent 
variables, and various attitudinal and demographic characteristics. These in turn are our 
independent variables. There are several advantages of using existing survey data. Firstly, 
continuous and regular surveys like the WVS and Asian Barometer provide the opportunity 
for the researcher to do both longitudinal and comparative studies. Secondly, these survey 
data are user-friendly and are easily accessed and downloaded from the Internet. As these 
data sets are highly accessible, therefore the process is less time-consuming and less 
expensive than primary data (data collected by oneself). Moreover, they are representative. 
However, the existing survey data have their downsides because the researcher has less 
control over the questions asked and sometimes, they may unable to answer specific 
research questions. To overcome these weak points, this study used semi-structured 
interviews as an alternative tool of data collection.   
 
The WVS is the largest cross-national time series data set and is a well-known data 
survey in regards of quantitative based behavioral studies. Specifically, the WVS is a study 
of “changing values and their impact on social and political life”.19 Thus, the WVS is 
particularly relevant to this study as it provides interpretable results for analysing young 
people’s attitudes toward politics and democratic institutions, not only in Malaysia, but 
also in the Southeast Asia region. Whilst many studies on youth participation in Southeast 
                                                          





Asia and Malaysia used the Asian Barometer, instead this research relies on both data sets 
because they are worldwide surveys which enables for a cross-national and cross-sectional 
comparative study on a wide-variety of topics. Although the topics in the WVS are broad 
and various, covering questions on attitudes and values, the survey lacks some indicators 
such as rural-urban and authoritarian values, which are important for this research. To 
further extend the analyses from the WVS survey data, this thesis used another well-
respected survey data source which was the Asian Barometer Wave 2 (2005-2008) and 
Wave 3 (2010-2012). The rationale for choosing the Asian Barometer survey for the 
analyses is that it provides a broad spectrum of political actions and covers a wide range of 
variables and political topics that fit specifically with the features of this region, compared 
to the WVS. Moreover, it allows us to cross-check the WVS results. It is worth noting that 
the fieldwork period for the WVS was from March to June 2012, and the Asian Barometer 
wave 2 was on July 2007 and wave 3 was from October to November 2011.  Therefore, it 
could be expected that there would be variations in key statistics for voter turnout reported 
between these surveys and the official statistics on the actual turnout. Additionally, due to 
social desirability bias individuals may over-report voting in surveys. 
 
3.6.1.1 Sampling of survey data  
 
Sampling is the process of selecting a subset within a target population so that we can save 
costs and time, as well as providing sufficiently precise estimation (Kumar, 1999). The 
most significant aspect in the sampling is the selection of sampling method, as it provides 
greater accuracy, makes sampling more efficient (Cochran, 1953) and avoid sampling error 
(Burns, 2000). As this quantitative study compares political activism between younger and 
older people, the sample is divided into two age groups: the young age group (21 to 40 
years old) and the older age group (41 to 70 years old). The sample is drawn as follows 












Table 3.1 Sample size  
 The WVS Survey The Asian Barometer Survey 
 Wave 6 
 (2010-2014) 
Wave 2  
(2005-2008) 
Wave 3  
(2010-2012) 
Total Sample 1170 1072 1074 
Sample for Young People 
(21 to 40 years old) 
523 570 493 
Sample for Older People 
(41 to 70 years old) 
647 502 581 
 
3.6.1.2 Data analysis  
 
The survey data are analysed using STATA 14 and Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 23. The detailed method for the quantitative analyses and the findings are 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. This study uses cross-tabulations, comparison of proportion 
tests and regression methods as the statistical analyses. The T-test enabled this study to 
compare the means of a normally distributed dependent variable for two independent 
groups, the young people and the older people. The cross-tabulations and T-test were used 
to see clearly the overall percentage and patterns of political activism and test for 
significant differences between young and older groups. On the other hand, regression 
analyses allowed us to test how changes in the predictor variables such as demographic 
variables, political identification and political interest, predicted the level of changes in the 
outcome variables as well as testing for interaction effects of different factors on these 
outcomes. Subsequently, the findings from this first phase (the quantitative analyses) are 
further explored in the second phase and research questions and more deeply probed 
through the analysis of the material from the qualitative interviews to which we now turn.  
 
3.6.2 Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews  
 
Qualitative interviewing, according to Mason (2002), refers to in-depth, semi-structured or 
loosely-formed interviews. It seeks “to understand the world from the subjects’ point of 
views, to unfold the meanings of people’s experiences, to uncover their living world” 





particularly in analysing people’s perceptions and values (Keats, 2000).20 Qualitative 
interviewing is used as a technique of data gathering in this research based on the logic that 
it would provide a deeper and more holistic picture of youth political participation in 
Malaysia, specifically on the reasons why young people engage and disengage from 
politics. Furthermore, it also acted as a means of triangulating with the findings from the 
quantitative analyses. Through this cross verification, the consistency of findings attained 
from different methods was verified in order to minimise bias. In addition, the nature of 
research questions requires depth and complexity of explanations, rather than broad 
understanding of surface patterns (Mason 2002). Thus, it needs the researcher to interact 
directly and closely with the subjects. 
 
One of the challenges of employing a qualitative approach is to convince others to 
accept the value and trustworthiness of qualitative data compared to quantitative 
approaches which tend to appear as more objective and accurate since in practice anyone 
can have access to the data sets to reanalyse them and subjective interpretation of the 
researchers is not as central as in qualitative analysis. Since qualitative interviews are 
based on the subjective views of quite distinct informants who have different levels of 
knowledge and experience on the issues at hand, we can therefore expect that their 
opinions will be very different in some instances and that there could be contradictions 
between the qualitative individual responses and some of the results from the quantitative 
analysis and interview data. For example, government and opposition elites offered very 
different perspectives for explaining youth political interest and engagement (see Chapter 
7). Similarly, academics also claimed that there is an upward trend in youth political 
engagement in Malaysia (see Chapter 6), which is in fact contradicted by the quantitative 
findings. However, this is not a problem for the study given that the role and scope of the 
different types of data is diverse. More specifically, this study is designed based on the 
implementation of the ‘sequential mixed-methods’ approach where the quantitative 
analyses provide statistical evidence on the patterns of youth political participation in 
Malaysia, while the qualitative data helps to enrich the interpretation of these quantitative 
                                                          
20Among the main features of interviews outlined by Mason (2002:62) are: the interactional exchange of 
dialogue (it may involve one-to-one interaction, larger group interviews or focus group); a relatively informal 
format (it is more like a conversation, rather than a question and answer format); a thematic, topic-centred, 
biographical or narrative approach (the researcher has a number of topics, themes or issues which she wishes 





results in the words of the informants, specifically on how individuals makes sense of 
different experience and why youth (dis)engage in politics.  
 
 Semi-structured interviews are adopted in this research since they allow for the 
formulation of a set of questions before the interview, with the opportunity to explore more 
details and probe responses on particular issues further. The significant characteristics of 
semi-structured interviews, according to Mason (2004:1020), are that they have a flexible 
and fluid structure. In this sense, the researcher is not forced to follow sequence of 
questions but can vary the order depending on the flow of conversation (Saunders et al., 
2003). Thus, it gives freedom to the interviewee to express their views in their own 
meaning. However, this kind of interview has a tendency to be biased and misinterpret the 
data as it will be influenced by the respondent’s emotions and perceptions (Mason, 2002). 
To avoid this, the researcher needs to let the interviewee ‘flow’ (May, 1997) and to record 
as clearly and fully as possible (Mason, 2002).  
 
 The qualitative interviews in this study were conducted face-to-face by using semi-
structured interviews. Utilising face-to face interviews as the method of data gathering is 
based on the following rationale. First, it allows us to probe young people’s attitudes 
towards disengaging from elite-directed politics and become involved in elite-challenging 
activities. Second, it studies closely the reality of young people’s experiences and diversity 
in views on politics because it requires the researcher to interact closely with the subjects. 
The combination of these elements allows for more detailed explanations of the 
motivations and characteristics of young people in engaging with the political process. For 
reliability purposes, an interview topic guide which contained a list of questions in a 
particular order was used to structure the interview. An interview guide was important for 
the researcher as it served to guide conversation and reduced the chance of main topics 
being neglected. Therefore, as argued by Babbie (2005:314), the researcher must be “fully 
familiar with the questions to be asked.” Although this type of interview was guided with a 
standard set of questions, the interviewees were allowed to talk and express themselves 
freely in their thoughts and ideas about the topics that interested or that seemed important 








3.6.2.1 Sampling and representativeness  
 
As qualitative research commonly relies on small and non-probabilistic samples, it is 
impossible for the researcher to claim representativeness and generalisation (Silverman, 
2005). Typically, the qualitative researchers make a sampling choice from the population 
which enable them to deepen their understanding of a particular phenomenon. Since one of 
the aims of this thesis is to understand why youth participate or do not participate in 
politics, I sought to use purposeful sampling whereby the samples are chosen selectively 
and authoritatively according to the aims of the research (Schatzman and Strauss (1973), in 
terms of who is particularly knowledgeable about or experienced the phenomenon of 
interest (Cresswell and Plano Clark, 2011; Lewis and Sheppard, 2006) to produce cases 
that are ‘information rich’ (Patton, 1990:169). Given that this is the case, we do not intend 
to make statistically representative generationalisations to a larger population as in the 
quantitative research, but instead describe in detail some conditions under which a certain 
phenomenon exists and the ways in which individuals make sense of a certain phenomenon 
based on their subjective knowledge or explain why they choose to engage or not. 
 
There are different strategies for selecting the sample as argued by Patton (1990), 
such as intensity sampling, deviant cases etc., but this thesis only applies maximum 
variation sampling and snowball or chain sampling.21 At the first stage, we used the 
maximum variation sampling by selecting a sample across different groups in the society, 
covered political leaders, academics, youth activists and youth non-participants. The main 
purpose of gathering data from across four groups allows me to see if there is any 
consistency in patterns and central themes outlined across groups, and examine whether 
there are any outliers or themes exclusive to one group. Therefore, the total sample used in 
these interviews is forty respondents, where a total of 10 respondents were purposively 
selected from each group. The sample was appropriate as this study investigated a narrow 
but deep subject and it built up detail, strong and convincing analytical explanations of 
                                                          
21Maximum Variation Sampling aims at capturing and describing the central themes or outcomes across 
different participants. Although a small sample with a great deal of heterogeneity can be a problem, but this 
thesis is more interested in finding any common patterns or shared aspects within that variations. By using 
this sampling, therefore, the data collection and analysis will yield two kinds of findings: (1) very detailed 
descriptions of each case which are useful to find uniqueness, (2) important shared patterns that cut across 
participants.  
 
Snowball or Chain Sampling is an approach to locate key informants by asking a number of people who else 





particular contexts. For this type of research, 25 to 30 interviews should suffice (Creswell, 
2007). Mason (in Baker and Edwards, 2012) also claims that, “it is better to have a smaller 
number of interviews that are creatively and interpretively analysed, than a larger number 
where the researcher runs out of time to do them justice analytically”. Moreover, given the 
limitations of time and resources in the course of this study, it was impracticable to 
practice a greater number of interviews. The scientifically robust criteria for selecting each 
group can be detailed, as follow: 
 
i. Political elites/leaders 
The selection of the political elites or leaders was based on their position in the 
government, political parties, and political organisations. Most of them are the chief 
leaders of the youth wings of political parties from both government (UMNO and 
MCA) and oppositions (PKR, PAS, and DAP). Some of these informants are key 
actors in public policy (for example, the Malaysian Youth Parliament and Institute 
for Youth Research Malaysia) and directly involved in mobilising Malaysian youth 
in the political arena. Some of these informants were selected based on their 
popularity among young people and are well-known political actors who have 
contributed a lot to nation-building and political developments of this country.  
 
ii. Academics 
The academics were selected from various public universities in Malaysia and they 
are well-known scholars of Malaysian politics who have intensive knowledge and 
have written many journal articles on political participation. The selection of 
academics as informants was based on the reason that their opinion can provide a 
more overarching and balanced perspective compared to the views of political 
elites and young Malaysians.   
  
iii. Youth activists 
The so called ‘young activists’ were those aged 21 to 40 years old who were 
actively participating in political parties, social movements, non-governmental 
bodies or were members of loosely structured organisations. Most use different 
platforms in advocating social changes, human rights, and political justice to 






iv. Youth non-participants 
These are young people aged 21 to 40 years old, who had not participated actively 
in politics e.g. those not registered as voters and not affiliated with any political 
parties or organisations. 
 
In seeking access to a sample of political elites and academics, their names and contact 
details were retrieved from official websites and social networking sites, they were 
contacted via email and through phone calls explaining the purpose of the interviews and 
why they had been selected. The consent form and participant sheet were attached 
together. Once they agreed to be interviewed, appointments were scheduled accordingly at 
dates, times and locations preferred by the respondents. Prior to the interviews, the 
respondents were contacted again to reconfirm the dates and locations of the interviews. 
On the other hand, for accessing a sample of youth activists and youth non-participants, we 
used snowball or chain sampling, which is a valuable tool to access an isolated or hard-to-
reach group (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997) and provided the researcher with a set of 
potential contacts through social networks of identified respondents and a ‘link’ that exists 
between such target groups (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). The most important aspect in 
dealing with human participants in this snowball technique is trust. To ensure the 
participants agreed to identify other members of their group, we tried to develop a good 
rapport with them and managed to meet several participants who were willing to ‘link’ us 
to other activists and non-participants, who were then subsequently interviewed in this 
research. In this regard, the interviewing process continued for a period of six months 
(from November 2015 to April 2016) in Malaysia until we totalled an equal number of 
participants in each group. Within a period of six months, we visited three cities across the 
country and made contact by email or telephone with 55 individuals, which resulted in 40 
successful interviews (15 females/25 males). Therefore, this research achieved a relatively 
high response rate.  
 
3.6.2.2 Access issues within interviews  
 
Whilst using face-to-face interviews provided a holistic picture of the phenomenon under 
investigation, there were some issues raised in accessing, acquiring trust, and establishing 
rapport with the target group, especially political elites. One of the main problems in this 





relatively unstudied because they have power and the ability to protect against intrusion. 
They were undeniably hard to reach whilst they have been highly visible because they have 
very rigorous schedules and they were surrounded by gatekeepers who control access to 
them. Prior to commencing the fieldwork and after the project passed the University of 
Sheffield ethical review, we had identified the elites and established contact through 
emails, but only half of them responded to interview invitations regardless of the number 
of times that we emailed them. Therefore, we used different ways to reach the remainder 
including private messaging through Facebook and telephoning their offices. We had to 
come up with a backup plan by rearranging the list of respondents which in turn took me a 
very long time and higher cost compared to the other participant groups.  
 
 Apart from the difficulties in seeking access to political elites, it was also quite 
challenging to interview political elites due to their powerful and influential positions. As 
argued by Mikecz (2012:484), elites have the ability and power to protect themselves from 
being exposed to criticism. There was a time when elites attempted to dominate the 
situation, gave strong views and offensive comments regarding certain issues that had been 
raised during the interview and they even challenged the views of the researcher. In order 
to get honest views from the elites, we had to be non-judgmental by giving them the space 
to express in detail their concerns about the issues and summarising what has been 
discussed to avoid misunderstanding their opinions.  
 
 We also encountered the issue of possible bias, particularly the problem of 
interviewing people from different ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds. For 
instance, some Chinese and Indians respondents were reluctant to participate in this study 
as they felt suspicious about sharing their political views with an outsider, especially one 
not from their ethnic group. In dealing with this issue, we asked another respondent (from 
the same ethnic group) to convince them and re-clarified the main purpose of this research. 
In fact, the literature (Alderfer and Tucker, 1996; Davis, 1997) emphasises that the race of 
interviewers affects participants’ responses—participants may manoeuvre their answers to 
satisfy the perceived expectations of the interviewer. Thus, we made it clear to them that 
the researcher was an independent researcher that is not affiliated with any group of 
society, and their opinions in general are expected to reflect their personal view rather than 
certain ethnic groups. This reduced concerns about information that could be regarded as 





 In addition, the issues of suspicion and potential risks also came up during 
interviews with young non-participants. This happened because young Malaysians are 
regularly subject to surveillance and criminalization by the government. In this case, 
several respondents from the non-participant group were very circumspect in making their 
statements with regard to issues associated with the government and political freedom. For 
example, one young non-participant that we interviewed told us that ‘It is better to remain 
in silence in commenting about the government, otherwise we might get penalised under 
the Sedition Act.’ These sorts of sentiments were addressed through establishing clear 
procedures to reduce risks and minimise bias. For example, we would ensure that they 
understood the risks they may face as a participant beforehand and kept reminding them 
about the importance of confidentiality by giving them options whether to be identified or 
not. Similarly, Weinstein (2005) encountered the issue of suspicion caused by state 
surveillance when accessing a sample of social movement activists.  
 
 Despite these challenges, it worth underlining some of the positive outcomes. We 
personally felt privileged to interview some well-known people, and to gain valuable 
insights from them. Some of them were very passionate to share their story. Some were 
very generous to provide us with reading materials that were useful for this study. In this 
sense, we believed that semi-structured interview was a vital instrument for this study, to 
get access to a broad range of people and outlooks on youth political participation in 
Malaysia. 
 
3.6.2.3 The interviewing process   
 
Qualitative interviews are commonly viewed as ‘the interactional exchange of dialogue’ 
(Mason, 2002:62) or ‘conversation with a purpose’ (Berg, 2001:77). It is the responsibility 
of the interviewer to create non-threatening environments and a welcoming atmosphere for 
the participants. Therefore, we allowed the respondents to choose the venues of the 
interview, which usually took place in public places such as cafés or in participant’s office 
to ensure the participants would feel at ease. Although a café or restaurant offers a relaxed 
and informal space, we had to cope with the problem of background noise. The participants 
were given an option whether to speak in English or the Malay language, but generally 
most interviews were conducted in the Malay language. In line with ethical procedures, the 





research including issues of confidentiality and protection; participant’s consent and right 
to withdraw; and the rights of the researcher to interpret, analyse as well as publish the 
data. Field notes and digital audio-recorders were used to record the conversation with the 
permission of each participant, and subsequently transcribe to ensure that there was no 
manipulation or distortion of the text.  
  
Each group of participants was allocated different sets of questions based on their 
position and experiences (see Appendix A for detailed questionnaires) to analyse 
explanations on youth political participation in Malaysia. However, some important 
research questions were intentionally posed to all interviewees to generate deeper insights 
on certain issues and to provide a comparison between answers. The questions were 
carefully drafted by grouping them in themes that followed a logical sequence and they 
were asked the exact questions in the interview plan. Normally, the interviews lasted for 
about 30 to 60 minutes, but interviews with youth activists tended to be longer than other 
groups because they had much more to say about their activism, motivation, and overall 
picture of youth political participation in Malaysia. To preserve the authenticity of the text, 
the interviews were translated from Malay to English language by the researcher herself. 
The interviews were thus important to obtaining information on the respondents’ 
demographic profile, their general opinions on politics and motivations to participate and 
not to participate in politics in order to achieve the aims of the research for this thesis. 
 
3.6.2.4 Analysing and presenting qualitative data  
 
Analysing interview data is quite challenging as it involves a continuous process in which 
different contents and structures from each interview must be integrated together and the 
whole process of collection, transcribing and analysing are inseparable. Although there are 
different approaches for analysing qualitative data and they are debatable among social 
scientists (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Mason, 1996; Silverman, 2005), there is unanimous 
agreement on the organisation of data through the ‘coding’ process or breakdown the data 
into more handy chunks (Welsh, 2002). Therefore, a thematic analysis was implemented in 
this study. The thematic analysis is a term associated with the analysis of qualitative data to 
refer to the extraction of key themes in one’s data (Bryman, 2012). Braun and Clarke 
(2006), on the other hand, define thematic analysis as “a method for identifying, analysing 





the process of extracting themes from the verbatim qualitative data (Attride-Stirling, 2001). 
The thematic analysis of this study was done by using a qualitative data analysis program: 
NVivo 10. 
 
In the first phase, the researcher became acquainted with the data obtained from the 
interviews. After the data had been transcribed, the interview transcripts were read 
carefully, and we generated initial careful notes from them. Although computer software 
NVivo 10 was used as the analytical tool, the printed copies of the transcripts were useful 
for quoting the interviewees. This process is known as ‘utterances’, brief notations (Mc 
Craken, 1988). The process also helped to reduce the data from the raw data. Once 
utterances and coding had been identified, the transcripts then transferred to the system. 
 
The process of coding was done with the assistance of the qualitative data analysis 
software package NVivo 10. NVivo was chosen as it helped the researcher to code as many 
potential themes as possible and organized these themes into a systematic structure. In 
addition, NVivo is simple to use because it allows the data to be imported directly from a 
word processing application (Welsh, 2002). Thus, it reduced a number of manual jobs. 
Bazeley (2007) highlights five main tasks in which NVivo eases the analysis of qualitative 
data: First, NVivo helps to manage and organise data. Second, it also manages the ideas in 
order to understand the theoretical and conceptual issues. Third, it allows for querying data 
by questioning the data and utilizing this software to answer these enquiries. Finally, 
NVivo allows for a reporting task by utilising the data to formulate the findings. After all 
transcripts were transferred into NVivo, they were coded once again to discover the 
emergence of important themes and underlying patterns relating to this study. In this 
regard, the researcher selected some key phrases from the transcripts and gave coding to 
the phrases that were relevant to the research questions and issues which related to the 
interest of the researcher. According to Corbin and Strauss (2008:160), “...coding requires 
searching for the right word or two that best describe conceptually what the researcher 
believes is indicated by the data.”  
 
The third phase of the qualitative analysis was to thoroughly examine different 
codes and potential themes in order to find the relationship and developed patterns. To do 
this, a tree Node was developed. This contains information about particular concepts or 





included the coding for ‘memos’ or extended notations about the data. After finishing the 
coding process, this was the time for reviewing and refining the nodes and codes. This 
allowed the researcher to code additional data that were missing out and generate a 
‘thematic map’ of the analysis, so that it could build up a coherent and logical explanatory 
story (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). All main codes were grouped to ease the writing process 
by separating them into main themes and sub-themes.  
 
The final phase was to produce the report by writing up narrative analyses and 
numerical data, and linking back the analyses with the conceptual framework, research 
questions and literature. Since the interviewees were divided across four different groups—
politicians, academics, youth activists and youth non-participants—the data for each group 
were analysed independently and separately to gain deeper insights and views from 
particular groups. However, the final analysis of this study used a comparison of data 
between all groups to find the common and different features, as well as constructing 
relationship. Although NVivo was used as a tool, this research relied heavily on the actual 
analysis and interpretation from the researcher. 
 
3.7 Validity and reliability  
 
Validity is the truthfulness of the findings (Altheide and Johnson, 1994; Stiles, 1993), 
which is concerned with the ability of a research tool or method to describe and measure 
what it is supposed to measure or describe (Bell, 1999). In contrast, reliability refers to the 
constancy in measurement (Altheide and Johnson, 1994; Anderson and Arsenault, 1998), 
or how the findings can be replicated (Stiles, 1993). This means that similar results will be 
found if it is to be carried out in a similar context (Cohen et al., 2000). From a positivist 
point of view, the indicator of validity is reliability (Altheide and Johnson, 1994). These 
terms are clearly defined in quantitative explanation and commonly accepted by positivists 
rather than interpretivists. Thus, there is an ongoing debate among researchers about the 
appropriateness of the use of validity and reliability in the qualitative findings. 
 
One way of ensuring the validity of this research was through triangulation by 
combining quantitative and qualitative data. The purpose of triangulation was to neutralize 
or to eliminate biases of another method (Creswell, 2003). In this research, internal validity 





collection. For example, the researcher used the qualitative data from semi-structured 
interviews to triangulate and cross-check the analysis of data survey, to ensure that the data 
were precise and the arguments coherent. Additionally, to obtain more validation in the 
research, the interviews were conducted in the Malay language and were later translated 
back to English. This helped to minimize bias and falsification of the data. In terms of 
external validity, the researcher used different target populations and took into 
consideration several characteristics such as ethnicity, area, and gender in selecting the 
sample for semi-structured interviews and analysing existing data survey. As suggested by 
Ridenour and Newman (2008), one should sample respondents across several strata such as 
age, socioeconomic status, and occupation which reflect the world. For reliability, the 
semi-structured interviews were conducted in a similar setting, using similar questions and 
similar circumstances. Silverman (2005) argues that to ensure the reliability of the data, 
they need to be consistent such that cases are assigned to the same category which can be 
applied in different occasions. In addition, using software in data analysis, particularly 
NVivo also provided accuracy in research as it can yield more reliable result through 
interrogation of the data (Welsh, 2002). Although NVivo provides rigorous data analysis, 





This chapter has provided a detailed account of the research methodology used in this 
thesis, including a brief discussion on the research paradigm, research design and data 
collection methods. As the study’s philosophical stance followed pragmatism, a mixed-
methods approach—a combination of existing survey data and semi-structured 
interviews—has been used to achieve the overall objectives of this study and to provide a 
deeper understanding of youth political participation in Malaysia. Although the study relies 
on quantitative methods qualitative analyses were also needed to deepen and triangulate 
the quantitative findings, particularly to achieve high levels of validity and reliability. The 
next chapter will discuss and present the first set of quantitative findings obtained from the 
analysis of the WVS survey data before turning to the analysis of the Asian barometer data 











AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MALAYSIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Research on political participation in established democracies has aimed to develop and 
test theories pertaining to who participates in politics, how, and what motivates them. Most 
of these works tend to associate political participation with a functioning democratic 
system. However, for semi-democratic countries in Southeast Asia like Malaysia, there is a 
shortage of thorough research in this area as citizens’ participation has not always been 
accompanied by democratisation. Influenced by studies of Western democracies, political 
participation researchers in Malaysia are also now studying questions of participation. The 
common view claims that Malaysian youth are less likely to participate in politics than 
their elders (Samsudin, 2007; Abdul Hadi et al., 2013). However, this account in the 
literature is not very well developed in explaining why young people in Malaysia are 
disenchanted with politics, since they sometimes overlook the influences of certain 
demographic backgrounds and the life circumstances of young people on political 
engagement. Therefore, with the help from the data surveys from Wave 6 (2010-2014) of 
the World Values Surveys (WVS), this study aims to investigate the differences in political 
engagement between younger and older people in Malaysia: following the definition of 
‘youth’ in Malaysia as ending at 40, this study operationalises the youth as those aged 
between 21-40 and older people as those aged 41-70 (older respondents are dropped from 
the sample since issues of mobility may hinder their opportunities to participate). In 
particular, this chapter provides descriptive results on the levels of political activism 
between young and older people in Malaysia, and examines analytically which variables 







4.2 Who participates and why? 
 
Age has been a key indicator in the analyses of political participation. Much of the 
empirical literature finds that age and voting are correlated and tends to assert that the 
young cohort is significantly less likely to vote than their elders (Franklin, 2004; Pattie, 
Seyd and Whiteley, 2004). Some believe that voting, on its own, is a partial measure of 
political engagement as the younger generation are more predisposed to participate in 
‘unconventional’ or ‘elite-challenging politics’ like protests, signing petitions and strikes 
(Marsh et al., 2007). Therefore, scholars have recently been paying more attention to 
examining the age group differences in political activities beyond voting (Norris, 2003; 
Grasso, 2013, 2017; Melo and Stockemer, 2014). In relation to age, we expect that the 
young cohort in Malaysia will be less likely to participate in elite-directed politics than 
their older counterparts.   
 
Apart from age, this study looks at the factors explaining political participation as 
developed in the model of socioeconomic status (SES) (Rosenstone and Hanson, 1993; 
Verba et al., 1995), whereby differences in political resources, such as educational level, 
income and social class are seen as the key for explaining why people participate. 
Numerous studies have long held that more educated citizens are more likely to vote in 
elections and participate in electoral campaigns because they have time, money, 
knowledge, and ability to access political information (Schlozman, 2002; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980; Blais et al. 2004). In particular, the impact of education on political 
participation not only stimulates and increases participation per se, but also allows citizens 
to acquire a strong sense of civic skills and political interest (Verba et al., 1995). Goerres 
(2009:59) finds that education has a greater effect on European young citizens’ likelihood 
of voting than it does for older people. This means that there is a huge gap between 
educated and uneducated young people in term of turnout. In addition, some believe that 
political participation is also affected by gender roles (Verba et al., 1997; Karp and 
Banducci, 2008; Almond and Verba, 1963, Norris, 2002; Campbell et al., 1960). Burns, 
Scholzman and Verba (2001:1) showed that women were still lagging behind men with 
respect to other forms of political activity, even though they were more likely to go to the 
polls. This shows that the growing liberalisation of gender roles does not reduce the 
activism gap between men and women. Financial resources, including income and 





1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). In particular, those with higher income are more 
likely to become politically engaged as they have more energy, time and money (Lipset, 
1981; Rubenson et al., 2004). Moreover, ethnic differences in political participation, 
particularly voting have been widely researched (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Campbell et 
al. 1964). This research reveals that African Americans participate at relatively lower 
levels in voting and affiliations with political organisations than White Americans, but they 
are more likely than to take part in protests as they have been isolated from civic affairs 
and lack political resources such as income, education, and employment status 
(Schlozman, Verba and Brady, 1999). Given that participation in politics requires greater 
individual resources, we expect that young Malaysians with higher levels of education to 
participate in elite-challenging political activism at higher levels than their older 
counterparts. 
 
However, the variables in the socioeconomic model including age, gender and 
income should be examined alongside other factors, since socioeconomic status strongly 
relates to skills and civic orientations that can directly influence participation (Dalton, 
2006:50). The common explanation of participation identifies other determinant factors: 
group effects and people’s psychological orientation or political attitudes (Dalton, 1996; 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). First, party attachment and group membership relate 
positively to political participation. Specifically, the studies on the impact of party 
attachment show that citizens who have strong ties with a political party are more likely to 
turn out to vote (Dalton, 2008; Campbell et al., 1960). Likewise, membership of 
organisations also helps to provide individuals with skills, training, values and attitudes 
and strong political efficacy to participate actively in political activities (Putnam, 2000; 
Verba and Nie, 1972; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). In many Western democracies, the 
declining of turnout in elections is paralleled with a weakening of partisan ties, and this 
confirms that the strength of party affiliation encourages individuals to further participate. 
As we expect young Malaysians to be less active in elite-directed politics than their older 
counterparts, therefore we can predict that the weakening of partisan attachment and 
membership of organisations amongst young people contributes to explaining these 
patterns.   
 
Second, political attitudes—political interest, knowledge, efficacy, values and 





country are multiple factors that help to explain different facets of participation (Norris, 
2002; Dalton, 2006; Putnam, 2000). Political interest, “the degree to which politics arouses 
a citizen’s curiosity” (Van Deth, 1990:278) or “attentiveness to politics” (Zaller, 1992:18) 
has been said to have a positive effect on political participation. Those who are interested 
in politics are more likely to engage in political activities (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Milbrath and Goel, 1977). However, for Van Deth 
(2000:116), citizens may be interested in politics, but this does not essentially mean that 
they consider politics as important or relevant in their lives. Moreover, Verba, Nie and 
Kim (1978:46) postulate that political interest should be an independent variable as it is an 
attitude that drives citizen to participate. In relation to political interest, many studies 
suggest an effect of political knowledge on participation: citizens who are politically 
informed and know more about politics should also tend to be more actively engaged in it 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Neuman, 1986; Milner, 2002). For instance, Delli Carpini 
and Keeter (1996) find that in America there is a very unequal knowledge distribution 
when many African Americans, young people and financially less well-off citizens have 
substantially less knowledge about national politics.  
 
Political efficacy also has been said to affect political participation (Van Deth, 
1997; Campbell et al., 1960). In particular, one’s own ability to understand and participate 
effectively in politics (internal efficacy) (Niemi, Craig and Mattei, 1991:407), or the 
responsiveness of the political system (external efficacy) (Craig et al., 1990:289) may 
increase the level of political efficacy, which then leads people to be more politically 
engaged. Ideological orientation on a left-wing political spectrum is an important matter 
too in political participation (Dalton, 2006:51). Left-wing identifiers are expected to be 
more active in politics, and more prone to participate in demonstration and petition than 
right-wing citizens, since they are anti-establishment and frequently challenge the status-
quo (Melo and Stockemer, 2014; Bauknecht, 2012). Whilst citizen satisfaction with 
democracy has long been tied to political actions, mainly voter turnout (Norris, 2002; Karp 
and Banducci, 2008; Franklin, 2004), the relationship between dissatisfaction with the way 
democracy works and political participation is still debatable. Some argue that citizens 
with low levels of political trust in the political institutions may not participate in politics 
as they exhibit low levels of support for the system and of democratic values (Almond and 
Verba, 1963; Putnam, 2000). Meanwhile, others believe that dissatisfaction leads 





1970; Farah et al., 1979). Accordingly, there is a blurry line between conventional and 
unconventional forms of participation because dissatisfied citizens may seek demands for 
change or express discontent using multiple channels, from protest to voting (Norris, 2002; 
Farah et al., 1979). With respect to political attitudes, we expect that young Malaysians 
relative to older people would be less likely to engage in elite-directed political activities 
because they have very low levels of political interest, efficacy and they are dissatisfied 
with the regime and how democracy works in this country. Thus, we combine socio-
demographic factors (e.g. education, income, and gender), group effects (party attachment) 
and political attitudes (e.g. political interest and efficacy) as predictor variables that may 
explain youth (dis)engagement in Malaysia generally, and the differences of political 
activism between young and older people specifically. 
 
This chapter aims to develop on the study conducted by Grasso (2013) on ‘The 
Differential Impact of Education on Young People’s Political Activism: Comparing Italy 
and the United Kingdom’, and apply it to the Malaysian case. Accordingly, this chapter 
hypothesizes: 
H1: Young people in Malaysia are less likely to participate in elite-directed activism than 
their older counterparts.  
H2: Young Malaysians who have higher levels of education will be more engaged than 
their older counterparts with elite-challenging political activism. 
H3: Young males are more likely to be engaged in elite-directed activism than young 
females. 
H4: Young Malaysians who have high levels of dissatisfaction with how democracy works 
in Malaysia are more likely to be engaged in elite-challenging politics.  
 
4.3 Data and methods  
 
This chapter draws upon Wave 6 (2010-2014) data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 
to analyse how young Malaysians engage in politics as compared to older people in 
Malaysia. Survey data with the large samples (N: 1170) allows for statistical analyses and 
significant testing (to show whether differences between young and old are larger than 
would be expected by chance), such as to test for correlations between young people’s 





dependent variables, and various attitudinal and demographic characteristics as the 
independent variables. Thus, the data set of the WVS is an ideal source of data for this 
study as it provides interpretable results for analysing young people political engagement 
(dis) in Malaysia. 
   
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research relies on the WVS for several 
specific reasons. First, the WVS provides detailed and comprehensive questionnaires 
which consisted of more than 250 questions, covering a wide-range of topics such as 
organisational membership, democracy, politics and society, socio-demographic, national 
identity and so on. Second, it uses large representative national samples, with an average of 
1330 respondent per country (Dima and Dima, 2009). In addition, the WVS encompasses 
useful measures to analyse whether there are differences in political activism between 
young people and older generation in the previous and recent years of the surveyed 
interviews by using important intervening variables such as education, ethnicity, and 
gender. The survey topics in the WVS are significantly comprehensive and well-
constructed, but in relation to this study, some aspects have not been covered in the WVS 
such as the questions on political mobilisation, authoritarian values and system 
responsiveness. These neglected aspects will be fully analysed in the next quantitative 
chapter using the Asian Barometer survey. It is useful to triangulate the findings between 
different sets of survey data, with different set of questions as it provides greater 
consistency of the findings on youth political participation in Malaysia, including the 
changing pattern of participation, diversity of political activism and their attitudinal 
correlates. 
 
There is a dearth of studies on age-related patterns of political activism in Malaysia, 
specifically on young people’s patterns of political participation relative to their elders, and 
in relation to the rich literature that has developed for Western democracies. This study 
investigates whether the disengagement of young people in established democracies is 
replicated for Malaysia, and it examines whether intervening variables like education have 
important explanatory effects. As this is a quantitative study which compares political 
involvement of young and older people, the sample of 1170 respondents is divided into 





old/ N=647).22 This will allow us to analyse the differences in participation between young 
people and their older counterparts in Malaysia in terms of political engagement. The 
measure of political engagement rely on respondents’ engagement in six political activities 
available in the WVS: voted, party membership, labour union membership, signed a 
petition, demonstrated and boycotted products for political reason.  
 
Descriptive analyses are applied to provide the percentage-point gap in each 
political activity between younger and older people. Additionally, t-test and ANOVA 
analyses are developed to determine whether mean differences between two groups (age 
groups, levels of education and gender) and three groups (ethnic groups and social classes) 
are significantly different in these political activities. For the regression analyses, we create 
two scales as dependent variables: ‘elite-directed’ is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, 
where zero indicates that the respondent has participated in none of the activities and one 
indicates that the respondent has participated in all the following activities: voting, being a 
party member and being a labour union member. Similarly, for the ‘elite-challenging’, 
scale from 0 to 1, zero also here indicates that the respondents has participated in none of 
the activities and one indicates that the respondent has participated in all following 
activities: signing a petition, demonstrating, and boycotting a product for political reasons.  
 
Both elite-directed and elite-challenging scales tested positively to principal 
component analysis (PCA). Before performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor 
analysis was assesed. The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical 
significance (0.000) for all items in both scales and The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin values was 
.70, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1974), supporting the factorability of 
the correlation matrix. The elite-directed items loaded on a single component with an 
eigenvalue greater than one (e=1.50; 50.03% variance explained). Similarly, the elite-
challenging items loaded on a single component with an eigenvalue greater than one (1.57; 
52.53% variance explained). As for the independent variables,the socio-demographic and 
attitudinal variables are included in the regression models. These variables are: Young 
(coded 1 for 21-40 years, 0 for 41-70 years), Male (a dummy, where 1 male, 0 female), 
                                                          
22Although the age of Malaysian youth is defined as those between 15 to 40, I have to exclude young people 
under 21 years as voting and other political activities are specifically focused on youth aged above 21 years, 
and also for ensuring the comparability of the subjects across different forms of participation. Similarly, older 
respondents who are above 71 years old are dropped from the sample since issues of mobility may hinder 





University (1 for University Degree and 0 for other), Employed (1 employed and 0 for 
other), Married (1 married and  0 for other), Party identification (1 for yes and  0 no), left-
right values a  (10-items scale), Satisfaction with democracy (10-items scale), Confidence 
in government (1 yes, 0 no), Confidence in political parties (1 yes, 0 no), Assessment of 
degree of fair voting system in Malaysia (1 yes, 0 no), Assessment of degree of Respect for 
human rights in Malaysia (1 yes, 0 no). The coding of all these variables and the full 
wording of the original survey items are detailed in Appendix B.  
 
4.4 Analysis  
4.4.1 Age group differences in political activism 
 
Table 4.1 
Comparison of proportions: political activism by age group in Malaysia 








Vote in elections (national) 65.4% 92.2% 0.000 1170 
Party membership 14.5% 20.4% 0.014 1170 
Membership of labour union 16.1% 14.4% 0.455 1170 
Signing a petition 2.3% 2.0% 0.656 1170 
Joining in boycotts 1.1% 1.1% 0.853 1170 
Attending peaceful demonstrations 2.9% 2.2% 0.373 1170 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
Table 4.1 compares the proportions of individuals in each of the two age groups for six 
political activities in Malaysia. As expected, results confirms findings in the literature that 
young people (21-40 years old) are less politically active than older people (41-70 years 
old). Older people are significantly more likely than younger people to vote and to be a 
member of political parties. In fact, the first line of the table shows there is a 26 
percentage-point gap in voting between young and older people. Although the percentage 
of young people who are members of labour union, sign petitions, boycott products and 
demonstrate is slightly higher than for older people, there are no significant differences 
between these two groups in those activities. Therefore, overall, young people in Malaysia 
are less likely to participate in conventional political activities than older people, but there 
are no significant differences for unconventional participation. This follows the argument 





demonstrating, petition and boycotting are more popular among the young people (Dalton, 
2007; Norris , 2002; Quintelier, 2007), but these differences are not so large in Malaysia. 
 
Table 4.2 
Comparison of proportions: political activism by ethnic groups in Malaysia  
  Age group differences, by ethnic (N=1170) 
 
 


























Vote in elections (national) 68.0% 93.1% 0.000 59.1% 89.1% 0.000 63.6% 95.4% 0.000 
Party membership 15.9% 26.8% 0.000 10.6% 6.4% 0.164 15.9% 4.7% 0.150 
Membership of labour union 16.7% 17.0% 0.865 12.1% 7.7% 0.167 22.7% 11.7% 0.217 
Signing a petition 2.3% 2.0% 0.713 1.5% 1.9% 0.830 4.5% 2.3% 0.524 
Joining in boycotts 1.2% 1.1% 0.914 0.8% 1.3% 0.691 2.3% 0.0% 0.304 
Attending peaceful 
demonstrations 
3.2% 2.9% 0.752 0.8% 0.6% 0.881 6.8% 0.0% 0.070 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
When we compare for the respective age differences within ethnic groups (Table 
4.2), we find out in the first line of the table that the younger generation whether Malays, 
Chinese and Indians are significantly less likely to vote in elections than their older 
counterparts. In addition, the second line of the table shows that the old Malays are 
significantly more likely to be a member of political party compared to the young Malays. 
Although the proportions of young Chinese in several political activities (party 
membership and membership of labour union) are higher than their respective elders, but 
there are no significance difference between these two groups in that activities (see column 
two). Similarly, column three shows that the young Indians are more active than the old 
Indians when it comes to participating in almost all political activities, except for voting, 
but there are no significance differences between these groups, though at p 0.070 the 
difference in attending a demonstration is significant at the 90% confidence interval. 
Therefore, overall, young people regardless of different ethnic groups are less politically 











Comparison of proportions: political activism by social class in Malaysia 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
Table 4.3 reports the comparison of proportions between age groups in respective 
social classes. Column two and three demonstrate that the older generation from both 
middle and lower social classes are significantly more likely to be engaged in voting 
compared to the younger generation. Furthermore, the old lower class have a greater 
intensity to be a member of a political party than their younger counterparts (see the 
second row of the column three). However, the third row of column two shows that 
members of the young middle class are significantly more likely to be a member of a 
labour union relative to their respective elders. For the upper class group, there are no 
significant differences in all political activities as the sample sizes are too small between 
each group. Therefore, overall, the young middle-classes appear to have a stronger 
preference for labour unions relatively to their respective elders. The high level of unions 
membership amongst young middle-class is in line with the increase of the labour force 
participant rate (LFPR) in this country. For example, in 2014, the LFPR for young people 
increased to 71.3 percent from 69.3 percent in the previous year (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2014). This means that young people, especially from the middle-class group, 
are amongst the working-age population that actively engaged in the labour force in 
Malaysia. This is contrary to the declining patterns of young workers’ union membership 
in established democracies such as Britain (Bryson and Gomez, 2005), and New Zealand 




  Age group differences, by social classes (N=1169)  
 


























Vote in elections (national) 75.0% 90.9% 0.459 67.4% 94.5% 0.000 64.2% 90.6% 0.000 
Party membership 25.0% 18.2% 0.789 23.5% 20.6% 0.351 9.3% 20.4% 0.000 
Membership of labour union 25.0% 18.2% 0.789 24.6% 14.8% 0.009 11.1% 14.0% 0.251 
Signing a petition 0.0% 0.0% - 3.7% 2.6% 0.417 1.5% 1.6% 0.930 
Joining in boycotts 0.0% 9.1% 0.566 2.7% 1.1% 0.181 0.3% 0.8% 0.382 
Attending peaceful 
demonstrations 





 Table 4.4 
Comparison of proportions: political activism by gender in Malaysia 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
The All column in Table 4.4 compares the proportions of political activism of Malaysian 
males and females. Overall, the result in the first column indicates that males, either young 
or old, are more politically active than female with regard to party membership, labour 
union and attending demonstrations, which replicates the patterns that we have seen in 
many studies by Verba et al., (1997), Karp and Banducci (2008), Dalton (1996), Almond 
and Verba (1963), Norris (2002), Campbell et al., (1960) that females still lag behind 
males with respect to political participation. Even though we have seen an increase from 5 
percent in 1999 to 10 percent in 2012 of women representatives in both parliament and 
state assemblies, the participation of women in Malaysian politics has remained at a low 
level (Abdul Hadi et al., 2013:17784). Some obstacles faced by Malaysian women that 
deter them from political engagement are: the dual burden—juggling domestic 
responsibilities and career concerns; political parties which are inclined to conservative 
attitudes and fail to adapt to women’s leadership; a deterring environment for women such 
as belittling remarks; offensive jokes and the hypocrisy and dirty game of politics (Wan 
Azizah, 2002:193-194). Interestingly, when we tested the age group differences in political 
activism between males and females, it is worth noting that young males and young 
females are significantly less likely to participate in voting relative to their male and 
female elders (see the first row of the column two). In fact, there are greater percentage-
point gaps in voting between younger and older groups, with young males (25%) and 
young females (28%). Therefore, we can sum up that young people, either males and 
females are generally less likely to be engaged in political activities than their respective 
elders, but the difference is only significant with regards to the voting activity.  
  All (N=1170) Age group differences, by gender (N=1170) 
























Vote in elections (national) 81.3% 79.8% 0.513 67.2% 92.5% 0.000 63.5% 92.1% 0.000 
Party membership 20.3% 14.7% 0.010 17.0% 23.3% 0.068 11.9% 17.3% 0.098 
Membership of labour union 17.4% 12.8% 0.025 18.8% 16.1% 0.419 13.1% 12.7% 0.843 
Signing a petition 1.9% 2.2% 0.708 3.0% 1.2% 0.106 1.6% 2.8% 0.349 
Joining in boycotts 1.6% 0.5% 0.067 1.5% 1.8% 0.812 0.8% 0.3% 0.418 
Attending peaceful 
demonstrations 





4.4.2 Age group differences in political activism: the impact of university education  
 
Previous research points to the level of education has a strong influence determining 
citizens’ level of political engagement, where more educated citizens are more likely to 
participate in political activities as they have time, money, knowledge, and ability to access 
political information (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Dalton, 2006; Blais et al. 2004). 
Additionally, some research finds that there is a differential impact of education on turnout 
between age groups. Goerres (2009), Martin (2012) and Rubenson et al. (2004) argue that 
education has a greater effect on young citizens’ likelihood of voting than it does for older 
people. However, Blais et al. (2004) discover that the newer cohorts of educated young 
people in Canada vote less than older age groups which have the same education level. 
Furthermore, Inglehart and Welzel (2005:43) argue that due to increases in education, 
young people are more inclined to participate in elite-challenging politics as they are less 
likely to be trusting of elites and institutions. This does not mean that their support for 
democracy has eroded, but young people are changing the way they participate in politics.  
 
Table 4.5 
Comparison of proportions: political activism by education in Malaysia 
  
Less than university 
education (N=883) 
  













Vote in elections (national) 69.9% 91.8% 0.000 883 56.9% 94.4% 0.000 287 
Party membership 12.8% 19.6% 0.004 883 17.7% 24.5% 0.164 287 
Membership of labour union 14.3% 13.9% 0.578 883 19.3% 16.9% 0.621 287 
Signing a petition 1.2% 2.0% 0.737 883 4.4% 1.9% 0.260 287 
Joining in boycotts 0.6% 1.1% 0.404 883 2.2% 0.9% 0.430 287 
Attending peaceful demonstrations 2.0% 2.0% 0.231 883 4.4% 2.8% 0.500 287 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
The two columns in Table 4.5 presents information about the differences between 
younger and older people amongst those with non-university education and those who have 
a university degree or higher educational levels (Masters, PhD), and their level of political 
activism in Malaysia. When we compare the level of political activism between the non-
university educated and the university educated, only voting activity remains significant in 
political activism amongst those with a university education (see the first row of both 
columns). Compared to the non-university educated sample, the percentage-point gap in 





people. Amongst those with a university degree, there is no longer significant difference in 
party membership between younger and older people (see the second row of both 
columns). As expected, young people with a university education or higher are less likely 
to vote than their respective elders who have same educational level. Therefore, overall, 
educated young people are less likely to vote in elections than the educated older people, 
but there are no significant differences for unconventional participation even the 
percentage of educated young people participating in unconventional politics is fairly 
higher than the educated older people. The result is contrary to the findings of the previous 
literature (Goerres, 2009; Martin, 2012; and Rubenson et al., 2004) that education 
increases young citizens’ likelihood of voting than their respective elders. This finding, 
however, confirms the previous study in Malaysia (Muhammed Fauzi et al., 2003) that 
those with secondary school education and below are the ones that actively engaged in 
political activities compared to those who have university education.  
 
In addition, the result in Table 4.5 conflics with the argument of Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005:43) that educated young people are more prone to participate in elite-
challenging politics as they are driven by a motivation to make a difference so that they 
could have a better quality of life. As we can see, the educated young people in Malaysia 
are less likely to be engaged in voting relatively to educated older people, but there are no 
significant differences for unconventional participation even though some argue that 
educated young people see unconventional participation, particularly street demonstration, 
as a rational response after voting is seen to have no influence on the election outcome 
(Weiss, 2006; Welsh, 2012). Overall, for young people, having a university education or 
















Ranking of political activities amongst youth (21-40 years old) and older citizens (41-70 
years old) in Malaysia 
All (N=1170) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 523)   41-70 yrs (N: 647) 
1 Vote in elections (national)  65.4% Vote in elections (national) 92.2% 
2 Membership of labour union 16.1% Party membership 20.4% 
3 Party membership 14.6% Membership of labour union 14.4% 
4 Attending peaceful demonstrations 2.9% Attending peaceful demonstrations 2.2% 
5 Signing a petition 2.3% Signing a petition 2.0% 
6 Joining in boycotts 1.1% Joining in boycotts 1.1% 
University education or higher (N=287) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 181) 41-70 yrs (N: 106) 
1 Vote in elections (national)  56.9% Vote in elections (National) 94.4% 
2 Membership of labour union 19.3% Party membership 24.5% 
3 Party membership 17.7% Membership of labour union 16.9% 
4 =Attending peaceful demonstrations  4.4% Attending peaceful demonstrations 2.8% 
5 =Signing a petition 
 
Signing a petition 1.9% 
6 Joining in boycotts 2.2% Joining in boycotts 0.9% 
 
The upper portion of Table 4.6 (all) shows that the ranking of political activities amongst 
young and older people for the whole sample is virtually different. For young people in the 
general sample, voting and membership of a labour union are on the top two of the list and 
boycotting a product is on the bottom of the list. In contrast, the top two of the list for the 
older people are voting and party membership and boycotting a product is on the bottom of 
the list. However, when we look at the ranking of political activities amongst educated 
young people and educated old people (the lower portion of Table 4.6), the pattern is 
slightly different, with demonstrating and signing a petition (4.4%) share the same rank 
and percentage on the list. The ranking of political activities amongst older people and old 
university-educated old people is almost the same. This shows that whether the older 
respondents have university degrees or not, there is no change in their political activities. 
Overall, the top three most popular political activities amongst young and older people, 
whether they have university education or not, are voting and being a member of political 





boycotting and demonstrating are the least popular activities amongst both young and older 
people in Malaysia.  
 
 To sum up the findings of this section, being more educated does not mediate the 
differences in political activism between younger and older people in Malaysia, as 
educated young people are significantly less politically active in voting than their 
respective highly educated older people.  In addition, education also does not mediate the 
differences in political activism between older people and older university-educated 
people, as the older university-educated people show less intensity to be a member of 
political party compared to older people in general.  This shows that being older has a 
positive effect on older citizens’ political activism as does being more educated.  Overall, 
these findings indicate that having a university education actually does not reduce the 
participatory gap and differences of political activism between young and older people in 
Malaysia. Therefore, being more educated has no effect for political activism amongst 
young people, whereas the reverse is true for older people. 
 
4.5 Elite-directed and elite-challenging repertoires   
 
In the previous section, we discussed the importance of other modes of participation, such 
as protests, riots, and civil disobedience as ways of publicly making people’s voices heard 
in an attempt to influence political decisions. Since the unconventional forms of 
participation have become more popular amongst young people, largely in Western 
democracies, various forms of political activities which used to be regarded as ‘elite-
challenging’—usually outside the established order or “...gives the public an increasingly 
important role in making specific decisions” (Inglehart, 1997:3) such as political protests—
must be clearly distinguished from ‘elite-directed’ modes, where elites mobilise mass 
support through voting and established organisations such as political parties and the 
labour unions. Following the classification of ‘elite-directed’ and ‘elite-challenging’ by 
Inglehart (1997), we have recoded the political activities engaged by young people (either 
in their lifetimes or within the past 12 months) in this analysis into a mean scale from 0 to 
1 where zero indicates that the respondents have participated in none of the activities and 
one indicates that the respondent have participated in all of them. 










Elite-directed and elite-challenging activism 
        All 
    
21-40 yrs         41-70 yrs p-value N 
Elite-Directed .32 .42 0.000 1170 
Elite-Challenging .02 .01 0.450 1170 
    
University education or higher 
        21-40 yrs  41-70 yrs p-value N 
Elite-Directed .31 .45 0.000 287 
Elite-Challenging .04 .02 0.249 287 
        Gender 
    
21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 
Elite-Directed Male .34 .44 0.000 620 
   
Female .29 .41 0.000 579 
Elite-Challenging Male .03 .02 0.447 620 
      Female .01 .01 0.836 579 
        Ethnic 
   
  21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 
Elite-Directed Malay .34 .45 0.000 813 
   
Chinese .27 .34 0.010 295 
   
Indian .34 .38 0.395 91 
Elite-Challenging Malay .02 .02 0.699 813 
   
Chinese .01 .01 0.797 295 
      Indian .04 .00 0.141 91 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
Table 4.7 compares the means between young people and the elders in elite-directed and 
elite-challenging activism. An independent sample t-test is conducted to test the age 
differences in activism by looking at education levels, gender and ethnic groups. The result 
shows that older people are significantly more actively engaged in elite-directed activism 
than younger people and these differences also persist amongst those educated older 
people. In addition, there are no significance differences in elite-challenging activism 
between young and older people, even when we focus only on university-educated 
respondents. When we test the age differences by gender in both activisms, we find out 
that older males and females are significantly more likely than younger males and females 
to engage in elite-directed activism. As expected, there are no significance differences in 





greater intensity to engage in this activism compared to their respective male elders. The 
last column in Table 4.7 shows that amongst the ethnic Malay and Chinese, young people 
are significantly less likely to be involved in elite-directed activism than their respective 
elders. Overall then, these findings correspond to the literature that there are differences in 
political activism between young and old with the young generally being more disengaged 
from politics (O’Toole et al., 2003; Kimberlee, 2002), since a significant age gap is 
apparent in elite-directed activism, and absent for elite-challenging activism. 
 
4.5.1 The effects of age, education and their interaction   
 
Table 4.8 
The effects of age, education and their interaction  
 
Elite-Directed Elite-Challenging 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
N 1170 1170 1170 1170 






















   
-.046 
(0.034)   
.021 
(0.013) 
  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 
 Items in () refer to standard errors 
 
Table 4.8 presents the effects of age, education and their interaction on elite-directed and 
elite-challenging activism. In particular, it models the effects of being young, being 
educated and their interaction on both types of political activism. Adding the interactive 
effects to the regression model is useful in understanding whether the effect of one 
independent variable on the dependent variable is dependent on the effect of another 
independent variable. When the interaction effect is included in a model we check if it is 
significant.  If it is, it means that the effect is indeed dependent on the other variables. In 
this thesis we test both for two-way and three-way interactions. Model 2 for elite-directed 
activism shows that there is no significant interaction effect between age and education as 
we had hypothesised, for elite-directed activism. As such, for elite-directed activism, 
university education does not account for the differences between young and older people.  
 
Morevoer, when we look at elite-challenging activism, we can see in Model 1 that 





elite-challenging activism. However, in Model 2, there is no significant interaction effect 
between being young and having a university degree on elite-challenging activism. 
Therefore, the findings contradict our initial hypothesis that young people who have higher 
levels of education will be even more highly engaged in elite-challenging activism. Rather, 
education spurs elite-challenging or protest action but older age spurs elite-directed or 
conventional politics.   
 
4.5.2 Party identification effects and socio-economic determinants of political 
activism   
 
Alongside age and education, many empirical studies suggest other socioeconomic status 
predictors such as gender, marital and employment status as potential variables to explain 
participation. Therefore, we include these indicators in further analyses (Table 4.9, Model 
1) together with party identification (Table 4.9, Model 2) in order to see their impacts on 
elite-directed and elite-challenging activism. It is worth noting that the literature shows 
how party identification plays an important role in encouraging people to engage with 
politics and to become a member of a political party (Miller, 1976). In particular, citizens 
who have strong ties with a political party exhibit more participatory activism than people 
who do not feel close to any political parties (Clarke and Stewart, 1984). 
 
Table 4.9 
Socio-economic determinants of political activism  
 Elite-Directed Elite-Challenging 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
N 1170 1170 1170 1170 



































































  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 






The findings (Table 4.9) show that when controlling for both socioeconomic 
indicators and party identification, the effect of being young is negative for elite-directed 
activism and significant as in Table 4.8, and controlling for the socio-demographic factors 
and party identification has a positive effect, doubling the model fit for elite-directed 
activism relative to the model from Table 4.8 with just age and education. In addition, 
being male has a positive effect on elite-directed activism. This confirms the earlier 
findings (Table 4.7) that males are significantly more likely to be involved in the political 
arena, mainly conventional politics, than females.  Additionally, being married appears to 
have a positive impact on elite-directed activism potentially since married people have 
more stable networks. As for elite–challenging activism, socioeconomic status and party 
attachment have no significant effects. It appears that socioeconomic factors such as 
employment and marital status, as well as political party, plays no role in motivating young 
people (or old people, for that matter) to participate in elite-challenging activism.  Model 
fit does not improve much either. Additionally, the education effect disappears given that 
the variables included probably each have some correlation with it. As such, on balance 
education is the only variable found to have an influence on elite-challenging participation 
whereas older age, male gender and married marital status all have positive influences on 
elite-directed action net of the other effects.  
 
4.5.3 Attitudinal determinants of political activism  
 
Previous research has emphasised the importance of political attitudes such as political 
interest, knowledge, efficacy, values and orientation towards the government and 
democracy as determining factors in political participation (Norris, 2002; Dalton, 2006; 
Van Deth, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Therefore, five major attitudinal factors (political interest, 
ideology, political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy and experiences with the regime) 
are included along with their interaction effects between age and higher educational level 
in political activism in the following analyses. Political interest measures whether the 
respondents are interested in politics or not, ideology is measured by using the left-right 
scale and the measure of democracy relies on questions asking respondents whether they 
were satisfied or not with the way democracy works in Malaysia. Two other attitudinal 
factors, political efficacy and experiences with the government are also taken into 
consideration as they typically facilitate greater political participation. For, political 





three other factors: satisfaction with democracy, assessment of fair voting system and 
assessment of respect for human rights are considered as reflecting citizens’ experience 
with the regime which might hinder or support political action. 
 
Overall, Model 1 in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 show that only some attitudinal 
variables have significant effects on political activism. Some like political interest support 
both elite-directed and elite-challenging activism whereas others like belief that the voting 
system is fair or having more leftist values and dissatisfaction with government support 
only one or the other type (the first elite-directed and the latter two elite-challenging 
activism). The fact that being interested in politics takes a positive effect on both 
repertoires of activism confirms findings in the literature that being very interested in 
politics increase citizens’ likelihood to engage in political activities whether in the forms of 
formal or informal political participation (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Milbrath and Goel, 
1977). However, as argued by Van Deth (2000:116), a subjective expression of political 
interest does not necessarily mean that a person considers politics important in their lives. 
When controlling for attitudinal variables in elite-directed activism, the negative effect of 
being young has been strengthened. As predicted, feeling that Malaysia has a fair voting 
system has an effect on elite-directed activism. Moreover, being female and not married 
have significant negative effects on elite-directed activism. 
 
Model 1 in Table 4.11 for elite-challenging activism shows that being more left-
wing has a positive effect on activism.  Apart from left-wing ideology, dissatisfaction with 
democracy also has an effect on elite-challenging participation. Given that demonstrating 
and signing petitions are the most prevalent elite-challenging activities, therefore, it could 
be expected that young university graduates are more likely to be engaged in elite-
challenging activism because they are interested in politics, hold a more left-wing political 














Attitudinal determinants of political activism and further interaction effects: elite-directed 
activism 
  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 
 Items in () refer to standard errors 
 
  Elite-Directed Activism 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
N 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 
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Male*University 





























Satisfaction with Democracy*University 
     
.011 
(0.070) 
Satisfaction with Democracy*young 














Attitudinal determinants of political activism and further interaction effects: elite-
challenging activism 
  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 
 Items in () refer to standard errors 
  Elite-Challenging Activism 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
N 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 



















































































































































































(0.040)    
Male*University 
   
.012 
(0.020)   
Male*young 
   
.003 
(0.013)   
Male*University*young 
   
.008 
(0.026)   
Political interest*University 








    
-.030 
(0.026)  
Satisfaction with Democracy 
*University 
 
    
.005 
(0.027) 
Satisfaction with Democracy*young 
     
.024 
(0.013) 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
*University*young 
 







4.5.4 Further interaction effects  
 
Models 2 to 5 in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 represent further interaction effects based on 
the analyses from previous sections. For elite-directed activism (see Table 4.10), there are 
several hypotheses derived: (1) being male has a strong positive effect for elite-directed 
activism. However, there is no significant interaction effect (male*young) as shown in 
Model 3. This contradicts our initial hypothesis that young males are more likely than 
young females to be more engaged in elite-directed activism. (2) Model 2 for elite-directed 
activism shows that the interaction party identification*young is not significant. (3) Model 
4 for elite-directed activism shows that the interaction political interest*young is also not 
significant.  
 
There are two further hypotheses derived for elite-challenging activism (see Table 
4.11). (1) Controlling for attitudinal variables should strengthen the positive effects of 
being young university graduates on elite-challenging activism, perhaps the reason is that 
being very interested in politics has a positive effect on young university graduates. 
However, there is no significant interaction effect (political interest*university education 
*young) as shown in Model 4. (2) Model 5 shows that the interaction term satisfaction with 
democracy*university education*young is also not significant. This opposes the initial 
hypothesis that young university graduates who have high levels of dissatisfaction with 
how democracy works in Malaysia are more likely to be engaged in elite-challenging 
politics. Therefore, overall, there is no positive impact of being a young university 




Based on the analyses from the WVS Waves 6 (2010-2014) survey, we confirm findings in 
the literature, and hypothesis (H1) that young people are less likely than their respective 
elders to be politically involved in elite-directed activism. However, the findings from the 
investigation do not substantiate the other hypotheses (H2, H3 and H4) since the relevant 
interaction effects and main effects of university*young, as well as male*young for elite-
directed activism and the effects of satisfaction with democracy*university*young in elite-
challenging activism are not significant. Therefore, we can conclude that education does 





and their elders in political activism. Our empirical study in this chapter has scrutinised the 
diverging patterns of participation between two age groups in Malaysia employing 
individual-level data for different types of political activities. There are some other 
significant key findings that can be highlighted from this chapter: first, young people 
irrespective of being male or female are less likely to be engaged in elite-directed in 
particular, and mainly voting, compared to their respective elders. However, there are no 
age effects or age differences in elite-challenging activism. Similarly, young people 
regardless of ethnic group are less politically active relative than their older counterparts. 
Third, when we compare directly with older people, young middle-class people are more 
likely to be members of a labour union relative to their respective elders. Overall, young 
people’s political disengagement in Malaysia clearly is an empirical fact since our data 
analysis has shown that they are in general less likely to be politically active than their 
elders. The next chapter will re-analyse whether and to what extent young people in 
Malaysia are disengaged from politics and what are the determinant factors by analysing 
another well-known survey with some additional variables not present in the WVS, 













FURTHER ANALYSES OF YOUNG PEOPLE’S POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN 
MALAYSIA: THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF EDUCATION AND THE ROLE 
OF THE RURAL-URBAN DIVIDE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that Malaysian young people in general are less likely 
than their elders to be politically interested and involved in politics, either through 
conventional or unconventional political participation. Whilst we test whether education 
levels have a differential effect on young people’s political activism as is found for some 
European countries—thus suggesting that higher education levels might close the gap 
between young and old (Grasso, 2013)—in the case of Malaysia, our results remain the 
same. Young people irrespective of education levels are less likely to be politically active 
than their elders in elite-directed action in particular. Given this finding, this chapter aims 
to extend the analyses further on whether young people are truly disengaged from the 
political process relative to their respective elders by using another well-known survey 
data source, the Asian Barometer Wave 2 (2005-2008) and Wave 3 (2010-2012). This new 
and additional source of representative data allows us to investigate further research 
questions that we could not shed light on with the previous data sources.  
 
As such, this chapter is arranged slightly differently from the earlier chapter, and 
this structure is detailed as follows: (1) in the aforementioned chapter, we mainly focused 
on the micro-level theories such as socio-demographic and attitudinal determinants of 
political actions. On the other hand, this chapter aims at integrating micro-level approaches 
with mobilisation factors on youth political activism. (2) Additionally, this chapter will 
also seek to examine the age group differences in political activism from two Waves 
(2005-2010) to analyse the underlying and time-varying dynamics of youth political 
activism in Malaysia. (3) Moreover, this data source also allows us to include another 





chapter, we include this variable in the models together with educational levels in order to 
test whether they have a differential effect on youth political activism in Malaysia. We 
added the element of rural-urban difference in the analyses because the split between urban 
and rural inhabitants is very clear particularly after the General Election of 2013. Social 
commentators argue that the urban city dwellers are better educated and well-informed 
citizens that are more likely to support progressive changes, while rural inhabitants are less 
educated and less-informed and more likely to continue to adhere to the old style of 
patronage politics (Thompson, 2013). In this respect, Malaysian young people who are 
educated and urban dwelling are seen to be more likely than their rural counterparts to be 
involved in political activities (Rajasakran and Sinnapan, 2013). Therefore, it can be 
expected that those young people living in urban settings are more likely to be engaged in 
unconventional political participation since they are amongst the more well-educated and 
better informed citizens. This echoes the results for Italy found in Grasso (2013) and 
shows, that in Malaysia, the urban dimension is also important in conjunction with the 
effect of higher educational qualifications for identifying those particularly active young 
people that go against the grain of theories of youth apathy. (4) The repertoires of political 
action in this chapter have been broadened to include contacting politicians and attending a 
campaign meeting, both forms of conventional political action that are available in the 
Asia Barometer but were unfortunately not available in the WVS. As such, this is a further 
advance introduced in this chapter’s investigation relative to the previous one which we 
hope will further shed light on the patterns of youth political activism in Malaysia. In the 
remainder of the chapter we cover the key elements from the literature, move on to data 
and methods before introducing our analyses and results. We conclude with a discussion of 
the wider implications of our findings for the literature and for scholarship on youth 
political participation worldwide and more specifically in Malaysia. 
 
5.2 Further explanations for political participation  
 
We have highlighted several key themes from previous studies focusing on the importance 
of socioeconomic resources and social psychological elements as determinant factors of 
political participation. In this chapter, given the data source, we include a further important 
factor that may influence the propensity to be active, which is the rural-urban distinction. 
Numerous studies have long predicted (although the effect found has sometimes been 





Richardson, 1973). Some argue that people living in urban areas have higher levels of 
participation than those who live in less populated areas as they have more social 
interaction with other people and therefore, are more likely to develop skills that enable 
them to participate (Milbrath, 1965). In particular, those who are “exposed to the 
stimulation of the urban environment” (Verba and Nie, 1972:233) have a greater tendency 
to be campaigners or complete activists or participate in activities which require greater 
effort compared to those who live in the rural areas. However, the community in rural 
areas tends to have direct engagement with politicians because they know better the 
context of local politics. Richardson (1973), for example, finds out that rural people in 
Japan are more likely than their urban counterparts to be strongly engaged in local politics, 
have a greater feeling that voting is a duty and are more concerned about having their 
political needs represented. However, the ‘Decline-of-Community’ model (Verba and Nie, 
1972) stipulates that participation may be waning since increasingly more people are 
becoming urban dwellers and move to a more urbanised setting since they no longer feel 
that they belong to a particular community due to the impacts of modernisation.  
 
 For the attitudinal determinants, another important factor that has been taken into 
consideration in this chapter is political knowledge. Political knowledge or to be more 
specific, “the range of factual information about politics that is stored in long term 
memory” (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996:10), is beneficial for democracy since an 
informed citizen is needed for democratic systems to function as intended (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter, 1996; Neuman, 1986:1). Most studies find that there is a positive link between 
political knowledge and participation, particularly in the act of voting. It is generally 
considered that high levels of political knowledge are associated with high levels of 
political participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Neuman, 1986; Verba et al., 1997; 
Milner, 2002). In the case of voting, political knowledge enhances the ability of 
individuals to make voting decisions based on specific criteria such as a candidate’s 
positions on certain issues (Bartels, 1996; Barber, 1972). To some extent, political 
knowledge also increases citizens’ likelihood to participate in non-electoral participation 
due to the fact that politically informed citizens have greater information about more 
complex modes of political participation (Milner, 2002; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 
1995). How should political knowledge be measured? Generally, many scholars agree that 
the informative and mobilising roles of the media helps citizens gather information about 





Putnam, 2000). Therefore, exposure to the political news gathered from various media 
outlets can be seen as an important indicator for measuring the level of political knowledge 
and participation. At the societal-level, many scholars of political participation emphasise 
the importance of mobilising agencies as one of the explanatory factors for political 
participation (Putnam, 2000; Stolle, 2007; Norris, 2004). However, operationalisations 
vary widely (see Chapter 2 for details). In this chapter, given indicator availability in the 
survey, we use group membership and political discussion indexes as predictors of 
mobilisation, particularly to explore their effects on youth political activism. These two 
variables capture important aspects of the mobilisation model in terms of organisational 
embeddedness, potential network, and information effects leading to heightened activism.  
 
 5.3 Data and methods  
 
The analysis in this chapter uses cross-sectional survey data from the second and third 
Waves of the Asian Barometer Survey in the period of 2005 to 2012.  The time frame 
between 2005 to 2012 is critical for this exploration as there were some major political 
events that significantly affected the likelihood of participation in Malaysia.  First, there 
was a ‘political tsunami’ resulting from the outcome of the 2008 general election, when the 
ruling government (the BN) lost its stronghold of two-thirds majority in the parliament for 
the first time since 1969 (though it held on to power nationally) and four state governments 
in Selangor, Penang, Perak, and Kedah were handed over to the opposition.  Another 
significant political event during this time was the rise of popular protests by the Bersih 
Movement and Hindraf which conveyed major popular grievances over social inequality 
and electoral manipulations.  Finally, Malaysia also experienced the rapid growth of the 
Internet, mainly social media platforms and independent websites which allowed for the 
unbiased flow of information, enabled public discussion, and provided an unregulated 
medium for free expression compared to the mainstream media.  However, since 2007, the 
government have gradually tightened control over Internet users or politically sensitive 
contents which could threaten national security.  For example, a prominent Malaysian 
blogger, Raja Petra was arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) and 
Sedition Act for allegedly insulting the Malays and Islam (Mohd Azizuddin, 2009).  
Therefore, the Asian Barometer (ABS) is another important source of empirical data for 
analysing whether young Malaysians are truly disengaged from politics or not. In 





such as socio-demographic, attitudinal elements, mobilising networks as well as some 
aspects that could be seen to be linked to the specific intitutional context on youth political 
activism. The Asian Barometer survey is a large-scale regional survey that encompasses 
comparable data on public opinion on political values, democracy and governance in some 
parts of East Asia and Southeast Asia regions. Although it is a relatively new project and 
has been conducted only three times so far, it has been used extensively by Asian 
researchers, specifically to study citizens’ attitudes about democracy and politics. It is also 
useful for providing a temporal dimension to the analyses by examining two successive 
Waves side by side.   
 
This chapter analyses the ABS data sets based on the following reasons. First, the 
ABS data is comprehensive enough as it uses more than 120 standardised questions and 
covers a broad range of topics on political participation, electoral mobilisation, 
psychological involvement and additional questions reflective of the Malaysian context. 
Some questions are retained as regular indicators which are monitored over time, while 
others are added to depict the current concerns at that time. Second, the sample size used 
in the Malaysia survey is large and covers the entire country including the Peninsular and 
East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). Generally, the average number of respondents for 
each Wave is nearly 1,200 repondents, who are selected randomly amongst voting-age 
adult Malaysians (18 and above) gives a maximum error margin 2.83% at the 95% 
confidence level (Malaysia Survey Technical Report, 2007, 2011). In addition, most of the 
questions passed the reliability test with all items showing positive correlations. Thus, we 
can use the whole set of questions since the consistency of each item is acceptable. The 
ABS survey also provides useful measures covering aspects neglected in the WVS to test 
whether young people are disengaged from the political process relative to their respective 
elders and also analysing the factors that may play a role in explaining these. For example, 
the ABS data gives us a chance to study a broad spectrum of political action (voting, party 
membership, contacting politicians, attending a campaign meeting, boycotting, signing a 
petition, demonstrating and using violence for a political cause) compared to the WVS, 
which provided a more limited set of items of political action (voting, party membership, 
labour union membership, signed a petition, demonstrated and boycotted products for 
political reason). The breadth of activity allows us to clearly understand the variations and 
diverging patterns of political activism amongst young people. Although the ABS data are 





try to compare between the two Waves. In this regard, some important questions that 
appeared in Wave 2 are no longer being asked in the more recent questionnaire. The 
absence of repeated measures for these indicators limits the over-time analyses. For 
example, the question on conflict among political groups is no longer repeated in Wave 3. 
However, with the ABS this study is still advantaged in being able to account for rural-
urban differences and includes this variable in the analyses together with the other 
variables. All details of coding and questionnaire items are provided in Appendix C. 
 
In order to conduct in-depth analyses on the entire repertoire of political 
participation, we compare the ABS data from Wave 2 and Wave 3. Specifically, this 
chapter aims to examine whether young people are truly disengaged from the political 
process relative to their elders in two different Waves and thus across time, also testing 
whether the rural-urban dichotomy is reflected in the findings from the data and whether 
educational levels are still shown to have a differential effect on political activism amongst 
young people. As this chapter compares the political involvement between young and 
older people in two different Waves, so the sample in these Waves is divided into two age 
groups:23  
 
i. The total sample for Wave 2 is 1072 respondents: young people (21 to 40 years 
old/ N=570) and older people (41 to 70 years old/ N=502).  
ii. The total sample for Wave 3 is 1074 respondents: young people (21 to 40 years 
old/N=493) and older people (41 to 70 years old/ N=581). 
 
These Waves are deliberately separated to more clearly see differences in the patterns and 
proportions between young people and their elders, but also between young people in two 
different Waves. To measure their level of political engagement, we use the same 
procedures as previously, in which we select eight indicators of political participation 
available in the ABS.24 The percentage-point gap in political activitism between young 
                                                          
23Although the age of Malaysian youth is defined as those between 15 to 40, I have to exclude young people 
under 21 years as voting and other political activities are specifically focused on youth aged above 21 years, 
and also for ensuring the comparability of the subjects across different forms of participation. 
  
24Voting is the most ubiquitous political activity in which an eligible electorate appoints their representatives 
through a regular election.  
Party membership can be understood as partisan affiliation or individual’s organisational affiliation to a 





people and the elderly is analysed by using cross-tabulations and t-test analyses and these 
are applied to determine whether the mean differences between the two groups (age 
groups, rural-urban difference, gender and education levels) are significant i.e. greater than 
would be expected simply by chance. We generated a mean scale to use a as a dependent 
variable for the regression on citizen-oriented activism, from 0 for participation in no 
political activity to 1 for participation in all four activities, where zero indicates that the 
respondent has participated in none of the activities and one indicates that the respondent 
has participated in all the following activities—voted, being a party member, attended a 
campaign meeting, contacted politicians (either in their lifetimes or within the past 12 
months). Likewise, for cause-oriented activism, we created a mean scale from 0 to 1, 
where zero indicates that the respondents has participated in none of the activities and one 
indicates that the respondent has participated all of the following four activities—
boycotted, signed a petition, demonstrated, and used force or violence for a political cause.  
 
These scales were tested through principal component analysis (PCA). Before 
performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assesed. Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) for Wave 2 reached statistical significance (0.000) for all items 
in both scales and the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .674, exceeding the recommended 
value of .6 (Kaiser, 1974), supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. The 
citizen-oriented items loaded on a single component with an eigenvalue greater than one 
(e=1.64; 41.19% variance explained). Similarly, the cause-oriented items loaded on a 
single component with an eigenvalue greater than one (1.82; 45.58% variance explained). 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Attended a campaign meeting is the part of the party work which requires more effort, time and commitment 
from an individual.  
Contacted politicians is part of the political expressive mechanisms where citizens communicate or get in 
touch with the elected representatives or officials regarding political and local issues.  
Boycotted is when consumers voluntarily refrain from buying, using, participating in or dealing with a person 
in order to put pressure for change of the policies pursued by government or private organisations.  
Signed a petition is when there is a collective effort to demand some form of actions from the government or 
other major agency e.g. a company.  
Demonstration is an act of a mass of individuals group expressing their public sentiments (positive or 
negative) for political or other cause. It generally consists of and includes public gatherings, marches, sit-ins, 
and rallies.  
Using force or violence for a political cause is a type of ‘high cost’ illegal activism is practiced by very few 
people. It can involve the unlawful use of great physical force or violence such as guerilla warfare, 
insurgency, rebellion, revolution, and rioting against adversaries to achieve political ends. According to 
Della Porta and Tarrow (1986:614), political violence, for example, the Red Brigdes in Italy in the late 
1960s-70s or the Baaden-Meinhoff Group in Germany in the same period, tends to consist of repertoires of 
collective action that include great physical force and cause damage to an opponent in order to impose 






For Wave 3, the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical 
significance (0.000) for all items in both scales and the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin values was 
.705. The citizen-oriented items loaded on a single component with an eigenvalue greater 
than one (e=1.86; 37.34% variance explained). Similarly, the cause-oriented items loaded 
on a single component with an eigenvalue greater than one (2.13; 53.28% variance 
explained).  
 
5.4 Analysis  
5.4.1 Age group differences in political activism 
 
The proportions for each of the two age groups (young and older people) engaging in eight 
political activities as shown in Table 5.1 below confirms the findings of the previous 
chapter that Malaysian young people aged 21 to 40 years old are less likely to be engaged 
in politics than their respective elders aged from 41 to 70 years. Overall, a significant age 
gap is apparent in voting, party membership and attending a campaign meeting for both 
Waves, and signing a petition in Wave 2. All these political activities are more likely to 
attract older people, with the exception of signing a petition. Compared to older people, 
young people in Wave 2 (13%) are more likely to have signed a petition than their 
respective elders (9%). However, Wave 3 shows that the age difference is no longer 
significant for signing a petition activity.  
 
Table 5.1 
Comparison of proportions: political activism by age group in Malaysia  
      Wave 2 (2005-2008) (N=1072)   Wave 3 (2010-2012) (N=1074)   















Voted  45% 88% 0.000 1072 48 % 90% 0.000 1074 
Party Membership 12% 17% 0.012 1072 5% 12% 0.000 1074 
Attend a campaign meeting 24% 33% 0.002 1072 24% 41% 0.000 1074 
Contacted Politician 30% 34% 0.155 1072 37% 40% 0.251 1074 
Boycotted  12% 11% 0.671 1072 41% 47% 0.062 1074 
Signing a petition 13% 9% 0.018 1072 21% 20% 0.591 1074 
Attended a demonstration  5% 3% 0.085 1072 5% 7% 0.308 1074 
Used force or violence for a 
political cause 
2% 1% 0.402 1072 3% 5% 0.096 1074 





Additionally, the age difference is largest in voting: less than half or 50 percent of 
younger people voted in the last election, in sharp contrast to over three-quarters who 
voted in the last election amongst older people. When we examine the two Waves (see 
Figure 5.1), the pattern displays that the percentage of young people involved in all 
political activism have increased in Wave 3, with the exception of party membership. Party 
membership amongst young people has dramatically decreased from 12 percent in Wave 2 
to only 5 percent in Wave 3 (see the second row of Table 5.1). The findings confirm the 
previous study by Pandian (2012) that young voters are more likely to be the ‘fence-sitters’ 
who seemed dubious of party affiliation, but voted based on issues, prioritising the 
national issues such as unemployment, security and corruption as their central preferences.  
 
Figure 5.1 




It is worth noting that signing a petition and boycotting went up, but party 
membership declined in Wave 3 and this could be due to several factors. First, there were 
legislative reforms which were meant to open greater democratic spaces for people by the 
government. For example, the amendment of AUKU (Section 15) 26 allows students to join 
political organisations outside the campus, and the enactment of the Peaceful Assembly 
                                                          
25The total sample for this graph is N=1063, which is based on the total sample of young people in Wave 2 
N=570 and young people in Wave 3 N=493). 
 
26 Since 2012, the government has amended the Section 15 of AUKU by allowing varsity students to take 
part in politics as long as they do not violate the laws or regulations of their respective universities.  Before 
the amendment, students were not allowed to join political parties or express support for them.    
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Voted
Party Membership





Used force or violence for a political cause





Act 2012 (PAA) which allows public assemblies without any permit from the police. 
Instead, the organiser of an assembly must give notification to the police at least 10 days 
before the assembly. Second, the rise of a social movement called ‘Bersih’ raised public 
attention and consciousness for democratic values through their common campaigns such 
as lobbying, signing a petition, or protesting. Third, social media like Facebook and 
Twitter has becomes a democratic instrument that enables people to have greater access to 
political information and help social movements to mobilise people to sign a petition. 
Moreover, the results confirm previous findings that young people in Malaysia do not 
prefer to be engaged in ‘protest politics’ or other forms of participation that differ from 
traditional political activities, as there are no significant differences between young and 
older people in unconventional political activities, with the exception of signing a petition 
in Wave 2. This finding however, contrary with arguments by Norris (2003), Van Aelst 
and Walgrave (2001) and Dalton (1996) that young people are usually engaged in 
unconventional forms of participation. Therefore, overall, Malaysian young people are less 
likely to be politically active relative to their respective elders, even when we directly 
compare between different Waves, in accordance with the thesis of youth apathy. 
 
5.4.2 Age group differences in political activism: the impact of urban-rural living  
 
Table 5.2 compares the proportions of political activism between rural and urban 
Malaysians, using existing codes in the ABS data. In Wave 2 (see the first column), it is 
clear that there are no significant differences in political activities between the urban and 
rural young. (However here we should also consider that this could be likely due to the 
sample size being very small for the young rural group). Nevertheless, there is a rural-
urban gap amongst the older group in three political actions, namely party membership, 
demonstrating and using force or violence for a political cause. In particular, these 
activities are more likely to be practiced by older people in rural areas than their urban 
counterparts. Wave 3, however, indicates different findings in rural-urban differences 
amongst younger people (see the second column of Table 5.2). During this time, Malaysia 
entered a phase of leadership transition—Abdullah Badawi handed over power to his 
deputy, Najib Tun Razak. Upon taking up office, Najib embarked on several radical 
reforms of the government policy by focusing on economic development, especially in 
rural areas.  For example, the government continuously started providing direct cash 





residents under the hardcore poor housing programme in order to ease their burden.  There 
is a strong patron-client relationship between the ruling government and the rural populace 
(Zhang, 2003). This could moreover be a reason why young people in rural areas are more 
politically engaged than their urban counterparts in party membership, attending campaign 
meetings and signing petition. Similarly, older rural people also are significantly more 
likely than older people in urban areas to vote, attend a campaign meeting and boycott. 
Khoo (in Liu Yangyue, 2014) argues that sometimes, young people who are working 
periodically in the urban area serve as the conveyors of information about democratic and 
liberal ideas when they return home. Young people may indeed be capable of influencing 
those in rural areas to be more politically active and aware about political issues. On the 
other hand, the older urban participants are more likely to contact officials than the older 
rural residents. Overall, rural residents whether they are young or old are more likely to be 
politically active in political activism than their respective urban residents.  
  
Table 5.2 
Comparison of proportions: urban-rural difference  
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
When we test for respective age differences within the rural-urban dichotomy (see 
Table 5.3), we find that young urban dwellers in Wave 2 are significantly less likely than 
Urban-rural difference 
  Wave 2 (N=1072) Wave 3 (N=1074) 
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older urban citizens to vote and attend a campaign meeting, but they are significantly more 
likely than their respective urban elders to sign a petition. Perhaps, one of the factors that 
helps to explain why young urban citizens are more likely to sign a petition is the use of 
social media. Since social media has been used as the main tool to mobilise people to sign 
an online petition, and the young urban middle class is the largest group who have actively 
used the social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and blogs as a main workable 
source of political information (Mohd Adnan et al., 2012:1249), we can assume that social 
media plays a role in explaining this.  
 
Table 5.3 
Comparison of proportions: age group difference, by urban-rural  
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
Correspondingly, young rural citizens are significantly less likely than their rural 
elders to vote and be a member of a political party. In Wave 3, we can see a similar trend 
as in Wave 2 where young people, whether they reside in rural or urban areas, are 
significantly less likely than their respective elders to participate in conventional politics 
including voting, party membership and attending a campaign meeting. In terms of 
unconventional political activism, there are no significant difference between these two 
groups, except for the rural areas where older people more actively participate in boycotts 
than younger people. Therefore, overall, young people—regardless of whether they live in 
Age group difference, by urban-rural 
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Attend a campaign 
meeting 


















































































4% 2% 0.068 7% 6% 0.733 6% 6% 0.762 4% 6% 0.277 
 
Used force or violence 
for a political cause 





rural or urban areas—are less likely to be politically active in conventional political 
activism than their respective elders, except for signing a petition activity amongst young 
urban in Wave 2. These findings clearly contradict the conventional wisdom that 
Malaysian young urbans are more likely than their rural counterparts to be politically 
active citizens (Rajasakran and Sinnapan, 2013; Thompson, 2013).  
 
5.4.3 Age group differences in political activism: the impact of gender  
 
Table 5.4 reports the proportions of political activism of Malaysian males and females. 
Overall, the results from both Waves 2 and 3 confirm findings in the previous chapter that 
males, irrespective of age group, are more politically active than females in regard to 
attending a campaign meeting, contacting officials, boycotting and signing a petition. 
Additionally, as shown in Wave 3 (see column 4), these gender gaps are apparent in almost 
all political activities, with the exception of voting and party membership amongst older 
males and females.  
Table 5.4 
Comparison of proportions: gender difference 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
When we compare the age group differences in political activism between males 
and females in Table 5.5, young males in wave 2 (see the first column) are less likely than 
Gender difference 
  Wave 2 (N=1072) Wave 3 (N=1074) 
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their respective male elders to vote in elections, to be a member of a political party or 
attend a campaign meeting. Whilst the percentage of young people in unconventional 
politics such as boycotting, signing a petition, demonstrating and using political violence is 
slightly higher than that of older people, there are no significant difference between these 
two groups in these activities. Compared with the older female group (see the second 
column), young females are five percent more likely to have signed a petition. However, 
there is a significant age gap between these two groups in terms of voting, where only 44 




 Comparison of proportions: age group difference, by gender 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
The findings in Wave 3 (columns 3 and 4) show that both young males and females are 
significantly more inactive than their respective elders in voting and attending a campaign 
meeting. In addition, young males are less likely than their older counterparts to use force 
or violence for a political cause, while young females are significantly less active than 
older females in being a member in a political party. Therefore, overall, we can sum up 
Age group difference, by gender 
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that young people, both males and females are generally less likely to be engaged in 
conventional political activities than their respective elders, particularly in terms of voting, 
party membership and attending a campaign meeting. There is a significant difference in 
unconventional political activity, mainly in signing a petition, but this is only apparent 
amongst young females in Wave 2.  
 
5.4.4 Age group differences in political activism: the impact of university education  
 
Table 5.6 shows the proportions involved in political activism amongst younger and older 
people for the non-university education sample or solely amongst those that university 
degree or higher (Masters, PhD) in Wave 2. When we compare the level of political 
activism between these two samples, only voting activity remains significant amongst 
those with a university education (See the first row of both columns). The percentage-point 
age gap in voting is somewhat larger (47 percent)—less than half of educated young 
people having voted in the last election—in sharp contrast to over three-quarters of 
educated older people. In addition, there is a significant age gap between educated young 
and old people in contacting politicians, in which this activity is more likely to be 




 Comparison of proportions: political activism by university education or higher in Wave 2 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
      Less than university education University education or higher 
      Wave 2 (2005-2008) (N=879) Wave 2 (2005-2008) (N=193) 
      
21-40 yrs 
(N: 413) 








Voted  48% 88% 0.000 879 36% 83% 0.000 193 
Party Membership 14% 18% 0.119 879 8% 17% 0.094 193 
Attend a campaign meeting 25% 33% 0.012 879 22% 30% 0.257 193 
Contacted Politician 30% 33% 0.294 879 31% 50% 0.033 193 
Boycotted  12% 11% 0.596 879 11% 11% 0.961 193 
Signing a petition 10% 8% 0.426 879 23% 17% 0.414 193 
Attended a demonstration  4% 3% 0.280 879 6% 0% 0.143 193 
Used force or violence for a 
political cause 





On the other hand, the findings of Wave 3 in Table 5.7 reveal that five political activities 
(voting, attending a campaign meeting, contacting officials, and boycotting) show 
significant age differences between young and old in the university-educated sample, as 
compared to only three activities (voting, party membership, and attending a campaign 
meeting) in the non-university education sample. Like in Wave 2, all these activities are 
more actively practiced by educated older people relative to their younger educated 
counterparts. Therefore, overall, the results of Waves 2 and 3 confirm findings from the 
previous chapter that young people, whether with or without university education or higher 
are less likely to participate in almost all political activities than older people. The patterns 
also confirm, as many researchers have found, that conventional politics tend to attract the 
older sections of the populations, including amongst those older people with a university 
education or higher.  
 
Table 5.7 
Comparison of proportions: political activism by university education or higher in Wave 3 
      Less than university education University education or higher 
      Wave 3 (2010-2012) (N=900) Wave 3 (2010-2012) (N=174) 











Voted  47% 90% 0.000 900 50% 83% 0.000 174 
Party Membership 6% 12% 0.001 900 4% 6% 0.632 174 
Attend a campaign meeting 25% 40% 0.000 900 23% 52% 0.000 174 
Contacted Politician 31% 37% 0.088 900 53% 75% 0.007 174 
Boycotted  43% 45% 0.456 900 35% 60% 0.003 174 
Signing a petition 21% 19% 0.586 900 23% 27% 0.578 174 
Attended a demonstration  6% 7% 0.678 900 3% 6% 0.276 174 
Used force or violence for a 
political cause 
4% 5% 0.307 900 1% 4% 0.162 174 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
5.4.5 Ranking of political activities   
 
Table 5.8 displays the ranking of political activities amongst young and older people from 
the general, urban-dwelling and university educated samples in Wave 2. The upper portion 
of Table 5.5 (all) shows that the ranking of political activities amongst younger and older 
people for the whole sample are slightly different. For young people in the general sample, 
signing a petition is on the top four items of the list, with party membership and boycotting 





membership, boycotts and signing a petition are ranked on the fourth, fifth and sixth of the 
list for older people across the whole sample. 
 
Table 5.8 
Ranking of political activities amongst young (21-40 years old) and old (41-70 years old) 
in Wave 2 
Wave 2 (2005-2008) 
All (N=1072) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 570) 41-70 yrs (N: 502) 
1 Voted  45% Voted  88% 
2 Contacted Politician 30% Contacted Politician 34% 
3 Attend a campaign meeting 24% Attend a campaign meeting 33% 
4 Signing a petition 13% Party Membership 17% 
5 Party Membership 12% Boycotted  11% 
6 = Boycotted  
 
Signing a petition 9% 
7 Attended a demonstration  5% Attended a demonstration  3% 
8 Used force or violence for a political cause 2% Used force or violence for a political cause 1.0% 
Urban (N=889) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 472) 41-70 yrs (N: 417) 
1 Voted  46% Voted  87% 
2 Contacted Politician 29% Contacted Politician 32% 
3 Attend a campaign meeting 24% Attend a campaign meeting 31% 
4 Signing a petition 14% Party Membership 15% 
5 Party Membership 12% Boycotted  9% 
6 Boycotted  11% Signing a petition 8% 
7 Attended a demonstration  4% Attended a demonstration  2% 
8 Used force or violence for a political cause 2% Used force or violence for a political cause 0% 
University education or higher (N=193) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 157) 41-70 yrs (N: 36) 
1 Voted  36% Voted  83% 
2 Contacted Politician 31% Contacted Politician 50% 
3 Signing a petition 23% Attend a campaign meeting 30% 
4 Attend a campaign meeting 22% Party Membership 17% 
5 Boycotted  11% =Signing a petition 
 
6 Party Membership 8% Boycotted  11% 
7 Attended a demonstration  6% Attended a demonstration  0% 
8 Used force or violence for a political cause 3% =Used force or violence for a political cause 
 
 
When we look at the ranking of political activities amongst younger and older 
people in urban areas (the middle portion of Table 5.8), the pattern is slightly different, 
with the top four to six political activities on the list for young urban people being signing 





on the list for older urban residents are party membership, boycotts and signing a petition. 
Compared to the general sample, the proportions of young urban residents in boycotting 
(11%) is slightly lower than young people in the general sample (12%). Thus, boycotting 
drops to sixth place in the political ranking list for young urbans. Furthermore, the ranking 
of political activities amongst older people and older urban people is almost the same. This 
shows that there are no large differences between older respondents living in urban and 
non-urban areas.  
 
The lower portion of Table 5.8 displays that the ranking of political activities 
amongst educated younger and older people is also slightly different. In particular, signing 
a petition, attending a campaign meeting and boycotting are ranked within the top five of 
the list, while party membership comes in the bottom three of the list for the young 
educated sample. In contrast, for educated older people, attending a campaign meeting is 
one of the top three most popular activities, signing a petition and boycotting (11%) share 
the same rank and percentage, and boycotts are listed in the bottom three of the list. 
Overall, when we compare the ranking of political activities between young people in the 
general, urban and university-educated samples, we can see that amongst educated young, 
the top three most popular political activities are voting, contacting officials and signing a 
petition, while party membership, demonstrating and using political violence are the least 
popular activities. For young people in the general and urban samples, voting, contacting 
officials and attending a campaign meeting have been placed on the top three most popular 
activities, while boycotting, demonstrating and using political violence are on the bottom 
three of the least popular activities. However, the ranking of political activities amongst 
older people in the general, urban and university-educated samples is virtually the same. 
This shows that whether older respondents live in urban areas or have a university degree 
makes no change to their political activities.   
 
Table 5.9 compares the ranking of political activities between young and older 
people from the general, urban and university-educated samples in Wave 3. The upper 
portion of Table 5.9 (all) shows that the ranking of political activities amongst young and 
older people for the general sample is slightly different. For young people in the general 
sample, contacting politicians and attending a campaign meeting are ranked in third and 
fourth places on the list, while party membership and demonstrating share the same rank 





attending a campaign is ranked in third place, and contacting officials is on the top four of 
the list.   
 
Table 5.9 
Ranking of political activities amongst young (21-40 years old) and old (41-70 years old) 
in Wave 3 
Wave 3 (2010-2011) 
All (N=1074) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 493) 41-70 yrs (N: 581) 
1 Voted  48% Voted  90% 
2 Boycotted  41% Boycotted  47% 
3 Contacted Politician 37% Attend a campaign meeting 41% 
4 Attend a campaign meeting 24% Contacted Politician 40% 
5 Signing a petition 21% Signing a petition 20% 
6 Party Membership 5% Party Membership 12% 
7 =Attended a demonstration  
 
Attended a demonstration  7% 
8 Used force or violence for a political cause 3% Used force or violence for a political cause 5% 
Urban (N:465) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 205) 41-70 yrs (N: 260) 
1 Voted  46% Voted  85% 
2 Contacted Politician 37% Contacted Politician 45% 
3 Boycotted  36% Boycotted  36% 
4 Attend a campaign meeting 19% Attend a campaign meeting 31% 
5 Signing a petition 16% Signing a petition 20% 
6 Attended a demonstration  6% Party Membership 10% 
7 Used force or violence for a political cause 4% Attended a demonstration  6% 
8 Party Membership 2% Used force or violence for a political cause 5% 
University education or higher (N=174) 
Ranking 21-40 yrs (N: 122) 41-70 yrs (N: 52) 
1 Contacted Politician 53% Voted  83% 
2 Voted  50% Contacted Politician 75% 
3 Boycotted  35% Boycotted  60% 
4 Attend a campaign meeting 23% Attend a campaign meeting 52% 
5 =Signing a petition   Signing a petition 27% 
6 Party Membership 4% Party Membership 6% 
7 Attended a demonstration  2% =Attended a demonstration  
 
8 Used force or violence for a political cause 1% Used force or violence for a political cause 4% 
 
When we examine the ranking of political activities amongst younger and older 
people in the urban areas (the middle portion of Table 5.9), we can see that the bottom 
three of these lists are different. The bottom three of the list for young urban participants 





urban residents, amongst three of the least popular activities are being a political party 
member, demonstrating and using force or violence for a political cause. As we compare 
the ranking of political activities between young people in the general sample and young 
urban people, there is a far lower proportion of young urban redisdents in all political 
activities, except contacting officials, demonstrating and using political violence.  
 
In addition, the ranking of political activities amongst older people and old urban 
people is nearly the same, except for contacting politicians and boycotting, which have 
been ranked in second and third places of the list for old urban residents, and this is 
reversed for older people in the general sample. The lower portion of Table 5.9 shows that 
the ranking of political activities amongst educated younger and older people is different. 
For educated younger people the topmost popular activity on the list is contacting officials 
– and signing a petition and party membership share the same rank and percentage (4%). 
At the same time, voting is the most common activity of the list for educated older people, 
and party membership and demonstrating share the same rank and percentage (4%).  
 
Therefore, overall, the top three most popular political activities amongst younger 
and older people, whether from the general, urban or university-educated samples, are 
voting, contacting politicians and boycotting, except for older people in the general 
sample—attending a campaign meeting is on the top three of the list. On the other hand, 
contentious participation such as demonstrating and using force or violence for a political 
cause are the least popular activities amongst younger and older people, regardless of their 
education levels and living areas. Remarkably, party membership is also one of the least 
popular activities amongst both young and older people in Wave 3.  
 
5.5 Citizen-oriented and cause-oriented repertoires  
 
Many scholars argue that it is necessary to distinguish between two repertoires that broadly 
map on to the distinction between elite-directed and elite-challenging activities employed 
in the previous chapter, namely, that between citizen-oriented—relating primarily to 
elections and parties, and cause-oriented activism—focusing mainly on specific issues and 
policy, since unconventional politics such as demonstrations, strikes, and consumer 
politics have become ‘mainstream’ and more widespread (Norris, 2007; Van Aelst and 





by Norris (2003), citizen-oriented and cause-oriented, in order to differentiate this chapter 
with the previous one. This terminology also draws a clear distinction between 
conventional and unconventional politics by relating citizen-oriented actions with elections 
and parties, that are widely recognized as essential to democracy, and cause-oriented 
actions are commonly used to pursue specific issues and policy concerns amongst various 
targets through different forms such as protests, consumer politics, and petitioning. 
Following Norris’s classification of ‘citizen-oriented’ and cause-oriented activism, we 
have recoded political activities in this analysis into a mean scale from 0 to 1.27 (0 = 
indicates that the respondents have participated in none of the activities and 1 = indicates 
that the respondents have participated in all activities). 
(1) Citizen-oriented activism: voting, party membership, contacting politicians and 
attending a campaign meeting. 
(2) Cause-oriented activism: signing a petition, boycotting for a political reason, 
demonstrating, and using force or violence for a political cause. 
 
By using an independent sample t-test, Table 5.10 compares the means of two age 
groups (between young and older people) in citizen and cause-oriented in Wave 2 and 3. In 
Wave 2, older people are significantly more likely than younger people to participate in 
citizen-oriented activism. These differences are also significant amongst university-
educated respondents, older males and females, and older people who reside in urban and 
rural areas. In contrast, young people are significantly more likely than older people to be 
engaged in cause-oriented activism; these differences also persist amongst young people in 
urban areas. The higher engagement of young people, particularly amongst the young 
urban residents in cause-oriented activism in Wave 2 (2005-2008) could be related to the 
political situation at that time. Looking back at the political scenarios during the period 
from 2005 to 2008, there was a strong feeling of disillusion about the ruling government 
over several issues, such as the economic recession and the spiralling rate of inflation, 
political corruption, and the worsening of inter-ethnic relations (Brown, 2008; Ooi Kee 
                                                          
27Since demonstrations and ‘unconventional’ forms of participation have become widespread and 
mainstream, Norris (2003:4) suggests that it is better to distinguish between citizen-oriented actions, relating 
to the traditional agencies such as elections and parties, and cause-oriented actions which more concern on 
single-issue or policy, typified by new social movement or consumer politics. Norris (2003:17) also finds out 
that, young people in post-industrialized society are more likely to get involved in cause-oriented political 
action, so there is a broader cultural shift in young people’s political participation “from the politics of 
loyalties towards the politics of choice”. By analysing different forms of political activism separately, we can 
examine whether the disengagement of young people is reflected across different social contexts and across 





Beng, 2008; Saravanamuttu, 2008). Such issues eventually culminated in popular 
uprisings, namely the Bersih 1.0 and Hindraf protests, noted as major historical events in 
Malaysia.28 These massive rallies galvanised largely young people, who were strongly 
linked to numerous student associations and political NGOs.     
 
Table 5.10 
Citizen-oriented and cause-oriented activism 
Note: Figures in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
When we examine Wave 3, we can see that older people remain significantly more 
active in citizen-oriented activism; these differences also appear significant amongst 
university-educated respondents, older males and females, and older people who reside in 
                                                          
28The first incarnation of the Bersih 1.0 rally, also known as ‘yellow wave rally’ was held on November 10, 
2007 in preparation for the 2008 general election. The name Bersih was derived from the name of its 
organiser, BERSIH (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections), a coalition of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the opposition parties, with an objective to reform what they saw as the flawed electoral process 
in Malaysia. 
 
The Hindu Rights Action Front (Hindraf) is a coalition of Indian non-governmental organisations to preserve 
the Hindu community rights. The ostensible purpose of the Hindraf rally was to protest the poor social 
conditions and the violation of the rights of minority Indians in Malaysia. 
    Wave 2 (N=1072) Wave 3 (N=1074) 
    All 
    21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 
Citizen-oriented .33 .50 0.000 1072    .28   .45 0.000 1074 
Cause-oriented  .31  .23 0.038 1072    .17   .19 0.190 1074 
    University Education or Higher 
    21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 
Citizen-oriented  .33 .45 0.000 193   .32   .53 0.000 174 
Cause-oriented  .42 .27 0.284 193   .15   .24 0.018 174 
    Gender 
    21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 
Citizen-
oriented 
Male .36 .50 0.000 542 .32 .49 0.000 516 
 
Female .31 .48 0.000 530 .24 .41 0.000 558 
Cause-
oriented 
Male .39 .31 0.147 542 .21 .23 0.377 516 
  Female .21 .14 0.126 530 .13 .15 0.435 558 
    Urban 
    21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 21-40 yrs 41-70 yrs p-value N 
Citizen-
oriented 
Urban .33 .49 0.000 889 .26 .42 0.000 465 
 
Rural .32 .53 0.000 183 .30 .47 0.000 609 
Cause-
oriented 
Urban .30 .20 0.009 889 .15 .17 0.482 465 





urban and rural areas. In addition, older people are significantly more likely than their 
respective younger counterparts to be involved in cause-oriented activism; however, these 
differences only persist when focusing only on university-educated respondents. In Wave 
3, young people—whether amongst all respondents, the university-educated, male or 
female, living in urban or rural areas—are less likely than their elder counterparts to be 
engaged in citizen and cause-oriented activism.  
 
5.5.1 Age effects on citizen-oriented and cause-oriented activism  
 
By using regression analysis, Table 5.11 reports the age effects, specifically the effect of 
being young on citizen-oriented and cause-oriented activism amongst all respondents, 
those who have a university education or higher and those who reside in the urban areas. 
These results reflect the findings in Table 5.7, in which being young has a significantly 
negative effect on citizen-oriented activism in both Waves 2 and 3. There is also such a 
negative age effect amongst the university-educated and urban respondents. When we look 
at Wave 2, being young has a significantly positive effect on cause-oriented activism; the 
effect is also positive and of a similar magnitude amongst just the urban citizens. 
Therefore, being young a has a greater effects on cause-oriented activism in Wave 2. In 
Wave 3, however, being young has no effect on cause-oriented activism, whether amongst 
all the sample, among university graduates or urban respondents. Therefore, overall, the 
findings show that there are significant differences between younger and older people in 
citizen-oriented activism in both Waves and in cause-oriented activism only in the earlier 
Wave.   
 
Table 5.11 
Age effects on citizen-oriented and cause-oriented activism  
  Wave 2 (N=1072) Wave 3 (N=1074) 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 













N 1072 193 889 1072 193 889 1074 174 465 1074 174 465 
R² 7.31% 10.11% 6.22% 0.40% 0.60% 0.77% 10.72% 11.62% 10.42% 0.20% 0.20% 0.80% 
Young -.604 -.843 -.551 .079 .148 .105 -.679 -.722 -.685 -.078 -.077 -.083 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.284 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.191 0.209 0.163 
  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 





In particular, the patterns show that young people whether in Wave 2 or 3 remain 
significantly less likely than older people to engage in citizen-oriented activism. For cause-
oriented activism, there are differences between younger and older people in Wave 2.  
Moreover, there are no significant differences between younger and older people in cause-
oriented activism in Wave 3.  
 
5.5.2 The effects of age, education, and their interaction   
 
Table 5.12 presents the effects of age, education and their interaction on citizen and cause-
oriented activism. In other words, it models the effects of being young and being educated 
and their interactions on both types of political activism. As stated in Table 5.11, being 
young has a significantly negative effect on citizen-oriented activism whether amongst the 
general sample or just the university-educated for both Waves. Judging from the 
magnitude of the coefficients, being young has a greater negative effect on citizen-oriented 
activism in Wave 3 than Wave 2. In Wave 2, having a university degree or higher 
education has no significant effect on citizen-oriented activism. Similarly, model 2 for 
citizen-oriented activism shows that being young and having a higher education level has 
no interaction with this repertoire.  
 
Table 5.12 
Age, education and interaction effects 
  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
N 1072 1072 1072 1072 1074 1074 1074 1074 




























































  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 
 Items in () refer to standard errors 
 
In Wave 3, however, having a university degree has a positive effect on citizen-oriented 
activism, but there are no interaction effects between being young and having a university 





between younger and older people, but even having a university degree does not attenuate 
these differences. When we look at the cause-oriented activism in Wave 2, we can see in 
Model 1 that having a university degree or higher has a positive effect, but there are no 
significant interaction effects between being young and having a university degree in this 
repertoire. No such interaction effects are observed in Wave 3. This confirms the findings 
in Table 5.11 that when controlling for a university degree, younger people are less likely 
than their respective elders to be engaged citizen-oriented activism, but no significant 
differences between younger and older people for cause-oriented activism are observed. 
 
5.5.3 The effects of age, urban and their interaction   
 
Table 5.13 illustrates the effects of age, urban and their interaction on citizen and cause-
oriented activism. It models the effects of being young, being urban and their interactions 
on both repertoires. As reported in Table 5.11, being young has a significantly negative 
effect on citizen-oriented activism whether amongst the general sample or the urban 
sample for both Waves. Model 2 for citizen-oriented activism in both Waves show that 
being urban has a negative effect, but there are no significant interaction effects between 
being young and being urban in this repertoire.  
 
Table 5.13 
Age, urban and interaction effects  
  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
N 1072 1072 1072 1072 1074 1074 1074 1074 


































































  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 
 Items in () refer to standard errors 
 
Therefore, for citizen-oriented activism, there are greater differences between young and 
older people but even being urban does not attenuate these differences. Model 2 for cause-





urban has a negative effect on this repertoire. However, no such interaction effects 
(urban*young) are observed in this repertoire. Similarly, Model 2 for cause-oriented 
activism in Wave 3 shows that being urban has a negative effect, but no such interaction 
effects (urban*young) are observed in this repertoire. Whilst the effects of being young 
and urban are positive in both repertoires, there are no significant effects for these 
interactions. 
 
5.5.4 Party identification effects and socio-economic determinants of political 
activism   
 
Following the previous chapter, we include the classic socioeconomic indicators also in 
these analyses such as gender, marital and occupational status (Table 5.14, Model 1) 
together with party identification (Table 5.14, Model 2) in order to see their effects on 
citizen and cause-oriented activism. The findings in Table 5.14 show that controlling for 
both socioeconomic indicators and party identification leaves the effect of being young 
negative for citizen-oriented activism for both Waves.  
 
Table 5.14 
Socio-economic determinants of political activism  
  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
N 1072 1072 1072 1072 1074 1074 1074 1074 
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(0.182) 
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(0.142) 
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(0.124) 
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  (0.074) 
-.231** 
(0.081) 








   .312 
(0.171) 






   .050 
(0.119) 


















  .260*** 
(0.064) 
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(0.065) 
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(0.071) 
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(0.067) 















  .328*** 
(0.069) 
  
  .352*** 
(0.069) 
  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 







In addition, Model 2 for citizen-oriented activism shows that being a male has a 
positive effect on both repertoires, in both Waves. This confirms the findings in Table 5.4 
that males are significantly more likely to be involved in the political arena than females. 
Whereas, being married and employed only appear to have positive effects on citizen-
oriented activism. As for cause-oriented activism, Model 2 in Wave 2 shows that 
controlling for socioeconomic factors and party attachment still accounts for the negative 
significant effect of being urban. However, political party attachment plays no role in 
mobilising urban residents to participate in cause-oriented activism.  
 
5.5.5 Attitudinal and mobilising network determinants of political activism 
 
Apart from attitudinal factors, another important determinant for political participation are 
mobilising networks (Putnam, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Stolle, 2007). 
Mobilisation as defined by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993:25) is “the process by which 
candidates, parties, activists and groups induce other people to participate.” The Asian 
Barometer also contains two indicators to measure mobilising networks, which are: 
political discussion, and membership of organisations. Table 5.15 shows that controlling 
for attitudinal and mobilising network determinants improves model fit particularly for 
citizen-oriented activism. Controlling for attitudinal and mobilising determinants leaves 
the effect of being young negative and significant for citizen-oriented activism in both 
Waves. In addition, the result also confirms previous chapter findings that being interested 
in politics accounts for a positive effect on both repertoires in Wave 2, and on citizen-
oriented activism in Wave 3. Similarly, internal efficacy or citizens’ ability to understand 
and participate in politics has a positive effect on both activisms in these Waves even when 
we control for attitudinal and mobilising determinants. As expected, exposure to political 
news accounts for a positive effect on citizen-oriented activism in both Waves. Exposure 
to political news can increase citizens’ likelihood to participate in political activities. 
Furthermore, trust in parliament has a greater effect on citizen-oriented activism in Wave 
2. In particular, group membership and political discussion have greater effects on citizen-
oriented activism in Waves 2 and 3. Party identification also has a positive significant 
effect on citizen-oriented activism in Wave 2 when controlling for attitudinal and 
mobilising factors. Being female, not married and not employed have negative effects on 







Attitudinal and mobilising networks determinants of political activism  
  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
N 1072 1072 1072 1072 1074 1074 1074 1074 
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 (0.065) 
   .137* 
 (0.058) 
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 (0.058) 
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(0.064) 
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  .353*** 
(0.061) 
   .321*** 
(0.061) 
External Efficacy 
  .102 
 (0.065) 




   .030 







  -.041 
  (0.066) 
Dissatisfaction with democracy 






   .050 
  (0.044) 
 .024 
(0.072) 




   .097 
  (0.073) 
Trust in Political Parties 
  .083 
(0.069) 
  .082 
 (0.061) 
   -.093* 
 (0.044) 
  -.095* 
  (0.044) 
 .039 
(0.064) 




   .080 
  (0.065) 
Trust in Parliament 
  .189* 
(0.074) 
  .130* 
 (0.066) 
   -.060 
 (0.047) 
  -.060 







  -.077 
  (0.072) 
Left-wing 
  .074 
(0.096) 
  .012 
 (0.086) 
   -.040 
 (0.061) 
  -.038 







  -.088 
  (0.060) 
Exposure to political news 




   -.035 
 (0.041) 
  -.033 







   .007 
  (0.062) 
Mobilising Networks 
   
  
    
Group Membership  
.926*** 
(0.059)  
   .047 












  -.044 
  (0.042)   
.210*** 
(0.062)   
  .208** 
  (0.067) 
  Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 
 Items in () refer to standard errors 
 
 
For cause-oriented activism, the effect of being young is not significant in both 
Waves even when we are controlling for attitudinal and mobilising network determinants. 
Findings in Wave 2 show that trust in political parties has a negative effect, but party 
identification accounts for no significant effect on this repertoire. However, these are 





as party attachment has a positive effect. In addition, group membership, and political 
discussion account for positive effects only amongst respondents in Wave 3, but being 
interested to politics has no significant effect on this Wave. 
 
5.5.6 Further interaction effects  
 
Overall, we found no relevant further interaction effects for our investigation. See tables in 




Based on the analyses from the Asian Barometer Waves 2 (2005-2008) and Wave 3 (2010-
2012) survey, we reconfirm findings from the previous chapter that young people are less 
likely than their elders to be politically involved in ‘elite-directed’ or ‘citizen-oriented’ 
activism. Whilst there are some small signs that young people might be significantly more 
likely than older people to be engaged in at least some forms of ‘cause-oriented’ or ‘elite-
challenging’ activism, these significant differences only appear in Wave 2 and are no 
longer significant when controlling for socioeconomic, attitudinal, mobilisation and 
institutional determinants. The results also reconfirm findings from the preceding chapter 
that education does not appear to mediate or have any influence on attenuating the age 
gaps between young people and their elders in political activism. Similarly, when we use 
urban-rural as an intervening variable, the effects of being urban and young are not 
significant on both citizen and cause-oriented activities. Overall, these findings indicate 
that being more urban actually does not narrow down the participatory gap and differences 
in political activism between younger and older people in Malaysia. This empirical 
chapter’s analysis has scrutinised the diverging patterns of participation between two age 
groups in two different time frames, by employing variables capturing socio-demographic, 
attitudinal, and mobilising networks to explain why young people are engaged or 
disengaged in citizen-oriented and cause-oriented activism.  
 
This chapter also provided some evidence of an upward trend in young people’s 
political activisms from Wave 2 to Wave 3, even though the overall levels were still lower 
than those of their elders.  Overall, based on the analyses from two well-known surveys 





has been clearly shown to be an empirical fact since our data analysis has shown that they 
are disengaged from both conventional and unconventional politics, compared to their 
older counterparts. For the purpose of triangulation and the enrichment of the findings 
from the quantitative analyses, the next few chapters will analyse the interview materials 
to develop a more complete understanding and detailed description of whether young 















This chapter examines the views of academics from qualitative interviews on whether 
conventional or ‘elite-directed’ participation has been waning in Malaysia, while 
unconventional or ‘elite-challenging’ participation has been on the rise. Based on analysis 
from the two quantitative chapters, statistical evidence has shown that young people in 
Malaysia are disengaged from both conventional or ‘elite-directed’ and unconventional or 
‘elite-challenging’ political participation. However, qualitative analyses also allow us to 
contextualise and enrich our understanding of the roots and causes of political 
disengagement with a specific focus on mechanisms. As mentioned, the qualitative 
analyses are presented based on interviews with different groups in society. This allows us 
to observe any consistency in patterns and commonalities and differences across groups, 
which allows us to answer the overarching research questions.  
 
6.2 Views on youth political participation  
 
The first theme covered in the interviews with academics is their subjective views on 
youth politics in Malaysia. The opinions expressed may vary depending on participants’ 
observations of the current political situation. Interestingly, most academics agreed that 
young people in Malaysia have played a remarkable role from the beginning of the 
independence period. Young people fought for the political rights of society, as mentioned 
by Academic (10), “So far as I can remember, the earliest moment in history was a 
conflict between the ‘Kaum Muda’ [Young Group, the progressives] and the ‘Kaum Tua’ 
[Old Group, the conservatives]. The younger generation brought new ideas to roll back the 
role of Islam that were totally opposite to the older people, who practised those traditional 





University of Malaya opened in Kuala Lumpur, the youth has driven the agenda to fight 
for several local issues, such as the issue in Tasik Utara in Johor29 and Baling, Kedah.30 
But when their actions became radicalised, the government decided to take action, such as 
making arrests. During the 1970s era, their struggles were mostly silenced due to the 
amendments of the University and University Colleges Act (UUCA) 1971.31” This marked 
the end of the student movement as a powerful political force in Malaysia and the 
‘depoliticisation’ of the youth.  
 
 However, more than half (6 out of 10) of the academics interviewed believed that 
the 2008 Malaysian general election marked a turning point for young people’s 
participation in politics. It witnessed outstanding numbers of young people engaging in 
politics, whether in online or offline activism. The uprising of young voters in the last two 
elections was seen by some as a reason for the ruling party’s (BN) lost the popular vote 
                                                          
29The Tasik Utara demonstration in September 1974, is a significant example of the student-led protests 
aiming to tackle society’s problems. They begun when the Malay squatters, mainly the poor who could not 
afford to buy houses, set up squatter houses in the Tasik Utara, on land owned by the government. Prior to 
the General election of 1974, the government assured the squatters that their homes would be secured and 
promised to give their rights to stay on the land if the BN-led government won the election. However, after 
the 1974 election, the squatters were shocked when they received eviction notices warning them to evacuate 
and their homes were demolished without providing any compensation. A group of students led by 
Hishamuddin Rais, gathered at Tasik Utara and pleaded the authority to stop the demolition. Their plea was 
unsuccessful, and the students were arrested. The detention of several student leaders led to a massive 
student demonstration in Kuala Lumpur, pressing the government to release all the detained students. 
Students from the University Malaya Students’ Union (UMSU) seized and took over the administration of 
University Malaya in sign of protest towards the brutality of the police and specifically the government. This 
coup only lasted for 12 hours, and the UMSU was suspended. See Karim and Hamid (1984) and Abdul 
Rahman Abdullah (1997) for further details. 
 
30 A few months after the Tasik Utara incident, there was another significant demonstration in Baling, Kedah 
on 19 November 1974, related not only to the student’s struggle but also involving the participation of the 
masses. More than 1,000 peasants, mostly the rubber smallholders who were affected by the falling prices of 
rubber, demonstrated in Baling. They demanded that the government to increase the price of rubber and 
reduce the price of foods and necessities. However, their protests were in vain as the government did not take 
any actions towards their demands. Therefore, the angered peasants staged another mass protest on 1 
December 1974 in Baling, attended by 30,000 people to show their growing frustration. In support of the 
peasants’ struggle, more than 8,000 students held a huge demonstration on 3 December 1974 in Kuala 
Lumpur, demanding that the government solve the inflation problem, increase the price of rubber, and punish 
all corrupt ministers. Altogether, more than 1,200 students were arrested by the police in this demonstration. 
Meanwhile, the students’ leaders who stirred up the demonstration such as Anwar Ibrahim, Ibrahim Ali and 
Kamarulzaman Yacob were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). For further details, see Abdul 
Rahman (1997) and Hussain Mohamed (1986).  
 
31The University and University Colleges Act (UUCA) was first enacted in 1971 aiming to provide 
guidelines for the establishment, regulations, the administration of colleges and public universities. 
Following the student-led demonstrations on 1974, the government amended Section 15 of the UUCA in 
1975, which prohibited any student or faculty members from expressing support for any political party, 
organisation, or trade union. However, it was revised in 2012 to give greater flexibility to the students by 
allowing them to take part in political activities off-campus, including the right to be a member of any 





and led to a more competitive balance between the government and the opposition, as 
noted by Academic (6), “The BN has lost its two-third majority vote in the parliaments 
because of the votes of the youth. It was estimated around two million of first-time voters, 
who are mostly amongst young people, voted in the 2013 election. There has been a huge 
increase of voters compared to five years ago, and young voters have been targeted by the 
competing parties to get their votes.” This comment confirms findings by Pandian (2015), 
Welsh (2014), and Mohamed Nawab (2013) that the ‘youth factor’ played a decisive role 
in determining the outcome of the 2008 and 2013 elections, since first time voters, mostly 
young people, increased from 637,548 in the 2008 election to 2.6 million in 2013. The 
young voters are 21 to 39 years old, making up to 5.6 million or 40 percent of 13.3 million 
eligible voters (Election Commission, 2013). An influx of young voters in the elections 
was probably due to the increased political interest amongst the young middle classes, who 
were educated and felt marginalised by government’s race-based affirmative action 
(Norshuhada et al., 2016:129). The outcome of the 2008 general election came as a major 
shock to BN, since this was its worst performance in history, comparable with that of the 
1969 election. The result showed a “tectonic shift to the Malaysian political landscape” 
(Saravanamuttu, 2008:35) had taken place, since Malaysians wanted drastic political 
change.32  
 
 In addition, many observed that since the 2008 general election political awareness 
among young people was evident, as stated by Academic (1), “They have very great 
political sensitivity and excitement whenever they talk about politics.” This argument is 
supported by Academic (3), who commented that, “I think now we can see that politics is 
something that everybody, mainly young people, talk about.” Academic (8) also added that 
“One of the reasons that makes young people become more concerned about political 
issues is due to the internet.” New media has expanded the discursive terrain by providing 
a vital avenue for political debate, thereby enhancing greater awareness among young 
electorates since the number of internet users in Malaysia, most of whom were young 
people, increased dramatically from 2.7 million in 2000 to 14 million in 2008. This means 
                                                          
32 The ruling coalition (BN), for the first time, suffered a major setback when it failed to maintain two-thirds 
of the parliamentary majority, and secured only 140 out of 222 seats in the parliament, with the popular vote 
falling from 64 percent to just 51 percent (Case, 2010; Weiss, 2008). On the other hand, the main opposition 
parties represented primarily by DAP, PAS, and People’s Justice Party (PKR, previously KeADILan) formed 
an informal electoral pact prior for the election. The opposition coalition achieved unprecedented triumph 
when they garnered 82 parliamentary seats from a total of 222, thereby denying the BN a two-thirds majority 





that, within eight years, the growth rate of internet users rose sharply by 302.8 percent 
(Koh, 2008:25). Moreover, a majority (7 out of 10 academics) gave positive responses that 
young Malaysians in general are interested in politics, as stated by Academic (9), “Young 
people are interested, that is why they are participating”. Although agreeing with this 
sentiment, Academic (10) emphasised that political interest is somewhat greater amongst 
the young middle-class group as “…the middle-class consists of young people who have 
professions such as lawyer, doctor, educators etc. They have already attained economic 
stability and live comfortably.” This idea supports the theory of civic voluntarism of 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) that having necessary resources (income and 
education) may increase the interest and motivation to participate in politics. The 
remaining interviewees believe there is some sense of indifference or “…the syndrome of 
‘I don’t care’” (Academic 6) amongst the younger generation, which makes them less 
concerned about political matters.  
 
Whilst a majority argue that the 2008 Malaysian general election showed 
significant changes in the patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia, two out of 
ten academics claim that the ‘Reformasi’ era in 1998 should be set as a benchmark for the 
integration of youth into political life, as commented by Academic (5), “...there are a lot 
of changes that have happened since 1998. During the 1999 election, we noticed that 
young people’s participation was obviously clear. At that time, many issues were raised by 
young people and the government was asked to solve them.” The Reformasi era is depicted 
as the rise of young Malaysians in politics, immediately after the dismissal of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, from the government and UMNO. Anwar, who lost his 
political power, launched the so-called Reformasi movement (Reform movement) which 
was supported by the public and mainly young people and called on Mahathir to step 
down. The political unrest caused by Anwar’s dismissal and the Reformasi movement 
resulted in the worst electoral setback for the BN up until that point, particularly UMNO, 
in the 1999 general election.33 Many Malays, mostly young and educated professionals, 
switched their support to PAS to show their discontent with the political and economic 
developments which had rocked the country (Hiebert, 1998). Overall, most academics 
were optimistic about young Malaysians’ political engagement where they believe that the 
                                                          
33 The result of the 1999 general election showed that BN retained its two-thirds majority in Parliament with 
148 of the 193 seats (a drop of 10% popular votes), but UMNO, the kingpin in the BN, lost more than half of 
the Malay votes and failed to secure half of the total number of seats won by BN. UMNO won only 72 out of 





period since the 2008 general election signifies a palpable change in the patterns of youth 
political participation from being passive to actively engaging in politics. However, such 
arguments are based solely on the increment of young voter turnout rate in current 
elections. They fail to compare the age gap between young and old people in voting and 
other forms of participation – or to take into account the large number of unregistered 
eligible young voters. This failure creates a spurious bias by positively stereotyping young 
Malaysians as a politically engaged and active generation; instead, they are a distinct 
generation with negligence when it comes to participating in conventional politics.   
 
6.3  Declining conventional or ‘elite-directed’ political participation?  
 
Current discourse on declining political engagement tends to look at the literature on 
conventional politics. Conventional participation or so called ‘formal politics’, ‘traditional 
politics’, and ‘elite-directed participation’ can be understood as those means that a 
prevailing political culture recognizes as acceptable and that are related to institutionalized 
actions (Conway, 1991), sanctioned and inspired by political elites (Marsh, 1990), or 
political activities that are facilitated by traditional bodies such as political parties and 
trade unions (Morales, 2009; Mair, 2006). In advanced democracies like Britain and the 
US, some believe that these countries are facing a crisis of democracy because there is a 
serious decline in two conventional indicators: voters’ lower turnout in national elections 
(Dalton, 2000; Franklin, 2004; Blais et al., 2004) and falling party membership (Clarke et 
al., 2004; Whiteley and Seyd, 2002).  
 
When observing the case of Malaysia, 6 out of 10 academic respondents stated that 
the current pattern of youth political engagement in Malaysia is different from that in 
western democracies. The pattern of political participation in established democracies 
shows a decrease, while in Malaysia it shows an increase. This is reflected in the 
comments of Academic (6), “I do not have the exact statistics as proof, but we can see an 
increment in political engagement amongst young people.” Academic (9) also added, 
“They are actively involved in politics and have become registered voters.” Academic (1) 
also responded positively to this issue by saying, “Based the observation of the general 
elections, the total number of young voter turnout are increasing. We can see the channels 
for youth (channels 3 and 4) are always full.” Although agreeing with the statement that 





the increase is only apparent in voting, but not party membership. Membership of political 
parties continues to shrink amongst young people, as commented by Academic (8), “There 
is a decrease in party membership. We can see the younger generation prefer to be non-
partisan and refuse to attach themselves to any political parties.” This is in line with the 
arguments of Pandian (2014a) and Welsh (2012) that this age group no longer identifies 
themselves with any political parties, claiming that the political party is ‘over’ in Malaysia. 
In this case, Malaysia is also experiencing a downward trend in partisanship parallel with 
many advanced democracies, although Britain has recently been experienced a sharp rise 
in Labour Party membership following Corbyn’s leadership victory. These responses 
correspond with findings from the previous chapter that there is an increase in political 
activism amongst young Malaysians from Wave 2 to Wave 3, except for party 
membership. Yet, young people still have low levels of political participation when 
compared to their older counterparts, and young people in other Southeast Asian countries.  
  
 In addition, several academics argue that the increment in participation can be seen 
clearly in terms of young people’s engagement in social activism, such as new social 
movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This can be seen in the response 
of Academic (3), “They participated in various forms of so-called social activism. They 
formed their own NGOs, and networks.” Academic (2) also takes a similar view, saying, 
“There are many activities outside parties. Activities that are related to culture, literature 
and arts, but are instilled with political elements and have been engaged in by young 
people”. In contrast, one respondent argues that turnout has declined in Malaysia and so 
has party membership, especially amongst young people. Academic (5) stated that: “When 
we look at the rate of political party membership, it is quite low. The decline in the level of 
turnout is also true because one of my students did a study on youth voter turnout. The 
findings are disappointing. They did not cast their votes, but they also did not register as 
voters.” For the remaining participants (2 out of 10), they believe that the engagement of 
young people in politics can be predicted based on the current political situation and the 
issues that interest them. According to Academic (10), “Young people either in established 
democracies or semi-democratic nations are mostly passive. They will be active only when 
important issues relevant to them arise.” In particular, young people tend to be ‘issue-
based’ rather than ‘organizationally-centred’, where they are far more likely to be 






 When we asked further in interviews about the major issues concerning young 
people now, a majority (8 out of 10) of the academics claimed that the biggest issue facing 
the Malaysian youth today is the economy, particularly the increase of the cost of living, 
unemployment, and student-loan debt. This can be reflected in the comment of Academic 
(9), “They have no chance to get better employment and they have a heavy education debt 
with the PTPTN. These are the issues brought up by the youth.” However, Academic (10) 
argues that economic issues tend to affect most urban young people, while another issue 
faced by young people in rural areas is religious and racism issues, as he stated that, 
“Religion and racism are two strong issues in rural areas. However, the most worrying 
issue amongst Malaysians is racism. If the situation cannot be controlled, there is a 
possibility of riots between races, but not widely spread around the country.” Malaysian 
politics has always been determined and mobilised along the communal framework, as 
apparent during the election. In this case, 6 out of 10 academics agreed that communal or 
ethnic politics remain a forceful factor in Malaysian politics as most of the political parties 
are ethnic-based parties. Therefore, ethnic sentiment is relevant to mobilise popular 
support. 
 
Based on these responses, it can be pointed out that many of the academics agreed 
that the downward trend of conventional politics or elite-directed activism is clearly visible 
in party membership. When we asked whether political parties engaged and communicated 
effectively with young people, although a majority of academics (8 out of 10) reacted 
positively by mentioning that political parties are now competing to get the youth votes by 
organising many ‘youth-friendly’ policies and programs, as commented by Academic (2), 
“… many changes have been made by the government and they put effort into more 
deliberately  responding to young people’s needs,” the mechanisms used by political 
parties to approach young people are not suitable and failed to empower young people to 
have a full and active participation in politics. In retrospect, Academic (4) said, “When 
they approach young people, they initiate ‘festival-like’ programs without aiming to 
educate them. This is not meaningful engagement.” Academic (10) is also pessimistic, 
arguing that most youth policies are not formulated by young people, thus they do not 
reflect the youth’s interests. Academic (9) in similar vein also claims, “They only listen, 






If political parties are actively engaging, why do young Malaysians not want to join 
them? Most academics (7 out of 10) related this development to young people’s 
disillusionment with traditional political parties as a major reason for the decline of party 
membership. To be specific, young people have lost hope, trust, and confidence in the 
parties, be it the government or the opposition, as reflected by Academic (4)’s comment, 
“We have this one side that is very hopeless yet not credible politically, which is the 
government, while the other side is not organised, not credible and has no leadership, 
which is the opposition. So, where to now for the youth?”, and the comment of Academic 
(5), “One party, which is the ruling party, has their own problem. Whereas, the opposition 
has started to look unstable after PAS left the coalition and yet...the newly established 
party...we do not know their ability and credibility.” Therefore, the internal rifts and lack 
of credibility of these two power blocs (the ruling BN and the opposition pact) which want 
to govern Malaysia leave young people with no alternatives but be a ‘fence sitter’ or 
choose to remain outside the parties.  
 
Some emphasize that political parties’ structure is a main barrier preventing young 
people from actively participating (2 out of 10). It is worth noting that the ruling party, 
mainly the UMNO, is a hierarchically-structured party which has different grassroots 
levels such as central, state, division, and branch. Therefore, people have to go through a 
complicated procedure to become members of this party, as stated by Academic (4), 
“There is no direct registration. Only those who really want to be politicians are willing to 
go through all these complex member’s registration process.” In other words, young 
people join the parties to become a leader or worse, they become a party member simply to 
fulfil their material needs, as commented by Academic (4), “There is no motivation to be 
an active member of UMNO, unless I want a position, project or power because the 
patronage system is deeply rooted in this party”. Moreover, UMNO has always been a 
feudal nationalist party in which most of its upper leaders are often from aristocratic 
family backgrounds. Therefore, it is not easy for young people to join the upper level 
leadership, even though there is a youth wing, because the conflict between young and old 
in UMNO has long been institutionalised. This is reflected in the remark of Academic 
(10), “Khairy Jamaluddin is the only youth leader in UMNO that stands out. Other youth 
leaders are trying to stand out, but they sometimes have not been given the opportunities 






 Unlike UMNO, the opposition parties such as DAP and PKR are cadre parties that 
depend on mass support. These parties are more appealing to young people since they are 
much easier for young people to join, they don’t necessarily need to register as a party 
member but can participate in party activities as political volunteers. According to 
Academic (4), “So what they are doing is basically to find platforms where they can 
approach young people through sport activities, entrepreneurship programs, and many 
other events that suit the interest of young people”. The opposition has proven far more 
effective in allowing younger leaders to emerge and shine in national politics, as noted by 
Academic (6), “As younger ones join the opposition party, they can be easily placed as 
leaders within the party.” Academic (2) also added, “There are many young leaders such 
as Rafizi, Nurul Izzah and so on who are very active and energetic in the opposition 
party”. However, the internal crisis faced by the opposition, particularly disunity amongst 
the component parties, makes young people much less interested in joining this party.  
  
Furthermore, some highlight the waning attachment to political parties due to lack 
of resources (such as income, time, and education), and attitudinal factors (such as political 
efficacy and skills). The response of Academic (10) reflects that resources adversely affect 
participation: “Career and living factors, such as time constraints, are the reasons for 
[young people] having no interest in participating or maybe sometimes young people 
already feel comfortable with their lifestyles.” Academic (6) also argues that “...certain 
political skills are required to participate in political activities. Maybe young people’s 
political skills and organisation are still low”. In this respect, political skills could be 
enhanced through partisanship which helps to create a more responsive system by 
reinforcing citizens’ ability and awareness to respond to the political system and articulate 
societal needs (White and Ypi, 2011). Therefore, the disenchantment of young people with 
politics and the low levels of political skills amongst young people in Malaysia could be 
related to the decline of partisan politics. Dalton (2000:29) argues that citizens have 
become less dependent on political parties to cultivate their political skills and information 
due to increase in levels of education and the expansion of the media.  This means that 
they are no longer mobilized by hierarchical organisations, instead relying heavily on their 
cognitive capacities (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Therefore, we can see that loyalties to 
long-established traditional political parties are weakening, but loosely-structured 






6.4 What drives conventional or ‘elite-directed’ political participation? 
 
As mentioned above, we can see that most academics are reasonably positive that elite-
directed participation is rising, mainly in terms of voting based on the marginal increase in 
voter turnout in the recent election, while at the same time, party membership is shrinking 
amongst young people in Malaysia. These views area consistent with the findings in 
Chapter Five.34 What drives young people in Malaysia to participate in politics in general? 
Some (4 out of 10 academics) argue that socioeconomic factors such as educational 
background and living areas affect young people’s engagement in elections. In particular, 
Academic (5) argues that uneducated rural young people are less politically informed 
citizens, so they are less likely to be engaged in voting than their counterparts. This can be 
reflected in her comments that “Uneducated citizens in the rural areas are less politically 
informed because they are still struggling for basic necessities like food, money and live in 
poor conditions.” Therefore, education or political knowledge may reliably increase the 
likelihood of young people to vote. This confirms findings from the literature that educated 
citizens are more likely to vote in the election because education gives them necessary 
civic skills to be more concerned about politics (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba et al., 1995; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).  
 
On the other hand, 3 out of 10 academics are in agreement about the role played by 
socialisation agents, such as family and friends, who can motivate young people to be 
active in politics, as mentioned by Academic (10), “If family has been involved in politics, 
the probability for the children to get involved is high. There is also an influence from 
peers. When friends discussed politics, they will join them and then later, have an interest 
in it.” It appears that the influence of family is the strongest determinant of socialisation 
which deeply influences young people’s attitudes towards politics. However, most 
academics (6 out of 10) claim that the rapid growth of the internet, mainly social media in 
recent years, has to some extent replaced the traditional agents in transmitting political 
knowledge to young people. As pointed out by Academic (8), “Before, we usually relate 
[the transmission of political knowledge] with family, peers, etc., but now, I can say that it 
is because of the media, particularly, the internet that has a big influence on young 
                                                          
34The percentage of young people voted in the election has increased slightly from 45 percent in Wave 2 to 
48 percent in Wave 3, but party membership amongst young people dramatically decreased from 12 percent 





people.” This is in line with the argument by Mohd Azizuddin (2014) that social media, 
whilst not the determinant factor for political change in Malaysia, is obviously significant 
in providing avenues for electorates to debate and communicate with political leaders.  For 
instance, in 2012, there were over 13 million users of Facebook, nine million of whom 
were young people in urban areas over 21-years-old (Asohan, 2013).  As this media is the 
most popular channel and commonly used by young people, therefore it was used 
extensively during the campaigning period by both the ruling party and the opposition to 
communicate with and attract the voters during the 2013 general election.  Therefore, the 
2013 general election has been regarded as the first ‘social media’ election (Lim, 2013) 
that witnessed the BN government still losing its two-third majority in the parliament. 
 
6.5 Rising unconventional or ‘elite-challenging’ political participation? 
   
Some studies show that the rise of new social movements coincided with the increase of 
protest activism, which has become mainstream in western democracies (Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2003; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). In this sense, political 
participation has evolved, and these kinds of repertoires, new social movements (human 
rights, environment, development, etc.) and unconventional political participation (protest, 
boycotting, signing petitions, etc.) are typical of younger cohorts (Grasso and Giugni, 
2016, Norris, 2003). As in Malaysia, 8 out of 10 academics agreed that there is a rise in 
unconventional political participation as new mediums for young people to voice their 
opinions and to influence political decisions. One other academic (1 out of 10) believes 
that there is no shift from the conventional to unconventional, but young Malaysians use 
all forms of political participation. While one academic has given a mixed response by 
saying, “There are two camps of youth. First, a very brave group who is more extreme, 
and like to use protest as the way to convey messages to the government. The second group 
is more fearful, and they are only engaged in conventional political participation like 
voting and party membership.” To be specific, unconventional political participation is 
pre-eminent amongst those brave youngsters. In addition, the respondents have listed the 









1) Demonstrations or street protests 
 
Street protests or political rallies were long practised in Malaysia from before World War 
II, and normally were supported by the lower classes in society who aimed to bring 
gradual social change in this country. In fact, Academic (10) argues that “Even the main 
political parties such as UMNO and PKR were established on the basis of protests”. For 
example, UMNO was transformed into Malaya’s largest nationalist party on May 11, 1946 
due to an anti-Malayan union protest. However, since the reformation 1998, and the 
establishment of BERSIH movement, street protests have been widespread and occurred 
more often than before, as commented by Academic (8), “It had happened before, but not 
as much as now. It has become a normal activity amongst citizens.” Although protests are 
commonplace today, there are not as many as in other neighbouring countries like 
Indonesia and Thailand. As argued by Academic (9) “We can see protest exists, but not 
many compared to other countries as there are many restrictions imposed by the 
government. If we are given freedom, surely there will be a massive political change.” In 
particular, some indicate that the government did not accept protest as part of political 
participation and regarded this activity as contradicting Malaysian culture, and regulated it 
with the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012.35 According to Academic (3), “I do not think they 
will accept street protests. What they are trying to do is to make the protesters gather in a 
stadium. That kind of proposal has been proposed many times. Luckily there are no groups 
of protesters to take that kind of offer because if we take in that kind of offer, you will set a 
precedent.” To some extent, the government will use brutality and excessive force against 
protesters, as pointed out by Academic (6), “Sometimes when we look at the government’s 
attitude towards protesters, it seems like the government is not mature enough.” This is in 
contrast with the situation in long-established democracies where the normalisation of 
protest activities has made protest a vital part of democracy, rather than a threat to its 
existence (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Nevertheless, 
some argue that the government’s harsh stance has changed, and they are now generally 
                                                          
35The Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (Act736) was passed to facilitate a more peaceful assembly process in 
Malaysia. It replaced Section 27 of the Police Act 1967, which implies that the organisers of protest no 
longer need a permit to hold a protest or an assembly, but one is required to give a written notice to the 
police 10 days before the intended assembly. The police have discretion to impose restrictions and 
conditions, but they have no power to refuse the holding of an assembly. This Act forbids a street protest or 
assembly within 50 meters of a ‘public place’ such as places of worship, hospital, schools, etc. The police 
also have the power to arrest both the organiser and the participants if they fail to comply with the rules and 





more tolerant of protesters, as clearly put by Academic (5), “At least now we can get the 
permit to do a protest in a short period, and allow gatherings in designated places 
permitted by the authority.”  
 
In this regard, most believe that protest is usually used as a last resort, appropriate 
when negotiation and other cooperative methods of problem-solving have failed, as 
commented by Academic (6), “…protest is the only way when we do not have any other 
options.” Several (4 out of 10 academics) claim that those young people who participated 
in protest are generally outside the political parties or organisations, attempting to bring 
about political change, or to represent the political voice of marginalized groups, as 
described by Academic (2), “Normally, the protesters are amongst independent groups, 
such as anarchist or socialist groups. However, they have always been labelled as pro-
opposition as they are anti-establishment”. The ‘Occupy Dataran’ is one of the examples 
of a grassroots assembly of independent young people demanding more democratic spaces 
in Malaysia. Furthermore, some (3 out of 10 academics) find that the number of protesters 
is still considered low compared to other countries, but they manage to get wider coverage 
and attention from the media and public. To attract more young people, protest nowadays 
has become distinctively entertaining and satiric, more akin to a festival-like protest, as 
depicted by Academic (3), “…protest is very much like a fun fair kind of festival where 
young protesters sing and dance, enjoying an ‘open-air concert’ and speech from the 
leaders.” As expected, alongside the increase of protest politics in this country, it often 
leads to the rise of social activism. 
 
2) Social activism  
 
Instead of being apathetic towards politics, several academics (4 out of 10) argue that 
young people are finding new alternatives in venting their frustrations against the system 
through their engagement in social activism, mainly the grassroots movements and popular 
culture. This is reflected in the comment by Academic (2), “…most of the youth do not 
affiliate themselves with political parties. As they do not have any other alternatives, they 
find another activity such as the social movement like Bersih. This is a trend in Malaysia 
now.” Malaysia’s Bersih movement is noted as linked to pivotal events in Malaysia. To 
some extent, Bersih is considered a proponent for Malaysian political change. In fact, 





1998 (Weiss, 2012). Whilst these protests have conveyed different messages and demands, 
they helped to ignite the crux of the democratisation processes in Malaysia. However, 
Academic (6) finds two new forms of NGO that stand out most amongst the youth. This 
can be reflected in his comment, “Currently, it is the era of the rising of Malay’s NGOs 
such PERKIDA and PERKASA. They had organised the ‘Red Shirt’ rally, most were youth. 
On the other hand, a new movement has emerged, which is the indie group movement, 
organized by young people, but more towards anti-government NGOs.” These views 
confirm the findings of Samsudin et al. (2012), that Malaysian youngsters have shifted 
from political-oriented participation to civic-oriented participation—they are more inclined 
to be involved and work with voluntary and non-governmental organizations, rather than 
political parties. This also supports the previous findings that party membership is one of 
the least popular activities amongst young Malaysians.   
 
 Over the last few decades, the younger generation has found a new and different 
way to be politically engaged—less attached to political organisations, but more to 
personal interest, social networks, and cultural activism. Some (4 out of 10 academics) 
perceived cultural activism or so-called ‘popular culture’ like music, film, arts and 
literature, as one of the most common forms of resistance amongst young people in 
Malaysia today, as commented by Academic (7), “One of the most popular things among 
youth is ‘popular culture’. For example, we have University Bangsar Utama (UBU), The 
Street Kitchen (Dapur Jalanan), The Street Books (Buku Jalanan), Komuniti Frinjans, 
Diskopi and so on”. This mode of activism is appropriately useful to analyse political 
participation (Cohen, 2010; Jenkins, 2006), even though it is often practiced through 
informal, non-institutionalised or loosely-structured networks. In other words, such things 
are political insofar as they aim to influence political decision making. This activism is 
closely related to young people, as stated by Academic (3) “I think using the arts and 
music are very important and easy for attracting more young people.”  
 
 Why are young people more likely to be attracted to this kind of activism? First, 
this is one of the most effective ways in fostering critical engagement—for example, 
creating free spaces and facilitating public debates to flesh out political ideas against the 
dominant political structure, as described by Academic (2) “We can simply criticise and 
encourage political awareness through art and culture because they are easy to 





radical images, which are not able to resist or change the status quo. Therefore, with the 
help of technologies such as social media, young people’s political creativity, fresh and 
ongoing ideas could spread rapidly. However, the Malaysian government regularly uses 
crackdowns on free expression, mainly the Sedition Act,36 to intimidate and harass the 
critical activists and this has created “a culture of fear” amongst young people. Therefore, 
we can observe that the circle of youth activists in this country remains small even if the 
numbers of social activities have increased, as described by Academic (3), “...one person 
can actually wear many hats. It works similarly with NGOs, where person A also is a 
member of other groups.” Apart from the government’s control, Academic (7) also argues 
that “Malaysian youth lack the sense of empowerment in a variety of life circumstances 
due to long-term dependency on the government.” This happens when young people’s 
identities are moulded in accordance with the government’s desires and young people have 
not been given a formal space to develop their own identity and creativity.  
 
3) Online activism  
 
It is imperative to consider that the internet, and primarily social media avenues such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, have changed the way that people, especially youth in 
urban areas, participate and engage with politics. Although this media does not have 
intrinsic power to bring about political change, at least it helps in organising and 
mobilising young people in politics and collective action. Unsurprisingly, a majority of 
academics (8 out of 10) think that online activism serves as a medium to galvanise young 
people for more meaningful political participation, as commented by Academic (8), 
“Young people used social media for political purposes such as discussing political issues 
or expressing their dissatisfaction.” It is noteworthy to mention that the 1998 Reformasi 
movement gave birth to Malaysia’s online activism (Abbot, 2004; Weiss, 2012; Khoo Boo 
Teik, 2003). In particular, they utilised the potential of the internet by transforming it into 
a new repertoire of contention as this medium is not scrutinized under the government’s 
censorship. Since 1998, internet users in Malaysia boomed significantly from 6.7 percent 
                                                          
36The Sedition Act was enacted in 1948 by the British colonial authority, originally aimed to fight against the 
local communist insurgents before Malayan independence. However, it continues to be used with full force 
by the Malaysian government to limit citizens’ freedom of expression by prosecuting individuals including 
activists, journalists, and politicians for actions or discourse deemed as seditious and critical towards the 
government which may threaten national security. In other words, it makes it an offence to say or publish 






to 67.5 percent in 2014, with its netizen population getting to almost 20.1 million in 2014 
– and it has been estimated that more than 60 percent of these users were young people 
below 30-years-old.37  
 
There are several factors which explain why young Malaysians are more interested 
in using the internet, as outlined by the academics interviewed. First, the internet offes 
more spaces for young people to voice their views, ideas, and criticisms about the 
government, as it is controlled by the people and could be a ‘check and balance’ for the 
government’s mainstream media. This can be reflected in the comment of Academic (4): 
“Young people, like Syed Saddiq, voice out their concerns and political comments not 
through political parties, but through social media.” Second, the new media was hassle-
free and provided a relatively cost-effective means of communication. Third, it was due to 
the ‘global trend’—many developed countries like the United States and Britain had been 
using new media for political activism. For example, Ward and Gibson (1998:22) 
concluded that the 1997 British general election was the ‘first internet election’ that ‘the 
internet appears to be doing more to equalize exposure of parties’ ideas to the electorate 
compared to other media’. The development of cyberculture in other countries thus 
influenced young Malaysians to explore this new space.  
 
 It would seem, therefore, that the academics are positive about the growth of elite-
challenging political participation, which is often manifested in the forms of protest, social 
activism, and online participation amongst Malaysian young people. Indeed, a majority of 
academics (9 out of 10) emphasised that Malaysian youth have the right to participate in 
unconventional political participation and that it is necessary for them to be encouraged to 
engage in this kind of repertoire. However, there must always be a balance between both 
conventional and unconventional political participation, and instead, the government 
should pose no further restrictions on citizens’ political freedom, as explained by 
Academic (9), “It is indeed necessary, and all restriction should be removed by the 
government to allow them to voice their political views as initiatives to changing the 
country in a better direction.” 
 
 
                                                          





6.6 What drives unconventional or ‘elite-challenging’ political participation? 
 
Although the quantitative results suggest that there is no significant difference between 
young and older people in elite-challenging activism, it is worth highlighting several 
reasons why some young Malaysians tend to engage in this form of participation based on 
the responses of the academics. The most profound explanation is related to young 
people’s discontent towards the system and the government. In this case, most argue (6 out 
of 10 academics) that unconventional political action is an alternative to express 
dissatisfaction with the government or to spur political change, since most of the formal 
channels are fully controlled by the government. The current political scenarios show that 
young people are hard-pressed by the economic downturn, prevailing corruptions, racial 
skirmishes, and a government crackdown on freedom of speech. All these problems make 
young people feel angry and frustrated with the government. This can be reflected in the 
comments of Academic (9): “The government does not try to lessen people’s burdens, 
instead putting them on the people’s shoulders. These are the problems that make young 
people angry at the government.” In a similar vein, Academic (2) also commented that, 
“…they only wanted some sort of channel to voice their opinions. As we all know, the 
strict system makes it difficult for the youth to think outside the box…” In this context, 
young people in Malaysia are frustrated with the government and the system as their 
political rights and freedom have been denied. This supports the argument from relative 
deprivation theory that the socio-psychological grievances of young people are a potential 
cause for collective action, mainly protest and social movements (Gurr, 1968; 
Klandermans, 2007; Dalton, 1988; Farah et al., 1979, Grasso and Giugni, 2016).  
 
However, feelings of deprivation alone might not motivate young people to engage 
in elite-challenging political participation, as they could also need a mobilisation driver 
such as group membership. In this case, 2 out of 10 academics believe that social 
networks, mainly the affiliation of political organisations, could somehow increase 
political awareness and the interest of young people to participate in elite-challenging 
political participation, as mentioned by Academic (3) “There are still many groups of 
young people who are very much affiliated and willing to work with political parties and 
organisations.” For example, the support for Bersih movement is generally based on party 
lines. This can be clearly seen when the Bersih 1.0 protest was first launched in 2006, it 





representatives from civil society. It did not entirely enter the grassroots consciousness as 
only 10 percent of non-partisans participated in this rally (Radue, 2012:64). For example, 
since PAS enjoyed much Malays support, therefore, the absence of PAS supporters clearly 
affected the Malay turnout in Bersih 4.0 when the party decided not to mobilise its 
members to participate in this protest. The responses confirm findings from mobilisation 
theory that young people who are embedded in political parties and organisations are more 
likely to engage in political activities, including protests (Diani, 2007; Kriesi, 1993; Snow 
et al., 1980).  
 
Furthermore, some highlight the rise of unconventional activities due to the 
emergence of a ‘new politics’ which has replaced the ‘old politics’ of ethnicity that has 
been long dominated Malaysian politics. Recent developments, particularly those occuring 
since the Reformasi era, successfully developed the idea of a ‘new politics’ as the issues 
raised by this movement went beyond ethnic lines—civil liberties, human rights, good 
governance, more democratic space, and accountability indirectly encouraged young 
Malaysians, mainly those in urban areas, to abandon ethnic allegiance. This is reflected in 
the response of Academic (9): “We cannot run from ethnic politics, but we see now the 
youth are more attracted to new politics like human rights, good governance and so on.” 
The ultimate reason behind the formation of new politics in Malaysia is related to the rise of 
a new middle class, as a result of rapid economic growth, which can be seen in the 
comment of Academic (6), “The educational institutions and economic development later 
created more middle-class people, largely amongst young people who were born in the 
1970s and 1980s, who have received the benefits of the NEP and feel contented about their 
lives.” This in line with the arguments of Yun Han Chu, Welsh and Weatherall (2012:210) 
that less developed economies have entered a period of rapid growth and industrialization, 
thus leading young people to engage in politics because they have greater access to 
education and new media, known as ‘post-industrial knowledge’. Therefore, young people 
tend to be much more liberal in their views on democracy, with less preference for ethnic-
based politics. These young people are the ‘post-NEP’ generation. The post-NEP 
generation are those born from the 1980s, a tech-savvy group who are not easily influenced 
and are more likely to make assessments of any decision or action taken by the government. 
As Inglehart (1990) argues, people’s values could no longer be explicated simply by 






Other academics (2 out of 10) pointed out that the upsurge of popular protests in 
neighbouring countries – or a ‘regional trend’ factor – may also have influenced the upward 
trend in unconventional political participation in this country, as mentioned by Academic 
(2), “If we look at the regional trend, especially in the Philippines and Indonesia, the 
changing of regime happened not by the means of the election system, but through the 
popular protests that were initiated mostly by the youth.” The regional trend can be 
reflected in Malaysia during the 1998 Reformasi movement. At that time, the financial 
crisis was a turning point for leadership change in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
In Indonesia, the downfall of the longstanding leadership of Soeharto in May 1998 through 
the popular uprising, and the dawn of Reformasi, inevitably influenced and eventually 
spread to Malaysia and became the rallying cry of Malaysians to call for Mahathir’s 
resignation soon after he sacked Anwar from the Cabinet on 2nd September 1998. The 
wide-ranging support that Anwar received from the ordinary masses led him to be at the 
forefront of a Reformasi movement with anti-Mahathir sentiments. Whilst the Reformasi 
movement in Malaysia failed to overthrow Mahathir from his premiership, there were 
several long-term ramifications. First, this movement had shaped citizens’ political 
awareness and galvanised youth participation in the whole spectrum of political activities, 
including institutionalised and non-institutionalised political participation, even the 
Reformasi movement no longer existed (Weiss, 2006). Second, the Reformasi provided a 
platform that bridged political parties and civil society, and joined the opposition parties 
against the regime. To some extent, it sowed the seeds for greater electoral challenges when 
the political opportunity structure was in favour of the opposition, as with the 2008 general 
election (Liu, 2014:44).  
 
6.7 Youth and democracy   
  
There was a strong sense amongst the academics that youth engagement in politics has 
contributed to strengthening the democratisation process in Malaysia, as explained by 
Academic (9), “…they are the ‘third force’. They are the centre or the core group are 
fighting for social justice and real democracy.” Whilst young people’s engagement has 
failed to change the government and only precipitated the ‘Political Tsunami’,38 they have 
                                                          
38Most scholars and political analysts used the term ‘political tsunami’ or ‘political volcano’ as metaphors to 
reflect a major setback of BN when it failed to maintain two-thirds of the parliamentary majority, an 





pushed the government to open more democratic spaces and restored some democratic 
elements in Malaysia. This is because young people have a powerful force in calling for 
greater democracy. For instance, under Najib’s tenure, he carried out legislative reforms 
after being heavily pressured by young people. First, he repealed the draconian ISA and 
replaced it with the Security Offences (Special Measures Act).39 Second, he amended the 
AUKU, mainly Section 15, to allow students to join political organisations, including 
political parties outside the campus. Third, he amended the Printing Presses and 
Publications Act—an annually renewable printing permit was abolished, a one-off licence 
being put in place. Finally, he enacted the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (PAA), which 
allows public assembly without a police permit (Liu, 2015:292). These indicate that the 
efforts of many NGOs such as SUARAM, Gerakan Mansuh ISA and Students Solidarity 
Malaysia to put pressure on the government had paid off.  
 
 However, some respondents argued that youth political participation has 
strengthened the democratisation process, while at the same time it has also strengthened 
the semi-democratic regime. This is reflected in the comment by Academic (7), “I think 
the involvement of the youth strengthened the democratic process as well as the 
authoritarian regime as the government is still enforcing control on the laws and their 
authority on the people.” In this case, the government’s initiatives to implement these 
political reforms meant the opening of greater democratic spaces for people, or at least 
tried to show responsiveness over human rights accountability that had been undermined 
when brutal crackdowns were employed against dissidents. It was evident during the 
Bersih rallies—Bersih 2.0 (in July 2011) and Bersih 3.0 (in April 2012)—and the People’s 
Uprising Rally (Himpunan Kebangkitan Rakyat, in Malay) that the government had 
engaged in pre-emptive arrests under the Sedition Act40, and used violence such as tear gas 
and water cannon to disperse the protesters. According to Academic (10), “As long as we 
are still in the semi-democratic system, the situation will be like a pendulum that swings up 
                                                          
39The Security Offences (Special Measures Act) or SOSMA was enacted in 2012 to repeal and replace the 
controversial Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA). The Act was made under the Article 149 of Federal 
constitution, specifically aimed to prevent internal security issues including acts of terrorism, sabotage, 
public order, prejudice, and espionage. The most important provision in this Act is Section 4 that gives 
powers of arrest and detention to the police over person who is suspected of having committed security 
offences. In particular, the police also allow to detent the suspect for 28 days and place an electronic 
monitoring if released.  
 





and later it comes down. Sometimes we see it towards democratic, sometimes more 
towards autocratic.”  
 
6.8 The future of youth political participation in Malaysia 
 
For established democracies, a recent study by Grasso (2016) predicts that elite-
challenging participation in Western Europe may decline in the future since younger 
generations who came of age in the 1980s and 1990s are less likely to participate in some 
elite-challenging activities, mainly new social movements. However, in contrast to this, a 
majority (8 out of 10 academics) were optimistic about the future of youth political 
participation in Malaysia. They argue that young Malaysians will be more politically 
active in the future, either in elite-directed or elite-challenging participation. An example 
of this point of view is given by Academic (9), “Surely more youth will be involved. 
Political development in this country has become more interesting to study, especially 
when elections are highly competitive as the government and the opposition have an equal 
chance to form the government.” This view supports the findings of Norshuhada et al., 
(2016) that Generation Y will continue to be a significant impact on elections by 
registering as new voters. On the other hand, 2 out of 10 academics point out that it is 
difficult to predict youth political participation as it depends on the current political 
situation of this country. This can be seen in the response of Academic (10), “If BN is in a 
stable condition, people will join them. Same goes to PR. If there is no stability within 
these parties, people will feel unsatisfied and the turnout rate will decrease, meaning that 
the people are to be less interested in politics”. The future of young people’s engagement 
in politics relies on the stability of the two power blocs; the ruling party and the 
opposition. Recently, young people have had no dependable alternative political party as 
the BN-led government has been plagued with corruption scandals, while PR has been 
reborn into the new Pakatan Harapan but there remain issues over this change. If young 
people do not have any viable choice, they might become more politically apathetic. The 
academics believe that politically apathetic young people can be encouraged to participate 









1) Better systems of voting regulation  
 
The government should provide better systems of voting regulation, particularly regarding 
to the voting age limitation. It is noteworthy that Malaysia is amongst 14 countries in the 
world which have a minimum voting age of 21-years-old.41 In this case, 6 out of 10 
academics suggest that the voting age should be lowered from 21 to 18-years-old, as 
argued by Academic (4) “I think the level of maturity is there already, at the age of 18 
years old.” Whilst they agree with this statement, 2 out of 10 academics also argued that 
young people must be exposed to politics or at least possess general knowledge about 
politics before lowering the voting age. This can be reflected in the comment of Academic 
(5), “The youth must be exposed to political knowledge, and the importance of politics 
from the very beginning, before we lower the voting age to 18.” However, Academic (10) 
is optimistic that Malaysia could be like Singapore, where voting is made compulsory for 
all eligible citizens and they could be somehow penalised if they do not cast votes. 
 
2) Academic freedom 
 
Three out of 10 respondents suggest that universities should be given political freedom so 
that students and academics can have spaces to voice their thoughts and move forward 
creatively, as pointed out by Academic (2), “The government should give a sense of 
freedom to the youth. Young people cannot do anything within the campus, there is no 
public speaking corner, etc.” Academic (6) also responded positively to this issue by 
saying, “They are still restrained by the rules made by the university’s bureaucrats. But, I 
am confident that the awareness is there…” In other words, the UUCA 197142 has been 
amended several times, but remains a significant barrier curbing student from engaging in 
political activism. 
 
3) Youth political leadership 
 
In other countries such as Britain and Canada, political careers begin at the university 
level. However, in Malaysia, as political parties are not allowed to be set up in universities 
                                                          
41Please see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/guidetowfbook.html, accessed 
on March 29, 2017. 
 





and students have not been allowed to actively engage in politics, we can see that the 
journey for aspiring young people to be politicians typically takes a long time. Generally, 
most political leaders enter politics through membership in the grassroots party divisions, 
mainly the youth wings. However, due to the rigid structure and cultural settings of 
established parties, leadership positions must be given to the senior members, rather than 
young leaders. Nepotism is practiced in the party where youth members can be advanced if 
their family members hold positions in higher office. Realising this, some academics (3 out 
of 10) suggest that political parties need to take more deliberate action by fielding more 
young candidates in the elections, and higher offices, as commented by Academic (1), 
“This is the main challenge necessary to the political parties where they have to give full 
opportunity to the youth to expose themselves in political leaderships,” and Academic 
(10), “… give the youth a chance to build their good leadership skills”. These views 
support the findings of Pandian (2014a) that young people prefer political leaders who 
possess characteristics of an ideal leader such as honesty, competence, bold views and 
brave ideas to remain relevant for youth.  
 
4) More responsive government or politicians 
 
Almost half, that is, 4 out 10 academics recommend that the government or politicians 
should try to be able to represent young people well and be willing to fight for their needs 
in order to gain young people’s support. This can be seen in the response of Academic (9), 
“Very simple. Leaders must change their attitudes in helping the people to settle their 
problems rationally, more responsive to their voices to ensure a better future.” In a similar 
vein, Academic (1) stated that “The government should necessarily be sensitive to the 
demands and problems faced by the youth.” In other words, young Malaysians desire 
meaningful engagement and hope that their voice will be listened to by the government. 
Although the government has provided various platforms for young people like the Youth 
Parliament to give training for potential youth leaders, they are still not free to exercise 




There are conflicting narratives in the literature on political engagement in established 





many advanced democracies are increasingly disengaged from voting and party 
membership. On the other hand, most studies on unconventional participation argue that a 
shift from ‘elite-directed’ engagement to ‘elite-challenging’ participation has taken place 
(Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) as a younger generation of ‘cognitively 
mobilised’ (Inglehart, 1990), ‘critical citizens’ (Norris, 2011), or ‘dissatisfied democrats’ 
(Klingemann, 1999) has emerged. Based on the opinions of the academics, they perceive 
that there has been an upward trend in elite-directed and elite-challenging participation in 
Malaysia, but there is a lack of statistical evidence to support this assumption. However, 
most of them agreed that young people in general are less likely to be a member of a 
political party. This group’s interview analyses also showed that education, rural-urban 
differences, and socialisation agents have an important role in explaining what drives 
young people to participate in conventional politics. In addition, young people are seen to 
be engaged in elite-challenging participation, commonly in demonstrations, social activism 
and online-participation. The feelings of deprivation, social networks, the emergence of a 
‘New Politics’ and regional trends are believed to be the determinant factors in explaining 
the rise of elite-challenging participation in this country. In the next chapter, we will 
scrutinise intensely the contrasting views of another elite group, namely the politicians, on 
the dynamics of youth political participation in Malaysia before turning to the analysis of 

















In the previous chapters, the analyses showed that young people in Malaysia are less likely 
than the older generation to be members of political parties or as closely identify with 
parties. Similarly, academics also believed that young people are increasingly disengaged 
from political parties. They argue that the shrinking membership of conventional political 
organisations has been equivalent with the increase of youth participation in new forms of 
elite-challenging participation such as social activism, protests, and online participation. A 
serious decline of party membership, particularly within youth wings, has not only 
occurred in Malaysia, but also in most established democracies over recent decades (Cross 
and Young, 2008; Hooghe et al., 2004). For example, Mair and Biezen (2001) show that 
the membership of political parties in Western Europe countries such as the United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy dropped by more than 50 percent between 1980 and 2000. 
Studies have shown that the plunging of party membership in these countries is a 
consequence of organisational changes (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002; Mair, 2006), alongside 
the increasing of societal disillusion towards the parties (Sloam, 2007; Henn et al., 2005). 
As party involvement requires a high degree of commitment, in terms of time and energy, 
so this activism is seen as undesirable and generally involves a small group of people 
(Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). Despite a decline, the study of youth party activism remains 
important as this is the only route for many people to become future politicians. Therefore, 
this chapter explicates the views of political elites on youth political participation, the 
structure of the major political parties in Malaysia, the motivations of their members and 








7.2 Making sense of current patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia  
 
Generally, half of the members of the political elite group (5 out of 10) agreed that young 
people in Malaysia have an interest in politics and are concerned about political issues 
around them, as stated by Political Elite (5), “Now we can see the tendency of young 
people to join politics is getting better day by day. For me, it is considered as a great 
development to develop Malaysia.” This opinion is supported by Political Elite (1), who 
commented that: “The number of young people coming out to vote in the last two General 
Elections shows that they are interested in politics.” Political elites rely heavily on the 
increment in voter turnout from recent election in their understandings. Although agreeing 
with the sentiment, Political Elite (6) pointed out that young people today show greater 
interest in politics, but not to any particular political party, since “… in terms of party 
involvement, many youths are not ready to engage consistently or even are being cynical 
about in-depth political involvement. They only vote and some of them are involved with 
demonstrations. But only a small group of young people are involved actively in politics.” 
This supports findings from the qualitative interviews with academics that young people 
are seen to be less likely to be a member of a political party.  
 
 There are several underlying factors, as outlined by the respondents, which 
influence youth interest in politics. Firstly, 3 out of 6 politicians believed that the existence 
of social media helps to provide a vast amount of political information and exposure to 
young people, as mentioned by Political Elite (9), “Young people in Malaysia today are 
interested in politics, since they have been exposed to enormous information from social 
media.” Political Elite (2), an UMNO Youth Exco member, in a similar vein also claimed 
that, “If we look closely to the AC Nelson’s analysis, the statistics show that 80 percent 
people who surf the internet to access information and read online news are young people 
aged 17 to 40-years-old.” Although there is a higher proportion of internet users amongst 
young people, the findings of Salman and Saad (2015) show that young Malaysians do not 
use this media for seeking political information, communicating with politicians, or 
commenting on political issues.  Instead, they are more likely to use this media to connect 
with others and look for entertainment. Despite the increasing importance of social media, 
Political Elite (10) also emphasised the role played by NGOs and civil society in building 
political understanding and awareness amongst young people, as he stated that, “Young 





they have many other platforms to gain political knowledge and voice their demands 
through NGOs and civil society.” This view resonates with the argument by Mohd 
Azizuddin (2009:108) that since the 2008 election, civil society groups have become more 
numerous and even stronger due to the change in attitude and mindset of young people 
who were increasingly aware of the importance of political freedom and rights. Thus, there 
emerges a reciprocal relationship between young people and civil society: civil society 
needed continuous support from the youth to move the country towards democracy, while 
young people wanted wider participation and an avenue to deliver their demands directly 
to the government.  
 
 Secondly, 2 out of 6 respondents argue that young people have shown to have very 
high levels of political interest because they are eager for political change in Malaysia. 
This can be seen in the response of Political Elite (1), “…there is a general sense or 
feeling that something must be done to save Malaysia and build a better Malaysia for 
all.”, and the comment by Political Elite (5), “When the youth care about politics, they 
will be the agent to change Malaysia to a much brighter future…” The remaining 
participants (5 out of 10) react negatively by saying that young people in general are not 
interested in politics. According to Political Elite (8), “…young Malaysians are not 
interested in politics, not interested to participate and to know about politics. They seem to 
be indifferent and apathetic about politics because when we talk about politics, it is about 
something ‘boring’ and unfair.” Political Elite (7), is also pessimistic about this issue by 
arguing that, “Young people find politics to be too ‘dirty’, too ‘technical’ and too distant 
from their daily lives.” In this regard, it seems like young people have a negative 
perception of politics because they tend to associate politics with political actors or parties 
who are often observed to pursuit their own objectives rather than the interest of society. 
This reflects the findings of Henn et al., (2005) and White et al., (2000) in Britain. 
 
7.3 Declining conventional or ‘elite-directed’ political participation? 
 
When asked about current patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia, more than 
half of respondents and most from the government (6 out of 10) agreed there is a decline in 
conventional or ‘elite-directed’ political participation amongst young people in this 
country. This is reflected in the comments by Political Elite (8), “I agreed that there is a 





likely to be registered as voters or be members of any political organisation...” Political 
Elite (10) also responded positively to this issue by saying, “Yes. I don’t have the exact 
numbers, but I believe that there is a decline. It not only happened to the political parties, 
but NGOs also faced the same problem.” It appears that not only is youth turnout in 
elections low, but young people also display comparatively weak attachment to political 
parties and are less likely to be a member of formal organisations. Evidently, in Malaysia, 
out of 13 million youth population, only two percent are registered as members of youth 
organisations. In addition, the findings from the Malaysian Youth Index (2015) which was 
created to enable the government to understand the youth based on certain indicators that 
would guide them to formulate suitable youth programmes, also showed that the overall 
domain score for young people between the ages of 15 to 30-years-old was ‘moderate’ 
(70.22 score). The lowest score amongst the 12 domains was political socialisation at a 
score of 45.82, falling under the category ‘not satisfied’.43 This indicates that the political 
engagement of young Malaysians is at the lower levels since they are less engaged in 
political activities, mainly conventional politics and discuss politics less.  
 
 On the other hand, other political elites (4 out of 10), the majority from opposition 
parties, argued that youth political engagement in this country is showing an upward trend, 
particularly after the 2008 general election, as commented by Political Elite (7), “No, I do 
not agree. In fact, I would argue the opposite and say that youth political participation in 
Malaysia has increased since 2008.” Political Elite (6) also responded positively to this 
issue by saying, “I think if we compare with the previous situation, where the reformation 
era occurred, the current situation is much better.” In this regard, the opposition elites 
tend to be positive on youth political engagement because they received large votes from 
young people since the 2008 and 2013 general elections. For example, 58.16 percent of 
young voters voted for the opposition (PR), while the ruling party (BN) only managed to 
                                                          
43This domain was measured based on three indicators: political discussion, following current issues on 
political developments and engagement in political activities. The score was based on the scale of 0 to 100. 
(0-39) refers to strongly dissatisfied, (40-49) is under the category of not satisfied, (50-59) refers to less 
satisfied, (60-74) refers to moderate, (75-79) refers to satisfied and (80-100) is under the category of strongly 
satisfied. The Malaysian Youth Index also shows that young females (44.42) have lower political 
socialisation levels than young males (46.81), the young urban (45.48) are slightly lower than the young rural 
(45.54) in term of political socialisation and the political socialisation of young Malays is lower compared to 
the young Chinese and Indians.  





get 41.84 percent of the youth vote in the 2013 general election (IYRES, 2014).44 
Although agreeing with the statement that youth political participation in this country is on 
the rise, but most of the respondents (3 out of 4 opposition elites) are in agreement that 
political parties continue to lose membership from young people. This can be seen in the 
response of Political Elite (1), “They may not be party members. But they are actively 
following contemporary political developments.” Young people are inclined to be non-
partisan or ‘fence-sitters’ due to several reasons. According to Political Elite (6), “They 
are maybe interested in political issues or policies, but they do not want to become 
members and be involved with party activities such as meetings, campaigning etc.” 
Similarly, Political Elite (7) also argued that “Young people today have many channels to 
be active in politics as there are more efforts by the government and political parties to 
reach the youth via many programmes such as the Youth Parliament, internship 
opportunities from political parties, the Perdana Fellowship and so on.” Therefore, they 
can simply participate in those activities despite not being a member of any political party.  
 
 Additionally, young people no longer think that party ideology is relevant in their 
life as they are more interested in a single-issue politics, as reflected by Political Elite (6)’s 
comment, “… we are currently living in a post-ideological world where racism, liberal 
democracy and leftist politics have failed to attract the youth’s attention in Malaysia.” 
This supports findings from the previous chapters that Malaysia is experiencing a 
downward trend in partisanship, and parallel with the argument of Marsh, O’Toole, and 
Jones (2007:100) that young people’s participation is greater in issue-led rather than 
ideological politics. Whilst the majority of political elites (8 out of 10) were concerned 
about the proportion of young members joining the political parties, for them, young 
people continuing to vote for them in elections is far more important than them being 
                                                          
44There were varied reasons why young people vote for the opposition. First, an indignation of young people 
towards BN’s policy outputs and institutional functioning—BN’s failure in managing the economy, the anti-
corruption campaign, respect for the rights and civil liberty of the people, criticisms of the former Prime 
Minister and ethnic-relation linked reasons. This indicated that young people had different political views 
and attitudea as compared to the older generation, who had strongest political loyalties and robust partisan 
attachments with the ruling parties. Instead, many controversies and political scandals that took place before 
the election such as the widespread corruption and economic downturn, did not changed the loyalty of older 
voters to BN. Second, young people tend to be much more liberal in their views of democracy, with less 
preference for ethnic-based politics. They were in favoured of multi-ethnic political parties, like the PKR, 
that inclusive for all populace regardless of race or religions. The Malaysian youth, especially young-urban 
professionals, believed many BN politicians to be blatantly corrupt and no longer capable to provide a better 
future for Malaysia. Another important factor contributing to the victory of the opposition was the impact of 
new media, primarily social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. This media was fully utilised and 





members of parties. This can be seen in the response of Political Elite (2), “Personally, I 
think that one day political parties will no longer depend on the numbers of members, but 
more on how to attract youth support.” Political Elite (6), in a similar vein, commented 
that, “Sometimes, we do not need to become a member, but we can become an agent for a 
party through handling talks and so on.” Political Elite (3) also added, “If they do not 
want to be a member in any political parties, they must be a good citizen by voting in the 
election.” As political parties, particularly the youth wings are the only channel or the 
recruitment base for future politicians (Hooghe et al., 2004), therefore, young members are 
still vital in Malaysian democracy. 
 
7.4 Understanding youth non-participation  
 
Based on the analyses above, we can see that most political elites claim that young people 
are less likely to be involved in ‘elite-directed’ political participation, be it in voting or 
party membership. These views echo the findings in the quantitative chapters that 
portrayed young people as more politically inactive than their older counterparts. So, why 
are Malaysian youth generally disengaged from traditional politics? Some political elites 
(3 out of 10) relate the disengagement of young people from politics with the attitudes or 
characteristics of young people that are distinct or different from the older generation. To 
be specific, young Malaysians are seen to opt to distance themselves from conventional 
political participation due to the changing of values and relationships between young 
people and the state. This is reflected in the comments by Political Elite (2), “We live in a 
different era from our ancestors where there was less physical development during that 
time. We experienced a different set of realities when we were born. Therefore, we will feel 
less grateful and indebted to the government.” In a similar vein, Political Elite (10) also 
commented that, “Young people tend to be individualistic and have less ties to the 
community...” The impact of economic insecurity and social life has strengthened the 
process of individualisation amongst young people, so they are less dependent on the state 
and community, and feel that politics is no longer relevant to them. As young people 
become more individualised, they are more likely to participate in less-institutionalised or 
loosely-structured groups that require not as much commitment or long-term loyalty, as 
stated by Political Elite (8), “Young people are less likely to be registered as a member of 
any organisation, but they are more likely to be involved in social clubs or unstructured 





labelled as ‘Actualising Citizen (AC)’, rather than ‘Dutiful Citizen’ (DC) as they are more 
disengaged from democracy, have less need for government intervention, and are in favour 
of a loose-structured network of community actions.  
 
 Other political elite members (2 out of 10) pointed out young people’s 
disillusionment with the democratic process in Malaysia as another possible barrier that 
made them disengaged from ‘elite-directed’ political participation. In particular, young 
people are frustrated with the political process, feel a lack of trust and faith in politicians as 
they seem unable to keep their promises and be accountable to society, as mentioned by 
Political Elite (4), “Politicians are supposed to fight for the interests of the people, but 
when that did not happen, this led young people to become distrustful and disengaged with 
elections and any political party.” This supports findings from Sloam (2007) and Molloy 
et al. (2002) in the United Kingdom that declining trust in traditional institutions and the 
political process make young people turn off from politics. For Political Elite (8), “Young 
people today are wise. Politicians need to rationalise an issue with factual data and 
logical content to attract young people.” In this sense, young people have a sceptical view 
of politicians and political parties as they are self-interested, and being involved in politics 
to benefit from the system. Furthermore, some (2 out of 6) argue that young people’s lack 
of political efficacy could be another factor that led to the decrease of their participation in 
politics, as indicated by Political Elite (4), “Young people think that voting is unimportant 
because they do not feel responsible to determine who will govern the country, and they do 
not believe that their vote will make any difference.” This opinion is also extended 
similarly by Political Elite (7) in his comment, “If there is no change in the government, I 
am worried that these young people would start to lose hope in the political process. And 
because of that, it also can decrease their political participation.” This supports findings 
from the literature that individuals who have low levels of self-efficacy or feel that they 
cannot bring change to the system are more likely to be disengaged from the political 
process (Niemi, Craig and Mattei, 1991; Renshon, 1974). 
 
7.5 Rising unconventional or ‘elite-challenging’ political participation? 
 
Based on the responses, 7 out of 10 political elite members are in agreement that some 
young people in Malaysia are turning to new repertoires of political engagement, where 





constructive channels to influence political decisions. Amongst the most prevalent forms 
of elite-challenging political activities that have been listed by the respondents are: 
 
1) Online activism.  
 
Internet access in Malaysia was developed as early as the 1990s, but online activism in 
Malaysia started in the 1998 Reformasi movement as a means of communication amongst 
activists and an alternative source for reformasi-related information for many Malaysians 
as it was free from the government control (Abbott, 2004; Mohd Azizuddin, 2009). 
Therefore, it was at this time, where the internet was politicised, and perhaps gave rise to 
the young Malaysians ‘internet generation’, though youth are marginalised politically and 
economically, but they are technologically empowered. However, only in 2008 did the 
internet, particularly social media like YouTube and Facebook become the vehicle for mass 
political mobilisation. Indeed, Bersih 2.0, which relied heavily on social media, 
successfully galvanised a diverse mix of Malaysians to the streets. This could help the 
emergence of a society that transcended ethnicity, and enabled possibilities for ‘bridging 
socio-political cleavages’ (Weiss, 2012:26). As expected, a majority of the respondents (9 
out of 10) emphasize the importance of social media as a new form of political expression 
in leading young people to participate politically, as mentioned by Political Elite (9), “The 
new form which is very popular now among the youth is social media, which is used to get 
information on politics, communicate with politicians or to channel their political 
opinions.” This is unlike the mainstream media, where all information has been filtered, 
manipulated, and distorted by the regime, only depicting their positive sides. Therefore, 
young people turned to alternative media for a more accurate and comprehensive source of 
information, and politically important to express views and criticise the government (Tan 
Lee Ooi, 2010:158).  
 
 However, social media can have adverse effects, as commented by Political Elite 
(6), “…the disadvantage of social media is that sometimes, young people simply like the 
page or group to show their concern, but when the party invite them to join, they will 
reject it because they think that it is much easier to press the ‘like’ button than to 
participate directly...” Whilst social media potentially creates ‘informed young 
Malaysians’, it may also potentially lead to lack of meaningful participation when political 





inaccurate, as stated by Political Elite (8), “Young people can simply be influenced by 
social media if they did not investigate an issue further before making any political 
judgment.” This supports the findings from Ipsos MORI (2015) that almost half of young 
Britons feel that social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter are making political 
debate more divisive and superficial.45 
 
2) Street protests 
 
As protests become prevalent over recent decades, many studies (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 
2001; Tarrow, 1989) find a ‘normalisation’ of protest in established democracies where the 
authorities have learned to accept protest as part of people’s everyday activity. It also 
means that protest is more likely to be less contentious or violent in more open political 
environments and systems, where the costs and opportunity of participation are higher 
compared to the close and non-democratic regimes (Tarrow, 1998). In Malaysia, the 
transition to democracy has significantly opened wide channels for protest activities, but 
the extent to which protests have become ‘normalised’ in this country is somewhat 
unclear. Moreover, many scholars who studied on protest activism are highly concentrated 
on the attitudes of the masses toward protest, rather than on what political elites perceive 
protest as part of political participation and their attitudes toward protest (Uba, 2016). 
Therefore, when I asked their view about political protest in Malaysia, 4 out of 10 
respondents from the incumbent party responded negatively on this issue by arguing that 
protest activities contradict Malaysian culture and have not been normalised in this 
country. This can be reflected in the comment by Political Elite (3), “When we talk about 
demonstrations, I think in Malaysia, it totally contradicts with our Asian culture and 
norms.” Political Elite (8), also pointed out that, “Our culture is totally different than 
Western culture. Western society is more transparent, and their young people carry out 
protests in a wise manner - unlike in Malaysia, where young people were being used by 
certain parties as a pressure group to achieve their own political goals.” These views 
depict that protests in Malaysia are not youth-led political activities, instead they are being 
manipulated by certain political actors. In the case of Malaysia, we can see gradual 
changes in protest activities. The 1998 Reformasi era witnessed the upsurge of young 
people, spontaneously gathered, and conducted the protest movement against the existing 
                                                          
45Please see https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3539/A-third-of-young-





status quo. But nowadays, protest relies heavily on a formal affiliation, a leader or at least 
it needs social networks to attract a large crowd. The Occupy Dataran in July 2011 is an 
example of a grassroots movement that was meticulously organised and publicized through 
social media, which aimed to reclaim the right to assembly in Malaysia. It was not a 
continuous occupation, but more of a ‘general assembly’ for young people to gather, 
organise activities, share ideas and thoughts.  
 
 In addition, some (2 out of 10) political elites from the opposition indicate the 
government still did not accepted protests and was intolerant of protesters, since various 
laws had been regularly used to criminalise dissent. According to Political Elite (6), “I 
have been accused three times for the same fault because I have held a Blackout 505 
assembly.”46 In contrast, Political Elite (7) believes that the government has accepted 
political protests as a reality in Malaysia which cannot be 100 percent banned or 
controlled. However, he argued that, “…the government is trying its hardest to limit the 
influence of these protest activities.” Therefore, the government will continue to infringe 
people’s basic human rights and freedoms.  
 
 It appears that political elites agreed there is a rise in elite-challenging political 
participation amongst Malaysian youth, predominantly in the forms of online activism and 
protest activities. In fact, a majority of political elites (8 out of 10) believed that 
unconventional political activities such as protests and online participation are part of 
political engagement and people’s democratic rights. This kind of repertoire has been seen 
as one of the new ways used by politicians, particularly the opposition to approach and to 
get close to young people.  
 
7.6 What drives unconventional or ‘elite-challenging’ political participation? 
 
In the previous chapter, most of the academics saw young people’s discontent about the 
system and the government as the main factor that drives them to participate in elite-
challenging forms of political participation. Similarly, 3 out of 10 political elites also 
                                                          
46Following the aftermath of the 2013 election, the PR coalition led a series of massive rallies throughout the 
country, known as ‘Blackout 505’rally—with the slogan of ‘Save Democracy’—the protests were against 
what was seen as the fraudulent victory of BN, claiming that there had been electoral malpractices 
undertaken by BN, and were backed by the Election Commission given issues of phantom voters, indelible 





believe that young people are discontented with the way democracy and the system works 
in Malaysia. Therefore, they use this channel as an avenue to express their dissatisfaction 
against the ruling party, as stated by Political Elite (9), “There are many factors, some of 
which are current issues like economic instability which cause them to protest against the 
government. Besides that, maybe the restrictions on political freedom and fundamental 
basic rights is another factor that drives youth.” For instance, the year 2015 was a bad 
time for Malaysia, since it had been exacerbated by a protracted political crisis, starting 
with the arrest of a de facto leader, Anwar Ibrahim, to five more years in prison for 
sodomy charges in February. The imprisonment of Anwar gathered nearly ten thousand of 
his supporters who rallied in the streets of Kuala Lumpur, calling for the freeing of the 
opposition leader and to vent their discontent with Najib’s government. These so-called 
unlawful ‘Kita Lawan’ (We Fight) rallies were held on 7th and 28th March, and ended 
with the mass arrests of opposition activists. In May 2015, the Kuala Lumpur streets were 
once again swamped with thousands of people who dressed in a ‘red shirt’ as a sign of 
protest against the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in Malaysia.47 On August 1st, 2015, the 
youth activist group known as the Coalition of Youth for Malaysia (Gabungan Anak Muda 
Demi Malaysia) organised the ‘Arrest Najib’ (#TangkapNajib) rally in Kuala Lumpur, to 
call for the arrest of Najib Razak for alleged corruption and abuse of power. A series of 
street protest in Malaysia did not occur in a vacuum, but they were the culmination of 
widespread discontentment over current political and economic conditions.  
 
 In addition, 3 out of 10 political elites highlighted that accidental exposure to 
politics on social media could increase young people’s likelihood of participating in elite-
challenging activities, as depicted by Political Elite (5), “This is because the exposure from 
social media such as blogs, Facebook etc., has created direct interactions with politicians, 
and increases their interest to join political activities.” In particular, social media acts as a 
driving force to mobilise young people into political actions, whether it is signing a 
petition, being invited to a rally or boycotting, since mainstream channels in Malaysia are 
                                                          
47The anti-GST rally was organised by a coalition of NGOs such as Solidarity Anak Muda Malaysia 
(SAMM), ‘Anything but UMNO’ (ABU) movement, and the Oppressed People’s Network (JERIT), 
supported by the opposition parties, in response to the implementation of GST by the government on 1 April 
2015. They argued that the 6 percent GST tax imposed would burden the people, while widen the income 
inequality and disparity (Asrul Hadi, 2015). Although the GST was heavily criticised, but Najib defended 
this tax as it was the lowest among ASEAN countries and the GST collection had benefited the people in the 






tightly controlled by the government. This can be reflected in the comment by Political 
Elite (4), “There are many informal mediums, mainly the social media that could be easily 
accessed by young people without any restrictions. Therefore, young people have been 
influenced by the information which in turn make them realise that they need to do 
something.” For instance, due to the diffusion effect of social media, mainly Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter, the size of Bersih rallies (from Bersih 1.0 to 5.0) has grown from 
around 40,000 to 300,000 Malaysians attending this civic movement. This echoed the 
other media-driven social movements like Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street that 
advocated political reform and accumulated people’s discontent on social media. 
 
 Some political elites (2 out of 10) argue that other contributing factors such as peer 
pressure or networking, and the image of the people who run and participate in elite-
challenging activities like protest, may influence young people to engage in this kind of 
repertoire, as commented by one politician, “They see these activities as a good way of 
networking, and sometimes young people are attracted by ‘cool’ politicians such as Tony 
Pua, Nurul Izzah and Hannah Yeoh and by ‘cool’ activists such as Fahmi Redza and 
Ambiga.” As the circle of activists who are always at the forefront of political rallies in 
Malaysia are “rooted from the middle-class” (Political Elite 7), and normally attended by 
young people, so we can expect that those who are from a very different background or 
social group may not be interested to participate in this kind of repertoire.  
 
7.7 The structure of political parties and parties’ strategies to attract young 
people 
 
This section sheds further light on the structure and role of political parties in Malaysia.  
The inclusion of the discussion of political parties is important to consider the methods by 
which various political parties seek to engage with and mobilise young people. It is worth 
noting that the Malaysian political system is mobilised along a communal framework 
(Liow and Afif Pasuni, 2010). Due to the highly pluralistic nature of Malaysian society, 
most political parties and coalitions in the country are racially-based, where they 
ostensibly represent the interests of their own ethnic groups, rather than competing 
political philosophies. There are more than 30 registered political parties in the country. 
However, this thesis only focuses on the six main parties, UMNO, PAS, PKR, MIC, MCA, 





and they actively contested in the general election for the past 10 years. In addition, all 
these major parties have youth wings and women’s wings. 
 
7.7.1 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) 
 
UMNO emerged in 1946 as a response to the British scheme of the Malayan Union, and is 
the largest political party representing the interests of the Malay-Muslims populace. 
Although UMNO is considered as a mass party, the membership is not universal as it is 
confined to Malays only. UMNO’s party election has been seen as important as the 
country’s election because its party apparatus often reflects the state apparatus (Fionna, 
2008). In other words, the president of UMNO normally served as the Prime Minister. 
UMNO is at the helm of their key allies, mainly the MCA (Malaysian Chinese 
Association), MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) and 12 other regional parties in a coalition 
called as the Barisan Nasional (National Front). Although this was not formally written, 
the elites understood that “UMNO and the Malays were primus inter pares (first among 
equals) in politics, while in return the business pursuit of non-Malays would remain free of 
hindrances or persecution” (Mauzy, 2006:53). In particular, the inter-communal coalition 
formula or consociational democracy, which recognised the Malay supremacy, was the 
very basis of constitutional polity and ethnic solidarity. UMNO has a large membership 
with more than three million registered members, spread around 190 divisions and more 
than 17,000 branches (Kaβner, 2014), and consistently able to gain support from the 
Malays. This is reflected in the comments by Political Elite (9), “We keep on receiving 
new membership forms from every division.” Political Elite (2), an UMNO Youth Exco 
member also responded positively to this issue by saying, “This number keeps increasing 
because we have membership bureaus at all party levels.” To keep continuing and getting 
more support from the youth, UMNO has separated its youth wing into male and female 
components (UMNO youth and Puteri UMNO). The UMNO Youth was formally formed 
in 1949 to deter the mounting intensity of radicalism among youth at that time and to 
represent the next generation of leaders. Unlike the UMNO Youth, Puteri UMNO can be 
considered as a newly-formed party wing which was established after UMNO’s setback in 
election 1999, as stated by Political Elite (3), “Puteri UMNO was launched in 2001, with 
the objective to attract and provide a political platform for young women between the ages 
of 18 to 35 years old.” Both UMNO youth wings are active in searching for and recruiting 





Puteri UMNO and 40 years old for the UMNO youth will automatically relocate to the 
central party.  
 
 Undeniably, the two recent elections of 2008 and 2013 showed that the popular 
vote for UMNO has gradually declined. This party has encountered big challenges as it has 
been exacerbated by protracted corruption and money politics, splits in the leadership, a 
growing force of the opposition, and most importantly, difficulties in approaching the 
younger generation. This can be reflected in the comments by Political Elite (9) “It is very 
hard to attract the young people as they have little trust in UMNO”. Political Elite (3) also 
believed similarly by saying, “We do not deny that attracting young people to UMNO is a 
big challenge to the whole UMNO leadership. Even though it is difficult, we have planned 
strategies to attract young people’s hearts.” Therefore, UMNO has geared up its 
machineries to mobilise youth support by introducing more youth-friendly policies and 
programmes that starting from the grassroots, through the branches and up to the national 
level. Additionally, UMNO also interacts directly with the university students by setting 
up the higher education bureau, as described by Political Elite (2), “We have direct 
interaction within small groups of youth. So, we hold discussions with chosen topics on the 
living costs, the Goods and Services Tax, employment, etc. We have established many 
programmes under City Hall and Q&A sessions.” In other words, to get close to young 
people, a party does not need large scale programs targeted to reach a large audience. 
Political Elite (3) also responded positively to this issue by saying, “It is just enough to 
have a coffee session with young people, to share and listen to their problems. So, we can 
be the middleman for youth to bring forward their problems to a proper authority.” In 
addition, UMNO has been heavily criticised as being discriminatory towards young 
leaders since many senior members have been placed in the top leadership. In response to 
this, Political Elite (2) argued that, “UMNO has been established for a long period, so we 
see an older generation in leadership. I cannot deny the fact that UMNO needs to be more 
open-minded and provide more spaces to young candidates.” Political Elite (3) also added 
that, “That is why we always urge the UMNO’s higher leadership to fill in the empty 
positions with more youth to make it fairer.” Recently, we can see that UMNO has opened 
the opportunities for young leaders to be at the forefront, and hold various portfolios in the 







7.7.2 Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
 
The MCA, which was transformed into the formal political party of 1949, served as a 
guardian of the interests of the Chinese in Malaysia. Historically, the MCA has succeeded 
in bringing a large Chinese support to the BN. However, the support of the grassroots 
Chinese towards this party has gradually deteriorated as evidenced in 2008 and 2013 
general elections.48 Despite the gradual withering of Chinese support, the membership of 
MCA has reached more than one million, thus the MCA remains as the largest Chinese-
based party in Malaysia. This can be seen in the response of Political Elite (10), 
“...approximately, the number of MCA registered members are around 1.8 million 
members. And it is increasing from time to time.” In this regard, the MCA Youth Section 
always plays an active role as a vanguard for the MCA and continues to attract more 
young Chinese, particularly those who are between 18 to 40-years-old, to join this party. 
He further added that “When we talk about support. It’s not only for young Chinese, but 
we also try to win the support from other races. But of course, the main focus is on young 
Chinese.” However, MCA admits that the party is facing difficulties in getting support 
from young Chinese, particularly in the urban areas, as stated by Political Elite (10), “Most 
of the supporters of MCA are located in the new village. So, we need to cater for them 
differently.” Therefore, this party has introduced well-planned strategies to attract young 
people by empowering young people in leadership, listening and sharing their ideas and 
thoughts, addressing non-race based issues to entice support from the non-Chinese, and 
starting to open the opportunity for young people to hold higher positions in the party. In 
terms of party registration, Political Elite (10) did not deny that MCA has a complicated 
registration system, as he stated, “Yes, I do agree that the application to be a member is 
quite complicated and sometime, if the applicant is far better than the head branch, he will 
be simply rejected because they are afraid that they might not get the chance to reach the 
higher position.” Therefore, they have made a significant change by introducing an online 
membership system that does not need approval from the head office or division support. 
This is another way to woo youth support by making party registration much easier.   
 
                                                          
48 Kam Hing and Ker Pong (2014:29) have outlined several possible reasons why the MCA continues to lose 
its support from the Chinese. First, the Chinese see UMNO as the dominant party in BN because it has many 
seats in parliament and all-important cabinet portfolios are held by UMNO leaders. Second, MCA is 
seriously hampered by party factionalism and internal crisis, particularly after the resignation of MCA’s 
president, Ong Ka Ting in 2008. Finally, many Chinese became disillusioned with MCA for failing to protect 





7.7.3 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 
 
While MCA caters to the interests of the Chinese, the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 
on the other hand is one of the BN component parties representing the interests of the 
Indian community. The MIC was founded in 1946 and considered as the first fully-fledged 
Indian-based political party in Malaysia. Indians have been described as a marginalised 
minority and comprise only slightly over seven percent of the total population, therefore, 
this leaves the MIC with minimal representation in the Cabinet and securing small quotas 
of seats in the Federal and State Assemblies. In 2007, the MIC position as the safeguard of 
the Indian community was firmly undermined when Hindu Rights Action Force 
(HINDRAF), also known as Hindraf Makkal Sakhti (People Power)—a coalition of Indian 
non-governmental organisations to preserve the Hindu community rights, led a massive 
protest against the BN government, mainly the MIC for failing to address and serve the 
interests of Indians.49 The Hindraf rally was clearly a new awakening of resentment of the 
Indians, which had never been seen before, showing their greater awareness and political 
consciousness to struggle for their rights. This also appeared to be a sharp decline of 
Indians’ confidence towards the MIC and its leadership in the 2008 general election.  
 
7.7.4 The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) 
 
The opposition in Malaysia received a great boost after Anwar’s dismissal from the 
government. Although many opposition parties claim they are a multiracial party, their 
ethnic affinities strongly underpin these parties. The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) is 
                                                          
49 Notably, as a small ethnic minority in a polarised society, Indians have been historically marginalised in 
both the socio-economic and political spheres, experiencing less economic progress to climb out from 
poverty, as compared to the Malays and the Chinese. Whilst they were unable to gain access to affirmative 
action policies that benefited the Malays, and influenced the political processes, they were largely politically 
compliant. However, a series of publicised incidents generated more discontentment from the Indian sectors 
of the population towards the government. Despite Moorthy’s burial incident, which led to the formation of 
Hindraf, the grievances of Indians build-up upon the issue of demolition of Hindu temples. For example, 
several Hindu temples were demolished by the government from 2006 to 2007, including the 100 years old 
Sri Maha Mariamman temple in Selangor, as these temples were built illegally. Realising the deepening 
anger of the Indian community, the government made some comforting promises by allocating compensation 
and providing sites for reconstruction of the temples. Nonetheless, these promises were unable to placate an 
outraged Indians, but provoked more furious reactions. Therefore, on November 25, 2007, almost 10,000 to 
30,000 Indians, largely from youth and working-class groups took to Kuala Lumpur’s streets. The protesters 
were clad in orange shirts and carrying the portraits of Mahatma Gandhi, alongside banners with the picture 
of Queen Elizabeth II, symbolic of non-violent protest (Saravanamuttu 2008:46). This rally turned violent as 
the police used tear gas, batons, and water cannons to push back the protesters, causing several injuries and 






a strong UMNO competitor in pursuing the Muslim-Malay vote. PAS, which was 
established in 1951, reiterates that it was really an Islamic party which aimed to form an 
Islamic state and implement Islamic law (Funston, 1976). In term of its membership, 
currently there are more than one million people registered as PAS members, as stated by 
Political Elite (5), “As I can remember, young people are among the highest registered 
members in PAS. This is because the minimum age to become a member is not 21 years 
old, but 15 years where they have reached the puberty.” Although PAS is exclusively for 
Malays, they have their own non-Muslim wing called the PAS supporters’ Congress which 
aimed to woo the non-Malay voters, particularly after its exit from the Pakatan Alliance in 
2015. PAS lost most of its non-Malay support when it left the now defunct Pakatan Rakyat 
coalition.50 PAS also experienced its biggest split when the so-called ‘progressive’ faction 
left the party and formed a new political party, known as the National Trust Party 
(Amanah), after being overwhelmingly defeated by the ‘conservatives’ in the party 
election. Despite the disunity within PAS and the break-up with the Pakatan coalition, this 
party remains strong and continues its strategy to win back young people’s trust by 
introducing dual approaches. First, PAS has setup more than 20 bureaus under its youth 
wing to organise various ‘youth’ programmes, whether in the context of politics, economy 
and social affairs that are largely inspired or derived from Islam, as stated by Political Elite 
(5), “We have to extend the meaning of Islam. Not only focusing on mosques, or even 
Islamic talks. We need to establish more programs, whether sports, art and culture to 
attract the youths towards religion.” For example, under the PAS Youth’s Bureau for Art, 
Culture, and Sport, they have setup a club called ‘Alternative Riding Club’ (ARC) for 
those young people who are interested in motorbiking. Through these activities, PAS can 
directly connect, socialise, and interact with young people. Primarily, the internet—such as 
social media, personal blogs, and an official homepage—is the key channel of mobilisation 
and mass communication for PAS. In this regard, PAS intended to bring a message that 
PAS Islamic style is not in contradiction of youth trends, so that moderate young people 
                                                          
50The disarray of the opposition pact or ‘the Pakatan Rakyat’ (PR), which was formed after the 2008 general 
election was due to several factors. First, the disagreement between PAS and PKR over the appointment of a 
new chief minister in Selangor, after Khalid Ibrahim was sacked from the party in 2014. Second, there had 
long been the ideological differences between Islamist PAS and Chinese chauvinism DAP, particularly on 
the implementation of Islamic law in Malaysia (Mohamed Nawab et al., 2015:2). Failure to resolve these 
internal issues, led to disunity in Pakatan Rakyat. On September 22, the new coalition ‘the Alliance of Hope’ 
(Pakatan Harapan, PH) was formed, consisting of DAP, PKR and the newly formed Amanah party. The 
formation of PH coalition amid the leadership crisis of Najib, leave the people, mainly the youth with no 






could subsequently be attracted to PAS, as pointed out by Political Elite (5), “By doing so, 
youth will get to know more about PAS and they can see PAS as a youth friendly party.” 
Whilst PAS does not have a specific quota or special position for the young leaders, they 
strongly encourage potential young leaders who are qualified to fill the post in the party 
central committee.  
 
7.7.5 The Democratic Action Party (DAP) 
     
The Democratic Action Party (DAP) is a socialist and multi-ethnic party, but 
predominantly vents Chinese grievances (Case, 2001:45). It was officially formed in 1966 
when the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Malaysia was deregistered after Singapore was 
separated from Malaysia. Therefore, they maintained the PAP’s idea of Malaysian 
Malaysia to defend the interest of non-Malays, by calling for elimination of the Malays’ 
privileges and the official national status of English, Chinese and Tamil languages. For the 
DAP, the entire structure of the Malay special rights did not benefit the Malay peasants or 
urban poor, but only created a greedy Malay capitalist class (Means, 1976:394). Although 
DAP is always seen as anti-Malay and racist, since 2008 the membership of DAP has 
increased significantly, particularly amongst Malays, as commented by Political Elite (7), 
“I would say that probably after 2008, we would have seen the members who join I would 
guess about 40% of them are being considered as Malays under the age of 35-years-old.” 
Why are more young Malays attracted to DAP? There are several underlying strategies 
implemented by DAP to reach the young Malays, as highlighted by Political Elite (7). For 
many young Malays, they are attracted to the programs and agenda brought forward by 
DAP which are seen as more inclusive and progressive to all citizens regardless of races. 
To draw more Malays to DAP and overcome the anti-Malay perception, DAP has 
established its training camp, known as Democracy School (SekDem) that is largely for 
young Malays to understand and speak about democracy. This can be seen in the response 
of Political Elite (7), “We are trying to expose the young people, especially Malays to what 
democracy is all about and we also asked the DAP leaders to talk to these young people 
and quite a number of them join the party as a result.” Second, DAP is a possible avenue 
for young people to flourish as political figures since this party brings more Malay 
candidates standing on DAP tickets to the election. For example, DAP has fielded a young 
Malay and political newbie’s candidature, Dyana Sofia, to compete in the Teluk Intan by-





more practically suit the interest of young people like party internships, volunteering 
activities, political seminars, and utilising popular culture (music, art, and literature) as 
part of its strategy to reach the younger generation.  
 
7.7.6 The People’s Justice Party (PKR) 
 
Initially, PKR was founded from the establishment of ‘Movement for Social Justice’ 
(Adil), led by Anwar Ibrahim’s wife, Wan Azizah, and Chandra Muzafar in an effort to 
formalise the Reformasi into a more concrete organisational structure. However, on 4th 
April 1999, this movement was transformed into a strong multiracial political party known 
the ‘National Justice Party’ or (KeADILan), and on 2003, it merged with the Malaysian 
People’s Party to form the ‘People’s Justice Party (PKR)’. The formation of PKR opened 
the possibility of building a broad opposition political alliance in Malaysia (Hilley, 2001). 
When it was first established, PKR attracted more than 200,000 members, mostly young 
people (Weiss, 2006:152). This party seemed a viable alternative for young, urban-based 
Malays and Chinese (Hwang, 2003:356). It was able to capture the hearts of some young 
people since it was born from the Reformasi; it is not a race-based political party and 
strongly addresses issues related to the interests of the youth, such as good governance, 
social justice, and human rights. Therefore, PKR can be considered a youth-oriented party. 
According to Political Elite (6), “Currently PKR has nearly half a million members, with 
roughly around 30 percent of young people who are under the age of 35-years-old.” For 
PKR, it is relatively easy to invite young people to join the party’s programs and activities 
as many are attracted to Anwar’s personal charisma and what he and the party stands for. 
However, it is quite challenging to increase the number of membership amongst young 
people, as stated by Political Elite (1), “Not many really want to be a card-carrying 
member, though many are very supportive of us.” This opinion is also extended similarly 
by Political Elite (6) in his comment, “Yes, it is not easy because sometimes, they follow 
their own moods. At first, they are very enthusiastic about it, but later they are not 
interested.” To overcome this major challenge, PKR has initiated an ongoing ‘youth-to-
youth’ strategy that uses different approaches for different target groups, as highlighted by 
Political Elite (6). First, PKR tries to maximise the use of online activities for the purposes 
of advocacy, establishing networks and supporting the youth. Second, through the 
establishment of its official student wing, known as ‘Mahasiswa Keadilan Malaysia’ 





training and have face-to-face meetings with young people involving senior leaders of the 
party. Furthermore, PKR gives priority to the youth being at the forefront of the party by 
promoting young leaders as election candidates. In particular, PKR launched its ‘School of 
Politics’ in 2010, specifically to develop the leadership skills of young people. Through 
these training programmes, the most promising participants can be fast-tracked into the 
party’s leadership positions.  
 
 As we can see, the main political parties in Malaysia have made efforts to develop 
strategic plans to attract youth support by implementing ‘youth-friendly’ policies and 
programmes. However, a majority of the political elite members (8 out of 10), whether 
from the ruling party or the opposition, acknowledged that while they have done a lot to 
reach young people, it is still not enough to engage meaningfully with young people. In 
other words, there is still room for improvement in the relationship between political 
parties and young people. The ruling party believes that social media needs to be 
completely utilised as a tool to communicate and get close to young people, as mentioned 
by Political Elite (2), “Maybe we are still lacking and have weaknesses that need to be 
fixed, mainly the use of social media. However, the efforts that we have made contributed 
a lot so far.” On the other hand, although they believe they have reached out to many 
young people through social media, one of the weakest points of the opposition is they are 
less engaged with young people in suburban areas, largely in Sabah and Sarawak. This can 
be seen in the response of Political Elite (7), “I think that one thing lacking is to reach out 
to young Malays in suburban areas. I think that can be improved significantly.”  
 
 Another factor that may widen the gap between political party and people is the 
increasing ‘professionalization’ of the parties, as commented by Political Elite (5), 
“Meaning, we have many specialists from different types of field, and those specialists are 
among the youth themselves. We have Associate Professors, economic specialists, and 
doctors who are brave enough to take the responsibilities to lead the party.” Obviously, 
the party today relies on a group of professionals or members with specialised skills to 
support the leadership and for the party to function.51 The rise of professionalization does 
not only appear amongst party members, but also can be seen in political campaigns and 
                                                          
51 ‘Professionalization’ as defined by Webb and Kolodny (2006:338) is, “by which professionals become 





communication. Therefore, there is ‘no room for amateurs’ (Johnson, 2001) in party 
activities anymore.  
 
7.8 Motivations to become a party member  
 
In Malaysia, according to Farish (2016), political parties often work as a patronage-
granting mechanism that provides not only political goals, but also social capital, prestige 
and means for obtaining power and resources. However, there is still a dearth of studies 
that explore the individual characteristics and motivations of party members. Therefore, 
this section aims to probe the significant motivations behind their participation in political 
parties by using the general incentives model. Most of these politicians are youth leaders 
but some are no longer characterised as ‘youth’. Taking into consideration that they have 
been active members of the party from a young age, it is important to account for their 
motivations in participating in a political party. Based on the responses, 5 out of 10 
political elites mostly expressed a process-type incentive, which means ideological 
incentives are their motivation for joining a political party. To be specific, some (2 out of 
10) argue that a strong ideological basis, mainly religion, drove them to join a political 
party, as commented by Political Elite (5), “Number one is religion, and religion has 
become a priority in my life. Later, the support I received from my family. I lived in an 
environment where they put religion and politics first.” In this regard, even the respondent 
has a strong family connection to party activism, but ideology turns out to be an important 
factor in motivating him to join the party. In addition, several politicians (2 out of 10) 
claim that they choose to join the party because they wanted to change or provide a better 
system for the country, which is strongly related to collective incentives. In this sense, the 
respondents take into consideration a calculus of costs and benefits not only at the level of 
the individual, but also at the party level because they have a strong believe that their party 
collectively can make a difference to outcomes. This can be reflected in the comment by 
Political Elite (10), “I felt disappointed and I think we need to change the system to be 
equal for all races. That’s why I choose to join the political party.” Although agreeing 
with the sentiment, Political Elite (1) significantly emphasised, “I realise that in this 
country, if you really want to affect change, you have no choice but to join politics.” 
Notably, civil society in semi-democratic setting like Malaysia is weaker, less powerful 
and developed since it has systematically limited by the state. Therefore, to influence the 





instead of being activists in NGOs. Political parties, particularly the youth wings, appear to 
be an important platform for recruiting future politicians or to start a political career. The 
remaining respondent (1 out of 10) concerns ‘selective outcome incentives’—joining a 
party in order to build up a political career acted as the strongest motivator for him. This 
supports findings from Recchi (1999), Hooghe et al., (2004) and Young and Cross (2002) 
that being a young member of a political parties is a significant factor in becoming a 
politician.  
 
 On the other hand, some (5 out of 10) political elites stressed social norm motives 
like family tradition or influence from friends as the main reason for party membership. In 
particular, 2 out of 10 respondents do not deny that they are greatly influenced by their 
family’s political background, as stated by Political Elite (6), “My father is a government 
officer, but he was aware about politics. Since I was little, I did talk with him about 
politics and I have two uncles from my father’s side who have competed for KeADILan.” 
The early political exposure received from the family has facilitated them to be an active 
member of a political party because having a family member in a party grants them access 
to political networks and knowledge about the party. This is reflected in the findings from 
Cross and Young (2008) in their study on Canadian young party members, and Recchi 
(1999) in Italy. Apart from the influence of family, some agreed (2 out of 10) that having 
friends connected to a political party to some extent inspired them to be involved in 
partisan politics, as mentioned by Political Elite (7), “I was asked to help DAP through my 
friend, Tony Pua. I was there for two years and then I joined the party in 2012.”  
 
7.9 Youth and democracy in Malaysia  
 
The meaningful participation of young people in politics is a necessity to strengthen 
democratic processes in a country. When we asked the political elites about youth and 
democracy, overall 6 out of 10 of them have an optimistic view that the involvement of 
young people in political processes could push this country into a much more democratic 
system, as explained by Political Elite (10), “The more young people participate in politics 
not only in political parties, but various kinds of activities, the more democratic this nation 
will be.” Political Elite (7) also reacted positively by commenting that, “I think the youth 
is less tied down by old ideas and old concepts and more willing to vote based on the 





on race or religion.” It could be seen that Malaysia is now entering the ‘new politics’ 
paradigm, where young people are more likely to embrace change compared to older 
generations, in favour of non-communal version of politics and at the forefront of a mass 
politics of dissent. They are, in fact, the politically aware generation that has been shaped 
by social media networking. Therefore, they prioritise issues about the economy and good 
governance more than communal issues (Pandian, 2014b). However, when we asked them 
further in the interviews whether ethnicity is still an important issue amongst young 
people, half of the respondents (4 out of 8) believe that race-based politics is still relevant 
and that young Malaysians are still racially inclined. This can be reflected in the comment 
of Political Elite (6), “Ethnic sentiment still exists because of propaganda and it is 
institutionalised in the educational system.” Since ethnicity has long been deeply 
embedded into the system and society, thus Political Elite (3) claimed that, “Racism 
cannot be removed”, but Political Elite (2) suggested that the best way to overcome this is 
“to defend their own races’ rights, at the same time protect other races’ rights as well.” 
This reflects findings from the previous chapter (See Chapter 6) that communal or ethnic 
politics remains a forceful factor in Malaysian politics.  
 
  In addition, 3 out of 10 political elite members pointed out that youth political 
engagement does not necessarily lead to greater democracy if certain conditions or ‘rules 
of thumb’ have not been fulfilled. First, young people will have an opportunity to help 
strengthen the democratisation process if they embrace the idea of ‘new politics’. 
According to Political Elite (1), “The idea of ‘new politics’ comprises of four major 
components: integrity, new governance framework, innovations in democracy and 
progressive political thoughts.” If the government and people could adhere to these four 
principles, only then would democracy be achieved. Second, democracy can be guaranteed 
if young people’s politics are supported with the right inputs and guidance, as commented 
by Political Elite (8), “For me, in today’s borderless world, young people can easily 
access information and data. Thus, we need to guide young people so that they can think 
more critically and be mature.” Therefore, politicians themselves need to rationalise an 
issue with factual data and logical content, as well as demonstrating a good quality of 
leadership to gain the trust of young people. Political Elite (4) believed that Malaysian 
democracy depends on its leaders. So, to reinforce the democratic process in this country, 
the current leaders must be the ‘role-models’ as they shape the characters of future leaders. 





strengthened the democratisation process in Malaysia because young people themselves do 
not understand the real meaning of democracy. This can be reflected in the comment by 
Political Elite (3), “When the government limits the freedom of citizens to speak, it does 
not mean that we are not practicing democracy. We must know that the democratic 
practices in Malaysia are different from other countries.” It is worth noting that, 
historically, the phase of Emergency, which lasted 12 years from 1948 to 1960, had a 
major impact on the Malaya political structure as it created a crux of authoritarian rule in 
the country. The British had to introduce draconian laws such as the Emergency 
Regulations of 1948, the Internal Security Act of 1960, and the Sedition Act of 1948, to 
deal with communists and some of these laws have continued to be used in Malaysia. The 
amendments of these laws allow the government to cut back the fundamental rights of the 
people whenever there is a threat to national security (Kheng, 2009:136). This resulted in 
the restriction of political freedoms to safeguard the national security and political 
stability—freedom of speech, freedom of publications and freedom of movement in 
Malaysia. Therefore, the Malaysian people have never had an actual experience of 
democracy, instead they have had to adapt to the nature of authoritarian rule. 
 
7.10 The future of youth political participation in Malaysia  
 
The findings from qualitative interviews with academics show that they are optimistic 
about the future of youth political participation in Malaysia. Similarly, when we asked 
political elites about the future support of young people, they confidently believed that 
political parties in Malaysia remain relevant to young people and continue to receive 
strong support from young people. An example of this point of view is given by Political 
Elite (9), “I am very optimistic. If UMNO maintains their strategy and continues existing 
programs with efficiency, I assure UMNO is able to gain more support from the youth.” In 
a similar vein, Political Elite (6) also pointed out, “We can see more youths have attracted 
to ideologies of ‘Pro Kebebasan’, ‘Pro Keadilan’ that we have implemented, which has 
put aside racism. I am sure that we have a bright future ahead of us.” However, many 
political analysts argue that Malaysians, mainly the younger generation will be greatly 
affected and has no other alternative as both PR and BN suffer internal strife. BN and 
Najib’s premiership have recently faced a leadership crisis and biggest corruption scandal. 
While at the same time, the demise of PR and the formation of new Pakatan 2.0, left 





coalition will stay united to govern Malaysia (Mustafa, 2015). In this regard, all political 
stakeholders must be geared up towards collaborating with young people and providing 
opportunities for more meaningful participation of young people in a deliberative process. 
Therefore, effective approaches need to be implemented to encourage more young people 
to be active in politics, as discussed below: 
 
1) Engage effectively with young people 
 
The majority of political elites (8 out of 10) suggested that elected representatives must get 
in closer touch with young people by giving them a more active role in the decision-
making process and more youth empowerment programmes. All politicians are in 
agreement that young people today are wise, very open-minded and very demanding, so it 
is better to encourage young people to participate through the concept of ‘touching young 
people’s hearts’, rather than ‘touch-and-go’ policies, as noted by Political Elite (4), “Even 
if we do something little (not necessarily in the form of money, but sometimes in the form 
of ‘in-kind’ goods such as development, infrastructure and so on), but it must be constant 
and long lasting.” In particular, patronising young people or bidding for their votes during 
elections by giving them material incentives is not the right way to boost their engagement. 
 
2) Youth political leadership 
 
Even though some political elites argue that the strength of a political party does not 
depend on the numbers of its members, they still believe that it is important that a political 
party can recruit young people to be the ‘future leaders’. Therefore, many political elites (6 
out of 10) suggested that the existing leaders and political parties must develop a pathway 
for future leaders and offer more opportunities for them to stand out. This can be seen in 
the response from Political Elite (3), “It is not wrong to recycle the leaders because we 
need the senior leadership to give advice and help us as they have a lot of experience. 
However, we must have the next generation of leadership by giving more opportunities to 
young people.” Although the government has provided ‘healthy’ platforms for young 





youth parliament52 and fellowships53, they also continue to use harsh penalties and further 
restrictions on political freedom. As a result, the younger generation might become an 
apathetic onlooker since they are less likely to engage in elite-directed activism and no 
more likely to participate in elite-challenging activism than their older counterparts.  
 
3) Improving the system 
 
Four out of 10 politicians emphasised that the state must make constant efforts to improve 
the effectiveness of politics, the economy and society. Several politicians (2 out of 10) 
suggested that the government should lower the voting age from 21 to 18, as depicted by 
Political Elite (7), “And I think at the age of 18, many people go to university or college. 
That is the time when they can start their maturing process which also may involve 
registering as voters and voting.” In other words, young people at the age of 18 are mature 
enough to be involved in the political system and are well-informed about the issues that 
affect their lives. However, some rejected this idea by saying that, “In Malaysia, only a 
few young people are like that, but generally, I can say that they are not yet ready.” To 
counter this, Political Elite (5) suggested that, “We have to educate the youth, so they will 
participate in politics maturely.” This means that young people must be exposed to 
political knowledge at an earlier age by providing them with both formal and informal 
political education.  
 
 
                                                          
52The Malaysian youth parliament was established on 2013 with the objective to provide a proper channel for 
young people to voice their opinions and demands to the government. This program is open to all young 
people whether they are affiliated with youth organisations or non-organisations, as long as they are 
Malaysian citizens aged 15 to 40 years old and they can be registered as voters, while young people aged 18-
30 can be nominated as the candidate for youth parliaments. The concept of this program is like the real 
parliament, where there is an election to elect the representatives. All the elected representatives have to 
undergo the orientation session and a pre-sitting session before they are divided into nine committees. Each 
committee will be focusing on different issues such as economy, religion, and sport. Unlike the parliament 
sitting, there will be no government and opposition, but the representatives will be sitting according to their 
respective committee. Each Member of Parliament will be serving for a term, which is two years only 
(Interview with Dr Zainah Sharif, Secretariat for the Youth Parliament). 
 
53Perdana Fellows is a programme spearheaded by the Ministry of Youth and Sports to provide talented 
young Malaysians the once in a lifetime opportunity to work at the highest level of the federal government, 
assisting the Cabinet ministers in substantiating the national agenda. The concept is similar like a mentoring 
programme where the fellow will be exposed to policy work under the direct supervisions of the Cabinet 
ministers for a period of six weeks to three months 
(http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/05/23/perdana-fellows-intern-ministers/. Retrieved on 







In conclusion, political elite members make subjective claims that young people in general 
are less likely to be engaged in conventional or ‘elite-directed’ political participation, 
including voting in elections and being a member of a political party. The large-scale exit 
of young people from this repertoire is mainly understood as emerging from the views that 
the young generations possess different political attitudes from their older counterparts, 
and being disillusioned with the democratic process in Malaysia. In this regard, most 
political elites relate the decline of conventional politics with the rise of youth engagement 
in ‘elite-challenging’ or unconventional political activities, particularly in online activism 
and protest activities. Feelings of discontent with the system, political exposure from the 
social media, and other contributing factors such as political networking, and the good 
personality or cool image of some prominent politicians and activists who get involved in 
social movements may explain why some young people are seen to be more likely to 
participate in the ‘elite-challenging’ politics. In addition, these political elites who opt to 
be an active member of a political party are largely motivated by selective process 
incentives (ideologically motivated), collective incentives (to provide a better system for 
this country) and social norm motives (family and friend connections and political 
education). Although many political parties in Malaysia have maximised their effort and 
develop strategic plans to woo youth support, they are still at a distance from young people 
because they do not fully engage in meaningful connections with them. In the next 
chapters, we will scrutinise the contrasting views of both active and inactive young people 










BEING A YOUNG ACTIVIST IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA: IN THEIR 





Based on quantitative analyses from two well-known surveys (the WVS and Asian 
Barometer), this thesis showed that young Malaysians are disengaged from ‘elite-directed’ 
activism relative to their older counterparts, but no significant differences between young 
and old people were found for elite-challenging political participation. However, when we 
scrutinised the views of academics and political elites on how youth in Malaysia get 
involved in politics and the divergent patterns of youth political participation in this 
country, they argued that young Malaysians appear to have become less participative in 
conventional political participation, but have shown increasing interest in ‘elite-
challenging’ or unconventional political activities, particularly in online activism and 
protest activities. In this regard, ‘elite-challenging’ forms of participation are seen to be 
potentially replacing voting and party membership as new ways for influencing political 
decision-making amongst young people who feel unrepresented and disenchanted with 
traditional agents. Yet, this is debatable, as argued by Henn et al. (2005): there is no clear-
cut evidence whether a possible trade-off between young people’s engagement in ‘elite-
directed’ or ‘elite-challenging’ repertoires has emerged. Rather it is more likely that there 
is a large gap between politically active and inactive young people because only a fraction 
of young people is involved actively in these kinds of political action, while the rest 
remains disengaged and tend to be ‘apathetic’ (Sloam, 2007).  
 
To make things clearer, this chapter aims to shed light on why some young people 
are politically active and politically inactive and what drives their behaviours by 
comparing the motivations for (dis-)engagement between a group of youth activists and 





activists who were actively involved in social movements, protests and civil society in 
Malaysia. This includes how and why they got involved in politics, their interpretation of 
politics, as well as their general views on youth political participation in Malaysia.  
 
8.2 Who are they?  
 
We started the interview by asking participants about their own background and how they 
first got interested and involved in politics. Generally, most of the youth activists who 
were interviewed were in their early twenties and thirties, with 26 or 27 being the common 
age. Most activists were highly educated—they have graduated from Malaysia’s most 
respected local universities, and a few were still at the university. Most among them had 
read for degrees in the social sciences including politics, economics and law. Given their 
education background, it is perhaps not surprising that most possessed a basic knowledge 
of politics or at least were aware of the contemporary political landscape. As expected, the 
majority of youth activists described themselves as middle-class. Several respondents 
noted that their parents were working in the government and the private sector, where they 
earned just enough money to live comfortably. For example, Youth Activist (6) said “I am 
from a middle-class family where you live within what you have.” This finding conforms 
with the social movement literature (Barnes et al., 1979; Offe, 1985) that many new social 
movements and protest activism are formed by middle-class activists.  
 
 As political activists, the participants were more drawn to politics. When asked 
about their own political leanings, none of them said they stood for a strong ideological 
position, be it left or right on the spectrum whilst most of them were actively participating 
in protests and social movements.  Rather, they placed themselves on the moderate level or 
centre-left politics, promoting the ideas of social justice or equality.  This is reflected in the 
comments of Youth Activist (2), “No one cares about political ideology in Malaysia, but 
for me, I would put myself along the line of progressive ideology.” Out of the ten youths 
interviewed, only three actively joined political parties, mainly the opposition, as 
members. Since these activists were active members of the opposition parties and they 
were somewhat more likely to place themselves as pro-opposition and anti-government. 
This needs to be borne in mind when analysing the results. Although the rest of the 
activists remained independent or participated actively in NGOs, they mentioned they 





parties. Activists in political parties agreed that the main reason why they chose this path 
was because they have more chance to make a change, although this is the most unpopular 
decision amongst the youth, as stated by Youth Activist (7), “I think if we do not enter the 
political arena and don’t try to make a change, who else will?” Youth Activist (9) also 
responded positively by saying, “The political party needs the ‘expert’ and fresh ideas 
from young people. So, I saw there was a space for me to help them and to make some 
changes.” However, those outside a party felt that changes can be achieved with or 
without the parties, as long as we participate in civil society. In this case, some activists (3 
out of 7) argued that it is in the nature of political parties to be in a power struggle, so we 
need a ‘third party’ to monitor them, as commented by Youth Activist (4), “I am not 
saying that political parties are not doing good work, but they should have a check and 
balance.” Indeed, in the case of Malaysia, some NGOs are quite vocal and, to some extent, 
influential in their advocacy of democracy and human rights, but they do not have a strong 
mass support base (Saliha, 2002). Therefore, civil society needs more participation from 
people to effectively play its role as ‘watchdog’ of the government. In addition, party rules 
and regulations, as well as the attitude of politicians who sometimes force people to do 
something against their will is another factor that makes some activists chose to engage 
with NGOs, as depicted by Youth Activist (10), “It is really hard because there are many 
limitations inside the party and you have to work for the party and follow their 
directions.” This supports views from the academics that the way parties function might 
be the main barrier for young people becoming members.  
 
 The classical approaches to political socialisation often sought to find out how 
early childhood development shaped the political attitudes and outlooks of the individual 
(Flanagan and Sherrod, 1998). Influences from the most important agents of political 
socialisation such as family, peers, educational institutions, and the media in the earlier life 
of individuals are considered to have greater impact on their political activism in later 
years. Of the ten youths interviewed, half came from a very political family who was 
actively involved in political activities. In particular, the family has been the most 
influential agent of political socialisation and transmitter of political values amongst 
activists from a very early age, conforming to the argument of Jennings et al. (2009) and 
Jennings (2007). In addition, 4 out of 5 respondents also mentioned that their family 
support the opposition. This is reflected in the comments of Youth Activist (7), “Since a 





to PAS talks and activities. So, I knew about current issues and what was happening 
around me.” Young people whose family frequently engaged in political actions and 
encouraged the expression of strong opinions, even those challenging the status quo, are 
more likely to be politically active citizens. Therefore, we can expect that most youth 
activists who came from a pro-opposition family, typically, have developed an anti-
establishment attitude and tend to be critical of the government. In other words, young 
people’s political beliefs are greatly affected by the values and attitudes learnt from their 
families. Other activists (2 out 10) argued that politics was a common topic of 
conversation, even if their families were not activists, as stated by Youth Activist (10), 
“My family is not involved in any sort of political activities, but we always discuss current 
politics at home.” In this regard, being heard or valued at home contributes to a strong 
sense of political efficacy and the feeling that their ideas are worthy, which is really 
important to activism (Torres, 2006). Therefore, the findings support the arguments of 
Hyman (1959) and Sigel (1970) that family is always acknowledged as the primary agent 
of political socialisation.  
 
 In some cases, instead of family, youth activists themselves may act as socialising 
agents for their family, as stated by Youth Activist (8), “At first, my family prevented me 
from being active in politics, but after I explained to them the reason why I did this, they 
can understand it. And now, they consistently follow updates on political development and 
give full support to me.” Those young people who partake in activist causes are more 
likely to be informed and thoughtful citizens as they closely follow political updates and 
experience issues faced by the community. Therefore, they may disseminate information 
not only to their family, but also to the public and encourage them to participate in politics. 
This clearly empowers the youth to be ‘information leaders’ (McDevitt and Butler, 2011).  
 
 For the remaining participants, they believed that their political attitudes and ideas 
were shaped by educational institutions, mainly university. Educational institutions 
provide training grounds to stimulate young people’s political skills and learning through 
the formal classroom, extra-curricular activities, and student bodies. This is important for 
young people because the political education they received in university stimulates them to 
think critically about politics and social realities, as mentioned by Youth Activist (9), “The 
university environment has opened our eyes to clearly see reality. That is why we feel that 





policies in this country.” Therefore, the phenomenon of growing political activism 
amongst young people in Malaysia has been associated with student activism as they are at 
the forefront of movements fighting for political rights and freedom.  
 
8.3 A brief history of student activism in Malaysia  
 
It is worth noting that the history of the student movement in Malaysia can be traced back 
to the pre-independence era, mainly when there were many higher educational institutions 
established in Malaya like the Malay College Kuala Kangsar and the Sultan Idris Training 
College. In 1938, a group of teacher trainees, namely Ibrahim Yaakob, Ishak Hj, 
Muhammad and Mustapha Hussein, from Sultan Idris Training College, formed the first 
political association known as the Kesatuan Kaum Muda (Young Malay Movement or 
KMM).54 KMM was seen as a Malay nationalist movement and having leftist politics 
rather than a mass political movement as it only represented the political crisis between the 
Malays and the British. By the time University Malaya was first established in 1949 (in 
Singapore), many political clubs were developed by students, which tended to be “non-
communal, nonsectarian, autonomous, lawful, limited to undergraduates and essentially 
academic in nature” (Weiss, 2011:44-45). But their premises contained an anti-colonialist 
idealism and desired the attainment of self-government. Amongst the earliest club to form 
was the University Socialist Club (USC), created in 1952. The Socialist Club aimed to be 
ideologically moderate, but still there were some members who actively promoted 
socialism and Marxist revolutionary ideas, while others focused more on local issues and 
social justice through their well-known monthly journal, Fajar. In 1954, Fajar produced a 
provocative editorial edition entitled ‘Aggression in Asia’ which condemned Western 
imperialism and degraded Malaya as a ‘police’ state. All eight Fajar editorial board 
members, including James Puthucheary, Poh Soo Kai and M. K. Rajakumar, were arrested 
and charged under the Sedition Act (Kah Seng Loh et al., 2012:61). As the members of the 
socialist club graduated, most of them joined the trade unions, political parties and the 
peasant movement. The development of political clubs and the student movement 
                                                          
54Inspired intensely by the Indonesian nationalist movements, KMM aimed to enhance greater political 
awareness for Malay youth to overthrow colonial power through a political amalgamation of the Malays in 
Malaya and Indonesia, under the notion of ‘Melayu Raya’ (Greater Malay Nation-state). KMM envisaged 
upholding the Malay supremacy and reviving the legacy of the Malay kingdoms like Majapahit, Srivijaya 
and Malacca into a larger entity, known as the republic of Indonesia (Ramlah Adam, 2004:90). However, this 






continued when the University of Malaya moved to its Kuala Lumpur campus in January 
1962. However, their struggle was no longer on nationalism and anti-colonialist grounds. 
Instead students focused more on campus issues, especially on student welfare matters. 
The formation of Speaker’s Corner in 1966 had boosted students’ enthusiasm to raise their 
concerns, demonstrate and assemble on various issues which caught the university’s and 
other students’ attention.  
  
 The period from 1967 to 1974 marked the climax of student activism, the ‘heydays 
of protest’ (Weiss, 2011) or ‘the golden age of the student movement’ in Malaysia (Abu 
Bakar, 1973). Various student bodies were established, including the University of Malaya 
Islamic Students Society (PMIUM) and Malay Language Society (PBMUM), and the most 
influential of these was University of Malaya Student Union (UMSU) as all student bodies 
were linked to it, except for the Socialist Club. Their shared focus went beyond the issue 
of students, but covered issues in national politics, policy, and any problems of the 
community. There emerged many well-known student leaders such as Anwar Ibrahim, 
Syed Hamid Ali, Syed Naquib al-Attas and Hishamuddin Rais, who were at the forefront 
of the student demonstrations. In 1967, there was a huge protest against the Selangor 
government for attempting to destroy a squatter community in Teluk Gong. Since many 
students themselves came from poor families, they denounced the crackdown by the 
government on the peasants of Teluk Gong. In support of the unfortunate peasants, 
UMSU, PBMUM and some lecturers demonstrated at the Speaker’s Corner and conducted 
a sit-in outside the Selangor chief minister’s office (Weiss, 2011:155). In order to make 
sure that students’ views were heard and people had more power in the decision-making 
process, the UMSU launched a students’ manifesto in the 1969 national general election. 
They championed the idea of democracy—demanded greater involvement in the decision-
making process and that national politics should be based on democracy which guaranteed 
more freedom and justice (Karim and Hamid, 1984:4). UMSU also held a series of public 
rallies throughout the country before the election, persuading the people to vote based on 
the issue and against the racial politics. In the aftermath of May 13th, ‘anti-Tunku’ rallies 
erupted at the University of Malaya and Mara Institute of Technology on July 1969. The 
students, led by Anwar Ibrahim and Syed Hamid Ali, denounced Tunku over the 13th May 
riot and demanded Tunku resign from the government. It was the first time that police had 
invaded the UM campus to disrupt the protest against the Prime Minister. Their efforts 





 After 1969, the implementation of the state-led preferential policy, the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) and the increased of the number of several other local universities 
like the National University of Malaysia (UKM), the University of Science Malaysia 
(USM) and the University of Technology Malaysia (UTM), increased the proportion of 
Malay students in the universities—most of them were from rural and less privileged 
backgrounds—and continued struggles for Malay rights and social justice through a series 
of protests in the early 1970s. Whilst these struggles were situated within a communal 
framework, they received wide support from the students, including non-Malays, as it gave 
precedence to economic concerns. Student movements acted as non-partisan pressure 
groups to criticise the government’s policies (Karim and Hamid, 1984). To curb the 
growth of the student movement, the government enacted the Universities and University 
Colleges Act 1971 (UUCA), and later was amended in 1975, prior to the mass arrest of 
students in the 1974 Tasik Utara and Baling incidents. The 1975 amendment of the UUCA 
1971 has silenced the students from being critical and vocal to being passive in activism.  
 
Whilst student activism was weakened, the later period of the1970s was notable for 
the rise of Islam among the Malay youth, which was manifested in the emergence of 
Muslim revivalist groups who challenged the existing political power structure.55 The most 
prominent dakwah group in Malaysia, who was considered a political threat to the 
government, was Angkatan Belia Islam or ABIM (Islamic Youth Movement). ABIM, 
which was established by a group of young Muslim intellectuals in 1971, served as a 
religious pressure group and had been very critical about government policies which were 
deemed as unfair, inhumane, and contrary to Islamic teachings. They received support 
from among the highly educated, professionals and then urban-middle class Malays who 
were more devout in Islamic practices. Although it was a non-partisan organisation, many 
of its leaders crossed over to politics, particularly PAS as its ideology is similar to this 
party.  
                                                          
55There were various causes that contributed to the growing of Islamisation in Malaysia. First, the rise of 
Islamic consciousness among Malay youth was influenced by the rise of a global Islamic resurgence, 
particularly in the Middle East (Ahmad F. Yousif, 2004). Second, the driving force behind the Islamic 
resurgence was a prevalent feeling of failure and loss of identity, political system and economies of the 
Muslim societies (Esposito, 2002:83). Islamic resurgence in Malaysia was also seen as a strategy of the 
Malays to preserve and strengthen their ethnic identity vis-à-vis the non-Malay population (Chandra 
Muzaffar, 1987). The Muslim revivalist groups or so-called dakwah groups actively developed Islamic 
consciousness within the Muslim community, but some groups were regarded by the government as deviant 
and posed potential threats to the religion. Among the visible impacts of the dakwah movement were the 
increased popularity of Islamic attire, greater piety in the perseverance of Halal foods, the practice of Hajj, 





However, during the 1998 Reformasi era, though students were curbed from being 
involved in the political arena, the dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim, who was perceived as an 
‘idol’ for student activists, contributed to the revival of student activism. At that time, 
Anwar rallied a large number of the masses, particularly the students, in a Reformasi 
movement. This movement echoed Indonesia’s anti-Suharto movement called to eliminate 
the practice of kolusi, korupsi and nepotisme (collusion, corruption, and nepotism) (Khoo 
Boo Teik, 2003). In fact, there were many student movements which cut across ethnic 
lines, such as, Students’ Voice (Suara Mahasiswa), Campus-Based Free Anwar Movement 
(Gerakan Bebas Anwar), and Malaysia Youth and Students Democratic Movement 
(DEMA), which were formed to support Anwar. In spite of the waning Reformasi 
movement, student activism continued energetically to advocate democracy and human 
rights. For example, June 2001 saw a large-scale student protest—around 400 students 
gathered at the National Mosque—demonstrating against the ISA (Weiss, 2011). In this 
protest, seven students were detained and suspended from their universities. In the same 
year, many more students were arrested for protesting against police brutality and 
restrictions on student activism. Through the establishment of ‘Abolish AUKU movement’ 
(GMA), the students kept pressing the government to abolish the UUCA, and only in 2012 
did the government decide to slightly amend Section 15 to allow students to join political 
organisations, including political parties outside campus. However, this amendment did 
not appease students since they still have limited autonomous power and academic 
freedom (Suhaimi, 2013). Meanwhile, student movements remain at the forefront or are 
strong supporters of massive rallies such as the Bersih movement, the People’s Uprising 
Rally (Himpunan Kebangkitan Rakyat), the ‘Arrest Najib’, and the ‘Dataran Occupy”. As 
student movements have undeniably played a significant role in many major social and 
political changes, therefore we need to contextualise why students decided to become 
activists and how they started their early political activism.    
 
8.4 Early involvement in political activism  
 
There are a variety of ways individuals enter into political activism. Some began with 
small scale activities such as attending meetings, volunteering activities, and slowly 
become actively engaged as full-time activists (Martin, 2007). Whereas, others become 
involved straight away in high-scale activities like organising protests. Since a social 





1992:113), the process of becoming part of an activist community is problematic and 
difficult if there is no connection to social movement networks, identifiable organisations, 
or necessary contacts (Weinstein, 2005). As expected, most (7 out of 10) of these activists, 
when asked about their early political involvement and how they gained access to a group, 
said that their political activism began at university, as student activists, and that they 
gained access to the activist community through their active roles in student movements 
such as Student Solidarity of Malaysia (Solidariti Mahasiswa Malaysia or SMM), 
Malaysia Youth and Students Democratic Movement (DEMA) and the Federation of 
Islamic Student of Malaysia (Gabungan Mahasiswa Islam Se-Malaysia or GAMIS). These 
student organisations were responsible for organising political campus activities and taking 
strong stands against the government policies by staging pro-democracy protests. This can 
be seen in the response by Youth Activist (2):  
 
“In 2010, I joined a protest voluntarily, protested the rise of Water tariffs at the 
National Mosque, and over there, I knew many student activists from other 
universities. And then, my university acted against me, and they barred me from 
student bodies, student election and all sorts of things. I brought up this case at the 
national level student movement and from there I started to actively join student 
movement.”  
 
As for Youth Activist (5), her exposure and experienced grew when she studied abroad 
and contributed to her political awakening, as reflected in her comments, “When I did my 
masters in the UK, most of my awakening is from there, particularly when I did some work 
for the Socialist Worker Party…” Being abroad has initiated the complex process of 
reflection between what young people perceived to be Malaysian democracy and Western 
democracies because they had a chance to get closer participation with globally connected 
social movements.  
 
 For the remaining participants (3 out of 10), their political activism began when 
they started working, whether being employed or self-employed. The workplace or 
working environment may open up the opportunity to acquire civic and political skills that 
are needed to become an active citizen, as pointed out by Youth Activist (3), who was an 
entrepreneur “My initial involvement in politics began when I worked as a bookseller and 
I got mixed-up with many core student activists from the UKM.” This supports findings 
from Humphries (2001) that those independent business owners have a tendency to be the 





politics since they have a central position in social networks. However, for Youth Activist 
(4), his decision to quit his job in corporate banking and build a career as an activist began 
when his friends were arrested by the government. According to Youth Activist (4), “I was 
not involved in this kind of thing much, until in 2007, when two of my friends were 
detained under ISA. They didn’t have any political associations, but they were detained for 
some reasons which I think ridiculous and unacceptable.” In this sense, the discriminatory 
experiences of someone close to us may develop our political awareness and a sense of 
responsibility to the community to change an unfair situation.  
 
8.5 What motivates young people in political activism? 
 
Youth activists were influenced by diverse motivations; the motivation to participate 
depends on costs and benefits gained (Klandermans, 1997; Muller and Opp, 1986). Since 
political participation is the “study of everything” (Van Deth, 2001:4) and takes a variety 
of forms, it could be distinguished by the time and risk or effort of engaging in different 
kinds of action (Klandermans, 2004). Some require little time, but are potentially risky, 
like a protest, a sit-in or joining a strike. Other forms of participation such as giving 
money, signing petitions, or attending peaceful demonstrations demand less time and less 
risk. At the same time, joining an organisation is both time consuming and takes 
substantial effort. Therefore, different forms of political activity require different kinds of 
resources (Verba et al, 1995), or what are termed ‘motivational dynamics’ (Klandermans, 
2004:361). By developing the social-psychological dimension of movement participation, 
Klandermans (2007), emphasises three fundamental motives (demand-supply why people 
participate in the movement) which are: Instrumentality; identity; and ideology. 
Instrumentality denotes as an effort to influence the political decision or social 
environment. By contrast, identity refers to sense of belonging to or identification with a 
valued group, and ideology simply means an expression of one’s views or in pursuit for 
meaning (Klandermans, 2007:361). As the circle of youth activists is small, and many of 
these activists are the drivers for social movement and protests in Malaysia, it is important 
to understand the reasons why they participate in such movements. Following this, it 
seems reasonable to use the framework of ‘Demand and Supply of Participation’, proposed 
by Klandermans (2007) in this chapter to examine what motivates young activists in 





 Based on the responses, there was a strong sense amongst half of these activists 
that they were motivated to actively engage in politics for political and social change. This 
is rooted in their recognition of deprivation, injustice, and indignation about some of the 
government’s policies, as commented by Youth Activist (4), “What motivates me is that 
this country is moving in the wrong direction, and injustice is everywhere.” This opinion is 
also extended similarly by Youth Activist (9) in his comment, “…we can see that our 
country is not moving in a better direction. We are moving towards a ‘failed state’ in 
terms of the economy, politics, and society. So, we can conclude that our country requires 
a total change. Not a small-scale reform.” It is clear that instrumentality is the motive to 
participate where the activists have a strong belief that their participation could bring about 
change, if not now, at least for future generations. This is reflected in the comment of 
Youth Activist (8), “We are fighting to see Malaysia better than what it is now. This is not 
for us, but it is for the next generation.” Evidently, we can see in Malaysia, there were 
several cases where movements have clearly been successful in irreversibly changing 
policies. For example, a national campaign for the abolition of the Internal Security Act 
(ISA) has been spearheaded by a coalition of human rights NGOs, such as Aliran, Hakam 
and Suaram, under a banner called as ‘Anti-ISA Movement’ (Gerakan Mansuh ISA, GMI) 
since 2001.56 After a decade of resisting and protesting against indefinite detention without 
trial, only in 2012 did the government repeal the act and replace it with the Security 
Offences (Special Measures) Act and release the detainees of ISA. This showed that the 
activists are aware that participation may not be effective straight away in bringing about 
changes (Klandermans, 2007), but it takes a long process or a ‘cycle’, as stated by Youth 
Activist (3), “We do not want to do something quickly, but fail to bring about a change. If 
you get tired, you can take a rest, and will be replaced by others. And when you are ready, 
you can come back to fight for change. All this is a cycle”.  
 
 In addition, some activists (3 out of 10) claimed the reason why they participated in 
political activism is because they were part of a group in society—collective identity is a 
factor that stimulates them to participate. In this regard, their strong attachment to specific 
groups like labour, women, and lower-class groups increases their likelihood to participate 
in political activism. For Youth Activist (2), belonging to the group of young people 
                                                          
56Abolish ISA Movement (Gerakan Mansuh ISA, GMI) is a coalition of more than 80 NGOs opposing 
against Malaysia’s 50 years old draconian law, the Internal Security Act (ISA). They organised a series of 
massive protests to put pressure on the government to abolish the ISA, and their efforts paid-off when the 





means leaning more towards an anti-establishment view. It is the nature of young people to 
be passionate and energetic in challenging the status quo and to refuse to acquiesce to the 
dominant culture. This is reflected in his comments, “As for young people, they are indeed 
rebellious. People don’t understand them, but it is part of the culture. Every period you 
can see there are counterculture groups who oppose the system, everything that they see as 
wrong.” Apart from group identity, Youth Activist (2) also was heavily inspired by stories 
from many successful movements in the 1970s that he read from books, and this indirectly 
triggered his awareness to go against the system. In a similar vein, Youth Activist (3) also 
stated that, “At the age of 11-years-old, I started to read political newspapers such as 
Watan, which was very critical at that time.” In contrast, Youth Activist (6), who came 
from a working-class family, saw that her family’s condition and the surrounding 
environment motivated her to actively engage in the civil society. She pointed out, “I can 
do something for marginalised groups because I saw them in their economic background 
where they live in poverty, but it is beyond having an economic reason.” This confirms 
findings from the literature (De Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Reicher, 1984; Stryker et 
al, 2000) that the construction of collective identity is central to social movements—the 
more people identified themselves with a group, the more they inclined to engage in 
political movements.  
 
 Others (2 out of 10), believed the agent of mobilisation was social networking and 
people from successful movements who inspired them to actively engage in the 
movement’s cause. According to Youth Activist (5), “…I was in the UK during the rise of 
popular uprising such as the Arab Spring and the anti-austerity movement of Spanish 
students where there were calls for greater democracy.  At that time, in Spain, the activists 
came out with a manifesto titled ‘real democracy now’, and I was very inspired by the 
people who were attached to these movements.” This is one of the impacts of successful 
movements on individuals where they have been a source of inspiration for people to build 
political awareness and to champion a cause, so they have more inclination for further 
activism. Furthermore, there is an activist whose participation was strongly influenced by 
her emotions about the government and political system. An example of this point of view 
is given by Youth Activist (7), “I’m mad with the government and I think if we do not 
show our anger, they cannot see and understand.” The sense of anger has been considered 
as the ideal emotion for protest (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007), which in turn 





used as a symbolic expression to attract others to participate, as mentioned by Youth 
Activist (7), “We need the feelings of anger to attract other young people.” Therefore, they 
can create a so called ‘group-based anger’ and channel this feeling into a movement.  
 
 As political activists often hold different views from the government, they are the 
group that has always been targeted for crackdowns by the government. When being asked 
whether they had been caught by the authorities, the majority activists (8 out of 10) 
mentioned that they have been caught at least once during their participation, as reflected 
by Youth Activist (9), “I was arrested seven times when I was a student activist, and two 
times when I worked for SUARAM.” Youth Activist (3) also pointed out that, “I was 
arrested for involvement in the ‘Tangkap Najib’ rally.” Whilst they have been arrested 
many times, most of these activists said that they were not afraid, and the government’s 
crackdown could not stop them from continuing struggling for better change. They 
believed the experience of previous political figures was a source of inspiration to resist 
the current system. For them, their punishment is minimal compared to that of previous 
leaders and activists, as mentioned by Youth Activist (2):  
 
“All the successful leaders out there have already been arrested a lot of times in 
their life. So, if I was in prison for five to six years, it is nothing compared to 27 
years of Nelson Mandela in prison. That is why I challenged myself.”  
 
This opinion is also extended similarly by Youth Activist (7) in her comment, “If we look 
at previous leaders, they were caught under the ISA, and even after they were released 
from ISA, they were still struggling. Meaning that, they have a very strong spirit.”  
 
 Despite being inspired by prominent political leaders, inner strength also came 
from the support and solidarity of family and friends, as depicted by Youth Activist (4), “I 
was very touched, there was a time when me and Adam were in prison, and from inside the 
cell, we heard our friends calling our names outside the police station.” Indeed, positive 
social support from family and in-group members is the strongest support system for each 
activist to remain constant in their activism. This reaffirms the importance of identity 
construction (Melucci, 1995; Taylor and Whittier, 1992; Hunt and Benford, 2007) as a 
result of a strong sense of belonging or ‘we-ness’ within the activist community. 
Moreover, getting caught or imprisoned is the main risk undertaken by activists, so they 





Youth Activist (9), “When we were first arrested, we were bullied and tortured by the 
police. But after several times, we did research about legal rights, specifically on the 
Penal Code, we realised that the police were just doing their job and we were just 
practising our right as citizens.” Clearly, legal and political knowledge is important for 
activists to be better capable of judging when systems are poorly functioning and willing 
to act whenever necessary.  
 
8.6 Interpretations of politics  
 
Youth activism in the past was often interrelated with idealism, altruism, and rebellions 
(Luzatto, 1997). But how about youth activism today? Do young people have an idealistic 
or rather narrow interpretation of politics? Generally, most youth activists have a broad 
and clear understanding of politics. Out of ten youths interviewed, three saw politics as a 
process of governance and administration of a country. This can be seen in the response of 
Youth Activist (6), “I think if you want to put it in a simple way, politics is something that 
is designed by a system, governed by a government that has been elected by people...” In 
contrast, some claim (2 out of 10) that politics is a tool or mechanism to achieve 
something, as explained by Youth Activist (2), “Politics is a tool that is used to gain 
something, your own agendas, whatever agenda that you have. For example, 
environmentalists use politics, student uses politics, chauvinists, fascists, racists, and all of 
them use politics.” Youth Activist (7) also reacted positively by commenting that, 
“Politics is not just between the political representatives and the people, but we have 
politics in the workplace, in university, in the office and so on. Politics is everywhere.”   
 
 These suggest that the definition of politics is relatively wide, is beyond political 
parties or politicians, and it encompasses all aspects of human life. Therefore, as proposed 
by Youth Activist (5), the more you participate in politics, the more you are able to govern 
yourself since “Politics is relating very much on how politically involved you are and how 
politically empowered you are.” However, the activists argued that many young people 
misunderstood the definition of politics as they frequently associate politics with 
politicians and political party. According to Youth Activist (3), “Sometimes when we 
heard the news about a leader who was arrested because of corruption, we straight away 
jumped to the conclusion that it is ‘politics’.” In this regard, politics is viewed as a ‘dirty 





having a narrow understanding of politics—politics is equivalent to political actors, could 
create a tendency for people to have a sceptical view about politics and the whole political 
system. This in turn will make them feel less in favour of engaging in the political process.  
 
8.7 Political concern: analysing the patterns of youth political participation in 
Malaysia 
 
Youth activists act as representatives or agents to bring about social changes and 
awareness for their fellow young people and society at large. To some extent, it is the 
nature of youth activists to be well-informed and concerned about whatever issues happen 
locally and globally. It is useful for their activism purposes and to be effective in their 
actions. Therefore, when we asked about current youth political engagement, they knew a 
lot about young people’s patterns of participation and their attitudes towards politics as 
they themselves experienced and engaged directly in youth activities. Interestingly, most 
of the activists (7 out of 10) claimed there is a downward trend of youth political 
involvement in conventional or ‘elite-directed’ participation, as stated by Youth Activist 
(8), “This can be seen through the data released by the Electoral Commission, where 
almost four million Malaysians, largely young people who are over 21-years-old are not 
voting, and even worse failed to register as voters.” Youth Activist (9) also responded 
positively to this issue by saying, “Students also are not concerned about voting. Almost 
400,000 students graduate each year, but less than two percent of these total graduated 
students are registered as voters.” This conforms to the consistent patterns of youth 
political participation in quantitative analyses (see Chapters 4 and 5). Although agreeing 
with the statement, Youth Activist (5) significantly emphasised that the decline appears 
evident amongst the generation who lived in the Mahathir era and post-Mahathir era, as 
she argued that, “Many of us grew up during the Mahathir era and post-Mahathir era, and 
had parents who were afraid of being politically active. So, we have a social structure that 
discouraged us to be politically active.” During the Mahathir premiership from 1981 to 
2003, Mahathir used many repressive mechanisms such as the Sedition Act, the UUCA, 
the amendment of the Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984 (PPPA),57 and mass 
                                                          
57The amendment of the Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984 (PPPA) requires all domestic and 
international publishers and printing firms to get annual permits. Under this Act, the minister had an 
‘absolute discretion’ power in allowing or rejecting the permits for printing presses and the minister’s 
decision to revoke or suspend the permit, could not be challenged in court (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:113). 
Therefore, the government had the power to prohibit any ‘malicious’ news, which they considered as a threat 





arrest under the ISA to curtail political rights of the people. The impact of Mahathirism 
upon the changing political landscape from semi-democratic to autocratic, and Mahathir’s 
centralisation of powers contributed to the creation of a ‘silent generation’ as there were 
many people at that time afraid to be involved in politics. In addition, some activists 
pointed out that the decline is significantly apparent in membership of political 
organisations, including political parties and NGOs. In other words, young people are 
disengaged from structural political participation, as mentioned by Youth Activist (6), 
“They don’t want to be put in a structure where they think every structure that exists, like 
political parties, political organisations, NGOs, for them those people can be hypocrites.” 
Not surprisingly, the decline of young people in political organisations signals that young 
people have little or no trust of political actors, as stated by Youth Activist (7), “They are 
still not ready to join the party and do not believe in political parties.” In this sense, some 
young Malaysians seem to hold a deeply distrustful and sceptical view towards political 
players, corresponding with the findings of Henn and Foard (2012) in Britain.  
 
Whilst a majority maintained that there is a decline in youth political participation, 
two out of ten activists believe that the indicators to measure political participation are too 
narrow, limited only to institutionalised politics, as argued by Youth Activist (3), “We 
cannot make a generalisation that there is a decline in youth political participation by only 
measuring electoral participation and party membership.” This suggests that political 
participation is a very broad concept and includes a growing range of youth-relevant 
political activities—elite-directed and elite-challenging participation. Failure to adopt a 
broad conception of politics will neglect new political repertoires that lie outside 
mainstream politics (Bessant, 2016; O’Toole et al., 2003) and we would not find evidence 
of high levels of youth political activism (Henn et al., 2002).  
 
 The repertoire of the modes of political participation has expanded; therefore, 
based on the responses, all activists agreed that there is a growth of elite-challenging 
participation because young people are more likely to have undertaken unconventional 
participation. According to Youth Activist (2), “I would agree that young people have 
shifted to something else. People have changed and look at politics from different 
perspectives. It is still politics, but in different forms.” Whilst the segmentation of youth in 





participation that have been commonly used by not only activists, but also young 
Malaysians in general.  
 
1) Online activism 
 
Social media, if it is used effectively, may help to perform a variety of roles such as 
putting pressure on the government, influencing political decisions, disseminating political 
information and to some extent, empowering people to initiate social movement. In fact, 
the Arab Spring is one example of how online activism led to offline protest. Out of ten 
activists interviewed, three of them believed that social media is the main mobilising agent 
for youth activism or a vehicle to stimulate cooperative efforts to challenge ‘real power’, 
as mentioned by Youth Activist (10), “I think social media is very convenient to share 
whatever they like, but to avoid them from getting into trouble since many people are 
arrested when they have joined the protests.” For young people, online activism seems to 
be a viable way to manifest their participation in politics compared to protest activism 
since this kind of activity is the path for high-risk activism. However, young people, 
mainly Generation Y, are more attracted to political humour on the web, featuring political 
jokes, parody, cartoons, and satirical shows, as described by Youth Activist (3), “Many 
fanpages like Amran Fans and Malaysian Gags which portray Malaysian political issues 
in satirical and humorous ways are popular amongst young people.” In this sense, 
exposure to entertainment-oriented programmes or ‘soft news’, indirectly allows people to 
gain political knowledge, even without their intention, because political information is 
presented in a more entertaining and easily digestible way (Baum, 2003). Notably, youth 
activists also use online activism frequently to maintain social networking, propagating 
dissenting opinions and mobilising the masses. Bersih rally is one of the examples of 
successful people movement that strategically using social media platforms of Facebook 
and Twitter to draw the significant number of young people to the rally, as mentioned by 
Youth Activist (4), “Previously, Bersih demanded for free and fair election but today, it is 
totally a people’s movement. And you can see the Bersih 4.0, the biggest rally ever in 
Malaysian history.” Whilst online activism is growing rapidly amongst the youth, it is 
pervasively used by most young middle-class people, as argued by Youth Activist (3), 
“For me, youth from the middle-class group in Malaysia are the main users of social 
media like Facebook and Twitter.” This group of society, as argued by Welsh (2012) is 





2) New social movements and protests  
 
Based on the responses, 2 out of 10 activists argued that the most common mode of 
political participation of young Malaysian today is social movements, as said by Youth 
Activist (6), “I think more young people want to be in social movements, a very loose 
social movement and very much unstructured, and they want a very different kind of 
system or modes of communication.” In particular, the salient characteristics of social 
movements, including voluntary membership, their non-partisan character, organised 
collective action, being less institutionalised and their commitment to promote social 
changes may be the factors that drive young people to engage in this mode of participation. 
It is noteworthy to mention that most of the social movements in Malaysia are closely 
linked with NGOs in advocacy on the issues of human rights and political freedom. These 
movements, as argued by Weiss and Saliha (2003), are deep-rooted in the middle class 
which embraces these ideas to bring about socio-political changes through large-scale 
protest. Today, the most outstanding Malaysian protest movement is the Bersih movement 
that is struggling to transform public places into spaces for people, largely young people, 
to engage in diverse political activities, leading to challenging the status quo (Smeltzer and 
Pare, 2015). According to Youth Activist (7), “If we look at the past Bersih 4.0, it could 
not be denied that there was a wave of Chinese, but there was also a wave of young 
people.” However, Youth Activist (9) opposed this argument by saying that:  
 
“Young people’s involvement in protest is relatively low in Malaysia. Normally, of 
250,000-300,000 participants of the Bersih movement, 90 percent is young people. 
If we compare this 90 percent with almost 16 million of youth population, there is 
only one to two percent of young people who participated.”  
 
Even if protest activism is rampant in Malaysia now, most activists (6 out of 10) believed 
that the government still refuses to accept protest as part of political participation, as 
mentioned by Youth Activist (4), “The government never recognised protests as they 
simply penalised people who fight for freedom of speech and assembly that had been 
guaranteed by the constitution.” In this regard, the government failed to understand that 
protest is one of the main elements in democracy since they blatantly used violence, 
excessive force, and randomly arrested protesters. This is reflected in the comments of 





protest. If we look at the earlier Bersih rallies, the government has rampantly used 
violence such as tear gas, with many people getting beaten….”  
 
 Although the recent Bersih 4.0 and 5.0 were run smoothly with no violent 
crackdown, few arrests, or significant incidents, it does not mean that the government has 
allowed protests and tolerated protesters. In fact, according to Youth Activist (4), “Me, 
Adam and several other activists were arrested two days after the Bersih 4.0, and a week 
later, I received a letter stating that I was to be charged in court for the old case.” This 
indicates that the government retains use of ‘exclusive’ prevailing strategies (Koopmans 
and Kriesi, 1995) such as repressive crackdowns on the dissenters. Perhaps it has changed 
its strategy by allowing people to protest before being arrested. Despite the crackdowns 
and detentions, the activists believe that protest needs to be continued as it will help to 
bring about change, although it may take a long time, as noted by Youth Activist (7), 
“Protest must be continued. If we do not show protest to the government, they will keep 
doing whatever they like.” In a similar vein, Youth Activist (9) also commented that, 
“Protest is regarded as a process to drive Malaysia towards democratic maturity and we 
will not give up making protest part of the culture.” Given that many of the activists are 
highly educated and commonly used protest and social movements as mechanisms to 
change the status-quo, therefore we could expect that the group underrepresented in protest 
activism in Malaysia is those with low levels of education, corresponding to the findings 
of Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001). 
 
3) The politics of popular culture 
 
Since young people perceive politics as something boring, irrelevant, stressful, and 
sometimes inexplicable (Bhavnani, 1994), 3 out of 10 activists believed that young people 
find different ways to make politics more meaningful, entertaining, and fun through their 
participation in popular culture like arts, music, and political satire. This can be seen in the 
response of Youth Activist (4),  
 
“Popular culture is wide enough and increasing amongst the youth as people want 
to contribute something, but sometimes they don’t have enough time or are afraid 
of the law of the state, being arrested, etc. So, they use their expertise in drawing 






Generally, the politics of popular culture means the use of culture to express political 
views (Street, 2004). According to Alvarez et al. (1998:7), culture is political since its 
meanings are constitutive of processes that, implicitly and explicitly, seek to redefine 
social power. In other words, culture is political because it affects power relations. The 
politics of popular culture is vague yet a comprehensive concept, encompasses the 
interactions between state and people, including the actions of the state and the exercise of 
individual rights, as well as the use of a counter-hegemonic force or a protest of popular 
resistance (Hall, 1981). It is noteworthy to mention that the politics of popular culture in 
Malaysia has long been embedded in the society, but its rise can be seen during the 
Reformasi 1998. At that time, many cultural revolutionary groups emerged, created by a 
handful of young people such as Komunite Seni Jalan Telawi (KsJT) and Universiti 
Bangsar Utama (UBU), which were actively organised community-based programmes, 
educational street theatre and agitprop, not only to challenge the authoritarian regime, but 
more embedded in everyday-life politics. The Reformasi era also marked the rise of the 
‘Malay Cultural Revolt’ (Khoo Boo Teik, 2002:33) with the significant growth of satirical 
novels written by Shahnon Ahmad, poems entitled ‘Shit’ by A. Samad Said, articles by 
Rustam Sani, Fathi Aris Omar and political cartoons by Zunar, that criticised and opposed 
the Mahathir regime.  
 
 Indeed, the use of politics of popular culture in Malaysia today has expanded in 
different forms of collective actions where people shared common meanings, interests, and 
experiences. Most of these collective actions were conducted by young people, and were 
generally anti-establishment and non-ideological but brought up a socio-political agenda. 
Amongst the most well-known youth collective groups are the Bangsar Utama Club 
(Kelab Bangsar Utama, KBU), the Frinjan Collective, the Street Book (Buku Jalanan), the 
Youth Open University (Universiti Terbuka Anak Muda, UTAM) and the Lecture Book 
(Kuliah Buku, KUBU).58 Apart from collective groups, the protest movement in Malaysia, 
                                                          
58Bangsar Utama Club (KBU), is a rejuvenation of Universiti Bangsar Utama (UBU). It was established in 
2012 when a group of activists rented a space to be a centre for youth activities and a gathering place for 
youth reformists. KBU’s activities are wide, ranging from community programmes such as the Street 
Kitchen (Dapur Jalanan) and free tuition for local children—to education programs like free classes on 
politics and philosophy, informal discussion, and forums—to arts and music such as the BangsarArt, Radio 
Bangsar and Bangsar Film Club. KBU is the place for young people, which open the doors to many 
activities, as long as their fundamental principal is pro-democracy. 
 
The Frinjan Collective is a loose-structured group for artists and those people who love art and culture. It 





mainly Bersih, also utilised the element of agitprop by staging a live concert and designing 
posters and images, as mentioned by Youth Activist (2), “Bersih 4.0 was totally different 
from other Bersih where there used to be political spirit, fights with police and so on, so 
we changed it to pop culture.”  
 
 Currently, we also can see the rise of a political graphic artist, Fahmi Reza, who 
uses art and graphic design as forms of civil disobedience. He is most well-known, 
particularly in depicting a caricature of the Prime Minister, Najib Razak, as a clown – 
which was widely shared across social media. Due to this image, Fahmi Reza was charged 
under the Communication and Multimedia Act 1998. Previously, the government has used 
the Sedition Act to stifle a prominent political cartoonist, Zunar, for his work (Human 
Rights Watch, 2015).  Clearly, the use of different forms of popular culture such as 
political jokes, satirical literature and internet memes as weapons of resistance able to 
challenge the hegemony and pose a threat to national security and public order. In 
Malaysia, popular culture has become political when the state has imposed censorship and 
banning because of explicit political content. According to Youth Activist (2), “Each 
successful movement, they do not leave even a single thing out of human experience. 
Meaning, you are not just going against the government, but you also go against the 
system and culture. So, you have to bring another culture to counter another culture.” 
Therefore, it is apparent that popular culture has been used by young people in Malaysia as 
a tool of resistance and to counter prevailing trends, such as inequality along ethnic lines 
and social class, and an oppressive state. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
to utilise art as a medium to empower young people to face any challenges and problems out there. The main 
programs organised by Frinjan are Frinjan City (Pekan Frinjan), Frinjan House (Rumah Frinjan), Frinjan 
Forum and Frinjan Black Box. Frinjan City (Pekan Frinjan) is a cultural activity for youth, combining the 
elements of arts, activism, and entrepreneurship. While, Frinjan House (Rumah Frinjan) is a space for arts 
and youth activities and Frinjan Black Box is an enclosed space, specifically emphasising collaboration 
projects with other art groups. (http://frinjan.blogspot.com, accessed on January 15, 2017). 
 
The Street Book (Buku Jalanan) is a fortnightly reading club that organise reading sessions as an effort to 
create a public reading culture and space for the community based on the principle of Books, Arts, Culture 
and Activism (BACA). (https://en-gb.facebook.com/bukujalanan/, accessed on January 15, 2017). 
 
The Youth Open University (Universiti Terbuka Anak Muda, UTAM) is an education hub to incalculate 
knowledge amongst Malaysians, mainly young people, strengthening the democracy and citizens’ 
participation through cross-displinary critical discourses. They organise online weekly lectures via Ustream 
and weekly open discussions involving many local and foreign students, as well as academics. 
(http://utam.net/, accessed on January 15, 2017). 
 
The Lecture Book (Kuliah Buku, KUBU) is a weekly discussion groupattended by progressive young people. 





8.8 Why don’t young people participate?   
 
It would seem, therefore, the youth activists are optimistic that young people are not 
politically apathetic even if there is a decline in elite-directed participation—voting and 
party membership. Instead, they believe that youth today are seen to be channelling their 
participation in different modes of elite-challenging activism, mainly online activism, 
social movements, protest activism and popular culture. There are several factors 
highlighted by the activists on why fellow young people are turning off from 
institutionalised politics, but the most insightful explanation is related to the ‘culture of 
fear’ amongst young people. In this regard, all youth activists argued that the government’s 
oppressive laws which stifle political rights and freedom have cultivated the ‘culture of 
fear’ within young people, making them afraid to participate, as argued by Youth Activist 
(10), “AUKU and the Sedition Act frighten a lot of students now and create a barrier for 
them to actively participate in politics.” This opinion is also extended similarly by Youth 
Activist (5) in her comments, “So I think that AUKU is very powerful in making people 
censor themselves into being very careful of what they think and what they say in real life 
and social media.” The government’s attempt to impose crackdowns and detention on 
youth activists is to give a warning sign to scare largely Malaysians (Human Rights Watch, 
2015). This support the argument by Hibbs (1973) that state repression has a negative 
effect which constrains citizens from participating in collective actions. Therefore, only a 
small group of young people are brave and willing enough to participate in political 
activism, as mentioned by Youth Activist (5), “I know that you always hear some students 
have been caught for something, to their credit, they are quite few, and they are very 
brave, and they are quite exceptional.” It seems that youth activism for a small minority is 
inextricably related to the political alienation of large sections of young Malaysians. 
 
 In addition, the youth’s frustration with political parties, whether the ruling party or 
the opposition is another explicit factor which explains why youth do not participate. As 
expected, a majority of the youth activists (8 out of 10) agreed that young people, 
including the activists, feel that they do not have a better alternative since both parties are 
facing internal incoherence and open rivalry. This can be reflected in the comments of 
Youth Activist (1), “Some youth are ‘fed up’. They have an interest in choosing PR, but 
there are internal problems in PR, tension. They want to support BN, but BN is troubled by 





racist.” Clearly, the attitude and internal strife of political parties make young people feel 
that these parties are not convincing enough to provide a better future, as argued by Youth 
Activist (9) “It seems like young people have already despaired”. This echoes the findings 
of previous qualitative chapters. Furthermore, some (3 out of 10) claim there is a 
relationship between youth political disengagement and thesocioeconomic resources, as 
pointed out by Youth Activist (4), “…the lower income people, I think they participate 
even less in politics. First, they need to work to earn for living. So, they don’t have enough 
time. Second, educational background plays an important role.” In this sense, young 
people, especially the working-class, are less integrated with politics as they do not have 
the necessary resources such as money and time. Perhaps, economic barriers may account 
for low participation amongst the youth, as Youth Activist (3) argued, “Young people are 
increasingly under pressure due to economic problems and the rising cost of living”  
 
 The quantitative findings showed that at the population, education did not attenuate 
the participatory gap between younger and older people in Malaysia, whilst more young 
Malaysians are gaining higher education and joining professional careers. In the qualitative 
interviews however, 3 out of 10 activists pointed specifically to the poor political 
education or political literacy amongst young people which can largely affect their 
participation in politics, as mentioned by Youth Activist (8), “Political education has not 
been integrated into the curriculum, whether at school or university levels. So, young 
people do not participate since our own education system does not prepare them for 
politics.” Youth Activist (9) is also in agreement with this view by responding that, 
“There is a dogma that says students cannot engage in politics and politics cannot enter 
the campus. This makes students become politically blind.” As a civic curriculum has 
proven to be effective in developing youth political literacy (Niemi and Junn, 1998), the 
lack of such a curriculum in educational institutions in this country means failing to 
provide students with the skills to understand the abstract concept of politics and political 
issues and to play roles and exercise their rights as citizens in a democratic society.  
 
8.9 Why have young people moved to elite-challenging political participation?  
   
As expected, more than half (6 out of 10) youth activists pointed out that growing 
discontent and mistrust with the government and the political system makes young people 





Youth Activist (5), “The young people, a lot of them, and also the NGOs as well, do not 
believe in the system anymore because they say elections never change everything even if 
we made them legal.” In this regard, institutionalised political participation, such as that in 
elections and political parties is unappealing to many young people because they are 
‘powerless’ to make change since their votes do not make any difference. According to 
Youth Activist (3), “I think our electoral system is not transparent. If it is transparent, 
there will be no problem and is better to concentrate on election.” Although Malaysians 
are free to vote, the electoral system remains suffers from serious malpractices—the issue 
of phantom voters, indelible ink, money politics, gerrymandering, and media bias—
skewed in favour of the incumbent government. Since the established formal system is 
problematic, young people tune into informal or unstructured participation. This supports 
the argument by Meyer (2004) that people resort to non-conventional methods when they 
believe that the conventional routes to influence are either unavailable or ineffective. 
Evidently, there was a massive rally organised by the PR Coalition and NGOs, known as 
‘Blackout 505’ in the aftermath of the 2013 general election. At least, more than 50,000 
protesters across different ethnic groups, clad in black as a sign of protest, had joined the 
mass rallies. They demanded the resignation of the electoral commission due to continued 
concerns about its impartiality, re-running elections in 30 constituencies where the margin 
of victory was small, and suspended the practice of gerrymandering or boundary 
delimitation and any form of amendment to electoral law (Zulaikha, 2013). Amid the 
rallies, many youth activists such as Adam, Safwan and Syukri were arrested under the 
Sedition Act, for organising and rioting in the illegal Blackout 505 rallies. 
 
 Some activists (4 out of 10) linked the youth motivation from formal to informal 
political participation with the culture of non-partisanship. It is the trend of young people 
today not to be identified with a political party or any organisation, as argued by Youth 
Activist (1), “If we look at the trend of young people today, honestly, it is quite difficult to 
attract young people to join any sort of organisation. The youth are very enthusiastic 
about being involved in many programs, but they do not want to be attached.” Youth 
Activist (2) is also pessimistic about this issue, arguing that, “For young people, being in a 
party or organisation is something unexciting, not ‘cool’, not young and unattractive…” 
To be specific, young people often see political parties or organisation as an activity that is 
commonly practiced by older people because being attached to these organisations makes 





being partisan is relatively contrary to the nature or ‘soul’ of youth. To some extent, young 
people in fact do not understand the concept of partisanship, as commented by Youth 
Activist (4), “Young people do not understand the meaning of partisan and non-partisan 
politics. Everything we do is partisan.” Therefore, the narrow understanding of the 
concept of partisanship embraced by the youth makes them prefer to be outside the 
organisations. Conversely, Youth Activist (2) argued that young people refuse to be 
attached to a political party because “Political parties have always been associated with 
power struggles, such as wanting to be a member of parliament, minister and so on.” 
Since political parties are always competing for power, young people often consider they 
seek power for their own sake.  
 
 Another common explanation of why young people are more prone to engage in 
unconventional or elite-challenging participation is because they are heavily influenced by 
successful popular movements, as mentioned by Youth Activist (5), “And I think a lot of 
these people found their awareness during the 2011 occupation and this is all democracy, 
participation outside, reimagining new spaces, and all these are sorts of movements.” In 
this regard, the success of popular movements which strive for political or social change, 
such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Movement, often inspired other groups or 
organisation to reproduce quite similar protests. A protest, as argued by Minkoff (1997), 
can be considered a successful protest when it generates demonstration effects. In 
Malaysia, many believe that the success of the Anti-ISA movement became the stepping 
stone for other movements to continue calling for improving the system, as stated by 
Youth Activist (8), “The success of the anti-ISA movement that struggled for so many 
years has driven us to organise an ‘anti-AUKU’ movement.” Generally, most of the 
successful protest movements have been primarily animated by young people because 
“Young people are radical, brave and they like to go in that direction. To make a change, 
we need to do something to show to the government that we are mad at them” (Youth 
Activist (7)). In a similar vein, Youth Activist (1) also commented that, “The youth is 
idealistic. They are educated, good thinkers and exposed to a lot of reading. So, when they 
are provoked, they become resistant.” Therefore, the attitude and the character of young 








8.10 Youth and democracy  
 
It is clear that in a semi-democratic country like Malaysia, the main purpose of political 
struggle is to ensure more extensive practices of democracy and greater political freedom. 
Therefore, when we asked the activists whether youth participation strengthens the 
democratisation process or if it simply legitimises the semi-democratic regime, all of them 
agreed that the participation of young people in politics make the process of 
democratisation in Malaysia grow even stronger. This can be reflected in the comments of 
Youth Activist (6), “Like I said, the more youth participate in politics, the more demands, 
they can go beyond the boundaries, they can push for democracy.” Youth Activist (5) also 
added, “…from Reformasi up until now, you can actually see many students have been 
caught. In that sense, if you are challenging democratic spaces and challenging the 
structure now, I think they always benefit democracy.” Notably, the Reformasi of 1998 
saw a remarkable increase in youth participation in Malaysian politics, particularly after 
the dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim from the government, and young people continued to play 
a crucial role in determining the electoral outcome of the 2008 and 2013 general 
election—significantly producing a ‘political tsunami’ in Malaysia—fend off a two-thirds 
majority of the incumbent BN in parliament. Throughout this time, from 1998 up until the 
present, a series of protests have been staged and largely supported by young people, even 
though regime change still seems far off. Realising that young people are able to challenge 
the status quo, the government attempts to ‘silence’ activists whenever possible, as stated 
by Youth Activist (3), “The government now is being more creative especially in dealing 
with young dissenters. For example, the government has abolished the ISA, but they 
replaced it with the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act or SOSMA." In this sense, 
the government has manoeuvred so that people see them as less dictatorial.  
 
 Although agreeing with the statement that youth political participation in Malaysia 
has strengthened the democratisation process, two respondents point out that the process is 
quite difficult to achieve, and it will not happen aggressively, particularly when the people 
still have been denied their rights, as explained by Youth Activist (2), “In Malaysia, it is 
difficult when you cannot get the same information, and receive unequal treatment in the 
media, and propaganda is only occurring on one side.” The mainstream media in the 
country are clearly biased in favour of the ruling government. The government’s strong 





Therefore, many Malaysians began leaning towards the alternative media, mainly the 
internet. However, as argued by Youth Activist (2), “The internet does not provide much 
political information as we expected. Although young people in rural areas use the 
internet, they don’t read much as they have different levels of education, etc. So, the most 
effective tool is still the television.” This supports findings from Nuurrianti (2016) that a 
large number of Malaysians, mainly those who do not have access to the internet, still rely 
heavily on the mainstream media channels as their main source of information.  
 
8.11 Youth activism and hopes for the future  
 
Whilst previous qualitative chapters indicated that young people will be more politically 
active in the future, based on our responses, some activists (4 out of 10) are pessimistic 
that young people will increasingly disengage from politics and the decline may well 
continue in elite-directed participation. This can be seen in the response of Youth Activist 
(9), “We have to admit that youth participation is gradually declining. The downward 
trend is not only happening to young people, but is also taking place inside the party”. 
Although agreeing with the sentiment, Youth Activist (3) expressed his concern about 
declining student participation on campus because “We can see that the percentage of 
students who participate in campus politics is far less than 10 percent. This trend 
happened since 1974.” It is worth nothing that the voter turnout for campus elections in 
every local university in Malaysia is less than 50 percent, except for some universities 
which enforced a merit system—deducting students’ marks for not voting (Junaidi et al., 
2015). Campus elections seem unappealing to large members of students as there is too 
much politicking and electoral misconduct—they are faulty and unfair. Also, the majority 
of students are still afraid to actively take part in campus elections, even though the 
government has amended the UUCA. Therefore, some effective strategies are needed to 
encourage more young people to persistently participate in politics as suggested by these 
activists.  
 
 First, 4 out of 10 activists believed that the political system is in need of a total 
overhaul in order to make young people get connected to the system. According to Youth 





“I think we really need legal reforms because there are far more oppressive laws 
like the Sedition Act, the PAA, and the UUCA etc. All these laws very clearly abuse 
your fundamental human rights. These things should go.” 
 
However, legal reform alone is not sufficient to encourage young people to participate. 
Evidently, we can see that even the UUCA has been amended by the government to allow 
students to engage in political activism, but there are still fewer students participating. 
Therefore, it is important to reform the educational and social system, mainly the family 
institution, since both systems facilitate social change, as argued by Youth Activist (1), 
“The disengagement of young people in politics occurred due to the weakness of the family 
institution. Parents pay less attention and they do not give a clear understanding of the 
current issues to their children.” It is normally perceived that young people’s political 
preferences are reflective of their family. So, the role played by the family may enhance 
positive attitudes about politics in young people. Apart from family, political parties also 
need to closely engage with young people through their popular grassroots programmes, 
small-scales activities, and direct communication, as depicted by Youth Activist (9), 
“Although face-to-face meetings with the grassroots is regarded as conservative, this 
conservative method is considerably effective for this time.” Indirectly, political parties can 
help to shed light on people’s political knowledge and current issues, even though it will 
threaten the survival of the party. Additionally, the activists (2 out 10) also suggested that 
the political party must develop more potential young leaders to represent the ‘voice’ of 
young people, as mentioned by Youth Activist (8), “We must put forward many young 
leaders, whether they are from the ruling party or the opposition, like Khairy Jamaluddin, 
Rafizi, Datuk Saifuddin and so on.” 
 
 Furthermore, some (2 out of 10) activists recommended that young people need to 
be encouraged to create their own collective groups that actively help society through 
community programmes, as stated by Youth Activist (7), “Many young people are not 
interested in politics, but they like to do community work.” Whilst they agreed with this 
statement, the remaining activists also argued that the use of pop culture probably make 
political activism seem more ‘cool’ and attractive to young people, as reflected in the 
comments of Youth Activist (10), “I can see now that young people, we cannot go straight 
away to them and talk to them about political things and so on. We must use another way 
like using arts, movies, music and relate it to the current political situation.” Although 





but not too fun so that it lost its values.” This means that politics should not just be about 
fun and entertainment, but that there are important aspects that need to be taken seriously 
by the politicians, particularly in terms of listening to the voices and demands of young 




All in all, the analysis of the views of youth activists in contemporary Malaysia, showed 
firstly that most of the youth activists who were interviewed hold key resources such as 
being a highly educated person, coming from a predominantly middle-class background, 
being politically informed, and exhibiting strong political socialisations. Many received 
early political exposure from their family and educational institution, mainly university 
where the nature of the environments in which they grew up were surrounded by political 
and participatory norms. Such socialisation experiences, combined with the availability of 
the movement networks, eased and facilitated their route to activism, conforming the 
previous literature (Snow et al., 1980; McAdam, 1988) that these two aspects are 
important to ensure a smooth transition into activism. Clearly, the majority of the activists 
started to actively participate in political activism at university, as student activists. Even 
though most of them have graduated, they still carry on their activism. To some extent, 
their motivations to political activism in Malaysia are significantly driven by 
instrumentality motives where activists have a strong belief that their participation could 
bring about change, as well as a sense of collective identity and strong attachment to 
specific groups and aided by the strong influence of social networking. In terms of their 
views on youth political participation, the findings from this group echo the results from 
the qualitative chapter on political elites, where there has been an overall decline in elite-
directed political participation amongst young people, either in voting or party 
membership. The activists mostly argued that the ‘culture of fear’ due to the government’s 
oppressive laws such as the UUCA, the Sedition Act and SOSMA stifle political rights—
and disengagement from political parties makes young people opt out of conventional 
politics. Instead of being disengaged, young people are believed to have shifted to ‘elite-
challenging’ political participation, mainly online activism, social movements, and protest 
activism, as well as a new way of entertaining politics, which is the politics of popular 
culture like arts, music and satire. In this regard, a growing discontent and lack of trust in 





movements are factors that explain why young people tend to participate in this repertoire. 
In the next chapter, we aim to understand how and why some young people show 









BEING A YOUTH NON-PARTICIPANT IN MALAYSIA: YOUNG PEOPLE 





We have just analysed interviews with young Malaysians who actively participate in 
varied forms of political activity on a regular basis. However, many other youths do not. 
They have always been characterised as an ‘apathetic’ and ‘apolitical’ generation since 
they lack interest, knowledge, and participation in politics (Wilkinson and Mulgan, 1995; 
Park, 2000). Some argue that politicians’ failure to respond to and address young people’s 
voices and concerns because they are too selfish in pursing their own agenda is one of the 
recurrent factors that turned young people off politics (Richardson, 1990; O’Toole et al., 
2003; Sloam, 2013). Others relate youth disengagement to the effects of life-cycle (e.g 
Verba and Nie, 1972; Norris, 2003; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) and generation (e.g 
Giugni, 2007; Grasso, 2014). In this context, this chapter analyses how young non-
participants in Malaysia who were not registered as voters or attached to any political 
parties or organisations think of politics, their potential participation and what drives them 
to be politically disengaged. 
 
9.2 An apathetic generation?  
 
As mentioned in the methodology (Chapter 3), the selection of youth non-participants was 
based on the criteria that they should be non-registered young voters that were also not 
members of political parties. The sample was accessed through a snowball or chain 
sampling method.  Although a small number of non-participants were interviewed they 





gender, social class, and ethnic background.59 The first theme covered in the interviews 
with young non-participants was their demographic profile. In terms of age, many of the 
young non-participants interviewed were in their late twenties and early thirties. Therefore, 
we can expect that many of these respondents generally had a relatively stable career and 
life. Their backgrounds also conformed to the expected patterns of the activists, which 
means some of them are being highly educated and coming from a middle-class family. 
Non-participant (3), for example, mentioned that her salary was just enough to meet the 
high cost of living, while several other respondents stated that they lived ‘a comfortable 
lifestyle’ (Non-participant 1). Once again, most of these young non-participants had 
graduated from well-known local universities in Malaysia, with a large number having 
studied social sciences, and a minority studying natural sciences. Given that the majority 
of this group were university graduates, it is not surprising that many of them had settled 
in urban areas and were working full-time either in the private or government sectors. If 
they possessed a number of necessary resources such as education and paid work, why 
were they politically disengaged?  
   
 The process by which young people take shape and develop an interest in politics 
depends on various life circumstances. It can happen when individuals become a member 
of society and take on knowledge, values, and attitudes (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) that were 
transmitted from one generation to another through various agents of socialisation. This is 
known as a broad process of political socialisation—a lifelong process where an individual 
obtains political attitudes and beliefs (Langton, 1969). In some cases, a politically active 
family may stimulate young people’s interest in politics. However, out of ten youths 
interviewed, eight of them said that they had never discussed politics at home, with the 
family, as commented by Non-participant (2), “I came from a non-political family, and we 
do not like to discuss about politics at home.” While the remainder (2 out of 10) claimed 
that their families are political and there is a member in the family who gets involved 
actively in political activities. This can be reflected in the comments from Non-participant 
(1), “I grew up in a political family where my parents were active members of a political 
party. But I have no interest in politics.” Although they have grown up in a politicised 
family environment and were taught from a very young age to be politically informed 
                                                          
59Amongst ten youth non-participants interviewed, half of them were males and another half were females.  
In term of social classes, four out of ten respondents came from the lower-class group, while the rest were 
from the middle-class group.  There were also different ethnic groups in this sample, with the Malays as 





through political discussions at home, this does not necessarily help in fostering their 
interest in politics. This is parallel with the findings by Jennings and Niemi (1968) and 
Dinas (2014) that there is a relatively low correlation between the political orientations of 
parents and children.  
 
 When we analysed the political exposure of youth activists, although a few of them 
came from an apolitical family background, their educational institution, particularly 
university, activated their interest in politics. However, for youth non-participants, none of 
them mentioned the role of educational institutions or a particular course in inspiring their 
political interest whilst majority of them have a higher educational background. According 
to Non-participant (7), “I have a very little knowledge about politics because neither 
school nor university has stimulated my political interest or given information about 
politics.” The involvement of students in campus politics may provide greater exposure to 
political activism, which affects them becoming a politically literate citizen (Mohd Fuad et 
al., 2009). However, it is apparently shown that young Malaysians are still quite behind in 
political literacy since formal political education and educational institutions failed to 
cultivate their general interest and understanding of politics. Unlike youth activists, most 
of the non-youth participants stated that they had never joined any student movements or 
organisations when at the university. Only a few of them (2 out of 10) said they were 
representatives for the student council, but they had no supportive contact or networks to 
help entry to the activist community. In this regard, another reason why youth non-
participants were politically inactive was because they had no networks or personal contact 
to find a route into activism.   
 
 Therefore, overall, we could see that the absence of political socialisation 
experiences and mainly the influences of socialisation agents such as family and education, 
to stimulate political interest and civic knowledge amongst most of the youth non-
participants could be one of the reasons for their disengagement. In contrast to youth 
activists, young non-participants had typically grown up in families and environments in 
which political participation is regarded as insignificant, discouraging them from 
developing their own interest to take part in political activities. As social movements and 
protest activism in Malaysia are commonly associated with student activists, the lack of 





results from the absence of personal contacts or social networks which can help to gain 
access to the activist community.   
 
9.3 Political interest  
 
As political socialisation is one of the driving factors of young people’s political interest 
and attitude, and given that such socialisation experiences are absent amongst these 
respondents, we can assume that most of the youth non-participants have relatively low 
levels of political interest. Indeed, when we asked the respondents directly about their 
interest in politics, most of them (7 out of 10) apparently showed a very low interest in 
politics since they perceived politics as something boring, irrelevant, and monotonous, as 
mentioned by Non-participant (5), “For me, politics is something complicated and difficult 
to understand.” Non-participant (1) also thought similarly, saying that, “I have no interest 
in politics because politics is very complicated and there is too much manipulation from 
political parties. For me, politics is an arena for those who have greater power and 
influence.” Since politics is regarded as a complex and serious matter, only a certain group 
of people who possess power and influence are usually involved in politics. In addition, 
there was a common perception that young people’s lack of political interest was due to 
politicians’ misuse of powers, selfishness, and untrustworthiness. This can be reflected in 
the comments of Non-participant (2) “I do not have any interest in politics because 
politics has always been in an unfair situation where those in powers remain rich, while 
the normal people continue to be poor.” In a similar vein, Non-participant (3) also pointed 
out, “Honestly, I do not have any interest in politics because I saw that many government 
policies and efforts only benefited and served the interests of the government itself, rather 
than the people.” Therefore, we could sum up that youth non-participants display lower 
levels of political interest because they tend to associate politics with political players, 
resulting to a greater cynicism towards politicians and institutions. This supports findings 
from the literature (Henn et al., 2005; O’Toole et al., 2003; Mardle and Taylor, 1987) that 
young people in the UK are highly pessimistic about political leaders and parties.  
 
 Furthermore, the decline of political interest amongst young people also relates to 
their limited understanding and knowledge about politics, as indicated by Non-participant 
(8), “The reason why I do not have any interest in politics is because I do not understand 





politics makes many young people decide to be ‘silent readers’ or ‘observers’ in politics. 
As mentioned earlier, whilst most of these respondents were highly educated citizens, they 
admit that they know less about politics. Again, this resonates with the findings of Henn 
and Foard (2014) on young people in Britain. For the remaining respondents (3 out 10), 
although they displayed strong interest in politics, they were only interested in mature and 
intellectual politics, as commented by Non-participant (6), “I am interested in politics 
because this is the best contribution that we can make to our country. But I do not like 
hanky-panky or dirty politics.” Additionally, the current political and economic conditions 
of this country also indirectly reinforced the interest in politics of young people, as argued 
by Non-participant (9), “I was not interested in politics before, but now I feel that I need to 
be politically aware and concerned about politics because of the impacts of political and 
economic instability in this country.” However, even some have a high level of political 
interest, but this does not guarantee they will engage actively in political activities because 
their engagement depends largely on the country’s current political and socioeconomic 
conditions. It would seem, therefore, youth political disengagement in Malaysia is 
attributed to low levels of political interest. 
 
9.4 Understandings of politics  
 
Based upon the responses given by the respondents on how they understood politics, four 
broad conceptualisations of politics can be identified. First, 4 out of 10 youth non-
participants associate politics with power struggle and influence, as stated by Non-
participant (9), “For me, politics is about power and influence. When we have influence, 
only then we can have the power to make whatever we think necessary.” In this sense, 
power is important for leadership because it gives the leader an ability to influence or 
control the people. But sometimes, power can be misused, unjust and abused by the leader. 
Therefore, for Non-participant (2), she believed that, “Politics is a great gamble for those 
who want power and money.” Second, 2 out of 10 respondents viewed politics as being 
connected to the government and administration. This can be reflected in the comment by 
Non-participant (6) that, “Politics is definitely about the government who takes the lead 
and is in charge of the government. And of course, there is the opposition and the current 
governing party and administration.” In a similar vein, Non-participant (10) also pointed 
out that, “Politics is about the government and it is an arena for people who want to show 





narrow conception of politics in which they framed politics as ‘political players’, mirroring 
the findings by Bhavnani (1994) that people, including the youth, relate politics with 
British party politics.  
 
In addition, some respondents (2 out of 10) were incapable of expanding their 
views on politics due to lack of knowledge. They claimed that the word ‘politics’ itself is 
vague and complicated to understand, as stated by Non-participant (3), “Honestly, I do not 
understand and know much about politics”, and Non-participant (8), “I know nothing 
about politics”. Others (2 out of 10) viewed politics negatively, related particularly to 
corruption and self-interest, as significantly emphasised by Non-participant (1), “Politics 
is about individuals who struggle for the community, and even for their personal 
interests”. Non-participant (7) also responded negatively to this issue by saying, “Politics 
is strongly related to corruption and money politics. We can never run away from this 
practice.” The perception that corruption and money politics are part of political practice 
in Malaysia appears to be widespread amongst young people in Malaysia, particularly 
when Najib’s premiership was accused of corruption.60 Overall, it could be seen that youth 
non-participants generally embraced an overly limited understanding of politics, 
conforming to the picture that is entirely consistent with the patterns of youth 
disengagement in established democracies (Henn et al., 2002; Henn and Foard, 2014; 
Quintelier, 2007). They often relate politics with political actors who try to win power and 
fulfil their own self-interest, rather than concerns about societal needs. This in turn makes 
them feel ‘politics’ is far off from their daily lives. Indeed, an overly limited understanding 
of politics amongst young Malaysians may be one reason for their lack of interest and 
motivation to participate in politics.  
 
                                                          
60 On July 2015, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the Sarawak Report alleged that almost RM 2.6 billion 
from the fund of 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a state-owned investment company, had been 
channelled into Najib’s personal bank account. However, Najib, who was also the chairman of the 1MDB 
advisory board, denied the allegations by claiming that the money was given by the Saudi royal family as a 
donation, to help UMNO win the 2013 election (Yang Razali, 2015). In reactions to this, the former prime 
minister, Mahathir condemned Najib’s mismanagement of 1MDB and strongly urged Najib to resign. To 
counter this criticism, Najib accused Mahathir of a ‘continuation of political sabotage’ to topple him. 
Meanwhile, the Deputy Prime Minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, publicly rebuked Najib for his involvement in 
1MDB scandal and continued to call for transparency and accountability in managing this issue. The political 
rift between Najib and his most likely successor, Muhyiddin, was clearly apparent when on July 28, 2015, he 
sacked Muhyiddin in a cabinet reshuffle, and appointed Zahid Hamidi as his deputy to replace Muhyiddin. 
Indeed, this move was seen as Najib’s attempt to prolong his political position by obviating ‘pressures’ to 






9.5 Attitudes towards ‘elite-directed’ political participation  
 
9.5.1 Why don’t young people register as voters?   
 
Evidently, although the number of new voters has increased by 354,141 in the second 
quarter of 2016, there are 4.2 million Malaysians remaining, largely young people, who are 
eligible voters but have yet to register (Shahanaaz Habib, 2016). Whilst voting is not the 
only way to influence political decisions, the ballot box remains the most common way for 
young people to get engaged with the political system. As a majority of youth non-
participants do not cast their votes and are not registered as voters, when we asked whether 
voting is important in this country, most of them (8 out of 10) have an optimistic view that 
voting is really important to elect representatives who will lead the country, as explained 
by Non-participant (4), “As a Malaysian citizen, it is important to vote in elections 
because indirectly we can determine who will govern our country.” Through elections, 
voters have the ability to decide who represents them at national and local governments 
and voting itself reflects “the practice of Malaysian democracy” (Non-participant 6).61 
                                                          
61It is worth noting that the outcomes of elections in Malaysia are somewhat predictable because for the last 
few decades, the country’s longstanding ruling coalition the BN, won every national election since the first 
held in 1955. However, the last two elections (the 2008 and 2013 general elections) were the hardest battled 
and the least predictable compared to previous polls as the BN had a very narrow victory. For example, in 
the 2013 general election, the BN performed badly by securing only 133 out of 222 parliamentary seats (60 
percent of the total seats, a loss of 7 seats from the 2008 election), with 47 percent of popular votes (Weiss, 
2013:1136). Whilst BN’s vote dropped significantly for the first time, they managed to reclaim Kedah from 
the opposition. In terms of state elections, BN won 275 out of 505 state legislative assembly seats contested 
(54.5 percent), declined marginally compared to the 306 seats it had obtained in the 2008 election. Within 
BN, UMNO performed better by winning 88 parliamentary seats, fairly in the rural-Malay heartland 
constituencies—typically characterised as less educated, less informed, digitally disconnected and less 
acquiescent to change. BN secured a national victory only because of its strong support in Sabah and 
Sarawak (Gomez and Surinder Kaur, 2014:12), mostly held by local parties such as United Traditional 
Bumiputera Party (PBB), United Sabah Party (PBS) and Sarawak People’s Party (PRS). However, all 
Chinese-based BN parties suffered a major setback as the Chinese swung their votes to PR. Notably, BN also 
lost huge swathes of support from the youth and multi-ethnic urban middle classes who dissented against 
corruption, weak governance, ethnic discrimination, and lack of transparency (Weiss, 2013; Khoo Boo Teik, 
2013). The 13th election result was not due to the ‘tsunami’ of the Chinese as what Najib had claimed “a 
wave of Chinese support has washed away from BN” but it was truly the ‘tsunami of the Urban’.   
 
On the other hand, the PR coalition led by Anwar Ibrahim did extremely well in this election as they 
once again managed to deny a two-thirds majority for BN in the parliament, increased their share by seven 
new parliamentary seats from 82 that it had won in 2008, and successfully bolstering majority popular votes 
from 46.4 percent in 2008, to 50.8 percent in this election and enlarged its state legislative assembly seats 
from 190 to 229. Whilst PR had a majority popular vote due to the ‘first-past-the-post’ system that had been 
adopted by Malaysia, they failed to take the federal power. However, PR retained its power in urban 
industrialised states like Selangor and Penang, and made significant headway into BN’s stronghold of Johor, 
Sabah and Sarawak, while at the same time continuing its rule in Kelantan (Gomez and Surinder Kaur, 
2014:12). This showed that PR’s base support came from the urban settlement with large young and urban-





Although most respondents are in agreement that voting is important, half of them (5 out 
of 10) believed that their vote could not make a big difference in Malaysia, as argued by 
Non-participant (9), “Honestly, if I voted in the last election, it would not make any 
change.” Non-participant (5) also reacted negatively by commenting that, “Vote or not, it 
does not bring any changes to the country because we already knew who will win the 
election.” In this respect, youth non-participants have a weak sense of personal efficacy 
where they are doubtful that their votes will have any meaningful effects on elections and 
political changes. This conforms to the previous literature (Almond and Verba, 1963; 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Norris, 2002) that the low levels of political efficacy leads 
people to be politically disengaged. 
 
 Furthermore, 4 out of 10 respondents attributed this to lack of awareness about the 
importance of the electoral process and voting registration. This can be reflected in the 
comments of Non-participant (4), “One factor that caused me not to register as voters is 
because I was not aware and alert about the voting system and I think that it is better to 
wait till the last minute to register as a voter.” Non-participant (1) in a similar vein also 
stated that, “I do not have an awareness and feel no interest to register since voting is not 
compulsory in Malaysia.” Voting is a basic democratic right, but when it is not made 
compulsory, citizens have the right to choose whether to vote or not vote. This supports the 
argument by Wan Ahmad (2010) that Malaysian youths are not taking on the role of a 
registered voter because they feel that voting is unimportant, and they are not aware of the 
benefits of voting.  
 
 In addition, out of ten youths interviewed, three felt unmotivated to register as 
voters because the voting system in Malaysia is too complicated and outdated, as argued 
by Non-participant (5):  
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
governance, political empowerment, and inequality across the population—these were clearly spelled by PR 
in its election campaign. Meanwhile, the Chinese support for PR also flourished tremendously. It is obvious 
that the PR excessive controlled of social media coverage during election was one of the factors that 
contributed to the ability of PR to win majority popular supports (Mohd Azizuddin, 2014:136). Interestingly, 
the 2013 election highlighted some significant points: First, race or ethnicity remained the crucial factor in 
determining Malaysian voting pattern, but it seems to have been superseded by the urban-divide and class-
divide. Second, the election outcome firmly showed that Malaysia was in a transition to the two-party 






“As I remembered, there were officers from the Election Comission of Malaysia 
(SPR) came and helped my brother to fill in the voter’s registration form. But now, 
no one come to help me. For me, the whole process is complicated.”  
 
They claimed that the counter-based registration model used by the electoral commission 
is outdated and everything must be done offline.62 In this regard, those who are eligible to 
vote must register with the electoral commission via specific offices and post offices or 
they can register through the political parties. However, the electoral commission has been 
dogged by criticism due to persistent inaccuracies of large numbers of missing voters and 
phantom voters from the electoral rolls (Lim Hong Hai, 2002). Therefore, the flaws in the 
voter registration system are one of the major factors that makes many young people lose 
their confidence in the system, as mentioned by Non-participant (6), “I think sometimes I 
feel doubt about the voting system as it is not clearly transparent. When the system is not 
transparent, there is not much change we can make through the election.” This means that 
voting can bring change to the system if the government ensures transparency of the voting 
process, as depicted by Non-participant (3), “We can make a big change through voting. 
But it depends on the transparency and integrity of the electoral system and the vote itself. 
The more transparent the system, the more changes we can make.” In the Malaysian 
context, however, fraud and malpractice are pervasive in elections through the practice of 
gerrymandering, issues of phantom voters, the problem of indelible ink (in which it can be 
easily washed off), an uneven playing field in the media, and intimidation at the ballot box. 
The electoral commission (SPR) is also faced severe criticism for its lack of impartiality 
and widespread inefficiencies, which worked in favour of the incumbent government.  
 
 The rest (2 out of 10) admitted that they are still not ready to register as voters 
because of personal restrictions such as employment, housing, starting a family, etc. This 
is reflected in the comments of Non-participant (7), “I know how to register as a voter, but 
I do not have enough time to do so”, and Non-participant (8), “I think I am not ready to 
vote because I was too concerned about finding a job after graduating.” This supports the 
hypothesis of the life-cycle theory (Verba and Nie, 1972; Norris, 2003; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980; Van Deth, 1990) that young people are focusing more on building 
social status and they will turn to politics when those issues are resolved. 
                                                          
62Additionally, the constitution (Article 113) provides that the important functions of Electoral Commission 
as conducting the elections, delineating electoral constituencies, and preparing for electoral rolls, including 





9.5.2 Why don’t young people join political parties? 
 
Partisanship is one of the most important modes of institutionalised political participation 
in a modern democracy. However, based on the previous qualitative analyses from the 
academics, politicians, and youth activists, they agreed that young people in Malaysia are 
less likely to be a member of any political party and organisation. So, when we asked 
youth non-participants why they do not join political parties, some (4 out of 10) argued 
that they have no alternative because political parties are not convincing enough to bring a 
better political transformation to Malaysia and they are currently facing different degrees 
of internal conflict. An example of this point of view is given by Non-participant (5), “For 
me, political parties, whether the government or the opposition, were just the same. Both 
are not convincing enough to provide a better future for this country. I don’t think these 
parties are sincere in helping the people, but they are more concerned about their own 
interests”. Non-participant (8) also pointed out, “Actually, I think that I have no 
alternative because the ruling party and the opposition are corrupted and have their own 
problems”. Young people’s frustration with political parties, be it the government or the 
opposition, makes them have a critical attitude which in turn makes them less desire to be 
a member of any party. This corresponds with earlier findings (Chapters 6 and 7) that 
young people are more likely to be ‘fence-sitters’ or not affiliated with any parties because 
most parties in Malaysia were not seen as ‘credible’ and convincing enough to bring about 
change to the country.  
 
 Additionally, 2 out of 10 respondents attributed their non-partisan attitude to the 
complex structure and function of political parties, conforming earlier findings (Chapters 6 
and 7) that the hierarchical structure of political parties was a main barrier that prevented 
young people from participating. As noted by Non-participant (1):  
 
“Most political parties in this country have difficulties to accept new reforms 
because they are based more on seniority and experiences. So, for young people, it 
is difficult to engage with them as our ideas will simply be rejected. And, the 
process of becoming a politician also very complicated and takes a long time.”  
 
Non-participant (7), in a similar vein also commented that, “Whatever ideas or views from 
young people have not been heard by the parties,” For example, UMNO is clearly seen as 





As a result, it is difficult for young politicians to show their talent and stand out in a party. 
In particular, some parties also have a complex registration system where members need to 
go through several grassroots levels like state, branch, and division. According to Non-
participant (6), “I tried to join this party, but unfortunately, I received no feedback from 
them.” Therefore, the tendency to be rejected as the prospective members is quite high 
compared to a party with an open registration system. Others (2 out of 10) believed that the 
behaviour of politicians who are unable to keep their promises makes young people less 
interested to join political parties, as stated by Non-participant (3), “I think, one of the 
reasons is the leaders themselves. Before the election, they make vast promises, but after 
being elected, they break their promises.” When the leaders fail to play their roles, and 
bring no changes to the society, this means that citizens’ participation in politics are “less 
meaningful and effective” (Non-participant 7). The remaining (2 out of 10) argued that 
their limited understanding of the concept of partisanship is a main factor that makes them 
less attracted to be a member of political parties. This is reflected in the comments by Non-
participant (8), “I don’t understand anything about political parties and partisanship. So, 
it is hard for me to decide which party I like the most.” Non-participant (9) is also in 
agreement with this view by responding that, “I do not understand, and I am, somehow 
less interested in partisan politics.” In this context, limited knowledge and understanding 
on partisanship is a result of little or no connection between political parties and young 
people. They are not providing young people with profound information about parties’ 
programmes and policies.  
 
 Most political elite members (see Chapter 7) had claimed that they have adequately 
engaged with young people, but when we asked these youth non-participants, only 2 out of 
10 were optimistic that political parties have communicated with them, as noted by Non-
participant (1), “The parties are trying to communicate with us, but only on specific times 
and occasions such as during the election.” Political parties often meet face-to-face with 
people during elections for campaigning and to woo people’s vote. For the rest (4 out of 
10), they believed that only some politicians are actively trying to bridge the gap with 
young people by engaging with them, as stated by Non-participant (10), “I think only some 
of the politicians have been doing this, for example, Khairy Jamaluddin. He would be the 
finest example for youngsters and even now, he is doing so much engagement with the 
youngsters.” Whilst they agreed with this statement, the remaining youth non-participants 





at the grassroots, as reflected in the comments of Non-participant (6), “There are certain 
MPs who will visit and meet the people in their constituencies. But there are many MPs 
who are just sending the officers and these officers can do nothing.” It was also 
consistently claimed that politicians are remote and inaccessible since they sometimes do 
not understand the needs of young people and are aware of the real problems of society, as 
argued by Non-participant (5), “We can see in the media that sometimes politicians have 
confused young people with their illogical issues, without facts and figures. I don’t think 
politicians went to the ground to clearly see what happened to the people.” The failure of 
political leadership to have much deeper engagement with young people has resulted in 
increases of irrelevance and youth-unfriendly policies and programs.  
 
  Overall, apart from the complex structure of political parties, there was also a 
negative and critical perception amongst youth non-participants of political parties. The 
general consensus was that political parties were unresponsive to young people’s demands, 
disengaged from young people and attempted to communicate only during election time 
for the sake to win votes from the youth. This once again reflects the findings of Henn and 
Foard (2014) on young people in Britain. Whilst party activism is generally low and 
perceived to be the less desirable mode of political participation in Malaysia, a majority (6 
out of 10) believed that this channel is the most efficient way to influence political 
decision directly compared to voting. This can be reflected in the comments of Non-
participant (4), “I think if I register as a voter and voted in the election, the impact is not 
as big as directly participate in a political party. When we join the party, it might affect 
the government’s decisions.” Non-participant (5) also added, “When we are inside the 
political party, indirectly we can contribute opinions or voices, but it depends on the top 
leadership to hear or not.” In the context of Malaysia, although we have many platforms 
that enable us to politically engage, but becoming a member of a political party is often 
selected by many people since the party is the primary path for future politicians. 
 
9.5.3 What makes young people ‘turn off’ politics? 
 
There are several factors underlying why they are disengaged from politics in general as 
emphasised by youth non-participants. First, the most significant explanation of youth 
political disengagement is related to the feeling of ‘fear’ amongst young people due to the 





participate freely in politics in Malaysia as they have very limited political rights and 
freedoms, as argued by Non-participant (5), “I think we are not completely free to 
participate in politics because there are still barriers that restrict our freedom. For 
example, students are not free to engage in political activities since the AUKU law has 
restricted their political rights.” The repressive laws such as the AUKU, Sedition Act, 
SOSMA etc., appear to have effectively blocked the opportunity for young people to 
politically engage in both conventional and unconventional politics. In this regard, young 
people face obstacles to fully exercise their democratic rights because they are undermined 
by the government’s draconian laws, as depicted by Non-participant (6), “As a government 
servant, I cannot actively participate in politics.” Non-participant (7), in a similar vein, 
also commented, “I think the violent repression used by the government on dissidents have 
scared not only me, but young people as whole, from getting involved in politics.” This 
corresponds to the views of youth activists that the ‘culture of fear’ amongst young people, 
makes them too intimidated to participate in politics. According to Non-participant (4), 
“Political freedom is limited and there is a double-standard where some group is given the 
freedom to engage in politics, but those who are against the authority will usually 
encounter excessive restrictions from the government.” The respondents viewed that many 
laws and policies as biased and have a double-standard against groups who have strongly 
opposed the government. In turn, Malaysia’s democracy is in a worse shape or a 
“democracy on paper only” (Non-participant 1). The increasing repressive measures taken 
by the regime to criminalize democratic dissent in Malaysia has clearly constrained them 
from actively engaging in politics more generally as the costs to participate are greater 
than the benefits (Hibbs, 1973; Muller, 1985; Davenport, 2007).  
  
Second, 4 out of 10 youth non-participants admitted that politics seems so 
complicated that they cannot really understand what is going on, as pointed out by Non-
participant (7), “Personally, I am not interested to participate in political activities 
because politics and the government are too complex terms to understand.” In this regard, 
there is a perception that politics is a complex subject which young people find hard to 
grasp and understand. Clearly, young Malaysians have a very limited knowledge and 
understanding of politics since they are less exposed to political education. This confirms 
previous literature (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Henn and Foard, 2014; Quintelier, 
2007) that young people have lower levels of political knowledge relative to their older 





to increase knowledge and interest in politics. An example of this point of view is given by 
Non-participant (1), “Political education is essential. We do not need a subject in a 
curriculum, but we need political exposure in general.” Young people also shared a 
general perception that politics is a dirty business as the politicians keep thinking about 
winning and maintaining power rather than working together to provide better services to 
the people, as argued by Non-participant (6), “Sometimes, people get involved in politics 
for the sake of money because some parties are willing to give money to get support. This 
is a normal practice in Malaysia now.” For example, Najib inaugurated a direct cash 
handout program, referred as Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (BRIM, or 1Malaysia Peoples 
Aid) in 2012, ostensibly to help low-income households cope with the rising cost of living, 
while at the same time prompting to woo votes for BN.63 The government is still giving 
out BR1M, despite it being greatly criticised by Mahathir as BN’s political ploy or a form 
of vote buying.  
 
In addition, youth disengagement stems from the perception that politics does not 
bring about political change. Some (3 out of 10) felt that their engagement in politics does 
not make any difference, as mentioned by Non-participant (4), “I felt that we are unable to 
bring any change through our political participation. So, we have to accept whatever is 
being done by the government.” Interestingly, some youth believed that government is 
unresponsive to their needs and voices. Therefore, they feel marginalised and distrust the 
government’s ability to make meaningful decisions for them, as commented by Non-
participant (8), “I think that many young Malaysians are upset that their voices and views 
are often ignored by the policy makers and the government. When our voices are unheard, 
it is better to stay away from politics.” This means that there is no point exercising 
democratic rights because young people are being politically neglected by the government. 
In this respect, young Malaysians are perceived to have a lack of political efficacy, 
whether internal or external as they feel unable to act effectively in politics and the 
decision-makers are unresponsive to their demands. This may explain their disengagement 
from conventional politics as political efficacy has been said to have greater effect on 
                                                          
63 The ulterior motive of BR1M is to create new patron-client relationships with the electorate, especially in 
rural areas, to retain BN’s hegemony. Notably, the BR1M program was extremely expensive as the 
government had to spend almost RM14 billion that reached 7.4 million recipients every year (Haikal Jalil, 







political participation (Norris, 2002; O’Toole et al, 2003). Apart from political exclusion, 
3 out of 10 respondents attributed their disengagement mainly to life-cycle effects—young 
people are struggling for ‘start-up’ problems such as they do not have a stable job, house 
and family, as indicated by Non-participant (2), “I don’t have time to think about politics 
because I am more concerned about my career and future planning.” Non-participant (9) 
also pointed out that, “I am not involved and am indifferent to politics as I am too busy 
building up a career and family. I was educated to build career first before politics.” This 
confirms findings of the literature (Barnes et al., 1979; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2009; 
Garcia Albacete, 2012) that the transition to adulthood or life-cycle effects may explain 
why young people are less likely to engage in politics than older cohorts.  
 
9.6 Attitude towards ‘elite-challenging’ political participation  
 
In the quantitative analyses, the results show that there is no significant difference between 
young and old people in elite-challenging activism.  However, in the qualitative analyses, 
most viewed that ‘elite-challenging’ forms of participation, particularly online activism 
and protest activities may be replacing the conventional participation as new ways to 
influence political decisions for young Malaysians. When being asked about their political 
activities, most of them do not refrain from engaging in political activities even if they are 
politically uninterested. However, most of the youth non-participants stated that they 
commonly participated in these three forms of participation or low-risks participation: 
 
1) Political discussion 
 
According to Kim et al., (1999:362), political discussion can be defined as, “all kinds of 
political talk, discussion, or argument as long as they are voluntarily carried out by free 
citizens without any specific purpose or predetermined agenda.” In this regard, political 
discussion could be considered as conversation or talk about any topics relevant to 
‘politics’. It appears that 9 out of 10 respondents agreed that the most prevalent form of 
political activity that has been frequently engaged by them is political discussions with 
friends and family. This is reflected in the comments by Non-participant (6), “I think 
political activity that I like the most and I usually do is gather together with friends to 
discuss political issues.” Non-participant (9), in a similar vein also pointed out that, “I use 





on the Youth Index 201564, discussions on political issues amongst youth was the highest 
indicator in the domain of political socialisation with a score of 48.29. Political discussion 
may likely stimulate the interest of young people to participate in political activity because 
it generates greater political knowledge and self-efficacy (Valentino and Sears, 1998; 
Hoffman et al., 2007). However, in the case of Malaysia, though young Malaysians are 
more interested to get involve in informal political discussion, they are not really interested 
in politics and what more to exercise their right as citizens, including casting a ballot in 
elections. 
 
2) Online activism 
 
As expected, a majority (8 out of 10) indicated that they have engaged online and used 
online activism for political purposes, as mentioned by Non-participant (4), “I used social 
media to explore political issues and information, and to find out what is happening in this 
country.” Non-participant (2) is also in agreement with this view by responding that, “I 
only access the online media to be aware about what had happened and read trending 
political news.” In this regard, online media has become increasingly important amongst 
the Malaysian youth for information seeking or ‘information-based’ activity, including 
searching for political information, rather than ‘participation-based’ activity such as 
posting political contents, friending politicians, or participating in online debates (Jensen, 
2013). This confirms the findings of Freeman (2013) that young Malaysians prefer online 
news instead of traditional news media. The primary source of political news for young 
people in Malaysia is online. Online activism creates more engagement opportunities and 
lowers participation costs since the information is updated, available at any moment and 
free from government censorship. Therefore, the internet has been a ‘playing field’ that has 
reduced the tendency for young people to engage in traditional forms of political 
involvement.65 Notwithstanding, the former prime minister Abdullah Badawi also 
                                                          
64The Malaysia Youth Index provides data on youth well-being in Malaysia, and is specifically used by the 
government to establish youth development programmes. 
 
65It is worth mentioning that the internet, primarily social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube were 
an important factor that contributed to the increase in support to the opposition in the 2008 and 2013 general 
elections. This media was strong enough to influence young people to vote for the opposition parties as the 
number of internet users, most of whom were young people, increased dramatically from 2.7 million in 2000 
to 14 million in 2008. This means, within eight years, the growth rate of internet users rose sharply bhy 302.8 
percent (Koh, 2008:25). Up to 2012, the total number of internet users in Malaysia was 17.7 million, 





acknowledged that the failure of the ruling BN in the online war made them lose the youth 
vote in the 2008 election. As he argued, “We thought that the newspapers, the print media, 
the television were important but young people were looking at text messages and blogs. 
(The influence of alternative media) was painful.” (New Straits Times, 26 Mac 2008:2). 
Similarly, the 2013 general election also proved that the social media war was won by the 
opposition. This is perhaps due to the domination of social media by the opposition, so the 
failure of BN to handle negative perceptions caused them to lose the popular vote.  
 
3) Community works or volunteerism 
 
Volunteering activities in Malaysia, although generally low, have started to increase. 
Evidently, a recent study conducted by Turiman et al., (2011) showed that about 74.6 
percent of the sample of 5,019 youths indicated that they have been involved in 
volunteering activities including community services, sport, education, and culture. 
However, out of ten youths interviewed, only half claimed to have engaged in community 
works or volunteerism, as commented by Non-participant (10), “I have volunteered myself 
to one political person to facilitate his program and it is like a roadshow and we have 
done so many things. But then, why I am engaged is because it is beneficial for the 
community.” In this sense, the main factor that motivates youth to participate in 
volunteerism is simply because they want to help or to assist others in need. But, many 
Malaysian youths are more likely to join a loosely-structured organisation or move 
independently in volunteerism, rather than joining formal youth organisations. This can be 
reflected in the comments by Non-participant (8), “I have been involved in volunteering 
activities to help those worst affected by the floods, but not attached to any particular 
organisation.” This in line with the findings of the Ministry of Youth and Sports that out 
of 8,000 youth organisations registered under the registrar’s office, only 30 percent are 
considered active with an overall membership of around 2.8 million youths (Utusan 
Malaysia, January 13, 2005).  
 
 When talking about political protest in Malaysia, none of the respondents have ever 
participated in a demonstration or protest. However, half of them (5 out of 10) believed 
that it is important to protest when disagreeing with something or feeling discontent with 





express our dissatisfaction on certain issues. We can demonstrate as long as it is 
organised in a proper way and not disturbing public order.” Non-participant (8) is also in 
agreement with this view by responding that, “Protest is important to make our voices 
heard and to ensure the government actually pay attention to us.” Although many young 
Malaysians feel grievances, anger and discontentment about the government and political 
system, these emotions are not strong enough to motivate them to participate in protests. 
Perhaps young people have a shared belief that protesting is a risky activity that makes 
them fearful about the personal consequences of protest. This is because the government 
continues to use excessive force and detention towards protesters, and protest has long 
been constructed by the government as something that is “…not an accepted culture in our 
country” (Najib, 2016). As protest is considered against the culture, therefore “...it is not 
effective in bringing about changes or influencing political decisions because the veto of 
power lies in the hands of the government” (Non-participant 2). In particular, protest 
remains governed by unclear legal norms in Malaysia and sometimes is deemed illegal by 
refusing organisers permission to take to the street. As argued by Tarrow (1998), 
contentious politics and revolutionary activities may be higher in the countries where 
participation channels are blocked by political restraints such as repression, but this does 
not apply in the case of Malaysia. 
 
9.6.1 What drives young people to become involved in elite-challenging political 
participation? 
 
There is no doubt that young Malaysians are channelling their participation in different 
modes of elite-challenging activism, mainly low-risk forms of participation such as 
political discussion, online activism, and volunteerism or civic engagement. When being 
asked whether these political activities are part of democracy, most of them (8 out of 10) 
agreed that these are other proper ways that can be used by citizens to influence political 
decisions and they are part of democracy, as stated by Non-participant (1), “Informal 
political participation, yet still democratic actions.” This opinion is also extended 
similarly by Non-participant (4) in her comment, “Indirectly, some people have their own 
opinion and want to express it to the higher authority through different popular and 
democratic means that are commonly popular today.” However, Non-participant (3) 
opposed this argument by saying that, “I think it depends on the government to decide 





the government has full autonomy in this country.” It is the political elite’s role to decide 
whether or not these modes of political participation are democratic and what they think is 
best for every people. 
 
 Overall, youth non-participants varied widely in term of their motivations to 
participate in elite-challenging activism. Most of them (6 out of 10) argued that this mode 
of political participation is fun and more relaxed compared to the formal ones because it 
allows them to share political thoughts and views without any misunderstanding and 
conflicts. This can be seen in the comments by Non-participant (4), “Activities like 
political discussion and online activism are stress-free where we can express different 
political opinions respectively, without any misunderstanding.” Similarly, Non-participant 
(5) also commented that: 
 
“I feel very comfortable to discuss political issues with my friends, especially with 
those who have the same point of view as I do, instead of discussing politics in a 
formal channel. Besides, I am afraid if we disagree with something, it may create 
misunderstanding since politics is a very sensitive issue.”  
 
To be specific, young people are more contented to speak about politics with their 
‘intimate circle’ such as friends and family instead of the public. The fear of harming or 
offending others, personal disapproval and punishment proved to be the reason why they 
are more likely to choose informal ways to participate in politics. In addition, 4 out of 10 
felt that engaging in unconventional political participation is somewhat easy and free from 
any interference from the government, as pointed out by Non-participant (9), “For me, this 
channel is relatively ‘cool’ since we have been warned that we cannot freely talk about 
politics.” The ongoing government crackdowns on free speech by abusing legal process to 
harass critics have deepened the culture of fear amongst the youth. Thus, it is clear that 
‘the culture of fear’ is not only a ‘roadblock’ to political participation, rather, it is 
perceived by young people as a convincing reason why they are moving away from 
traditional politics towards alternative forms of political action.  
 
 For some (4 out of 10), they believed that they were motivated primarily by 
specific issues that have been publicised in the social media, as mentioned by Non-
participant (8), “I was very attracted to the issues that went viral in the media, especially 





by saying that, “Only through online media we can get the latest and updated political 
issues and I think this is the best and fastest way to influence political decisions.” In this 
regard, youth involvement in informal channels is issue-driven or centred on issues that are 
relevant and interest them—ranging from personal, national, and global issues, conforming 
to the argument of Manning (2013) that young people engaged with issues rather than a 
particular ideology or set of principles. Out of ten youth interviewed, 7 of them revealed 
that the economy and cost of living are ranked as youth’s greatest concerns now, as 
explained by Non-participant (3), “The most critical problem faces by youth today is the 
rising cost of living and people have been dragged into paying higher rate of taxes.” 
Young people are, in fact, aware and informed about current affairs that are occurring 
around them because they have used online media excessively. This parallels with the 
findings of Pandian (2014b) that the main factors which affect youth in Malaysia the most, 
particularly students, are the good price increases, unemployment, and educational 
prospects.  
 
 When we asked them further in the interviews, whether ethnicity is still an 
important issue for young people, a majority of the respondents (9 out of 10) agreed that 
communal politics is no longer relevant and young people are against racism in Malaysia, 
as indicated by Non-participant (9), “I am not interested in ethnic-based politics. Because 
for me, politics must be equal for all races.” This supports the argument by Mandal (2004) 
that young people appeared to have embraced a new multi-racial identity and emerged as a 
bulwark against the practice of ethnic politics in this country. However, most of them (9 
out of 10) believed that racial sentiment strongly exists, and race relations remain shaky in 
Malaysia. This is reflected in the comments by Non-participant (1), “Undoubtedly, ethnic 
sentiment still exists in politics and most parties are fighting for the rights of their ethnic 
groups. We cannot run away from racism because it is part of the system and society.” In 
fact, there are some parties that were formed on a non-communal basis, but “one ethnic 
group will always dominate and take control” (Non-participant 6). Thus, a non-communal 
party still has to play the communal approach in order to maintain power.66 
                                                          
66 Historically, the first test for ‘ethnic bargaining’ was the Kuala Lumpur Municipal election in 1952. The 
party who won this election would lead the country for independence. The UMNO lacked campaign funds 
and faced a strong challenge from the non-communal party, the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) to gain 
votes from the majority Malays constituencies. Therefore, the MCA made an ad hoc agreement with the 
leaders of UMNO to fund their electoral campaigns. The political pact of UMNO-MCA won nine out of 
twelve seats in the election. In 1953, this pact was formally established at the national level, with the 





9.7 Democracy in Malaysia: the role of youth  
  
The role of youth in Malaysian democracy cannot be in any way underestimated as they 
make up a majority of the population. Therefore, political disengagement and the lack of 
political interest amongst young Malaysians could threaten the future of democracy in this 
country. However, when being asked whether youth political participation strengthens the 
democratisation process, overall, 7 out of 10 argued that their engagement in politics is 
essential in strengthening the democracy or at least, could support the effective functioning 
of democracy in Malaysia. According to Non-participant (2), “If we look at young people 
today, they have fresh ideas and a more aggressive spirit than the older generation. So, 
they are steering the country towards democracy, or at least, to adopt principles of 
democratic governance.” Non-participant (7) also reacted positively by commenting that, 
“I think young people are always the first to speak out on democracy and they often 
express incredibly strong political views. Sometimes, the government considers youth’s 
demands. Indirectly, this could help to strengthen the democratisation process in 
Malaysia.” Although it is generally perceived that young Malaysians are politically 
ignorant, they play a role as a key deciding factor in determining the outcome of elections 
and shaping the political landscape of Malaysia. Young people are largely unaligned but 
engaged, tech-savvy and a ‘critical citizen’ generation—those who viewed both the ruling 
party and the opposition with scepticism and wanted the whole system to be improved 
(Welsh, 2012). In particular, young Malaysians are given their highest recognition of the 
problems of corruption and inequality, as well as more inclined to democratic expansion 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Alliance, then contested in the first Malayan general election in 1955, where they secured majority seats 51 
out of 52. This victory proved that the Alliance’s viability and its elite accommodation for managing the 
political salience of ethnicity were supported by the Malays and convinced the British to grant independence 
to the country.  
The elites of these three parties worked out to draft some key substances for the constitution through 
the negotiation and compromise or so-called ‘the bargaining behind closed door’. The bargain or the quid 
pro quo arrangement, came out with specific key points in which liberal citizenship requirements, Jus Soli 
and economic rights would be granted to the non-Malays, but in return the Malays would have a 
constitutional protection—the special position of the Malay Rulers, Malays special rights (Article 153), 
Islam as the official religion (Article 3), and Malay as the sole national language (Article 152). These key 
principles were written down in the Malayan constitution and were viewed as the multiethnic ‘social 
contract’ or generally known as the Merdeka (Independence) compromise (Crouch, 1996). In other words, 
the constitution reflected a social contract between various ethnic groups and recognised the plurality of 
Malayan population. Although there was not formally written, but the elites understood that UMNO and the 
Malays were “primus inter pares (first among equals) in politics, while in return the business pursuit of the 
non-Malays would remain free of hindrances or persecution” (Mauzy, 2006:53). In particular, the inter-
communal coalition formula or consociational democracy, which recognised the Malay supremacy, was the 
very basis of constitutional polity and ethnic solidarity, which led to the independence of the Federation of 






(Welsh and Chang, 2012). Even the economic and political conditions in Malaysia are 
favourable for democratic pressures, but due to the widespread corruption and repression 
from the government, the opportunity for young people to enhance democratic change has 
been ‘blocked’.  
 
 As a political opportunity for youth to strengthen the democratisation process was 
blocked, therefore, 2 out of 10 respondents believed that youth political engagement may 
be leading towards greater authoritarianism, as stated by Non-participant (4), “…even 
more young people are participating and strongly campaigned for democracy, the 
government will use its power to stifle political dissents.” In a similar vein, Non-
participant (1) also commented that, “…if any attempts to establish true democracy have 
been thwarted, there is nothing much we can do about it.” Although there is solidarity and 
commitment for democratic change among youth activists, the unwillingness of ruling 
elites to accommodate popular demands for change leaves this country continuing with a 
legacy of authoritarian rule.  
 
 It is important to get as many young people as possible engaged in the political 
process because shaping their habits of participation could develop more active citizens in 
the future (Franklin, 2004). At present, there are some youth programme and policy 
initiatives by elites such as the Malaysian youth policy, youth parliament, school of 
democracy etc., to encourage greater youth engagement in politics. However, these 
programs are fragmented, selective, and exclusive to a certain segment of youth 
population, as pointed out by Non-participant (4), “I think many initiatives taken by the 
government for young people, like the youth parliament, only represent and benefited one 
side of youth society.” Therefore, some effective strategies are needed to boost youth 
political participation as suggested by these youth non-participants. First, some (3 out of 
10) suggested that more youth programme and activities should be initiated by political 
elites in order to eliminate negative perceptions of politicians and to decrease the gap 
between them and young people, as mentioned by Non-participant (8), “Political leaders 
must carefully plan and maximise activities which may interest young people and in 
accordance with their trend.” Young people have various needs, concerns and desires that 
differ from those of older people. Therefore, by knowing what interest young people, 
politicians may have a deeper understanding of how to facilitate political engagement 





should go to the grassroots and talk directly with young people to figure out their current 
problems.”  
 
 In addition, 3 out of 10 youth interviewed proposed that young people need to be 
educated on politics either through formal or informal institutions, as depicted by Non-
participant (9), “We should make politics such an interesting subject by making it 
compulsory to attract more young people.” In Malaysia, the educational system is highly 
centralised where the autonomy to implement the curriculum and syllabus lies in the hand 
of the federal government. There are no policies or emphasis on politics as a compulsory 
subject in schools, but politics has only been covered on an ad-hoc basis through core 
subjects like Malaysian history or civic education. At the private universities, Malaysian 
Study or Nationhood is made as one compulsory courses for all students to instil the spirit 
of patriotism, loyalty, and belonging to the country (Mohd Mahzan et al.,2013). However, 
this is not enough to educate youth to have a better understanding of politics. Therefore, 
many independent groups and NGOs emerged, such as Kelab Bangsar Utama (KBU), 
Youth Open University, The Lecture Book and so on, take an initiative by providing 
informal political education for young people through the organisations of political talks 
and intellectual discourses outside the university.   
 
 Some (3 out of 10) argued that young people should be given more space and 
opportunity in the political arena to become change makers, as mentioned by Non-
participant (2), “Giving young people more freedom to voice out their political views and 
encouraging more young people to channel their leadership capabilities in political 
parties and electoral politics,” and Non-participant (6), “Civil servants should be given 
leeway to be active in politics, and to some extent, they must be allowed to assert political 
affiliation.” As the civil servants are more well-informed with the strength and 
shortcomings of policies. Thus, they must be given a free rein to express constructive 
criticism to improve government’s administrative system and to serve people effectively. 
Furthermore, 2 out of 10 youth non-participants recommended the government to 
implement a fair and transparent system to restore the confidence of young people, as 
argued by Non-participant (5), “I think the whole electoral system needs to be 100 percent 
fair because if the system is unjust, how can people be involved in making a difference.” 
However, for Non-participant (7), she believed that, “Young people are more interested to 





supports arguments of Weiss (2013) and Khoo Boo Teik (2013) that the ruling party lost 
huge supports in the 2013 general election amongst the youth and multi-ethnic urban 
middle class who dissented against corruption, weak governance, ethnic discrimination, 




To sum up, the findings from a group of young non-participants provide some further 
answers to the puzzle of youth disengagement in Malaysia. Several main findings to be 
highlighted from this chapter. Firstly, although young non-participants have the necessary 
resources such as university education and paid work, the absence of political socialisation 
experiences, particularly influences from family and school in stimulating interest and 
knowledge of politics is one of factor in their disengagement. In this regard, the non-
functioning roles of family and educational institutions to stimulate young people’s interest 
and knowledge in politics could be one major factor why young people find politics as 
something complex to understand and have difficulties in grasping the meaning of politics. 
Second, young non-participants ‘turn-off’ from politics because they do not have any 
social networks or links to the activist community including any political party. Third, 
young non-participants appear to have an overly narrow and limited understanding of 
politics because they often associated politics with ‘political players’ and institutions who 
seems to be selfish and pursue their own agendas, are unable to keep their promises and 
fail to respond to young people’s needs. Apart from the low levels of political interest, 
qualitative analyses also revealed that the core factor explaining the large-scale exit of 
young Malaysians in politics is mainly due to the ‘culture of fear’—the government’s 
draconian laws that limit people’s freedom, and coupled with the lack of political efficacy, 
the complex structure of political parties and the voting system, feelings of alienation from 
political agents and life-cycle effects. Even if they are politically uninterested, they do 
engage in politics mainly in the form of low-risk unconventional activism, such as political 
discussion, online activism, and civic engagement. Young people are driven to participate 
in this mode of political action because it is relatively fun and more relaxed compared to 
formal modes, free from government interference and the issues addressed are relevant to 
their interests. Instead, they perceived these political activities as part of a democracy and 






When comparing these two groups, three significant points can be emphasised. 
First, there is a gap between politically active and inactive young people in Malaysia 
because the circle of young people who play an active role in politics remains small, while 
large segments of young Malaysians are passive and disenchanted with politics. The 
‘culture of fear’ and high risk involved when participating in politics in the autocratic state 
may be cited as the most significant reason why large young people have no courage to 
struggle for their democratic rights. Second, it is clear that youth activists are actually 
more politically aware and have a better understanding of politics than non-active youth 
since they received greater exposure and access to political information from the agents of 
political socialisation, mainly the family, educational institutions and media. They are also 
heavily inspired by social networks and the people from successful movements to actively 
engage in a movement cause. In other words, youth activists have more effective 
functioning socialising agents. Indeed, social support from the family and in-group 
members is the strongest support system along with inner strength for activists to be 
consistently active in their political activism. Finally, although there are rumblings of 
mounting discontent amongst youth activists over the political system and politicians, they 
are channelling this feeling into active political activism. This is because youth activists 
are more likely to have higher levels of political self-efficacy where they believe their 
political participation can bring about changes compared to youth non-participants. It is 
widely acknowledged that politically active citizens with high political self-efficacy tend 
to hold high political trust (Hooghe and Marien, 2013).  
 
In the concluding chapter, we will draw together the main findings of this thesis, 
more specifically, to make sense of whether the patterns of youth political participation in 
Malaysia exhibit distinctive patterns relative to established democracies and returning to 
discuss the conceptual framework that underpins this research, mainly the debate between 
elitist and popular conception of democracy. This thesis will end with identifying a 












The central aim of this thesis has been to investigate the dynamic patterns of youth 
political participation in Malaysia by challenging the dominant hypothesis that young 
people are more politically apathetic than older generations. In particular, we argued that 
young Malaysians in general are remarkably inactive in ‘elite-directed’ politics, and have 
been shifting towards ‘elite-challenging’ political participation such as protests and new 
social movements. This is motivated by their alienation from conventional politics, but not 
by apathy. This study aimed to examine some of the key theories of political participation 
(Putnam, 2000; Norris, 2002; Henn et al., 2002; Sloam, 2007; Dalton, 2007) and apply 
them to an analysis of youth participation in Malaysia. 
 
Most previous studies in Malaysia focused on youth participation in electoral 
activities and ‘traditional’ explanations of political participation, such as the resources or 
baseline model (Verba and Nie, 1972; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Parry, Moyser and 
Day, 1992; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). This study, however, moved beyond this 
by focusing on both conventional and unconventional types of political participation, and 
applying a multi-disciplinary perspective from political participation, economics, and 
social movement studies for a conceptual framework. To be specific, this study combined 
theories from politics, economy and social movement studies such as civic volunteerism 
(Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995), rational choice theory, mainly the general incentives 
model (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992) and the ‘Exit, Voice and Loyality’ framework 
(Hirschman, 1970), the social psychological model (Klandermans, 2007; Schussman and 
Soule, 2005), mobilising agencies (Putnam, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Norris, 
2003) and the institutional context (Kriesi, 2007; Taylor and Whittier, 1992; Dalton, 1996) 





distinctive factors relative to young people in Western democracies. There remains a 
dearth of empirical analysis on youth political participation in Malaysia within both elite-
directed and elite-challenging forms of participation. This study applied a mixed-methods 
approach to gauge the changing patterns of participation and attitudinal characteristics of 
young people over time by integrating the insights from analyses of existing data survey 
and qualitative interviews. In particular, the survey data allows for statistical analyses of 
the patterns of youth political participation, while the qualitative interview material 
complements the findings by providing detailed explanations. In this context, the goal of 
this final chapter is to look more broadly at the key findings of the study to provide a clear 
picture of youth political participation and non-participation in Malaysia, reflecting briefly 
the theoretical debates, discussing how the study has contributed to the literature, and 
suggesting directions for future research.  
 
10.2 Revisiting the research questions   
 
10.2.1 Young Malaysians: trajectories of political participation  
 
By using the existing survey data from the World Values Surveys Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
and building on Inglehart’s classification of ‘elite-directed’ and ‘elite-challenging’ political 
participation, Chapter 4 looked at the relationship between youth political participation and 
various attitudinal and demographic characteristics. The most important conclusion to be 
drawn is that youth political disengagement in Malaysia is clearly an empirical fact as 
young people are less likely than their elders to be politically engaged in both ‘elite-
directed’ and ‘elite-challenging’ activism. Indeed, the younger group, aged 21 to 40 years 
old, were less politically active than the older age group of 41 to 70 years old, across 
several political actions, and most markedly in voting and party membership. The 
empirical results show that there is no significant effect of being a young university 
graduate on both elite-directed and elite-challenging activism. Therefore, education does 
not play an important role to offset the gap between young cohort and older cohort in 
political activism. While in other contexts those who are more educated tend to be more 
likely to protest (Verba and Nie, 1972; Dalton, 1988), this appears to have no effect in the 






Chapter 5 also found similar evidence from another source of survey data, the 
Asian Barometer Wave 2 (2005-2008) and Wave 3 (2010-2012), that there is a dramatic 
decline of youth political participation in both ‘citizen-oriented’ and ‘cause-oriented’ 
activism, most markedly in voting, party membership, and signing petitions. In this regard, 
even when we tested whether intervening variables such as education and urban-rural 
divide have differential effects on youth political activism as found in some European 
countries, the effects turned out to be insignificant for each form of political activism. As 
such, in Malaysia, being more educated and living in an urban context do not attenuate the 
participatory gap between the younger and older generation in Malaysia. The differences 
between the levels of political participation in the younger cohort and older cohort are most 
pronounced in conventional politics, mainly voting and party membership. In terms of 
voting, although there is an upward trend between 2008 to 2013, young people still have 
lower levels of participation compared to the older generation. Party membership amongst 
young people dramatically shrinks relative to the older generation. This study also found 
that young Malaysians, compared to youth in Western democracies, do not prefer to be 
engaged in cause-oriented activism, including protest activities, as there were no significant 
differences between young and older people in this mode of participation. Although many 
argue that a series of large-scale protests, known as BERSIH or the ‘Yellow’ movement 
have mobilised largely young Malaysians into protest activism (Welsh, 2012), this study 
did not find evidence for this as a general population trend. In fact, as argued in Chapter 8, 
protest activism is often championed by small groups of committed youth or student 
activists, rather than a large number of young people. 
 
This finding is also supported in the material from the qualitative interviews with 
academics, politicians, youth activists and youth non-participants, where all groups 
claimed that young Malaysians have very low levels of political participation. Chapters 8 
and 9 probe this issue in more detail and show how young people are participating in 
politics, but only in the form of ‘everyday engagement’ or through low-risk channels such 
as online activism, community works and political discussion more generally. This 
suggests that young people in Malaysia do not reject politics per se. They may be turning 
away from mainstream politics, but they are connected differently to less conventional 
channels. As argued by Kimberlee (2002), Henn et al., (2002) and Marsh et al., (2007), 
young people are engaged in a broad range of activities that are often not seen as political. 





broad enough to include a different range of political activities, rather than be confined to 
formal participation as the only meaningful participation. The impact of technological 
advancement and social development has significantly expanded the opportunity for young 
people to participate in politics (Sloam, 2007; Norris, 2001; Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti, 
2005) by creating new forms of political participation, such as internet activism and social 
movement politics around online groups. Therefore, the results presented here support the 
arguments of the ‘anti-apathy’ school that young people can be seen as politically apathetic 
only when politics is narrowly defined, but that they are politically interested and engaged 
when more broadly conceived (O’Toole et al., 2003, Henn et al., 2002; Marsh et al., 2007).  
 
10.2.2 Findings on the attitudes of young people towards elite-directed participation 
 
Another contribution that the thesis makes to the existing literature on youth political 
participation is to rigorously apply different explanatory models that are commonly found 
in empirical studies of youth in established democracies to develop the conceptual 
framework. All these models contribute something towards an understanding of youth 
(dis)engagement. Although all these models can be used to account for youth political 
participation in Malaysia, they are not sufficient to provide strong underlying explanations 
for why young Malaysians are politically inactive. It is emphasized by this study in the 
quantitative Chapters 4 and 5 that levels of youth political participation in ‘elite-directed’ 
and ‘elite-challenging’ political activism are lower than those for the older generation. 
Although young people in Malaysia have been alienated from formal politics, the findings 
in Chapter 9 suggest that young people do profess that voting and party membership 
remain important mediums to influence political decisions and elect representatives that 
will lead the country. In this respect, the qualitative findings based on the semi-structured 
interviews with academics, political elites, youth activists and youth non-participants 
emphasised the role of authoritarian rule, the prevailing political system and socio-
historical context to make sense of present-day youth political participation in this country.  
 
As evidenced in Chapters 6 to 9, the findings show that the large-scale exit of 
young people from mainstream politics, and to some extent their disengagement from 
informal politics, are related strongly to the ‘culture of fear’ emerging from the 
government’s criminalisation of political dissent through the use of oppressive laws such 





Colleges Act 1971, to stifle political rights and freedom. These laws, which mostly date 
back to the colonial rule era, give central power to the regime to continue ‘blocking’ the 
opportunity for citizens’ participation by subverting the democratic process. A deeply 
embedded culture of fear in Malaysian society has created a very passive youth, largely 
amongst the Mahathir and post-Mahathir generation. They are, in fact, disengaged from 
both formal and informal political participation, including protest activism. This echoes the 
findings of Zhang and Lallana (2013), Yun Han Chu, Welsh and Weatherall, (2012) which 
indicated that heavily censored regimes such as those in Malaysia and Singapore, 
discourage young people from engaging in politics. This study concludes that fear of 
repression and the negative consequences of protest result in young Malaysians perceiving 
protest as a high-risk or high-cost activity that is, moreover, ineffective in bringing about 
change. Therefore, any increase in costs may constrain citizens from participating in 
collective actions. Put simply, increased state repression is likely to decrease participation 
in any form, as emphasised by Hibbs (1973). This supports the argument by Kriesi (2007) 
that states that more closed political opportunities and political spaces result in lower 
possibilities for the development of unconventional politics. Since the barriers to this type 
of action are relatively high, we could therefore argue that protest activism in Malaysia 
might not appear as ‘normalised’ as in Western democracies (Dalton, 1996), and many 
contentious actions that aimed to challenge the regime are practiced only by a small group 
of young people who are brave enough. 
 
In addition, we found in Chapters 8 and 9 that young activists have a very broad 
understanding of politics. For youth activists, politics is seen as a broad concept, covering 
all aspects of human life and behaviours, and suggests that citizens must be integrated 
within the system. In contrast, most young non-participants in this study define politics as 
an overly limited conception because they commonly relate politics with political players, 
such as parties and politicians who struggle for power, who are ‘self-serving’ in pursuing 
their own interests and fail to champion people’s needs. In addition, young non-
participants also perceive politics as something ‘complex’, dull and too technical to be 
understood because they have a little knowledge on what politics is really about. The 
difficulties in trying to grasp such ‘complex’ politics makes many young people simply 
‘observers’, rather than ‘participants’. Therefore, negative perceptions of politics and 
politicians, tend to depress their interest leading them to ‘turn-off’ from politics. This 





a hard time understanding politics and this inhibits them from participating (Henn et al., 
2002; Stradling, 1977; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004) and therefore, as suggested by 
O’Toole et al. (2003), research need to use a bottom-up approach to understand fully how 
young people conceptualise politics. Overall, we can conclude that young people tend to 
have a poor understanding of politics. In this regard, even young non-participants who are 
largely educated remain politically illiterate.  
 
This thesis highlights two significant factors for making sense of young 
Malaysians’ relationship with politics. First, the agents of political socialisation, 
particularly the family and school, seem to be not playing their roles in developing a sense 
of political interest and knowledge amongst young people, a factor that contributes to the 
limited understanding of politics amongst youth. This study showed that unlike youth 
activists, most of the youth non-participants grew up in environments where politics was 
not the cultural norm. Therefore, they tended to regard politics as unimportant in their 
lives. However, based on the findings from qualitative interviews in Chapter 9, we found 
that even if young people frequently discussed political matters with family and friends or 
had a family member who was actively involved in politics, this was still not enough to 
motivate them to participate in politics. Sumner (1906) argued that the effectiveness of 
political socialisation does not lie in parental and school influences, but in the desire of 
people to conform to a particular behaviour. The failure of people to conform to changing 
patterns implies that they are not ‘immunised’ to them (Butler and Stokes, 1974). This 
suggests that young people’s first experience of political activities and political activism, 
such as voting, could create a habitual participant (Plutzer 2002; Franklin 2004). In 
addition, the qualitative findings also revealed that social media platforms and online 
activism have become a popular new means for young Malaysians to engage in politics. 
Many young Malaysians switched from mainstream media to social media to access 
political news because of its anonymity, and since the news released in traditional media is 
biased towards the incumbent government given they have central power to tightly 
monopolise and control this media. However, they only used online media for 
‘information-based’ activity, particularly to seek political information, rather than for 
‘participation-based’ activity such as posting political contents, communicating with 
politicians, or participating in online debates. The findings are consistent with previous 





Twitter and Facebook may not necessarily lead to political activism even once relevant 
political information is collected. 
 
Apart from the non-functioning agents of socialisation, the thesis also argued that 
young people’s lack of political interest and political knowledge emerged from an absence 
of schooling on politics. There is no statutory subject or curriculum on politics in schools. 
Although Malaysia has a high percentage of youth literacy rates (98.42 percent)67, students 
remain politically illiterate because politics and civic education are only sporadically 
touched upon in subjects like Malaysian history or civic education, which are aimed at 
preparing the student to be a good and loyal citizen rather than providing essential skills 
and experiences for students to participate in political decision-making (Mahmood, 2014: 
135). Therefore, based on the evidence from interviews with young people, it could be 
suggested that young people have low levels of political interest also in part because of 
lack of formal civic or political education. As civic knowledge stimulates political 
participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) and 
‘civic literacy’ makes democracy work (Milner, 2002), the absence of such knowledge can 
act to obstruct efforts to promote democratic norms and values.  
 
 While young people have a narrow understanding of politics as evidenced in 
particular in the analysis of the interviews with young non-participants (Chapter 9), the 
reluctance of young Malaysians to engage in mainstream politics is also to be found in 
their low feelings of political efficacy. Feelings of political efficacy, as argued by many 
scholars (Almond and Verba, 1963; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Norris, 2002), are 
highly correlated with political activities and participation. This study (Chapter 5) showed 
that when controlling for attitudinal determinants, low internal efficacy—an individual’s 
belief in their political competency to make a difference in politics—has caused lower 
levels of young people’s engagement in citizen-oriented activism. The findings from the 
qualitative analyses complement this by showing how young people feel that they are 
powerless and have no say in politics because their engagement, and particularly voting, 
does not make any difference for policy change at any level. Moreover, we also found that 
the low levels of external efficacy amongst Malaysian youth are strongly related to low 
trust in political institutions due to the unresponsiveness of the government to tackle major 
                                                          
67Please see: The World Bank, 2015, 





‘youth’ issues, particularly the economy and the widespread practices of corruption. Given 
that political efficacy and political knowledge are key aspects of psychological 
engagement in politics (Clarke et al., 2004; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Marsh et 
al., 2007), particularly low levels of efficacy within this group is one potential explanation 
for youth disengagement from in politics.  
 
As discussed in the analysis of the qualitative chapters, it is clear that youth 
disillusionment towards the political institutions and politicians whom they feel 
unresponsive to their needs and self-serving also plays as a major role in explaining why 
young people are so inactive, both within and beyond the conventional political 
participation sphere. The qualitative findings (Chapters 6 to 8) suggest that young 
Malaysians hold sceptical views of politicians and political parties and have a lack of trust 
in the elites as they failed to keep their promises and be held accountable. These key 
findings have a lot in common with the study of Henn et al., (2002) in the UK. Based on 
the data from survey panel and focus groups, they found that young people in the UK 
regarded politics as remote because they have a lack of confidence in politicians. 
Therefore, the inability of politicians and parties to convince young people has left them 
with no alternatives to choose between suitable parties, resulting in them becoming ‘fence 
sitters’ or simply avoiding elections. There are two main reasons why young Malaysians 
are largely ‘cynical’ towards political actors. First, the internal rifts and widespread 
political scandals faced by the ruling party and the opposition in Malaysia makes young 
people increasingly lose hope, trust, and confidence in political elites, which also provide a 
potential explanatory avenue for the large exit of young people from elite-directed political 
participation. Second, the remoteness of the political parties, poor communication and 
inadequate engagement from the politicians make them constantly disregard young 
people’s needs as reflected in their failure to develop youth-friendly policies.  
 
  Building on the General Incentives model proposed by Seyd and Whiteley (1992), 
we found in Chapter 7, that political leaders are usually motivated to be members of a 
political party for a wide variety of purposive incentives such as a strong ideological 
commitment, satisfying policy-seeking needs and wanting to challenge the existing order. 
In order to change the status quo in a semi-democratic country like Malaysia, people have 
no choice but to join a political party instead of civil society groups because they operate 





to repression by the government such as placing the elections and mainstream media under 
tight control. This circumstance weakens the position of the opposition and denies their 
right to contest in a level playing field. However, over the recent years, particularly since 
the 2008 general election, the formation of an opposition coalition which successfully 
denied the ruling coalition a two-thirds parliamentary majority, has resulted in a more 
powerful scrutiny on the government power’s will since the government is no longer able 
to amend most of the constitutional provisions except with the cooperation from the 
opposition (Muhammad Fathi, 2016:4). The formation of an opposition coalition, if they 
manage to sustain their electoral success, may provide a strong and reliable alternative to 
the ruling coalition in the elections.  
 
The findings from qualitative analyses have also revealed further reasons why young 
people are refusing to be part of political parties and take on a role as voters. As explained 
in Chapter 8, the rise of the habit of non-voting amongst young people stems from their 
frustration with the existing electoral system in Malaysia, which is seen as too 
complicated, outdated and suffering from serious flaws, including the widespread concerns 
over the integrity of the electoral commission and the transparency of the electoral process. 
We also found that the complex structure of political parties, especially their complicated 
registration system, the hierarchical structure, and the culture of seniority, has dissuaded 
young people from joining them. Only those who aimed to become politicians are willing 
to go through the complex and long process of party membership because this is the only 
pathway to become a future leader in Malaysia. This reinforces the theory of relative 
deprivation, that the individuals feel a sense of grievance when they have not received a 
fair treatment or unfair political arrangement (Gurr, 1970; Mulgan and Wilkinson, 1997, 
Dalton, 1988). In this regard, the basic political system and institutional forms of 
Malaysian democracy such as the ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system, economic policy, 
and media control create political inequality, and thus inhibit effective participation of 
young people in politics. When young people cannot bear the burden of intensifying 
deprivation, they are more likely to engage in collective protest (Buechler, 2007; Farah et 
al., 1979; Dalton, 1988).  
 
However, our findings indicate that not all deprived young people have manifested 
feelings of deprivation, injustice, and anger with the authorities through collective action, 





and distance themselves from politics. Although there are major signs of discontent of 
young people about the system, there are certain priority issues of concern that have been 
raised by young people. The major issue facing Malaysian youth today is the economy, 
particularly the rising cost of living, including price increases in fuel, public transport, 
residential property, and the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax68 creating a 
sudden increase in young Malaysians’ expenses. Another issue cited by the youth is 
unemployment, largely amongst highly skilled and university graduates. The 
unemployment rates for young graduates tend to be higher than non-graduates because job 
creation in this country has remained concentrated on the low and middle-skilled sectors 
(Lim, 2016). With limited high-paying and high-skilled jobs, a mismatch of skills, the lack 
of professional experience makes young people less likely to be hired. As higher education 
in Malaysia is not free and an education fund is needed to bear the cost of tuition fees, so 
many borrowers, largely amongst young fresh graduates also face the problem of having to 
repay a high student-debt loan from the National Higher Education Loan Fund (PTPTN).69 
Defaulters who fail to pay back their study loan become blacklisted and are then unable to 
apply for other loans as well as being banned from leaving the country.  
 
Life-cycle theories help to explain the ‘exit’ of young people from both elite-directed 
and elite-challenging repertoires by suggesting that young people are inhibited from to 
participating in politics since they are facing start-up problems such as starting a career 
and family, finding a partner, purchasing a house (Converse and Niemi, 1971) at their 
early age of political life, and this effect will diminish when young people grow older. In 
this context, this study has found that young Malaysians, in contrast to young people in 
established democracies, complete their studies and enter the job market at a much older 
age because the secondary education in this country lasts until the age of 17, while the 
tertiary education normally begins at 18 and lasts until the age of 23 years old. This longer 
transition to adulthood thus delayed the opportunity for young people to establish 
themselves in a community and political process and this could further contribute to their 
                                                          
68The Goods and Services Tax (GST) is a consumption tax based on the concept of value-added. It was 
implemented on 1 April 2015 to replace the Sales and Service Tax and as part of the government’s tax 
reform programme to increase the capability and efficiency of tax management in this country. Although the 
government has not fixed the rate of the GST, but the standard rate that is used now is in the range of 6 
percent. (See http://www.gst.com.my/gst-malaysia-FAQ.html, for details). 
 
69The National Higher Education Loan Fund (PTPTN) was established in 1997 and it is a government agency 
under the ministry of Education responsible for providing an education financing scheme to students 





lower levels of engagement as a group. However, there is a need for further study in this 
area to provide greater understanding of the ways in which these life-cycle mechanisms 
operate in the context of Malaysia and to successfully disentangle them from period and 
cohort effects to make sense of the underlying patterns of social change (Grasso 2014, 
2016).  
 
10.2.3 Findings on the attitudes of young people towards elite-challenging 
participation 
 
The study confirmed that young people have always been less likely than older people to 
be engaged in elite-directed political participation, but showed no significant effects on 
elite-challenging participation. However, young people in general acknowledged the elite-
challenging repertoire as a relevant democratic channel and a proper way to influence 
political decisions. As discussed in Chapter 9, most young non-participants chose to 
participate in ‘everyday politics’ or so-called day-to-day political activity (Parry, Moyser 
and Day, 1992:8), mainly low-risk types of activities such as informal discussion and 
online activism because these forms of participation are indeed easy, more fun and 
‘relaxed’, require less commitment as well as being free from government interference. 
Although these political activities were not overtly political acts that aimed at challenging 
or influencing the government and incite genuine political change, they were understood as 
political by young people based on a loose and broad conception of political participation 
(O’Toole et al., 2003). Moreover, it was found that young people are more likely to 
discuss political issues with their peers rather than outsiders because they are afraid of 
being harshly judged by other people and fear the government’s surveillance and 
criminalisation of political dissent. In Chapter 6, we saw how the academics attributed the 
engagement of young people in elite-challenging activism with changes in their political 
values—specifically, the thawing of traditional political cleavages such as ethnicity being 
replaced by a new cleavage rooted in the opposition between materialist and 
postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1990; 1997). Indeed, the findings in Chapter 9 provided 
evidence in favour of the central premise of postmaterialist value change theory by 
Inglehart (1990) that young people tend to be individualistic and fragmented, in favour of 
participation through loosely-structured groups such as an environmentalist, human rights 
and good governance networks, that require lower political commitment or long-term 





from the politics of loyalty to the politics of choice from citizen-oriented, conventional, or 
elite-directed activism to cause-oriented, unconventional, or elite-challenging action.  
 
 The findings in Chapter 8 further showed how most youth activists appeared to 
hold both instrumental and identity motives (Klandermans, 2004), driving them to be 
politically active citizens. In this respect, feelings of deprivation and injustice emerging 
from the government’s policies, such as the erosion of universities’ autonomy, academic 
freedom, and students’ political rights,70 alongside greater levels of political efficacy - 
their participation could bring a change have generated a strong sense for political and 
social changes amongst these activists. Simply put, these young people participated 
actively in politics because they believe that they could influence the decision-making 
process and create a better future for Malaysia. Apart from instrumentality, a strong 
attachment to a group or having a sense of belonging motivated some youth activists to 
engage in activist communities. This reaffirms the important of collective identity as 
emphasised by social movement researchers (Melucci, 1995; Hunt and Benford, 2007; 
Snow, 2001). In particular, these activists have constructed a shared ideology, objectives, 
emotions and common interest in a group also known as a collective identity and this 
identity, according to Hunt and Benford (2007), builds up the commitment and solidarity 
among activists to champion a cause. The Bersih rally is a perfect example of how this 
movement managed to create loyalty and commitment amongst its members who are 
largely different in their goals and identity. In this regard, Bersih has successfully 
empowered its members to make changes to the system outside of the Malaysia’s 
democratic framework through the framing process: Bersih framed themselves as 
‘Bersih’,71 which clearly denotes the message that this movement is about peace, 
cleanliness and upholding the truth. 
                                                          
70It is worth mentioning that the government has placed restrictions on academic freedom in Malaysia where 
certain subjects such as religious and ethnic issues are highly sensitive for research by academics. Since the 
government is sensitive to criticism, academics or students cannot be too critical towards the government’s 
policy. There were numerous cases where the academics faced intimidation and displinary actions including 
losing their jobs because of the publication of academic materials. For example, Azmi Sharom who is a law 
lecturer was charged with sedition after commenting publicly about the constitutional crisis in Perak. 
Similarly, Dr. Abdul Aziz Bari who is also a law professor was also charged under the same Act for 
comments made allegedly insulting the Sultan of Selangor.     
 
71The name Bersih was derived from the name of its organiser, BERSIH (Coalition for Clean and Fair 
Elections), a coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the opposition parties, with an 
objective to reform flawed electoral process in Malaysia. The first incarnation of Bersih 1.0 rally, also 





Moreover, this study finds that another reason why youth activists are more likely 
to engage in high-cost political activities is because they have personal contacts or social 
networks to access the activist community where they actively join the student movements 
or activities in the universities. Another factor that helps to ease their route into activism is 
the influence of political socialisation from the family and educational institutions. This 
also corresponds to findings in the previous literature (Snow et al., 1980; McAdam, 1988) 
that political socialisation and greater access to social networks help to facilitate active 
engagement in politics. 
 
10.2.4 Findings on youth and democracy  
 
This thesis not only sheds light of the nature of youth participation and non-participation, 
but it also provides a vital exploration of whether youth engagement in politics strengthens 
the democratisation process in Malaysia. The analyses of qualitative interviews found that 
engagement of young people in the political process in Malaysia has pushed the 
government to open more democratic spaces and restore some democratic elements in 
Malaysia. Although there was an attempt, particularly during the Reformasi 1998, to 
complete the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Malaysia, it failed to create 
either a successful democratic transition or political reform (Abbott, 2004). However, in 
the 2008 and 2013 general elections, young people were the key players in determining the 
electoral outcome, and significantly produced a ‘political tsunami’ by denying the ruling 
coalition its two-third majority. Realising that young people are able to challenge the 
status quo, the government is now trying to please young people by introducing more 
youth-based policies and by making some political changes, such as the amendment of the 
University and University Colleges Act, mainly to Section 15.72  
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
2011 (Bersih 2.0), 2012 (Bersih 3.0), 2015 (Bersih 4.0) and 2016 (Bersih 5.0). Bersih rallies successfully 
galvanised n thousands of participants, mostly young people from different races to take to the streets.  
  
72The University and University Colleges Act (UUCA) was first enacted in 1971 and aimed to provide 
guidelines for the establishment, regulations, the administration of colleges and public universities. 
Following the student-led demonstrations on 1974, the government amended Section 15 of the UUCA in 
1975, which prohibited any student or faculty member from expressing support for any political party, 
organisation, or trade union. However, it was revised in 2012 to give greater flexibility to the students by 
allowing them to take part in political activities off-campus, including the right to be a member of any 






Although the Malaysian economy generally experienced a rapid economic growth 
that spawned the rise of a new middle class in society, which is important for 
democratisation processes, this thesis, however suggests that a transition to democracy in 
Malaysia is relatively difficult to achieve. There are several factors that can be postulated 
to account for why Malaysia is arguably far from democracy. First, the existing regime has 
made little progress towards democracy and they remain significantly resistant to change. 
For example, the government has repealed the draconian ISA, but they replaced it with the 
Security Offences (Special Measures Act). Similarly, the Section 27 of the Police Act was 
substituted with a more repressive new law, which is the Peaceful Assembly Act (2002). 
Second, while there are mounting popular pressures from the people through a series of 
protests, with the aim of moving toward a more democratic country, the government has 
managed to silence the dissidents by employing brutal crackdowns. To some extent, they 
have successfully manipulated the political and electoral arenas to retain power. 
Furthermore, as civil society suffers from severe limitations from the government, it is 
very difficult for them to mobilise widespread membership of organisations across all parts 
of civil society and develop strong connection with the wider population, especially with 
young people. This makes civil society unable to play an important role as key advocates 
and agencies for democratisation. Third, the policies and the system emphasise too much 
racial composition. Ethnicity is continuously asserted as a dividing line between Malaysian 
people in a ‘divide and conquer’ type strategy. Finally, whilst many young people have 
embraced the idea of ‘new politics’, the society at large, particularly the older generation 
who are more traditionalist and conservative, still tend to support the status quo instead of 
democratic change. Therefore, young Malaysians in general choose to distance themselves 
from politics because they feel that they are powerless to bring about a democratic change 
in Malaysia, since the opportunity to become involved in a meaningful way has been 
‘blocked’.  
 
10.3 Understanding youth political participation in Malaysia: Hirschman’s “exit, 
voice and loyalty” (EVL) framework   
 
As have been explained in Chapter 2, this thesis applies Hirschman’s trilogy of Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty (1970) to understand the patterns of youth political participation in Malaysia, 





in their political activism.  The detailed explanations of the extent to which the findings 
relate to the Hirschman’s framework are as follows:   
 
i. Exit: 
In his book, Hirschman (1970) argues that individual may choose to exit the 
organisation or to stop the buying goods or sevices as a reponse to the decline in the 
quality in products or services. The findings of this thesis suggest that young 
Malaysians are indeed frustrated and discontented with the regime due to the economic 
downturn, prevailing corruption, racial skirmishes, and government crackdowns on 
political freedoms. However, in response to dissatisfaction with the semi-democratic 
regime in Malaysia, young people in general do not choose to exit from politics 
completely. Instead they have exited from high-cost political activities such as voting, 
party membership and contentious politics, and have replaced this to some extent with 
participation in the forms of low-risk or ‘everyday’ politics such as online activism, 
community works and informal political discussion. Many young people in Malaysia 
are more likely to engage in these political activities because the costs or risks of 
participation in a semi-democratic country like Malaysia can be high and outweigh the 
perceived benefits since young people have to face a main political barrier—strict 
controls and crackdowns on political mobilisation and expression by the government 
through repressive laws like the Sedition Act, the UUCA, and the Official Secrets Act, 
etc.73 In addition, young people also feel that the costs of engagement in politics are 
                                                          
73Sedition Act was enacted in 1948 by the British colonial authority and was originally aimed for fighting 
against the local communist insurgents prior to Malayan independence. However, it continues to be used 
with full force by the Malaysian government today to limit citizens’ freedom of expression by prosecuting 
individuals including activists, journalists, and politicians for actions or discourse deemed as seditious and 
critical towards the government which may threaten national security. In other words, it makes an offence to 
say or publish words that have a ‘seditious’ tendency. 
The Internal Security Act (ISA) was enacted in 1960 as a preventive detention law that defended the internal 
security in Malaysia. It allows the government to detain people without trial. In 2012, the controversial 
Internal Security Act 1960 has been repealed and replaced by The Security Offences (Special Measures Act) 
or SOSMA. The Act was made under the Article 149 of Federal constitution, specifically aimed to prevent 
internal security issues including acts of terrorism, sabotage, public order, prejudice and espionage. The most 
important provision in this Act is Section 4 that gives powers of arrest and detention to the police over 
persons who are suspected of having committed security offences. In particular, the police also allow for 
detaining the suspect for 28 days and placing them under electronic monitoring if released.  
The University and University Colleges Act (UUCA) was first enacted in 1971 and aimed to provide 
guideline for the establishment, regulation, the administration of colleges and public universities. Following 
the student-led demonstrations on 1974, the government amended Section 15 of the UUCA in 1975, which 
prohibited any student or faculty members from expressing support for any political party, organisation or 
trade union. However, it was revised in 2012 to give greater flexibility to the students by allowing them to 





high because they have a very low chance of bringing about changes to the system and 
to influence political decision-making. The findings also suggest that young Malaysians 
are alienated from political agents such as political parties and formal political 
processes as they feel that the existing electoral system in Malaysia suffers from serious 
flaws and politicians are remote and unresponsive to their needs. Young non-
participants also do not have established networks and effective socialisation agents that 
are able to mobilise them to participate in political activities or to create a vibrant and 
exciting political environment.  
 
ii. Voice:  
Voice, according to Hirschman (1970:30), is “any attempt at all to change, rather than 
to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs.” Despite the high risks of participation 
in semi-democratic regimes like Malaysia, and the ‘blocked’ opportunities for young 
people to participate meaningfully in politics due to the actions of the regime through 
various institutional barriers such as the use of repressive laws, there remains a small 
circle of young people who actively voice their discontent and challenge the status quo 
through their involvement in high-cost political activities, such as protests, party 
membership, NGOs and perhaps, electoral participation.  Although this voice is costly 
because such activities require much effort, time, and the possibility of being punished 
by the authorities, some young people still tend to use this voice because they believe 
their participation in politics can bring about political changes or at least affect the 
government’s decisions in some way. In particular, those young people who choose to 
use voice are more likely to have higher levels of political self-efficacy. The findings 
also show that youth activists are politically aware citizens and have effective 
functioning socialising agents, the family and educational institutions which provide 
greater exposure and access to political information and social networks. Furthermore, 
their voices or demands may sometimes receive positive or negative responses from the 
government. If the government responds positively, in returns it benefits the citizens. If 
not, youth activists must bear the cost of having used their voice.  However, this group 
of young activists remains consistently active in using their voice or engaging in 
                                                                                                                                                                               
The Official Secret Act (OSA) was brought in force in 1972 as an Act that provides protection for information 
classified as an ‘official secret’. Offical secrets refers to any document, information and material that maybe 
classified as ‘top secret’, ‘secret’, ‘confidential’ or ‘restricted’ by a Minister, the Chief Minister of a State or 






political activism since they receive strong social support from the family and in-group 
members, alongside with a sense of inner strength to achieve their goals.  
 
iii. Loyalty: 
The term Loyalty is akin to ‘group loyalty’ (Dowding et al., 2000) in which the citizens 
accept the decline in the quality in products or services, causing them to stand (voice) 
rather than to run (exit). In the case of Malaysia, we argued that there is a group of 
young Malaysians who accept the status quo and see no reason to engage in either voice 
or exit, but instead participate in apathetic silence or enforced silence (Gehlbach’s 
concept of Silence, 2006). First, the findings suggest that examples of apathetic silence 
are those young Malaysians who do not complain but rather support and are satisfied 
with the status quo, abiding by its rules, and remaining loyal by engaging in elite-
directed activities, mainly in the ruling party. Although there is only a small fraction of 
young people who actively become members of a political party, they are powerful in 
influencing the policy or decision-making process. Second, this thesis also found that 
there are some young people, particularly amongst the civil servants, who fall under the 
category of enforced silence. Enforced silence here refers to those young people who 
are discontented with the regime and dissatisfied with the status quo, but have very 
limited choice to reject the status quo because their opportunity to exit or voice have 
been ‘blocked’ by the regime. In this regard, civil servants in Malaysia are prohibited 
from joining politics as they are bound by the Rules for Public Workers (Conduct and 
Discipline) 1993 where they are required to be neutral, loyal to the ruling government 
and be independent in partisan politics.74 
 
Therefore, overall, we conclude that Hirschman’s concept of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
(1970) offers a sturdy framework to analyse the patterns of youth political participation 
even in semi-democratic settings like Malaysia. However, it is insufficient to provide 
explanations on the concept of loyalty in the context of Malaysia.  Therefore, this thesis 
expanded the framework by applying also Gehlbach’s concept of Silence (2006) to make 
                                                          
74Rules for Public Workers (Conduct and Discipline) 1993 refers to the code of conduct for public service 
officers, including specific prohibitions and violations. Under freedom of expression, their rights are 
curtailed by three provisions, and actions can be taken against them if they: (1) provoke hatred against the 
government; (2) establish debates, discussions or talks containing anti-government elements; (3) show strong 







sense of which groups of young people have chosen to remain loyal and those instead who 
are forced to be loyal in supporting the status quo in Malaysia due to their professionalism, 
living conditions and the rules that govern them.     
 
10.4 Revisiting the debate between the elitist and popular conceptions of 
democracy  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to provide a robust understanding of youth political 
participation in the context of contrasting elitist and popular conceptions of democracy, 
and to elucidate the extent to which participation is desirable in this country. Based on the 
findings of the thesis and the conclusions presented above, several main points can be 
interpreted in light of the elitist and popular conceptions of democracy debate more 
specifically in order to analyse the position of both conceptions in Malaysia. First, the 
reality of Malaysia in our findings appears to correspond better with the elitist position, 
which argues that citizen engagement in politics should be limited to electoral participation 
(Schumpeter, 1952), because young people in Malaysia in general have a very low level of 
political participation. However, as we have seen, since the 2008 general election, young 
voters in Malaysia who are the largest group, play a decisive role in determining electoral 
outcomes. The 2008 and 2013 general elections were seen as the most closely fought 
battles between two major blocs of party coalition, the incumbent government and the 
opposition. The high level of electoral competition, as argued by Franklin (2004), has 
significantly stimulated people to vote. The previous election recorded a high voter turnout 
with more than 80 percent of the 13.3 million registered voters casting ballots, especially 
2.6 million new voters. Still, a large number of people (4.2 million), mainly young 
Malaysians, do not vote and even refuse to register as voters. Similarly, although there is a 
rise of protests and social movements in Malaysia against the existing status quo since the 
Reformasi 1998, only a small fraction of young people, predominantly the activists, are 
participating.  
 
 Second, the popular view is clearly not reflected in the realities of political life in 
Malaysia. True, to some extent young people are still participating in politics, but they 
change their styles of participation towards ‘low-risk’ informal channels, such as online 
activism, community works and political discussion, since the political context makes it 





decline of ‘elite-directed’ participation and the enlargement of ‘elite-challenging’ signals 
an emphasis on single issue priorities such as the environment, democratic rights, and good 
governance, and means moving further from representing class or ethnic interests. In this 
sense, politics is seen by the people as a set of single issues that need to be addressed by 
the government rather than lived experience of the demos to decide on their collective 
political destiny. To some extent, the shift of young people from mainstream politics may 
exacerbate political inequality in the future (Verba, 2003) because strong political voice no 
longer lies in the hand of political parties, instead it is centred on various pressure groups 
who only benefit some segments of society. Therefore, the expansion of participatory 
repertoires cannot be seen to replace the important role of the parties in a representative 
democracy (Mair, 2006). In addition, the advocates of popular democracy believe that the 
underlying aim of citizen participation is to achieve a common good. However, the 
findings suggest that young people in this country are less likely to engage in politics 
mainly because the government has blocked the opportunity for citizens to participate by 
imposing despotic laws to limit political freedom and only allow reasonably open 
discussion of its policy as long as not affecting the decisions of elites. In this regard, young 
people feel that the costs or the risks are high and outweigh the benefits of participation 
and they are fearful of the personal consequences of participation.  
 
 The findings of this thesis support the position of the popular conception of 
democracy that the disengagement of young people in politics is due to the system and its 
actors, rather than the people itself (Bale et al., 2006). In particular, in a semi-democratic 
setting like Malaysia which is fundamentally elitist, political participation is kept at 
relatively low levels through various means, including the enactment of repressive laws, 
censorship of the media, and electoral manipulation. Political activities and organisations 
like protests, social movements and civil society are allowed to form or operate within the 
system, but they are heavily constrained and can potentially be eliminated if the 
government feels that these groups have become threats to the system and its elites. For 
popular democracy, political participation has an educational role in increasing citizens’ 
knowledge to understand and improve the system. As the findings show, young 
Malaysians have a very narrow understanding of politics and relatively low levels of 
political knowledge. Lack of political knowledge amongst young people makes it 






 Finally, popular democracy aims to improve the flaws of the representative system 
by allowing more people to engage in the decision-making process. Bottom-up 
participation is needed to ensure that representatives are fully accountable and act to 
preserve citizens’ rights, not the interests of elites (Barber, 1984). Although young people 
desire to be actively included in the system, they are unable to see more opportunities to be 
involved in a meaningful way due to several circumstances. First, the system has limited 
possibilities for mass participation in ‘everyday politics’. Second, the elites prefer 
depoliticized citizens since the less people think about politics, the less the elites will need 
to confront people who want to change the status quo for a better political system. Third, 
due to these ‘blockages’ in participation channels, young people are just not convinced that 
their participation in politics can bring about change. Finally, the massive surge in the 
usage of the Internet and mainly social networking has opened up spaces for citizens’ 
participation. In Malaysia, the exploitation of the top-down approaches of mainstream 
media outlets by the government to control the news makes more young people, who are 
regarded as the ‘internet generation’ (Loader, 2007), switch to the Internet. However, 
young people are more likely to use this avenue for consuming political news or 
‘information-based’ activities (Jensen, 2013), instead of communicating with 
representatives or discussing political matters. There are ‘populist’ attempts made by the 
elites to have the so called ‘consultative council’ such as the Youth Parliament and the 
Perdana fellowship programs, to improve the policy by providing young people with more 
opportunities to participate and to influence political decisions. However, these 
programmes only benefit and reflect the interests of a particular group, not the whole of 
society.  
 
10.5 Major results of the investigation  
 
This thesis aimed to solve the puzzle of whether young people in Malaysia are politically 
apathetic or have simply shifted from mainstream politics to other forms of political 
activism. We have succeeded in solving this puzzle by concluding that young people in 
Malaysia are politically inactive in either elite-directed or elite-challenging political 
activism. However, they are not dropping out completely from politics. Instead, they are 
engaged, to an extent, in low-risk unconventional channels like online activism, popular 
cultural representations and informal political discussion. In a semi-democratic country 





government, the engagement of the youth in politics, mainly in conventional political 
participation, is extremely important for regime change.  
 
In addition, as evidenced earlier, there are some shared characteristics between 
youth political participation in Malaysia and Western democracies. For example, young 
Malaysians understand politics as politicians and political parties, rather than interpreting 
politics in a wider context—which is similar to youth in established democracies. Young 
people in Malaysia, as in established democracies, share the feeling of alienation and 
cynicism towards political agents and the political process which they believe are 
unresponsive to their interests and feel they have a lower ability to influence political 
decisions. Despite these similarities, it would be inaccurate to conclude that young people 
in Malaysia display common patterns with those of young people in established 
democracies. This thesis found that specific characteristics of Malaysia, particularly the 
long established ‘semi-democratic’ style of politics and the socio-political setting, are 
salient for making sense of the differential patterns of youth political participation in this 
country. 
 
The solution to our puzzle is rather incomplete without analysing the overarching 
barriers to youth political participation in Malaysia. The cost-benefit analysis of rational 
choice theory advocates such as Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), and based on 
the framework of Exit, Voice and Loyalty by Hirschman (1970) are strengthened by this 
thesis, which clearly shows that it is reasonable to expect that young people in Malaysia to 
politically ‘exit’, mainly from high-costs political activities like voting, party membership 
and contentious politics, because they perceive the ‘costs’ or the risks of harm in the 
course of participating in this country as outweighing the opportunities for them to have a 
decisive effect on political outcomes. Indeed, there are twofold ‘costs’ or political barriers 
to youth political participation in Malaysia and we discuss these in more detail below.  
 
10.5.1 Institutional barriers  
 
First, the implementation of ongoing undemocratic actions by the government, with 
respect to the draconian laws like the Sedition Act, the UUCA, and the Official Secrets 
Act, etc. to stifle the political rights of people are the main institutional barrier that inhibits 





which are justified as ostensible means for maintaining the political stability of the state, 
have created a constant fear amongst people (especially the Mahathir and post-Mahathir 
generations) to express their political views and to have a say in political decisions. The 
radical reforms – primarily economic, political, and constitutional reforms – embarked on 
by the government after the 13 May ethnic riot and during Mahathir’s premiership are seen 
as having produced a ‘depoliticized generation’. Second, the nature of the public policy-
making process in Malaysia is a ‘top-down’ or elite-centred approach. Therefore, it has 
ignored young people’s voices and discouraged their greater citizen participation. Third, 
the government’s tight control over the electoral process by using the Electoral 
Commission as their primary instrument has created a system that is less than fair, 
particularly for the opposition. As the electoral process is tainted with persistent 
manipulation and abuse of power by the regime, and worsening practices of money 
politics, so young people increasingly lose their confidence to participate in the system. 
Finally, many political parties in Malaysia have a complicated structure and recruitment 
system, and they draw much of their support from distinct racial community because the 
system is fundamentally based on ethnic lines rather than competing political ideologies. 
With voting on an ethnic basis, the political parties would typically manipulate ethnic 
issues and raise fears of ethnic outsiders in their electoral campaign. Since many young 
people feel that communal politics is no longer relevant, and they are more likely to 
embrace the idea of multicultural identity, therefore, ethnic-based political parties in 
Malaysia appears to be unattractive to youth. 
 
10.5.2 Personal barriers  
 
Being a politically active citizen requires resources, including time, money, education, or 
psychological traits such as interest and efficacy. As evidenced in the findings, young 
Malaysians in general have low levels of perceived political efficacy, political knowledge, 
and interests, which may act as psychological barriers inhibiting them from being 
politically active citizens. Firstly, in order to prepare youth to engage in political activities, 
we first need to develop their interest in politics (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Milbrath and Goel, 1977) through positive interactions with 
political socialisation agencies such as the family and educational system in a given 
society (Almond and Verba, 1963), and mobilising networks (Putnam, 2000; Diani, 2007). 





that the key personal barrier for young people to participate lies in an ineffective process of 
political socialization and mobilizing networks. Secondly, political efficacy is important 
not only as a driving force of political participation, but also as a personal quality. Political 
efficacy is linked with political confidence which makes a citizen confident to take part in 
political actions to try to make changes to the system. In the case of Malaysia, it could be 
argued that the very low levels of political efficacy amongst young people may stem from 
their personal experiences of a semi-democratic regime where they often characterise 
politicians as corrupt, repressive, and unresponsive to their needs. Low trust in political 
elites, and the entire political system makes many young people in Malaysia choose to 
withdraw completely from political life. Undeniably, a younger cohort in Malaysia today 
is well-educated group, tech-savvy and largely belong to the middle class (Norshuhada et 
al., 2016). Young people may be the most politically-informed citizens because they are 
highly dependent on social media to gain political information. However, they commonly 
have below-par knowledge and skills relevant for politics due to the inadequate education 
in politics and government. As mentioned earlier, the absence of formal civic and political 
education makes young people find ‘politics’ complex, dull and difficult to understand. As 
a result, young people do not see political participation as a part of their civic duty.  
 
Since participation in politics in Malaysia is somewhat risky and involves such a 
very high cost only those young people who are brave enough, have a high level of 
determination for democratic change, and a greater amount of resources are willing to take 
part in political activities. Typically, politically active young people possess in Malaysia 
vast knowledge on politics, effective socialising agents, and close relationships to political 
organisations, which in turn drive them to participate in high-risk political activism, 
including protests and social movements. Therefore, the gap between youth activists and 
young people at large in political participation will remain substantial unless these barriers 
to political participation can be successfully reduced.  
 
10.6 How can the problem of low levels of youth political participation in Malaysia 
be solved?  
 
Against the backdrop of a semi-democratic setting in Malaysia, youth political 
participation is vital to undermine autocratic rule and bring about a democratic 





specifically to encourage greater and meaningful youth participation. By looking at the 
barriers to politics, we can identify key solutions to the problem of youth disengagement. 
The most common suggestion to increase youth political participation in Malaysia is to 
provide a better electoral system by lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. The 
main argument for lowering the voting age is that young Malaysians today are politically 
informed, and they are mature enough to be able to make rational decisions. By lowering 
the age of voting, the hope is that more young people would have a greater say in decision-
making and determining the country’s direction. However, this could only be achieved if 
the ‘threats’ to scare young people from expressing their political views and rights are 
removed by the government. Not many young people dare speak up due to the punishing 
systems that dampen free speech. By restoring political freedom and opening up 
democratic spaces, one could encourage more youth to participate. Another effective way 
to facilitate youth political engagement is to implement a formal civic or political 
education curriculum in school so that the school-leavers would be widely exposed to 
general knowledge about politics and how the system works. Indirectly, the stimulus 
received at such early age could further develop a motivation and habit of engagement. 
 
10.7 Avenues for future research  
 
This thesis provides an empirically-rich study on youth political participation in Malaysia 
by analysing comprehensively how and why young Malaysians participate in politics, with 
respect to both elite-directed and elite challenging repertoires. Given the findings that 
young people in Malaysia are indeed inactive in elite-directed politics, but this is being 
compensated by their being active in very low-risk political activities, such studies needed 
a mixed-method approach to develop a value-added explanatory model fits specifically for 
youth in Malaysia. In this regard, the data from quantitative surveys was contextualised 
with the qualitative analyses from the interviews. However, there is a key limitation of its 
methodology. As this is a single case study, which focuses only on a country, the findings 
could not be generalised to young people in other countries, except perhaps for those 
countries which have relatively similar socio-political structures as Malaysia. As such, 
there is a need for further in-depth comparative or cross-countries studies in the Southeast 






 It is clear from this research that those young people aged 21 to 40 years old were 
less likely than their older counterparts to actively engage in political activism. This group 
of young people are regarded as the Mahathir and post-Mahathir generation, who were 
born between the 1970s to the 1990s and came of age during the Mahathir era when the 
country experienced autocratic and dictatorial rule. Low youth political participation is 
linked to the feelings of fear for the negative ramifications of participation, including a fear 
of being arrested by the government, and other explanatory factors such as lack of political 
knowledge and political efficacy, life-cycle effects, as well as feeling alienated from the 
system and politicians. Future studies however will need to further disentangle these 
effects investigating in particular evidence for generational change and cohort analysis 
where there is over time repeated data to provide statistical evidence and attempt to make 
sense of young people’s participation relative to the older cohorts. By doing so, we may 
develop a clearer picture of whether there will be a constant decline or an increase in the 
future of youth political participation in Malaysia. 
 
Another area where we need further strong prima facie evidence is the study of 
youth online political participation in Malaysia and its potential for democratic 
engagement and renewal. Although there is a growing body of literature in this area (e.g: 
Salman and Saad, 2015; Norshuhada et al., 2016; Teng and Joo, 2016), most of these 
studies examine mainly the role of social media for youth online and offline participation, 
without thoroughly investigating to what extent youth political uses of media influence the 
online and offline political participation, what motivates more young people to use social 
media for political purposes and how online political participation influences and shapes 
the political decision-making in Malaysia. The conventional wisdom holds that social 
media has witnessed an upsurge in youth political activism in Malaysia, but we do not find 
wider evidence for this finding. Our qualitative research rather suggests that most of young 
Malaysians generally use social media only for seeking political information, rather than 
participating in online political activities such as political debate, communicating with 
politicians, or interacting with political groups. This needs to be tested further with a wider 
and representative sample of the population in Malaysia by employing quantitative 
methods of analysis. 
 
Perhaps, the most important area which urgently needs to be addressed through 





Malaysia. The findings presented here indicate that one factor contributing to youth non-
participation in Malaysia is young people’s lack of basic political knowledge about politics 
and its processes, due also to the absence of formal civic education programmes in 
educational institutions. A civic or political programme is important to teach democratic 
values to the youth, and to develop a sense of civic duty. In particular, we need to ascertain 
whether such programmes are viable to be implemented in Malaysia and whether they 
could really help to increase youth’s interest in participating in politics. Answers to these 
and other questions raised by this investigation will hopefully provide useful tools to 
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Interview questions for Academicians 
Length of Interview: 60 – 90 minutes 
 
 
Section 1:  Politics in General  
Bahagian 1: Politik secara Umum 
 
1.1 In general, what is your opinion on the participation of young people in Malaysian 
politics? 
 Apakah pandangan anda mengenai penglibatan belia dalam politik Malaysia, 
secara umumnya? 
 
1.2 Aren’t these young people generally interested in politics? 
 Adakah golongan belia ini sebenarnya berminat dengan politik? 
 
1.3 Do you feel that young people in Malaysia are free to participate in politics?  
Why/ Why not? 
 Adakah anda rasa belia di Malaysia ini bebas untuk melibatkan diri dalam politik? 
Mengapa/Kenapa tidak? 
 
Section 2: The pattern of youth political participation 
Bahagian 2: Corak Penglibatan Politik Belia 
 
2.1 Do you agree that there is a dramatic decline of youth political participation in 
Malaysia? 
 Adakah anda bersetuju bahawa terdapat penurunan drastik penglibatan politik 
belia di Malaysia? 
 
2.2 Why are young people not engaging with politics? 
 Mengapa belia tidak mahu terlibat dalam politik? 
 
2.3 Do you think that there is a shift from conventional to unconventional forms of 
participation? If yes, what are the new forms of expression? 
 Adakah anda rasa bahawa terdapat peralihan daripada bentuk penglibatan 
konvensional kepada penglibatan bukan konvensional? Jika ada, apakah bentuk 
baru itu? 
 
2.4 Do you think that young people must be allowed to engage in activities other than 
voting and party membership? Why? 
 Pada pandangan anda, adalah belia Malaysia perlu dibenarkan melibatkan diri 
dalam kegiatan politik lain selain daripada mengundi dan menjadi ahli parti 
politik? Mengapa? 
 
2.5 To what extent has the government of Malaysia accepted and normalised protest? 
Sejauhmanakah kerajaan Malaysia menerima protes politik? Adakah protes politik 






2.6 How do they respond to the engagement of young people in protests? 
 Bagaimanakah respons kerajaan terhadap penglibatan belia dalam protes politik? 
 
Section 3: Political Attitudes of Young people 
Bahagian 3: Sikap Politik Belia 
 
3.1 What are the factors that influence young people to disengage from conventional 
politics? 
 Apakah faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi belia untuk menjauhkan diri dari politik 
konvensional? 
 
3.2 What motivates them to participate in unconventional political activities? 
Apakah yang memotivasi mereka untuk melibatkan diri dallam kegiatan politik 
bukan konvensional? 
 
3.3 Do you think that political parties or politicians have adequately engaged and 
communicate with young people? 
 Adakah anda fikir parti politik atau pemimpin-pemimpin politik melibatkan diri 
dan berkomunikasi sepenuhnya dengan belia? 
 
Section 4: Young people and democracy in Malaysia 
Bahagian 4: Belia dan Demokrasi di Malaysia 
 
4.1 Does youth political participation strengthen the democratisation process in 
Malaysia or does it simply legitimise the semi-democratic regime? 
 Adakah penglibatan politik belia ini semakin mengukuhkan proses pendemokrasian 
di Malaysia atau adakah mereka hanya menguatkan keabsahan rejim semi-
demokrasi? 
 
4.2 Do you think that communalism still determines young people’s political 
preference? 
 Adakah politik perkauman masih menjadi keutamaan politik belia? Mengapa? 
 
4.3 What sorts of topics/issues are important or of concern to the young people today? 
 Apakah isu-topik penting yang menjadi perhatian belia pada hari ini? 
  
Section 5: Future prospect for young people in Malaysian politics 
Bahagian 5: Masa depan belia dalam politik Malaysia 
 
5.1 Who are responsible to mobilise youth engagement in politics? Is it the political 
party, civil society, educational institution, the de’facto leader or other actors? 
 Siapakah yang bertanggungjawab untuk menggerakkan belia dalam politik? 
Adakah parti politik, kumpulan masyarakat sivil, institusi pendidikan, pemimpin de 
facto’ atau aktor lain? 
 
5.2 What are the best ways or strategies to encourage young people political 
participation?  







5.3 For the next 10 years, do you think that more young people will actively participate 
in politics or the situation is getting worse? 
 Dalam masa 10 tahun akan datang, adakah anda rasa bahawa akan lebih ramai 












































Interview Questions for Political Elites 
Length of Interview: 60 – 90 minutes 
 
 
Section 1: Demographic Background 
Bahagian 1: Latar Belakang Demografi 
 
1.1 Can you please tell me briefly about yourself and your current position in 
party/organisation? 
Boleh ceritakan sedikit mengenai latar belakang anda dan kedudukan anda dalam 
parti/organisasi? 
 
Section 2: Politics in General 
Bahagian 2: Politik secara Umum 
 
2.1 How you interpret the words ‘politics’ and ‘political participation’?  
 Apakah tafsiran anda mengenai perkataan ‘politik’ dan ‘partisipasi politik’? 
 
2.2 Do you think young people in Malaysia are generally interested in politics? 
Why? 
Pada pandangan anda, adakah belia di Malaysia ini berminat dengan politik? 
Mengapa? 
 
2.3 Do you agree that there is a dramatic decline of youth political participation in 
Malaysia?  
 Adakah anda bersetuju bahawa terdapat penurunan drastik penglibatan politik 
belia di negara ini? 
2.3.1 Why do young people engage/disengage with politics? 
 Mengapa belia terlibat/menjauhkan diri dari politik? 
 
2.4 Do you think that there is a shift from conventional to unconventional forms of 
participation? If yes, what are the new forms of expression? 
 Adakah anda rasa bahawa terdapat peralihan daripada bentuk penglibatan 
konvensional kepada penglibatan bukan konvensional? Jika ada, apakah bentuk 
baru itu? 
 
Section 3: Motivations 
Bahagian 3: Motivasi 
 
3.1 How long have you been involved in this party/organisation? 
Sudah berapa lamakah anda melibatkan diri dalam parti/organisasi ini? 
 
3.2 What inspired you to involve in the party/organisation? 
Apakah yang memberi inspirasi kepada anda untuk terlibat dalam parti/organisasi 
ini? 
 
3.3 Why do you think other young people joined this party? 







3.4 Do you think that young people have the same reasons as older members for 
joining? 
Adakah anda rasa belia mempunyai alasan/sebab yang sama dengan ahli yang 
lebih senior untuk menyertai parti/organisasi ini? 
 
3.5 How do you see your future in the party? 
Bagaimana anda melihat masa depan anda dalam parti/organisasi ini? 
 
3.6 Are your family/friends involved in politics? 
Adakah keluarga/teman rapat anda terlibat dalam politik? 
 
3.8 Do you discuss politics at home/with friends? 
Adakah anda membincangkang mengenai isu politik di rumah atau bersama 
teman-teman? 
 
Section 4: Structure of Party/Organisation 
Bahagian 4: Struktur Parti/Organisasi 
 
4.1 How many members registered in this party/organisation? 
 Berapa ramaikah ahli yang berdaftar dengan parti/organisasi ini? 
 
4.2 Do this number increases or decreases? 
Adakah jumlah ahli semakin meningkat dari tahun ke tahun atau semakin 
menurun? 
 
4.3 Does the party encourage young people to join?  
 Adakah parti/organisasi anda menggalakkan belia untuk terlibat sama? 
4.8.1 If yes – how? If no-why not? 
 Jika ada, bagaimana? Apakah caranya? 
 Jika tiada, mengapa? 
 
4.4 Is it challenging or relatively easy to encourage young people to join this party? 
Why? 
 Adakah sukar atau mudah untuk menarik belia terlibat dalam parti/organisasi ini? 
Mengapa? 
 
4.5 Does the party have links with other groups – NGOs, community groups, other 
parties etc? 
 Adakah parti/organisasi ini mempunyai hubungan dengan kumpulan lain seperti 
NGOs, kumpulan komuniti, dan parti politik lain? 
 
4.6 Do you think that ethnicity must be played as the main issue by political parties 
and organisations to attract young people to join in?   
 Pada pandangan anda, adakah perkauman masih perlu dijadikan sebagai isu 
utama oleh sesuatu parti/organisasi untuk menarik belia untuk terlibat dalam 
politik? 
4.6.1 If yes, why?  
Jika ya, mengapa? 
4.6.2 If not, what other important issues?  






4.6 Do you think that this party/organisation have adequately engaged and 
communicate with young people? 
 Adakah anda fikir bahawa parti/ organisasi ini telah melibatkan diri sepenuhnya 
dan berkomunikasi dengan belia? 
 
4.7 What are the strategies using by this party/organisation to attract young people? 
 Apakah strategi yang digunakan oleh parti/organisasi untuk menarik belia? 
 
4.8 Over the past 10 years, do you think that your party/organisation still could gain 
support from the young people? Why? 
 Pada masa 10 tahun akan datang, adakah anda rasa parti/organisasi ini masih 
mampu meraih sokongan dari belia?Mengapa? 
 
Section 5: Informal Participation 
Bahagian 5: Penglibatan Politik Tidak Formal 
 
5.1 Do you think there are other forms of political participation that are more important 
from voting and party membership?  
 Pada pandangan anda, adakah terdapat bentuk penglibatan politik lain yang lebih 
penting dari mengundi dan menjadi ahli sesebuah parti/organisasi? 
 
5.2 Do you consider activities like protests, petition and boycotts as part of political 
participation?  
 Adakah anda menganggap aktiviti politik seperti protes, petisyen dan boikot 
sebagai sebahagian daripada penglibatan politik? 
 
5.3 Do you think that young people must be allowed to engage in activities other than 
voting and party membership? Why? 
Adakah belia perlu dibenarkan untuk terlibat dalam kegiatan politik lain selain 
daripada mengundi dan menjadi ahli sesebuah parti? 
 
5.4 Do you encourage people to participate in informal of political participation? If so 
what, and why? 
Adakah anda menggalakkan rakyat untuk terlibat dalam kegiatan politik lain tidak 
formal seperti protes, petisyen dan cyber-politics? Jika ya, apakah kegiatan itu dan 
Mengapa? 
  
5.5 In your opinion, what motivates young people to participate in informal activities? 
Pada pandangan anda, apakah faktor-faktor yang memotivasi belia untuk terlibat 
dalam kegiatan politik yang tidak formal ini? 
 
5.6 How do the government respond to the engagement of young people in protests? 
Bagaimanakah respons kerajaan terhadap penglibatan belia dalam protes politik? 
 
Section 6: Role and Experiences 
Bahagian 6: Peranan dan Pengalaman 
 






 Apakah pandangan anda mengenai peranan sayap pemuda dalam parti ini dan 
dalam masyarakat sendiri? 
 
6.2 What do you feel about your role in the party? 
 Apakah pandangan anda mengenai peranan anda sendiri dalam parti/organisasi 
ini? 
 
6.3 Do you think that by involving in political party, you have the chance to change 
this country to be more democratic or at least influence the political decisions? 
 Adakah anda rasa dengan melibatkan diri dalam parti/organisasi politik ini anda 
mempunyai peluang untuk mengubah negara menjadi lebih demokratik atau 
sekurang-kurangnya mempengaruhi keputusan politik. 
 
 
Section 7: Future Prospect for Democracy 
Bahagian 7: Masa Depan Demokrasi Malaysia 
 
7.1 What are the best way to encourage young people to become more politically 
interest and active? 
 Apakah cara atau strategi yang terbaik untuk menggalakkan belia untuk bergiat 
aktif dan mempunyai minat yang tinggi dalam politik? 
 
7.2 Do you think that youth participation in politics help to strengthen the 
democratisation process in Malaysia or does it simply legitimise the semi-
democratic regime? 
 Adakah penglibatan politik belia ini semakin mengukuhkan proses pendemokrasian 




















Interview Questions for Youth Activists 
Length of Interview: 30 – 60 minutes 
 
 
Section 1: Demographic Background 
Bahagian 1: Latar Belakang Demografi 
 
1.1 Can you please tell me briefly about yourself and your current position in this 
organisation? 
Boleh ceritakan sedikit mengenai latar belakang anda dan kedudukan anda dalam 
organisasi ini? 
 
Section 2: Politics in General 
Bahagian 2: Politik secara Umum 
 
2.1 How you interpret the words ‘politics’ and ‘political participation’?  
 Apakah tafsiran anda mengenai perkataan ‘politik’ dan ‘partisipasi politik’? 
 
2.2 Do you think young people in Malaysia are generally interested in politics? 
Why? 
Pada pandangan anda, adakah belia di Malaysia ini berminat dengan politik? 
Mengapa? 
 
2.3 Do you agree that there is a dramatic decline of youth political participation in 
Malaysia?  
 Adakah anda bersetuju bahawa terdapat penurunan drastik penglibatan politik 
belia di negara ini? 
2.3.1 Why do young people engage/disengage with politics? 
 Mengapa belia terlibat/menjauhkan diri dari politik? 
 
2.4 To what extent young people in Malaysia can participate in politics? 
 Sejauh manakah belia di Malaysia ini boleh melibatkan diri dalam politik di 
Malaysia? 
 
2.5 Do you think that there is a shift from conventional to unconventional forms of 
participation? If yes, what are the new forms of expression? 
 Adakah anda rasa bahawa terdapat peralihan daripada bentuk penglibatan 
konvensional kepada penglibatan bukan konvensional? Jika ada, apakah bentuk 
baru itu? 
 
Section 3: Motivations 
Bahagian 3: Motivasi 
 
3.7 How long have you been involved in political activities? 
Sudah berapa lamakah anda melibatkan diri dalam aktiviti politikini? 
 
3.8 What inspired you to involve in politics? 






3.9 Why do you think other young people joined politics? 
Pada pandangan anda, mengapa belia melibatkan diri dalam politik? 
 
3.10 How do you see your future in politics? 
Bagaimana anda melihat masa depan anda dalam politik? 
 
3.11 Are your family/friends involved in politics? 
Adakah keluarga/teman rapat anda terlibat dalam politik? 
3.5.1 Do you discuss politics at home/with friends? 
Adakah anda membincangkang mengenai isu politik di rumah atau 
bersama teman-teman? 
 
Section 4: Informal Participation 
Bahagian 4: Penglibatan Politik Tidak Formal 
 
4.1 Do you think that most young people are more likely to involve in political parties 
or social movement like this? Why? 
Pada pandangan anda, adakah belia lebih berminat untuk terlibat dalam parti 
politik atau organisasi sosial seperti ini?Mengapa? 
 
4.2 Do you think there are other forms of political participation that are more important 
from voting and party membership?  
 Pada pandangan anda, adakah terdapat bentuk penglibatan politik lain yang lebih 
penting dari mengundi dan menjadi ahli sesebuah parti/organisasi? 
5.2.1 Do you consider activities like protests, petition and boycotts as part of 
political participation?  
 Adakah anda menganggap aktiviti politik seperti protes, petisyen dan boikot 
sebagai sebahagian daripada penglibatan politik? 
 
4.3 Do you think that young people must be allowed to engage in activities other than 
voting and party membership? Why? 
Adakah belia perlu dibenarkan untuk terlibat dalam kegiatan politik lain selain 
daripada mengundi dan menjadi ahli sesebuah parti? 
 
4.4 Do you encourage people to participate in informal of political participation? If so 
what, and why? 
Adakah anda menggalakkan rakyat untuk terlibat dalam kegiatan politik lain tidak 
formal seperti protes, petisyen dan cyber-politics? Jika ya, apakah kegiatan itu dan 
Mengapa? 
5.6.1 What are the tactics or approaches that your organisation use to attract 
young people to join the protest? 
Apakah taktik atau cara yang digunakan untuk menarik golongan belia 






4.5 In your opinion, what motivates young people to participate in informal activities? 
Pada pandangan anda, apakah faktor-faktor yang memotivasi belia untuk terlibat 
dalam kegiatan politik yang tidak formal ini? 
 
4.6 To what extent have the government of Malaysia accepted and normalised protest? 
Sejauhmanakah kerajaan Malaysia menerima protes politik? Adakah protes politik 
ini dianggap sebagai satu norma atau budaya dalam politik Malaysia? 
 
Section 5: Role and Experiences 
Bahagian 5: Peranan dan Pengalaman 
 
5.1 What do you feel about your role in political activism? 
 Apakah pandangan anda mengenai peranan anda sendiri dalam politik? 
5.2.1 What are the best aspects of being an activist? 
Apakah pengalaman manis atau perkara terbaik yang pernah anda lalui 
sepanjang menjadi aktivis? 
 
5.2.2 What are the worst aspects of being an activist? 
Apakah pengalaman pahit atau perkara buruk yang pernah anda lalui 
sepanjang menjadi aktivis? 
 
5.3 Do you think that by involving in political activism, you have the chance to change 
this country to be more democratic or at least influence the political decisions? 
 Adakah anda rasa dengan melibatkan diri dalam politik anda mempunyai peluang 
untuk mengubah negara menjadi lebih demokratik atau sekurang-kurangnya 
mempengaruhi keputusan politik. 
 
5.4 What are the main challenges faced by young activists in achieving their goals? 
Apakah cabaran utama yang dihadapi oleh aktivis belia dalam mencapai matlamat 
mereka? 
 
Section 6: Future Prospect for Democracy 
Bahagian 6: Masa Depan Demokrasi Malaysia 
 
6.1 What are the best way to encourage young people to become more politically 
interest and active? 
 Apakah cara atau strategi yang terbaik untuk menggalakkan belia untuk bergiat 
aktif dan mempunyai minat yang tinggi dalam politik? 
 
6.2 Do you think that youth participation in politics help to strengthen the 
democratisation process in Malaysia or does it simply legitimise the semi-
democratic regime? 
 Adakah penglibatan politik belia ini semakin mengukuhkan proses pendemokrasian 




Interview Questions (Groups of Young people) 
Length of Interview: 30 – 60 minutes 
 
Section 1: Demographic Background 
Bahagian 1: Latar Belakang Demografi 
 
1.1 Can you please explain briefly about yourself. 
Boleh ceritakan secara ringkas mengenai latar belakang anda. 
 
Section 2: Politics in General  
2.1 Are you interested in politics? Why/Why not? 
 Adakah anda berminat dengan politik?Mengapa/kenapa tidak? 
 
2.2 What do you think of when you hear the word ‘politics’ and ‘political 
participation’?  
Apakah yang anda fikirkan apabila anda mendengar perkataan ‘politik’ dan 
‘penglibatan politik’? 
 
2.3 Do participate in politics is important to you? Why/Why not? 
Adakah penting bagi anda untuk melibatkan diri dalam kegiatan politik? 
Kenapa/kenapa tidak? 
 
2.4 Do you feel that you are free to participate in politics? Why/ Why not? 
 Adakah anda rasa anda bebas untuk melibatkan diri dalam politik? 
Mengapa/Kenapa tidak? 
 
2.5 What sorts of issues are important to you? 
 Apakah isu-isu yang penting bagi anda? 
Section 3: Formal Participation (Voting and Party Membership) 
Bahagian 3: Penglibatan Politik Formal (Mengundi dan Politik Kepartian) 
 
3.1 Is it important to vote at an election? Why/why not?  
 Adakah mengundi dalam pilihanraya itu penting? Kenapa/kenapa tidak? 
 
3.2 Did you vote in the last election?  
 Adakah anda mengundi pada pilihan raya yang lalu? 
 
3.2.1 If not, why?  
Jika tidak, mengapa? 
3.2.2 If yes, what motivates you to vote?  
Jika ya, apakah faktor yang mendorong anda untuk keluar mengundi? 
 
3.3 Do you think your vote can make a difference in an election?  
Adakah anda rasa undi anda dalam pilihan raya akan membawa perubahan pada 
negara? 
3.4 Do you think that communalism still determines young people’s political 
preference? 






3.5 Are you a registered member of political parties or any political organisations? 
 Adakah anda ahli berdaftar bagi mana-mana parti atau organisasi politik? 
 
3.5.1 If yes, what motivates you to participate in political parties/organisations? 
Jika ya, apakah yang mendorong anda untuk melibatkan diri dalam 
parti/organisasi ini? If no, why not? Jika tidak, mengapa? 
 
3.6 Do you think that political parties or politicians have adequately engaged and 
communicate with young people? 
 Adakah anda fikir parti politik atau pemimpin-pemimpin politik mendekatkan diri 
dan berkomunikasi sepenuhnya dengan belia? 
 
3.7 Do you think that participation in the election and be a member of political 
organisations are the best ways to influence political decisions?   
 Adakah anda rasa dengan mengambil bahagian dalam pilihan raya dan menjadi 
ahli parti/organisasi politik adalah satu-satunya cara terbaik untuk mempengaruhi 
keputusan pemerintah atau membawa perubahan pada negara?  
 
3.8 In your opinion, why many Malaysian youngsters refuse to participate in election 
and political parties/organisations? 
 Pada pandangan anda, mengapa ramai belia Malaysia enggan melibatkan diri 
dalam mengundi dan menyertai mana-mana parti/organisasi politik?  
 
Section 4: Informal Participation  
Bahagian 4: Penglibatan Tidak Formal 
 
4.1 Apart of voting and party membership, have you been engaged in any of the 
following activities? 
Selain daripada mengundi dan menjadi ahli parti/organisasi politik, adakah anda 
melibatkan diri dalam aktiviti-aktiviti berikut: 
 
BI BM 
Personal contacting   Menghubungi pemimpin politik 
Seek help from acquaintances in 
Government or from persons with influence 
on officials 
Mendapatkan bantuan daripada kenalan atau 
orang yang mempunyai pengaruh dalam 
kerajaan 
Organizing/Participating in a 
group/movement (including student 
movement) 
Membentuk kumpulan sosial atau pergerakan 
social (termasuklah gerakan mahasiswa) 
Community Service Aktiviti Kemasyarakatan 
Attending political meetings Menghadiri mesyuarat politik 
Campaign activity Terlibat dalam aktiviti kempen semasa pilihan 
raya 
Protest/Demonstrations and strikes Protes/demonstrasi jalanan dan mogok 





Economic support to parties and groups Memberi sumbangan kewangan kepada parti 
atau organisasi 
Civil disobedience 
-Wearing of buttons, t-shirts, etc. that 
market a political cause 
Ketidakakuran sivil 
-memakai lencana, t-shirt, topi, dll yang 
berunsurkan politik 
Signing of petitions  Menandatangani petisyen 
Writing of letters to political actors or 
newspapers  
Menulis surat terbuka kepada pemimpin politik 
atau suratkhabar 
Involvement with Internet political chat 
sites 
Mengakses blog politik/media sosial pemimpin 
Sembang politik bersama rakan di media sosial 




4.2 Are you or have you been engaged in any other activities that you consider 
political? 
Atau adakah anda pernah terlibat dalam aktiviti lain yang anda anggap sebagai 
aktiviti politik? 
 
4.3 Do you feel that these activities are part of democracy? 
Adakah anda merasakan aktiviti-aktiviti ini adalah sebahagian daripada 
demokrasi? 
 
4.4 Have you ever taken part in a protest of any kind? (give examples)  
 Adakah anda pernah menyertai mana-mana protes/demonstrasi? (Beri contoh) 
4.4.1 If yes, are you associated with any organisations, family and friends or are 
you simply participating at your own accord? Or any other reasons? 
 Jika ya, adakah anda menyertai protes ini kerana dipengaruhi oleh kempen 
yang dibuat sesebuah parti/organisasi, pengaruh keluarga dan kawan-
kawan atau atas kehendak sendiri?Atau ada sebab-sebab lain? 
4.4.2 If no, why not? 
 Jika tidak, mengapa anda tidak berminat menyertai protes? 
 
4.5 Is it important to protest when you disagree with something or discontent with the 
government? Why/why not?  
 Adakah penting untuk anda protes apabila anda tidak bersetuju dengan sesuatu 
atau tidak berpuas hati dengan kerajaan? Kenapa/kenapa tidak? 
  
4.6 Do you think that young people must be allowed to engage in activities other than 
voting and party membership? Why? 
 Pada pandangan anda, adalah belia Malaysia perlu dibenarkan melibatkan diri 











Section 5: Future Prospect for Democracy 
Bahagian 5: Masa Depan Demokrasi 
 
5.1 What are the best way to encourage young people to become more politically 
interest and active? 
 Apakah cara atau strategi yang terbaik untuk menggalakkan belia untuk bergiat 
aktif dan mempunyai minat yang tinggi dalam politik? 
 
5.2 In your opinion, do you think that your participation in politics help to strengthen 
the democratisation process in Malaysia or does it simply legitimise the semi-
democratic regime? 
Pada pandangan anda, adakah penglibatan anda dalam politik membantu 
mengukuhkan proses pendemokrasian di Malaysia atau penglibatan anda hanya 










Variables for Analysis 
Variables  Coding WVS Questionnaire Items 
Young 
Recode of age of respondents  
1 (21-40 yrs) 0 (41-70 yrs) 
Age. This means you are___years 
old 
Male 
Recode of sex 
1 (Male) 0 (Female) 
Interviewer-coded 
Married 
Recode of marital status  
1 (married) 0 (other) 
What is your marital status? 
Employed 
Recode of employment status 
1 (employed) 0 (other) 
Are you employed now or not? 
University 
Recode of highest educational level attained 
1 (University or Higher) 0 (other) 
What is the highest educational 
level that you have attained 
Party Identification 
Recode of which party would you vote for if 
there were a national election tomorrow? 
1 (Attached) 0 (Not Attached)  
Which party appeals to you most? 
Interest 
Recode of interest in politics  
1 (very interested) 0 (other) 
How interested would you say you 
are in politics? 
Left-Right 
10-point scale where 0 means Left and 10 
Right  
In political matters, people talk of 
"the left" and "the right".  How 




10-point scale where 0 means not satisfied 
and 10 very satifsied 
How democratically is this country 
being governed today? 
Confidence in government 
Recode of Confidence: government 
1 (very confident) 0 (other) 
How much confidence you have in 
government? 
Confidence in political 
party 
Recode of Confidence: political party  
1 (very confident) 0 (other) 
How much confidence you have in 
political parties? 
Assessement of degree of 
fair voting system 
Recode of votes are counted fairly  
1 (Yes) 0 (other) 
How often are votes counted fairly 
in this country's elections? 
Assessement of degree of 
respect for human rights 
Recode of respect for individual human rights 
1 (very much respect) 0 (other) 
How much respect is there for 
individual human rights nowadays 
in this country? 
Vote in elections, party 
membership, membership 
of labour union, signing a 
petition, joining in boycotts, 
attending peaceful 
demonstrations 
Each coded as a dummy variable where  
1 (yes) 0 (no) 
I’m going to read out some forms of 
political action that people can take, 
and I’d like you to tell me, for each 
one, whether you have done any of 
these things, whether you might do 
it or would never under any 





Variables for Analysis 
Variables  Coding 





Recode of age of respondents  
1 (21-40 yrs) 0 (41-70 yrs) 
 
Age. This means you are___years old 
Male Recode of sex 
1 (Male) 0 (Female) 
Interviewer-coded 
Married Recode of marital status  
1 (married) 0 (other) 
What is your marital status? 
Employed Recode of employment status 
1 (employed) 0 (other) 
Are you employed now or not? 
University Recode of highest educational level 
attained 1 (University and Higher) 0 (other) 
What is the highest educational level 
that you have attained 
Urban Recode of Urban-Rural  
1 (urban) 0 (other) 
Interviewer-coded 
Party Identification Recode of which party if any do you feel 
closest to? 
1 (Attached) 0 (Not Attached)  




Recode of interest in politics  
1 (very interested) 0 (other) 
 
How interested would you say you are 
in politics? 
Internal Efficacy Recode of question 133 
1 (Yes) 0 (other) 
I think I have the ability to participate in 
politics. 
External Efficacy Recode of question qII116 
1 (Very responsive) 0 (other) 
How well do you think the government 
responds to what people want? 
Left-Right Recode of two items 1 (Left) 0 (other) If you had to choose between reducing 
economic inequality and protecting 
political freedom, which would you say 
is more important? 
 
In order to preserve social justice, the 
government should prevent the gap 






Recode of Question 98 
1 (dissatisfied) 0 (other) 
 
On the whole, how satisfied and 
dissatisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in this country? 
 
Trust in Political Parties and 
Parliament 
 
Recode of trust in institutions 
1 (A great deal of trust) 0 (other) 
 
How much trust do you have in political 
parties? 






Exposure to political news Recode of Question 57 
1 (Everyday) 0 (other) 
How often do you follow news about 
politics and government? 
Group Membership Recode of psychological involvement  
1 (Yes) 0 (other) 
Are you a member of any organisation 
or groups? 
Political Discussion Recode of psychological involvement 
1 (frequently) 0 (other) 
When you get together with your family 
members or friends, how often do you 
discuss political matters? 
Vote in elections, party 
membership, contacted 
officials, attend a campaign 
meeting, signing a petition, 
joining in boycotts, attending 
a demonstration or protest 
march, used force or 
violence for a political cause 
Each recoded so that a dummy variable 
1 (yes) 0 (no) 
I’m going to read out some forms of 
political action that people can take, 
and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, 
whether you have done any of these 
things, whether you might do it or 
would never under any circumstances 







Further interaction effects 
  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
   Model 8 Model 9 Model 8 Model 9 Model 8 Model 9 Model 8 Model 9 
N   1072 1072 1072 1072 1074  1074  1074  1074 
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  (0.130) 
    .013 
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Dissatisfaction with democracy 
-.034 
(0.063) 
  -.030 
  (0.063) 
.047 
(0.045) 
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Trust in Political Parties 
 .078 
(0.062) 
   .080 
  (0.062) 
   -.100* 
  (0.044) 
   -.098* 









Trust in Parliament 
 .131* 
(0.066) 
   .134* 
  (0.067) 
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  (0.047) 
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  (0.087) 
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Exposure to political news 
 .159** 
(0.059) 
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Party identification*Urban*University  
  .306 
(0.303) 
 







































  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 10 Model 11 Model 10 Model 11  Model 10 Model 11 
N  1072 1072  1072 1072   1074 1074  1074 1074 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
  Model 12 Model 13 Model 12 Model 13 Model 12 Model 13 Model 12 Model 13 
N  1072 1072  1072  1072  1074  1074  1074  1074 












































































































































































































































































































































































         




























































  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  Citizen Activism Cause Activism Citizen Activism Cause Activism 
  Model 14 Model 15 Model 14 Model 15 Model 14 Model 15 Model 14 Model 15 
N  1072 1072  1072  1072  1074  1074  1074  1074 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Key: ***p≤ 0.001 **p< 0.01 *p≤ 0.05 
 
